Paul Goble
Staunton, October 31 – Representatives of seven Balkar villages are in the fourth month of a hunger strike at the base of the Kremlin wall in Moscow to call attention to the violation of the traditional land-use rights of their community by officials in the bi-national Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the North Caucasus.
Participants in this action have repeatedly said that they were driven to this “extreme measure” because no one in Nalchik or Moscow had paid attention to larger protest meetings in their republic, the result, they say, of corrupt relations between the Kabardinian-dominated government in Nalchik and officials in the Russian center (www.nr2.ru/moskow/306621.html).
The Balkar protest in Moscow has attracted some attention but only about their demands for the restoration of land transferred to the Kabardinians. But now as a result of the publication on Friday of a resolution adopted two weeks ago by “citizens of Russia and residents of Kabardino-Balkaria,” their broader complaints may get more coverage (skfonews.ru/article/109).
The resolution, adopted at a meeting convened by two Kabardinian-dominated organizations, reflected anger about what its signatories said was “the legal nihilism in society and the organs of power” and the “unceasing bacchanalia of criminality” at a time of economic collapse and rising unemployment since Arsen Kanokov became republic president in 2005.
“Despite the systemic and continuing lie that under Kanokov Kabardino-Balkaria is flourishing that has been distributed by the local clan elite in the Moscow corridors of power and related media,” the resolution said, “statistics, facts and reality say that the situation on the ground is exactly the reverse.”
According to official statistics, Kabardino-Balkaria ranks among the worse in employment, corruption and other negative indices. And it has been the scene of an explosive growth in the number of extremist crimes and terrorist actions, according to Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoruk.
“All this is taking place because the KBR procuracy avoids struggling with genuine extremism, preferring instead to identify ‘extremists’ among law-abiding members of the opposition, while the force structure illegally persecute believing young people,” the resolution continues.
Even more disturbing, there is evidence that the terrorists have links with the officials, the resolution says. Otherwise, how can one explain that the terrorists never attack those who are directly part of the ruling clan and its supporters in Moscow but only those within the KBR who do not have links with Kanokov and also that officials don’t pursue terrorists in many cases?
`. Moreover, many in the force structures simply kill innocent opponents of the current ethnocracy, the resolution says, thus leading to a situation in which the mothers of KBR residents beg the powers that be “not to shoot their children but to bring them to court.”
Given this behavior on the part of the officials, the resolution suggest, it should surprise no one that “dozens of young people are fleeing into the forests and the mountains in order to save their lives from the illegal actions of the siloviki.”
More generally, it says, “if Parliament and President of the KBR publish unconstitutional laws and do not fulfill the decisions of the Constitutional court of Russia, if the KBR procurator does not challenge then and itself commits criminal actions without fulfilling the decisions of the court, then what are citizens to do?”
This situation is giving rise to “a general legal nihilism among the population” because “in the KBR, all complaints by citizens to whomever they are addressed fall into the hands of those against whom the complains are lodged, and among the population,” ever more people assume that this simply works to support the existing powers that be.
As a result, “dissatisfaction in the population with the ruling elite both local, district and federal is intensifying.”
Underlying all of this, the resolution says, is “the propaganda of ‘Circassian supremacy’ [the Kabardinians are a subgroup of the Circassians] and dislike to Slavs and Turks.” And because of the threat this poses to stability in the North Caucasus and Russia’s territorial integrity, the resolution makes the following seven “proposals:”
First, it calls on President Dmitry Medvedev to examine what Kanokov has been doing and at the very least warn him that he risks “the loss of faith” at the center. Second, it asks Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to examine Kanokov’s use and misuse of federal funds. Third, it calls on the Russian procurator general to bring charges against the KBR procurator for his crimes.
Fourth, it asks the Russian Constitutional court to insist that KBR courts fulfill Russian laws and court decisions. Fifth, it requests that Presidential Plenipotentiary Aleksandr Khloponin consult with all groups in the KBR and not just those tied to Kanokov. Sixth, it calls on the powers that be in Moscow to provide support to the Balkar protesters in Moscow.
And seventh, the resolution calls for the reversal of the violations of federal law that have occurred concerning the rights of Balkar communities in mountainous areas to use pasture land, the proximate cause of this anger among the Turkic Balkars but far from the most serious aspects of their fury at the present time.
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Adopts New Strategy to Weaken North Caucasus Republics
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 31 – Aleksandr Khloponin, Presidential Plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus Federal District, has called for the formation of a special “Caucasus Mineralny Vody agglomeration” tax district consisting not of whole federal subjects but rather of portions of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol kray
On the one hand, this arrangement which will involve only parts of the three federal subjects will have the effect of reducing still further the powers of the regional heads who will lose part of their authority to direct development in a significant portion of the territory of their republics or region.
And on the other, it will further anger people in Stavropol who are seeking to have their kray transferred from the North Caucasus to the Southern Federal District but who will now have three districts and eight cities of their kray, including Pyatigorsk and Essentuki, more tightly linked to the former (rian.ru/economy/20101029/290644987.html).
Speaking on Friday to a Pyatigorsk seminar of heads of municipal bodies, Khloponin said that “it is necessary to make out of the Caucasus Mineralny vody zone a special economic zone” with its own tax arrangements, benefits and preferences, adding that “the plan of the development of the agglomeration is [currently] at the developmental stage.”
The Presidential plenipotentiary argued that he expected to be able to clear such a program at the federal level and make it “one of the key projects of the strategy of the social-economic development of the North Caucasus Federal District,” an indication that the idea of such trans-border tax districts may be expanded to other parts of that Federal District.
Khloponin added, “Novosti” reported, that “the strategy must consider all the particular features of the region, including transportation logistics, tariff policies, and standards of the quality of sanatoria and resort services,” an indication that Moscow may be pushing for this project as part of its plans to stage the Olympics in Sochi in 2014.
However that may be, this proposal, the kind of administrative innovation that many in Moscow believed Khloponin was selected to come up with and then implement, is certain to provoke negative reactions not only among the governments of these federal subjects but also among the populations there.
For many of the non-Russians, this step will look like a kind of covert amalgamation of their republics into Russian regions, something that they have clearly indicated they oppose. And for the Stavropol residents who have petitioned Moscow to shift their kray to the Southern Federal District, this step will be viewed as Moscow’s negative answer to their request.
Because of the near certainly of resistance, this plan, although it attracted the attention of the Moscow media, may never be put into practice, but it is a measure both of Khloponin’s casting about for some means of gaining control of his district and of Moscow’s concerns about the run-up to the Sochi games that such a controversial idea is being floated now.
Staunton, October 31 – Aleksandr Khloponin, Presidential Plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus Federal District, has called for the formation of a special “Caucasus Mineralny Vody agglomeration” tax district consisting not of whole federal subjects but rather of portions of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol kray
On the one hand, this arrangement which will involve only parts of the three federal subjects will have the effect of reducing still further the powers of the regional heads who will lose part of their authority to direct development in a significant portion of the territory of their republics or region.
And on the other, it will further anger people in Stavropol who are seeking to have their kray transferred from the North Caucasus to the Southern Federal District but who will now have three districts and eight cities of their kray, including Pyatigorsk and Essentuki, more tightly linked to the former (rian.ru/economy/20101029/290644987.html).
Speaking on Friday to a Pyatigorsk seminar of heads of municipal bodies, Khloponin said that “it is necessary to make out of the Caucasus Mineralny vody zone a special economic zone” with its own tax arrangements, benefits and preferences, adding that “the plan of the development of the agglomeration is [currently] at the developmental stage.”
The Presidential plenipotentiary argued that he expected to be able to clear such a program at the federal level and make it “one of the key projects of the strategy of the social-economic development of the North Caucasus Federal District,” an indication that the idea of such trans-border tax districts may be expanded to other parts of that Federal District.
Khloponin added, “Novosti” reported, that “the strategy must consider all the particular features of the region, including transportation logistics, tariff policies, and standards of the quality of sanatoria and resort services,” an indication that Moscow may be pushing for this project as part of its plans to stage the Olympics in Sochi in 2014.
However that may be, this proposal, the kind of administrative innovation that many in Moscow believed Khloponin was selected to come up with and then implement, is certain to provoke negative reactions not only among the governments of these federal subjects but also among the populations there.
For many of the non-Russians, this step will look like a kind of covert amalgamation of their republics into Russian regions, something that they have clearly indicated they oppose. And for the Stavropol residents who have petitioned Moscow to shift their kray to the Southern Federal District, this step will be viewed as Moscow’s negative answer to their request.
Because of the near certainly of resistance, this plan, although it attracted the attention of the Moscow media, may never be put into practice, but it is a measure both of Khloponin’s casting about for some means of gaining control of his district and of Moscow’s concerns about the run-up to the Sochi games that such a controversial idea is being floated now.
Window on Eurasia: For First Time, Muslims Across Russia Meet or Exceed Haj Quotas
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 31 – For the first time ever, Muslims across the Russian Federation have met or exceeded their respective allocations of haj slots, a measure of the intensification of interest among that community in making the pilgrimage to Mecca but one that is creating problems in Daghestan, historically the most Islamic region of the country.
That is because until now, Daghestan has not only filled all the slots allocated to it but been able to make use of unfilled slots from other parts of the Russian Federation. But this year, republic President Magomedsalam Magomedov says, no such unused slots are available and that this has sparked “tensions” among believers there (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/176282/).
The Russian news agency Interfax buried this information in its story about Magomedov’s speech, possibly out of a desire not to attract attention to a trend that casts doubt on Moscow’s long-held assumption that attachment to Islam may be a problem in the North Caucasus but isn’t elsewhere (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38015).
But however that may be, the desire of Muslims in the Middle Volga, Siberia, and European Russia to make the required pilgrimage to Mecca means that Islamic identity is intensifying in places where most Russian commentators had dismissed such communities as little more than “ethnic Muslims.”
Daghestani officials this year had succeeded in getting Moscow to boost their share of the 20,500 Russian Federation haj places this year from 5,000 to 8,000 and even in having Moscow permit them to make a direct appeal to the Saudi king for 3,000 additional slots, but the boost within the Russian quota was still not large enough and the Saudis apparently did not agree.
In fact, these officials said, the number of Muslims in Daghestan wanting to make the haj this year was 6,000 more than Moscow had allowed them. As a result, if last year is any guide, many are likely to go in violation of the haj quotas: In 2009, Daghestan had a quota of 6,000 places but in fact send “on the other of 16,000” believers, republic officials said.
The haj quota system operates at two levels, worldwide and within each state. The Saudi authorities as custodians of the Holy Places set annual quotas for each country based on a number equal to one for every thousand estimated believers in it. The Russian allotment since the collapse of Soviet power has been 20,500.
(When he was president, Vladimir Putin successfully lobbied to increase the Russian quota by 5,000 with the argument that there was pent-up demand from Soviet times when few Muslims from the USSR were able to make the haj. But anger from other countries prompted the Saudis to end that concession.)
Within the Russian Federation, a haj commission, consisting of leaders from the major Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) and government officials, then divides up that 20,500 figure among the regions and republics of the country, historically giving somewhat more slots per 1,000 believers to the North Caucasus and somewhat fewer elsewhere.
Over the last five years, this commission has gradually reduced the numbers assigned to the North Caucasus republics in order to allow more Muslims from the Middle Volga and elsewhere to make the pilgrimage, precisely the reduction that has so angered the Muslim community in Daghestan.
At least three consequences are likely to flow from this development. First, there will be greater competition than ever before next year in the Russian haj commission with Muslims from the Middle Volga and elsewhere pushing hard to get larger allocations for themselves at the cost of cuts in the number of slots going to the North Caucasus.
Second, non-Russian republics are likely to follow Daghestan’s lead and seek clearance from Moscow to approach the Saudis directly, something the central powers that be may assume they have little choice about but also a step that likely would intensify ties between these Muslim republics within the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.
And third, Muslim groups through Russia are certain to press Moscow to press the Saudis for an increase in the overall quota. As a result, they are likely to be especially concerned by the outcome of the just-completed census, especially if Muslims believe they have been undercounted in order to keep the ethnic Russian decline from being so severe.
Staunton, October 31 – For the first time ever, Muslims across the Russian Federation have met or exceeded their respective allocations of haj slots, a measure of the intensification of interest among that community in making the pilgrimage to Mecca but one that is creating problems in Daghestan, historically the most Islamic region of the country.
That is because until now, Daghestan has not only filled all the slots allocated to it but been able to make use of unfilled slots from other parts of the Russian Federation. But this year, republic President Magomedsalam Magomedov says, no such unused slots are available and that this has sparked “tensions” among believers there (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/176282/).
The Russian news agency Interfax buried this information in its story about Magomedov’s speech, possibly out of a desire not to attract attention to a trend that casts doubt on Moscow’s long-held assumption that attachment to Islam may be a problem in the North Caucasus but isn’t elsewhere (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38015).
But however that may be, the desire of Muslims in the Middle Volga, Siberia, and European Russia to make the required pilgrimage to Mecca means that Islamic identity is intensifying in places where most Russian commentators had dismissed such communities as little more than “ethnic Muslims.”
Daghestani officials this year had succeeded in getting Moscow to boost their share of the 20,500 Russian Federation haj places this year from 5,000 to 8,000 and even in having Moscow permit them to make a direct appeal to the Saudi king for 3,000 additional slots, but the boost within the Russian quota was still not large enough and the Saudis apparently did not agree.
In fact, these officials said, the number of Muslims in Daghestan wanting to make the haj this year was 6,000 more than Moscow had allowed them. As a result, if last year is any guide, many are likely to go in violation of the haj quotas: In 2009, Daghestan had a quota of 6,000 places but in fact send “on the other of 16,000” believers, republic officials said.
The haj quota system operates at two levels, worldwide and within each state. The Saudi authorities as custodians of the Holy Places set annual quotas for each country based on a number equal to one for every thousand estimated believers in it. The Russian allotment since the collapse of Soviet power has been 20,500.
(When he was president, Vladimir Putin successfully lobbied to increase the Russian quota by 5,000 with the argument that there was pent-up demand from Soviet times when few Muslims from the USSR were able to make the haj. But anger from other countries prompted the Saudis to end that concession.)
Within the Russian Federation, a haj commission, consisting of leaders from the major Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) and government officials, then divides up that 20,500 figure among the regions and republics of the country, historically giving somewhat more slots per 1,000 believers to the North Caucasus and somewhat fewer elsewhere.
Over the last five years, this commission has gradually reduced the numbers assigned to the North Caucasus republics in order to allow more Muslims from the Middle Volga and elsewhere to make the pilgrimage, precisely the reduction that has so angered the Muslim community in Daghestan.
At least three consequences are likely to flow from this development. First, there will be greater competition than ever before next year in the Russian haj commission with Muslims from the Middle Volga and elsewhere pushing hard to get larger allocations for themselves at the cost of cuts in the number of slots going to the North Caucasus.
Second, non-Russian republics are likely to follow Daghestan’s lead and seek clearance from Moscow to approach the Saudis directly, something the central powers that be may assume they have little choice about but also a step that likely would intensify ties between these Muslim republics within the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.
And third, Muslim groups through Russia are certain to press Moscow to press the Saudis for an increase in the overall quota. As a result, they are likely to be especially concerned by the outcome of the just-completed census, especially if Muslims believe they have been undercounted in order to keep the ethnic Russian decline from being so severe.
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