Paul Goble
Staunton, October 29 – When the Soviet Union disintegrated, many analysts assumed that Iran would exert a powerful religious influence on the newly emerged countries of Central Asia. That has not happened, but Tehran has assumed an increasing and extremely variegated role in other areas, a development that many have ignored.
In a 4200-word, heavily footnoted article posted online today, A.A. Knyazev, the director of the Bishkek branch of the Institute of the CIS Countries, describes the way in which Iran’s strategy toward the Central Asian countries has evolved as well as how the Iranian government is pursuing its current priorities there (www.islamrf.ru/news/analytics/politics/14036/).
When the current Iranian government took power in 2005, Knyazev says, it “synthesized” the policies of its three predecessors: “achievement of the status of a regional power,” as the last shah had sought; “maximum pragmatism in economics,” as pushed by President Hashemi; and “consistent integration into the world economy,” as pursued by President Hatami.
In the early 1990s, he writes, “immediately after the collapse of the USSR,” Tehran “consistently pursued a more active role in the new states of Central Asia in general and in the first instance in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.” But despite the expectations of many, Iran did not pursue a religiously or ideologically driven agenda.
Instead, as Knyazev shows, its policy toward each of the countries of the region was based on Realpolitik and on the combination of specific factors rather than being only religious. Unfortunately, the Russian analyst continues, the assumption that Iran was doing otherwise blinded many analysts to what was really going on.
In fact, as he observes, “the post-Soviet history of the countries of Central Asia knows a multitude of examples of influence on the religious sphere from the side of a large number of other countries – Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, but in no way by Iran with its Schism, which was from the outset unacceptable” to the Sunnis of the region.
Indeed, throughout the 1990s, he insists, “Iranian influence [in the ideological realm] was limited to the expansion in local markets of Iranian goods” and “the establishment of a network of cultural centers, which drew into the sphere of their influence an extremely limited circle of cultural figures and an insignificant part of the population.”
Moreover, Tehran’s activities in this regard and its more conventional diplomatic activity reflected its growing antagonism to the United States after 2001. And that defined another vector of Iranian policy: its efforts to use ties to Central Asian countries to overcome its American-imposed isolation elsewhere.
In some respects, Knyazev says, Tajikistan represented “an exception.” Culturally and linguistically, the Tajiks and Iranians were close, although the former follows Sunni Islam while the latter is Shiite. But if there were commonalities, he continues, there were also real tensions, the reflection of economic competition and Iranian overreaching toward “a Greater Iran.”
With respect to Turkmenistan, the Bishkek-based scholar says, Ashgabat and Tehran were doomed to cooperate because of their geographic locations and natural gas wealth. But that may have forced cooperation in some areas, but it has done little to lesson mutual suspicions with each looking to others for support.
Turkmenistan viewed its relations with Iran as a counterweight to others and as something that gave real content to its policy of neutrality, while Iran saw Turkmen neutrality as “a restraining factor which allowed Ashgabat to distance itself from participation in international bloc structures,” something Tehran very much wants to promote.
Iran’s relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been more or less stable but not especially close. Tashkent’s pro-American approach and its Islamophobia have limited cooperation with Tehran, and Astana’s Euro-Atlanticist approach has reduced Iranian opportunities with that country.
Iran’s relations with Kyrgyzstan have “never been distinguished by a particular dynamic,” Knyazev says. “The economic and cultural presence of Iran in the republic is at a quite high level but in any case is exceeded by Russian, Chinese and even Turkish activities there,” something Bishkek is well aware of.
Moreover, after 2001, Kyrgyzstan was increasingly drawn into the US orbit, Knyazev says, and that restricted Iran’s ability to gain influence there. Consequently, Iran’s policy has been to play upon Kyrgyz desires not to fall under any one foreign center of gravity rather than count on winning support for itself.
“In general,” Knyazev continues, “one can characterize Iran’s Central Asian policy for the entire post-Soviet period as a quite high level of balancing” among various interests and countries and as the conduct of “ordinary Realpolitik and not any religiously defined messianism.”
That is especially obvious in Tehran’s opposition to “color” revolutions and instability, its approach to negotiations on the Caspian, and its involvement in multi-lateral organizations of which the Central Asian countries are also members. In each case, it has sought to maximize its freedom of action by playing one country or group of countries off against another.
Obviously, Knyazev concludes, all this could change, but in Central Asia, Iran is behaving far more like a traditional power than an ideologically-driven messianic cause, and consequently, Tehran is more likely to continue to behave in this way than to follow another paradigm altogether.
Friday, October 29, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Atheists Organize to Protect and Promote Secularism
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 29 – At a time when religious organizations are seeking an ever greater role in Russia’s public life and when clashes among them are increasingly frequent, Russia’s atheist community has formed a new public movement to defend secularism, a principle enshrined in the Russian Constitution but increasingly ignored by the powers that be.
This week, a group of Russian atheists came together to form the Sanity Public Foundation, the primary goal of which is to organize demonstrations “in support and defense of the secular character of the Russian state in correspondence with the 14th paragraph of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (http://www.atheistcampaign.ru/).
The members of the initiative group declared that they cannot remain silent about “the violation of the principles of a secular state,” including the overly close ties between the state and religious groups, budget funds being used for religious purposes, religious instruction in the schools, religious censorship, and “the de facto introduction of shariat law in particular regions.”
“Russia is a secular state and it must remain such,” they continue, asserting that “we are certain that legality and agreement in society, the basis of which is a legal state and its basic law, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is much more important than the dogmas of particular religions.”
“Our task is to initiate a public discussion about the level of clericalization of society,” the organizers say. “To achieve this we want with the assistance of the attraction of public attention to the clear violations of the principles of secularism in the country and with actions directed at the popularization of alternatives to a religious worldview.”
At the same time, the organizers of this foundation insist, “we are not positioning ourselves as fighters with religion, religious organizations, or believers. Rather, we only want to dispel the existing stereotypes and support somewhat shaky principles of a secular state in Russia.”
The group’s first action, the announcement says, “will be the continuation of the international Atheist Bus Campaign,” a measure that under Russian conditions will involve driving cars through the streets of Moscow with both “the slogans of the Western campaign and others in support of the Constitution of Russia.”
The claims of religious leaders in the Russian Federation notwithstanding, a significant portion of the Russian population consists of non-believers and, if polls are to be believed, an even larger share supports in principle the idea of a secular state. But except for a few human and legal rights groups, this large group of people has had no one to speak on its behalf.
With the creation of Sanity, this group may have acquired a voice and the Constitutional mandate for secularism a defender, something that can only be welcomed given the way in which the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious groups in its wake have sought to undermine that principle.
But at the same time, there is one troubling aspect of the emergence of this group. Its members are avowedly atheist, something that will reinforce the view of many Russians and especially many believers that secularism is nothing more than a cover for the promotion of atheism, something they had too much experience with in Soviet times.
If Sanity attracts support from believers who are also concerned about the threats to a secular state and hence to the Russian Constitution, then it is likely to become an important participant in public debates about where Russia should be going. But if it does not, it is likely to remain marginal or even become counterproductive as a straw man religious groups can use.
Staunton, October 29 – At a time when religious organizations are seeking an ever greater role in Russia’s public life and when clashes among them are increasingly frequent, Russia’s atheist community has formed a new public movement to defend secularism, a principle enshrined in the Russian Constitution but increasingly ignored by the powers that be.
This week, a group of Russian atheists came together to form the Sanity Public Foundation, the primary goal of which is to organize demonstrations “in support and defense of the secular character of the Russian state in correspondence with the 14th paragraph of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (http://www.atheistcampaign.ru/).
The members of the initiative group declared that they cannot remain silent about “the violation of the principles of a secular state,” including the overly close ties between the state and religious groups, budget funds being used for religious purposes, religious instruction in the schools, religious censorship, and “the de facto introduction of shariat law in particular regions.”
“Russia is a secular state and it must remain such,” they continue, asserting that “we are certain that legality and agreement in society, the basis of which is a legal state and its basic law, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is much more important than the dogmas of particular religions.”
“Our task is to initiate a public discussion about the level of clericalization of society,” the organizers say. “To achieve this we want with the assistance of the attraction of public attention to the clear violations of the principles of secularism in the country and with actions directed at the popularization of alternatives to a religious worldview.”
At the same time, the organizers of this foundation insist, “we are not positioning ourselves as fighters with religion, religious organizations, or believers. Rather, we only want to dispel the existing stereotypes and support somewhat shaky principles of a secular state in Russia.”
The group’s first action, the announcement says, “will be the continuation of the international Atheist Bus Campaign,” a measure that under Russian conditions will involve driving cars through the streets of Moscow with both “the slogans of the Western campaign and others in support of the Constitution of Russia.”
The claims of religious leaders in the Russian Federation notwithstanding, a significant portion of the Russian population consists of non-believers and, if polls are to be believed, an even larger share supports in principle the idea of a secular state. But except for a few human and legal rights groups, this large group of people has had no one to speak on its behalf.
With the creation of Sanity, this group may have acquired a voice and the Constitutional mandate for secularism a defender, something that can only be welcomed given the way in which the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious groups in its wake have sought to undermine that principle.
But at the same time, there is one troubling aspect of the emergence of this group. Its members are avowedly atheist, something that will reinforce the view of many Russians and especially many believers that secularism is nothing more than a cover for the promotion of atheism, something they had too much experience with in Soviet times.
If Sanity attracts support from believers who are also concerned about the threats to a secular state and hence to the Russian Constitution, then it is likely to become an important participant in public debates about where Russia should be going. But if it does not, it is likely to remain marginal or even become counterproductive as a straw man religious groups can use.
Window on Eurasia: Russian Experts Push for Revival of Early Soviet Model for Regional Amalgamation
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 29 – Experts from the Rostov Effective Administration Institute have suggested that Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts be combined into the single Lower Volga Kray they formed in the 1920s, a proposal that could provide a model for further regional amalgamation not only there but elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Yesterday, the Rostov experts speaking at a round table devoted to the prospects for the development of the Lower Volga enclave Volga unanimously agreed that unification of the two oblasts would both help Volgograd overcome its economic problems and promote modernization in the new federal unit (www.politrus.ru/2010/10/28/нижнее-поволжье/).
While there is no indication that Moscow is currently behind this idea, ongoing discussions about restarting Vladimir Putin’s regional amalgamation project suggest that at the very least some of the powers that be will be attentive, all the more so because the Rostov experts’ proposal draws on a previously existing division and is cast as a modernizing step.
At the conference, experts from the Rostov institute agreed that “significant changes” are taking place in the Lower Volga region, pointing both to developments in each of the current federal subjects there and to Moscow’s increased attention to the region, including President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent visit to Astrakhan.
Within what they call the Lower Volga “enclave,” the experts continued, there is forming up “a new hierarchy of the regions,” one in which Astrakhan is becoming the “dominating” political subject both within the region and more generally, with the other two federal subjects, Volgograd and Kalmykia falling behind.
Of particular importance as far as Astrakhan’s role is concerned, the experts pointed not only to Moscow’s decision to use that city as the site of talks about the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute among the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents but also to Astrakhan’s role in the Caspian region.
Astrakhan oblast, the experts noted, is “the only non-Muslim territory with access to the shore of the Caspian Sea, through the waters of which pass the border of the ever more complex and tense Russian-Iranian neighborhood.” Neither of the other two subjects has done as well either at home or as a foreign policy player.
Kalmykia has had particular problems, something that has forced Moscow to pursue “a unique strategy in many respects,” one that has “formally” kept that republic within the Lower Volga enclave but that in practice has moved it out of that grouping, For the Kalmyk elite, the experts said, this had both “pluses” and minuses.”
On the plus side, this has meant that Moscow has put on hold any chance of changing the status of Kalmykia. But on the minus one, it has led to a situation in which Moscow has refused to pay for the kind of large investment projects in that Buddhist republic that could allow it to develop and modernize.
Meanwhile, over the last two years, Volgograd has, contrary to Moscow’s expectations, fallen behind both economically and politically. The “illusions” the center had as recently as 2009 about that oblast have now dissipated completely, with little expectation that there will be much progress there in any sector there soon.
Given this situation, the Rostov analysts continued, the idea of uniting Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts into a single new federal subject, the Lower Volga kray, “as a mechanism of overcoming the deepening economic and political inequality” between the two is increasingly attractive.
The capital of the new kray would be Astrakhan which would play the predominant role in the new unit by developing “a shore economy,” that is, “the infrastructure formed in the Volga delta and on the northern coast of the Caspian Sea” and linking it with the canal system of Volgograd, Kamyshin and further afield.
. Such an arrangement, the experts argued, “would become a way out for the Volgograd territorial segment, the agro-industrial sector of which at present is experiencing a most sever crisis,” one exacerbated by the fact that the new Volgograd leadership “is not taking convincing steps to overcome [it].”
And they conclude that “the establishment of a Lower Volga kray with a capital at Astrakhan thus is an effective step toward the modernizing of the economic and political system of the current region,” adding that recent actions by Moscow suggest that “preparation for such a unification have already begun.”
A comment posted on this article suggests another reason why Moscow might be considering such a step in particular. A Lower Volga kray existed before, from 1928 to 1934, when it included eight districts made up of 76 rayons, plus the German ASSR, the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast and the city of Saratov.
Staunton, October 29 – Experts from the Rostov Effective Administration Institute have suggested that Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts be combined into the single Lower Volga Kray they formed in the 1920s, a proposal that could provide a model for further regional amalgamation not only there but elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Yesterday, the Rostov experts speaking at a round table devoted to the prospects for the development of the Lower Volga enclave Volga unanimously agreed that unification of the two oblasts would both help Volgograd overcome its economic problems and promote modernization in the new federal unit (www.politrus.ru/2010/10/28/нижнее-поволжье/).
While there is no indication that Moscow is currently behind this idea, ongoing discussions about restarting Vladimir Putin’s regional amalgamation project suggest that at the very least some of the powers that be will be attentive, all the more so because the Rostov experts’ proposal draws on a previously existing division and is cast as a modernizing step.
At the conference, experts from the Rostov institute agreed that “significant changes” are taking place in the Lower Volga region, pointing both to developments in each of the current federal subjects there and to Moscow’s increased attention to the region, including President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent visit to Astrakhan.
Within what they call the Lower Volga “enclave,” the experts continued, there is forming up “a new hierarchy of the regions,” one in which Astrakhan is becoming the “dominating” political subject both within the region and more generally, with the other two federal subjects, Volgograd and Kalmykia falling behind.
Of particular importance as far as Astrakhan’s role is concerned, the experts pointed not only to Moscow’s decision to use that city as the site of talks about the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute among the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents but also to Astrakhan’s role in the Caspian region.
Astrakhan oblast, the experts noted, is “the only non-Muslim territory with access to the shore of the Caspian Sea, through the waters of which pass the border of the ever more complex and tense Russian-Iranian neighborhood.” Neither of the other two subjects has done as well either at home or as a foreign policy player.
Kalmykia has had particular problems, something that has forced Moscow to pursue “a unique strategy in many respects,” one that has “formally” kept that republic within the Lower Volga enclave but that in practice has moved it out of that grouping, For the Kalmyk elite, the experts said, this had both “pluses” and minuses.”
On the plus side, this has meant that Moscow has put on hold any chance of changing the status of Kalmykia. But on the minus one, it has led to a situation in which Moscow has refused to pay for the kind of large investment projects in that Buddhist republic that could allow it to develop and modernize.
Meanwhile, over the last two years, Volgograd has, contrary to Moscow’s expectations, fallen behind both economically and politically. The “illusions” the center had as recently as 2009 about that oblast have now dissipated completely, with little expectation that there will be much progress there in any sector there soon.
Given this situation, the Rostov analysts continued, the idea of uniting Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts into a single new federal subject, the Lower Volga kray, “as a mechanism of overcoming the deepening economic and political inequality” between the two is increasingly attractive.
The capital of the new kray would be Astrakhan which would play the predominant role in the new unit by developing “a shore economy,” that is, “the infrastructure formed in the Volga delta and on the northern coast of the Caspian Sea” and linking it with the canal system of Volgograd, Kamyshin and further afield.
. Such an arrangement, the experts argued, “would become a way out for the Volgograd territorial segment, the agro-industrial sector of which at present is experiencing a most sever crisis,” one exacerbated by the fact that the new Volgograd leadership “is not taking convincing steps to overcome [it].”
And they conclude that “the establishment of a Lower Volga kray with a capital at Astrakhan thus is an effective step toward the modernizing of the economic and political system of the current region,” adding that recent actions by Moscow suggest that “preparation for such a unification have already begun.”
A comment posted on this article suggests another reason why Moscow might be considering such a step in particular. A Lower Volga kray existed before, from 1928 to 1934, when it included eight districts made up of 76 rayons, plus the German ASSR, the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast and the city of Saratov.
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