Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Now that the first cargo ship ever has traversed the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, traffic in the Arctic Sea north of Russia is set to expand dramatically next year, a development that along with concerns about access to mineral 32resources and geopolitical competition there, is raising new concerns in Moscow.
Three days ago, a Norilsk-Nikel ship docked in Shanghai after a 32-day voyage thus becoming the first cargo vessel in history to have sailed across the entire Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, according to a company press release cited by Barents Observer (www.barentsobserver.com/norilsk-nickel-shipment-arrived-in-shanghai.4831545-116320.html).
While the ship, the “Monchegorsk,” is “an ice-classed vessel,” meaning that it is able to pass through waters where break ice is present, its latest voyage, the company said, marks “the first time in the history of the navigation of the Northern Sea Route … that such a large vessel passed through the eastern section of [that route] without icebreaker assistance.”
The ship is currently off-loading its cargo of metal and will return with Chinese manufacturing and consumer goods, and officials of the company say that this routing will take on average 20 days as compared to the 60 to 65 days of sailing that would be required if ships took the traditional southern route via the Suez Canal.
Global warming has reduced the ice cover and extended the shipping season for the Northern Sea Route, but as the last icebreaker-assisted convoys leave this week, Barents Observer says, more companies are poised to send their ships along this passage next year (www.barentsobserver.com/preparing-for-next-years-northern-sea-route-season.4832790-116320.html).
Six convoys are already scheduled for 2011, Rosatomflot says, and that organization’s icebreaker fleet reports that it currently has 15 requests for assistance, a big increase from this year and one that suggests 2010 will be remembered, as Barents Observer has said, as a breakthrough year.
Global warming and the retreat of the icepack have made this possible, with September 2010 becoming “the first time in modern history that the Northern Sea Route was totally ice-free, with only a few places [ion which even] drift ice could been seen from the bridges of vessels sailing that route.”
Not only is this route shorter, Barents Observer continues, but it “also has the advantage of not being frequented by the sorts of pirates that lurk off the coast of Somalia,” near the entrance to the Suez Canal. Indeed, the failure of the international community to find a way of suppressing piracy is an increasingly important factor in making the Arctic route attractive.
Within the Russian Federation, the prospect of more traffic is having two consequences. On the one hand, it is leading to the construction of new port facilities at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. And on the other hand, it is feeding Russian concerns about Moscow’s ability to maintain security along the Russian Federation’s northern border.
In an article in the current issue of “Novaya versiya,” Moscow journalist surveys these concerns and draws the conclusion, on the basis of conversations with independent Russian experts on the military that Moscow is “not prepared for a large-scale war” north of the Arctic Circle but could defend its interests with respect to shipping.
Three weeks ago, Anton Vasilyev, the special representative of the Russian President, declared that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” despite provisions of Moscow’s security doctrine saying just the opposite (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/18/voennoe_vozvraschenie_rossii_v_arktiku).
This latest “new look” in Russian diplomacy may reflect a desire to project a more cooperative attitude in the region, both because more powers, including China, are getting involved there and because many in the Russian capital appear to recognize that some of Moscow’s earlier pretensions in the region are not sustainable.
But Aleksandr Tsyganok, one of Russia’s leading independent security analysts, says that however that may be, Moscow must take steps to ensure its “control over the sea routes” to the north of the borders of the Russian Federation which are rapidly becoming ice-free and thus more attractive to international shipping.
He suggests that at a minimum Russia should “already today” build a base for a naval flotilla “at the mouth of one of the major rivers of Siberia” in order to ensure that no other country will be able to project power into the high north and thus threaten Russia’s interests there.
If Moscow decides to take that step, it is likely to present it as providing a search and rescue capability for shipping, whatever its actual intent. But the central Russian powers that be are likely to face other obstacles than international ones: the costs of such a distant base would be high and most of the numerically small ethnic groups there would likely oppose it as well.
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Patriarchate Faces ‘Parade of Sovereignties’ Within Orthodoxy, Russian Historian Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Window on Eurasia: Most Russians Ignore Political Advice from Religious Leaders, Poll Shows
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
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