Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – The way in which Moscow is arming and training units assigned to the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty suggests that these forces will be used against domestic opposition groups in the member states – not excluding the Russian Federation, according to some analysts -- rather than exclusively against foreign aggressors.
Col.Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the unified staff of the ODKB (its Russian acronym), said this week that “the international forces subordinate to him soon will begin to receive as armaments water cannon, traumatic pistols, tear gas and noise grenades – all “so-called non-lethal” weapons (svpressa.ru/society/article/32035/).
Up until now, such weapons have generally been used by the police or special services rather than by national armies or international alliances. Obviously, “tank columns are not dispersed by water cannon.” Indeed, most of the units in the ODKB are “motorized rifle battalions, the chief task of which is repulsing a foreign threat.”
The ODKB was set up in 2002 as “a military-political bloc,” and its member states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, agreed last year to form a rapid reaction force, a large segment of which consists of Russian units drawn from the Volga-Urals Military District.
Many both in these countries and internationally viewed the ODKB as an effort by Moscow to create “almost a counterweight to the forces of NATO.” But because the organization did not involve large forces and even more because the ODKB increasingly focused not to the West but to Central Asia, ever fewer people share that view.
But on one aspect of the ODKB, most continued to agree: Its primary focus was about repulsing potential foreign aggressors rather than dealing with internal threats. But now, as a result of events in Kyrgyzstan and the declaration of Nogovitsyn, at least some analysts are shifting their view in that regard.
And that is the case even though Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly said that “the application of ODKB forces is possible only if there is an attack from the outside against one of the states which is a member” of the group. The ODKB agreement, the Russian leader insists, do not allow for anything else.
The events in Kyrgyzstan, however, led many to discuss whether ODKB forces might be used against what were after all domestic opponents of one of the signatory regimes, and “the logic” of the armaments Nogovitsyn says some of the ODKB forces will have suggests that some leaders of the ODKB consider such actions “extremely probable.”
Such views are likely to identify later this month, “Svobodnaya pressa” continues, when ODKB forces are scheduled to conduct a joint exercise using non-lethal force near Chebarkul, a step the organization would not be taking if it did not believe that it needed to develop a capacity to cope with domestic violence in its member states.
Leonid Ivashov, a retired colonel general who heads the Moscow Academy of Geopolitical Problems and a frequent critic of the incumbent Russian government, said that the trend in the ODKB forces was clear: the member states want an international capacity to intervene in the case of domestic violence in any of them.
As a result, he continued, “the appearance of [non-lethal weaponry] in the units of the ODKB, the main part of which consists of [Russian] soldiers and officers] will mean that there has begun a reorientation of army structures toward the struggle with the recent growth in protest attitudes across the post-Soviet space.”
And such attitudes are to be found not only in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, Ivashov noted. “Not everything is peaceful in Russia itself.” There are problems in the Far East and in the North Caucasus, and consequently, this new direction in the weaponry of the ODKB could mean that its forces might someday be deployed in the Russian Federation.
Friday, October 15, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Ashgabat Reaches Out to Turkmens of Iran
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – For the first time since Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, Ashgabat has helped to organize a cultural event for the estimated 1.3 million ethnic Turkmen living across its southern border in Iran, an action that by its very nature represents a challenge to Tehran’s control of the region.
Between September 29 and October 2, Ashgabat helped organize the Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran’s Golestan region. Turkmenistan had wanted to hold this event in Gonbad-e Kavoos, a center of Turkmen culture in Iran, but Tehran insisted that it take place far from that location (en.baybak.com/a-hopeful-step-for-the-turkmensahra-people.azr).
According to the Baybak.com portal, a southern Azerbaijani source, “officials of the Islamic Republic accepted Turkmenistan’s proposal reluctantly,” doing so Baybak.com said, only because of “the political conditions generated by the economic sanctions” and Tehran’s desires not to alienate its neighbors.
Ashgabat took advantage of this situation, Baybak.com continued, to reach out “for the first time since independence” to the more than one million Turkmensahra Turkmens of Iran, a community that has been under intense “political and cultural pressures” from Iranian officials to assimilate.
An indication of Iranian fears about the implications of even this relatively limited event, Baybak.com said, was provided by Tehran’s efforts to limit the impact of the Culture Week. Not only did Tehran insist that the week take place in a location where Persians were a majority, but it packed the sessions with Persians so that Turkmens could not take part.
Moreover, the Iranian side worked hard to block any publicity about this event in order to prevent Turkmensahra Turkmens from knowing about it. That effort was undercut, the Southern Azerbaijani site continues, by reports in the media of Turkmenistan itself and by Internet coverage of the Culture Week itself
In reporting this development, Baybak.com said that it “considers the Turkmenistani President’s attempt to organize a Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran a positive step,” one that “shows that Turkmenistan is ambitious about developing the Turkmen culture. And the Southern Azerbaijani site expressed the hope that Ashgabat will take “bigger steps in the future.”
“We again hope that the Turkmenistani officials would also be sensitive about not only the Turkmens’ right to receive education” in their own language and right to the restoration of lands taken from them but also about “the discriminatory policies” that the Iranian authorities apply against them.
“While the Islamic Republic can easily open publishing houses in Iran and carry out cultural activities,” the Southern Azerbaijani portal said, Turkmenistan needs to recognize that Iranian efforts in this regard will be directed against the ethnic Turkmens and consequently take steps to support that community.
Most of the Turkmens of Iran live along the northern border. Like their co-ethnics to the north, they are Sunni Muslims rather than Shiites like most Persians. In the 20th century, some of them fled north to avoid Iranian pressure and others revolved against the Soviet occupation in 1945 and against the Iranians immediately after that.
Following the Iranian revolution of1979, the Turkmens staged a revolt against Khomeini, a rising that Tehran crushed with extreme violence. As a result, some of Iran’s Turkmens have fled abroad, mostly but not exclusively to Turkey, with a small number even moving into the then-Turkmen SSR.
Over the last 20 years, the Turkmens of Iran have cooperated with ethnic Azerbaijanis in that country, protesting against Iranian policies and suffering from similar repressions of various kinds (en.baybak.com/the-regime-of-the-islamic-republic-has-commenced-to-hand-books-in-order-to-destroy-the-turkmen-culture-in-turkmensahra.azr).
Staunton, October 15 – For the first time since Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, Ashgabat has helped to organize a cultural event for the estimated 1.3 million ethnic Turkmen living across its southern border in Iran, an action that by its very nature represents a challenge to Tehran’s control of the region.
Between September 29 and October 2, Ashgabat helped organize the Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran’s Golestan region. Turkmenistan had wanted to hold this event in Gonbad-e Kavoos, a center of Turkmen culture in Iran, but Tehran insisted that it take place far from that location (en.baybak.com/a-hopeful-step-for-the-turkmensahra-people.azr).
According to the Baybak.com portal, a southern Azerbaijani source, “officials of the Islamic Republic accepted Turkmenistan’s proposal reluctantly,” doing so Baybak.com said, only because of “the political conditions generated by the economic sanctions” and Tehran’s desires not to alienate its neighbors.
Ashgabat took advantage of this situation, Baybak.com continued, to reach out “for the first time since independence” to the more than one million Turkmensahra Turkmens of Iran, a community that has been under intense “political and cultural pressures” from Iranian officials to assimilate.
An indication of Iranian fears about the implications of even this relatively limited event, Baybak.com said, was provided by Tehran’s efforts to limit the impact of the Culture Week. Not only did Tehran insist that the week take place in a location where Persians were a majority, but it packed the sessions with Persians so that Turkmens could not take part.
Moreover, the Iranian side worked hard to block any publicity about this event in order to prevent Turkmensahra Turkmens from knowing about it. That effort was undercut, the Southern Azerbaijani site continues, by reports in the media of Turkmenistan itself and by Internet coverage of the Culture Week itself
In reporting this development, Baybak.com said that it “considers the Turkmenistani President’s attempt to organize a Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran a positive step,” one that “shows that Turkmenistan is ambitious about developing the Turkmen culture. And the Southern Azerbaijani site expressed the hope that Ashgabat will take “bigger steps in the future.”
“We again hope that the Turkmenistani officials would also be sensitive about not only the Turkmens’ right to receive education” in their own language and right to the restoration of lands taken from them but also about “the discriminatory policies” that the Iranian authorities apply against them.
“While the Islamic Republic can easily open publishing houses in Iran and carry out cultural activities,” the Southern Azerbaijani portal said, Turkmenistan needs to recognize that Iranian efforts in this regard will be directed against the ethnic Turkmens and consequently take steps to support that community.
Most of the Turkmens of Iran live along the northern border. Like their co-ethnics to the north, they are Sunni Muslims rather than Shiites like most Persians. In the 20th century, some of them fled north to avoid Iranian pressure and others revolved against the Soviet occupation in 1945 and against the Iranians immediately after that.
Following the Iranian revolution of1979, the Turkmens staged a revolt against Khomeini, a rising that Tehran crushed with extreme violence. As a result, some of Iran’s Turkmens have fled abroad, mostly but not exclusively to Turkey, with a small number even moving into the then-Turkmen SSR.
Over the last 20 years, the Turkmens of Iran have cooperated with ethnic Azerbaijanis in that country, protesting against Iranian policies and suffering from similar repressions of various kinds (en.baybak.com/the-regime-of-the-islamic-republic-has-commenced-to-hand-books-in-order-to-destroy-the-turkmen-culture-in-turkmensahra.azr).
Window on Eurasia: Russian Commander Appeals to Mufti to Help Restore Order in His Unit
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – A Russian military commander at a base near Perm whose officers have lost control over his troops, in part at least because a quarter of them are Muslims from the North Caucasus who are insubordinate or clash with ethnic Russians, has appealed to a local mufti for assistance in restoring order.
But while some outlets, such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, have played this event up as some kind of “a Muslim revolt” (dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/17623/), the situation in Perm was more complicated and is likely to be more widespread given the increasing share of draftees made up by men from historically Muslim nationalities.
The two reports about what has occurred that provide the most nuanced coverage are an article by Sergey Ishchenko in “Svobodnaya pressa” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32098/) which is based on interviews with the principals involved and a report on a military affairs site (topwar.ru/1789-na-voennoj-baze-razgorelsya-islamskij-bunt.html) drawing on Perm media.
According to Ishchenko, Colonel Dmitry Kuznetsov “was forced to turn to the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Kama Region with a request to help call the faithful to order” after the soldiers from the North Caucasus refused to obey orders to perform certain tasks and formed “micro-collectives” which attacked soldiers of other nationalities.
Kuznetsov told a meeting of the inter-religious council in Perm on Monday that he “would not deny that conflicts are taking place” and that “they arise both on a religious and on a specifically ethno-national basis.” At the same time, he said, “we have done everything that we could do within the limits of the law.”
Prosecutors are currently “working in the unit,” the colonel continued, and “they are investigating the criminal cases. They will punish the guilty but unfortunately, that alone will not resolve the problem completely.” Consequently, he said he was seeking help from the religious authorities generally and Muslim ones in particular.
Khalim Sharafeyev, an advisor to the Perm muftiate for social and economic policy, said that the problems the colonel was describing reflected the fact that the young people “had managed to evade the control of commanders,” do not “recognize any power over themselves,” and permit themselves to violate the rules and sometimes to attack other soldiers.
When challenged about their refusal to carry out some task, he said, the Muslim soldiers sometimes invoke Islamic prohibitions against this or that kind of activity. Commanders often don’t know what Islam requires, and non-Muslims are infuriated by such claims, something that he said that has the result of sparking anti-Islamic attitudes.
Sharafeyev said that the first thing that needed to be done was to study the culture of the young people involved and make sure that officers know what the Koran prohibits and what it does not. Then, “jointly with the command, it is necessary to ‘neutralize the leaders’” and thus direct the energy of the soldiers in a useful way.
And finally, the MSD representative said, “there needs to be mediation, that is, the peaceful resolution of personal conflicts” among soldiers and officers. That too will require joint work by Muslim leaders and Russian officers, and Sharafeyev promised that “we will work on that.”
Military prosecutors, however, suggested that “the situation is not as simple as it may look from the side.” That is because, they say, “at a minimum, “half of the criminal cases” involve “soldiers of Slavic nationality” for a variety of violations of the law including “exceeding the authority of their office.” That reality must be addressed as well.
Yet another perspective was offered by Aleksandra Vlakina, head of the Council of Relatives of Military Personnel in Perm. She suggested that what had taken place was less “a revolt” of Muslim troops than a willingness of Col. Kuznetsov to involve the legal authorities in cases of violence among soldiers rather than seeking to cover them up as many officers do.
She also suggested that many of the problems arose from the way in which commanders treat all soldiers and in the Perm unit from overcrowding in the aging barracks. Blaming nationality or religion may get more attention, she pointed out, but these factors may be less significant than more mundane ones.
However that may be, there have been increasing incidents of clashes between soldiers of traditionally Muslim nationalities and ethnic Russians, and appended to Ishchenko’s article is a list of five major conflicts of that type in the Russian military from December 2006 to August 2010.
Staunton, October 15 – A Russian military commander at a base near Perm whose officers have lost control over his troops, in part at least because a quarter of them are Muslims from the North Caucasus who are insubordinate or clash with ethnic Russians, has appealed to a local mufti for assistance in restoring order.
But while some outlets, such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, have played this event up as some kind of “a Muslim revolt” (dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/17623/), the situation in Perm was more complicated and is likely to be more widespread given the increasing share of draftees made up by men from historically Muslim nationalities.
The two reports about what has occurred that provide the most nuanced coverage are an article by Sergey Ishchenko in “Svobodnaya pressa” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32098/) which is based on interviews with the principals involved and a report on a military affairs site (topwar.ru/1789-na-voennoj-baze-razgorelsya-islamskij-bunt.html) drawing on Perm media.
According to Ishchenko, Colonel Dmitry Kuznetsov “was forced to turn to the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Kama Region with a request to help call the faithful to order” after the soldiers from the North Caucasus refused to obey orders to perform certain tasks and formed “micro-collectives” which attacked soldiers of other nationalities.
Kuznetsov told a meeting of the inter-religious council in Perm on Monday that he “would not deny that conflicts are taking place” and that “they arise both on a religious and on a specifically ethno-national basis.” At the same time, he said, “we have done everything that we could do within the limits of the law.”
Prosecutors are currently “working in the unit,” the colonel continued, and “they are investigating the criminal cases. They will punish the guilty but unfortunately, that alone will not resolve the problem completely.” Consequently, he said he was seeking help from the religious authorities generally and Muslim ones in particular.
Khalim Sharafeyev, an advisor to the Perm muftiate for social and economic policy, said that the problems the colonel was describing reflected the fact that the young people “had managed to evade the control of commanders,” do not “recognize any power over themselves,” and permit themselves to violate the rules and sometimes to attack other soldiers.
When challenged about their refusal to carry out some task, he said, the Muslim soldiers sometimes invoke Islamic prohibitions against this or that kind of activity. Commanders often don’t know what Islam requires, and non-Muslims are infuriated by such claims, something that he said that has the result of sparking anti-Islamic attitudes.
Sharafeyev said that the first thing that needed to be done was to study the culture of the young people involved and make sure that officers know what the Koran prohibits and what it does not. Then, “jointly with the command, it is necessary to ‘neutralize the leaders’” and thus direct the energy of the soldiers in a useful way.
And finally, the MSD representative said, “there needs to be mediation, that is, the peaceful resolution of personal conflicts” among soldiers and officers. That too will require joint work by Muslim leaders and Russian officers, and Sharafeyev promised that “we will work on that.”
Military prosecutors, however, suggested that “the situation is not as simple as it may look from the side.” That is because, they say, “at a minimum, “half of the criminal cases” involve “soldiers of Slavic nationality” for a variety of violations of the law including “exceeding the authority of their office.” That reality must be addressed as well.
Yet another perspective was offered by Aleksandra Vlakina, head of the Council of Relatives of Military Personnel in Perm. She suggested that what had taken place was less “a revolt” of Muslim troops than a willingness of Col. Kuznetsov to involve the legal authorities in cases of violence among soldiers rather than seeking to cover them up as many officers do.
She also suggested that many of the problems arose from the way in which commanders treat all soldiers and in the Perm unit from overcrowding in the aging barracks. Blaming nationality or religion may get more attention, she pointed out, but these factors may be less significant than more mundane ones.
However that may be, there have been increasing incidents of clashes between soldiers of traditionally Muslim nationalities and ethnic Russians, and appended to Ishchenko’s article is a list of five major conflicts of that type in the Russian military from December 2006 to August 2010.
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