Paul Goble
Staunton, October 12 – Today marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Gabdulkhak Samatov, a self-educated Muslim who prior to his death in 2009 laid the foundations for Muslim educational institutions in the Russia Federation, first by organizing an underground medrassah in Kazan in the 1960s and 1970s and then by overseeing the growth of that system after 1991.
To mark that event, Muslim leaders from around the Russian Federation have assembled in Kazan to recall the career of that man who many of Russia’s Muslims call “one of the founding fathers of the contemporary system of Muslim religious education in Russia” (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/anons/?ID=2392).
In advance of that session, several websites posted biographies of Samatov, an individual who not only helped keep Islam alive in the late Soviet period but helped bridge the divide between the permitted and often desiccated forms of “official” Islam and the more active and radical “unofficial” one (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/public/?ID=2380).
But what is perhaps most striking is that Samatov, in organizing an “underground” Muslim religious institution in Kazan, succeeded in attracting to that then-illegal institution many of the individuals such as Talgat Tajuddin, Ravil Gainutdin, Gusman Iskhakov, and other leaders of Islam in Russia now.
Born in a village in the Aksubayev district of Tatarstan, Samatov grew up in a deeply religious family where he received his first lessons in Islam. When his father and elder brothers fought in World War II, he served as head of the family but decided at that time that he would continue to study Muslim theology independently.
After service in the Soviet Army, he became a driven but in the 1950s, during his free time, he studied with Gadulkhak Sadyykov and received “a jadidist education in the Muhammadiya mosque.” Later, he worked as a mechanic at the Marjani Mosque, the only Muslim religious center open in Kazan at that time.
He took that job, his biographers say, with “a double purpose.” On the one hand, he needed to have a job to avoid falling afoul of the Soviet authorities. But on the other, he wanted to work with the imams to provide “unofficial lessons on the foundations of Islam” to all who were interested.
“In the 1960s, 1970s and even later, this ‘underground’ medressah was visited by such well-known Russian religious leaders as Talgat Tajuddin [who now heads the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa] and Ravil Gainudtin [the leader of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR)],” not to mention many other current Muslim leaders in the Middle Volga.
In the mid-1960s, the authorities dispatched Samatov and Tajuddin to the Mir Arab medrassah in Bukhara,” but Samatov remained there only two years. On the one hand, he already knew most of what the instructors there had to teach. And on the other, the head of the Central Asian MSD didn’t like having two Middle Volga Muslims there at any one time.
By the 1970s, Samatov had become a member of the Marjani Mosque administration and helped restore the call of the azans and rebuild the infrastructure of the mosque, including recovering its library which the Soviet authorities had confiscated. Then in 1980, when Tajuddin assumed the post he now holds, Samatov began his service as an imam.
From 1981 to 1986, he worked as a mullah in Almetyevsk, then from 1988 to 1991 in Orenburg, and then in Chistopol. And throughout this period, he continued to push for Muslim education thus winning for himself recognition as “one of the founding fathers” of the current extensive system of Islamic training in the Middle Volga.
Among his students in the 1990s – Samatov continued to teach until 2003 – were the future mufti of Chuvashia, the imam-khatyb of the Kul Sharif mosque in Kazan, the rector of the Muhammadiya medrassah, and many others. In 1998, he was elected the chief kazi of Tatarstan, a post he occupied until 2006 when he was replaced by one of his students.
Samatov died on March 9, 2009. Today, he is being recalled as an intellectual and teacher, a continuer of the jadid and Naqshbandia Sufi traditions, and as the founder of a dynasty of imams – both his sons are serving in that capacity. But what may be most important about this anniversary is what it says about the relationship of official and unofficial Islam.
Many commentaries on Islam in Soviet times stress how distant and hostile these two trends were, with the former supported and controlled by the Soviet state and the latter reflecting the popular and far more vibrant tradition of Islam But Samatov in his career demonstrated that the two were closely connected, a reality that lives on in the leadership of Russia’s Muslims.
And that in turn means that the leaders of the officially recognized MSDs, like Tajuddin and Gainutdin, almost certainly have a different attitude toward those parts of Islamic life that are not included within their “official” purview, an attitude that they may use to defend themselves against Moscow’s demands and to push their own Islamic values.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Two New Moves on the Chechen Chess Board
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 12 – Two moves on the Chechen political scene this week – Akhmed Zakayev’s decision to defer to the Chechen militants at home and Ramzan Kadyrov’s effort to reach out to Chechens living outside the republic – could re-order the political situation not only in Chechnya but elsewhere as well.
On the one hand, the decision of Zakayaev, who has led the Chechen Republic Ichkeria in emigration, to recognize the supremacy of those fighting for Chechen independence inside the republic will help unite the militants around a nationalist agenda and undermine the arguments of those who insist that Islamic radicalism has displaced ethno-nationalism among Chechens.
And on the other, Kadyrov’s convention of a World Congress of Chechens in Grozny reinforces his authority among Chechens at home but also and perhaps more importantly gives him an independent power base and thus reduces Moscow’s ability either to rein him in as many in the Russian capital have urged or to dismiss him as at least some political figures want.
Zakayev announced that he was disbanding the émigré government he has headed and subordinating himself and it to the State Committee of Defense, the Shura Mejlis, “for the period of war, thus effectively making Khuseyn Gakayev, the militant leader who broke with Doku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175413/).
In comments to “Kommersant,” Zakayev said he and his colleagues had taken this step because “we consider that the Chechen militants have distanced themselves from this mythical formation with the name ‘emirate’ and intend to return to the legal field of Ichkeria,” a secular project rather than a religious one (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1520658).
Zakayev’s decision ends the split between the émigré leadership and the Chechen militants, a split that had its origins in the 2007 decision of Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in place of the Chechen republic and to promote Islamic goals rather than strictly national ones.
Gakayev recently explained his break with Umarov, the Moscow paper points out, by saying that “the problems of Chechens don’t interest Umarov” and that “other people direct his actions.” Thus, it turns out, “Kommersant” concludes, that “the conflict of Mssrs. Zakayev and Umarov has ended with the defeat of the latter.”
Zakayev has no plans to leave the political field, however. He said that he or his emissaries would meet with Gakayev’s militants “with the intention of forming new structures of power” and that “until that time, “he and the members of his government will continue to fulfill their responsibilities.”
But at the same time, Zakayev made clear that he expects that new government to consist primarily of those who are in Chechnya, although he said that he did not “exclude” the possibility that someone “from outside the borders of the republic might serve as prime minster,” a position he may hope to fill.
Meanwhile, today, Kadyrov opened a two-day World Congress of the Chechen People that his government said was attended by more than a thousand Chechens from outside the republic, including various parts of the Russian Federation, European countries and North America (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175436/).
While many observers suggested that this was simply Kadyrov’s response to the September 16th meeting Zakayev organized in Poland, others noted that this session was originally discussed as a possible venue for the return of Zakayev to Grozny, something that clearly is not going to happen.
In an opening address to the meeting, Kadyrov set the tone, saying that he wanted those attending to be sincere and open in their remarks and not to distort the meaning of what is said in the hall.” But he made it very clear that he has carefully thought through what he wants this meeting to achieve (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/Chechnya/27020.html).
Specifically, he said he wanted the meeting to adopt a resolution calling on Chechens regardless of where they live to preserve “their language, customs and culture, to always remain real Muslims and not forget that they are Chechens,” thus pointing to a different balance between Islam and nationalism than Akayev offers.
“Today, we are masters in our own republic,” Kadyrov continued. “We have full freedom and all opportunities for observing the canons of Islam. We can freely shout to the entire world that we are Muslims and Chechens. What more do we want? We need first of all that the world understands that the Chechen people are not guilty of the tragedies” it has suffered.
And “we need to become on fraternal family and protect that which we have now.” All Chechens of good will, Kadyrov continued, need to cooperate, except for those which he said he considers “enemies of the people.” And to that end, he called for forming a general council of the Chechens of the world and the launch of a new journal, “Chechens in the 21st Century.”
What is most immediately striking is the difference between Akayev and Kadyrov concerning Chechen national identity and Islam. Akayev, who, Moscow views as an enemy, took the step he did because the militants have broken with the jihadist groups in Islam, while Kadyrov, who enjoys Moscow’s support, celebrated Islam over Chechen identity.
Vienna, October 12 – Two moves on the Chechen political scene this week – Akhmed Zakayev’s decision to defer to the Chechen militants at home and Ramzan Kadyrov’s effort to reach out to Chechens living outside the republic – could re-order the political situation not only in Chechnya but elsewhere as well.
On the one hand, the decision of Zakayaev, who has led the Chechen Republic Ichkeria in emigration, to recognize the supremacy of those fighting for Chechen independence inside the republic will help unite the militants around a nationalist agenda and undermine the arguments of those who insist that Islamic radicalism has displaced ethno-nationalism among Chechens.
And on the other, Kadyrov’s convention of a World Congress of Chechens in Grozny reinforces his authority among Chechens at home but also and perhaps more importantly gives him an independent power base and thus reduces Moscow’s ability either to rein him in as many in the Russian capital have urged or to dismiss him as at least some political figures want.
Zakayev announced that he was disbanding the émigré government he has headed and subordinating himself and it to the State Committee of Defense, the Shura Mejlis, “for the period of war, thus effectively making Khuseyn Gakayev, the militant leader who broke with Doku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175413/).
In comments to “Kommersant,” Zakayev said he and his colleagues had taken this step because “we consider that the Chechen militants have distanced themselves from this mythical formation with the name ‘emirate’ and intend to return to the legal field of Ichkeria,” a secular project rather than a religious one (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1520658).
Zakayev’s decision ends the split between the émigré leadership and the Chechen militants, a split that had its origins in the 2007 decision of Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in place of the Chechen republic and to promote Islamic goals rather than strictly national ones.
Gakayev recently explained his break with Umarov, the Moscow paper points out, by saying that “the problems of Chechens don’t interest Umarov” and that “other people direct his actions.” Thus, it turns out, “Kommersant” concludes, that “the conflict of Mssrs. Zakayev and Umarov has ended with the defeat of the latter.”
Zakayev has no plans to leave the political field, however. He said that he or his emissaries would meet with Gakayev’s militants “with the intention of forming new structures of power” and that “until that time, “he and the members of his government will continue to fulfill their responsibilities.”
But at the same time, Zakayev made clear that he expects that new government to consist primarily of those who are in Chechnya, although he said that he did not “exclude” the possibility that someone “from outside the borders of the republic might serve as prime minster,” a position he may hope to fill.
Meanwhile, today, Kadyrov opened a two-day World Congress of the Chechen People that his government said was attended by more than a thousand Chechens from outside the republic, including various parts of the Russian Federation, European countries and North America (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175436/).
While many observers suggested that this was simply Kadyrov’s response to the September 16th meeting Zakayev organized in Poland, others noted that this session was originally discussed as a possible venue for the return of Zakayev to Grozny, something that clearly is not going to happen.
In an opening address to the meeting, Kadyrov set the tone, saying that he wanted those attending to be sincere and open in their remarks and not to distort the meaning of what is said in the hall.” But he made it very clear that he has carefully thought through what he wants this meeting to achieve (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/Chechnya/27020.html).
Specifically, he said he wanted the meeting to adopt a resolution calling on Chechens regardless of where they live to preserve “their language, customs and culture, to always remain real Muslims and not forget that they are Chechens,” thus pointing to a different balance between Islam and nationalism than Akayev offers.
“Today, we are masters in our own republic,” Kadyrov continued. “We have full freedom and all opportunities for observing the canons of Islam. We can freely shout to the entire world that we are Muslims and Chechens. What more do we want? We need first of all that the world understands that the Chechen people are not guilty of the tragedies” it has suffered.
And “we need to become on fraternal family and protect that which we have now.” All Chechens of good will, Kadyrov continued, need to cooperate, except for those which he said he considers “enemies of the people.” And to that end, he called for forming a general council of the Chechens of the world and the launch of a new journal, “Chechens in the 21st Century.”
What is most immediately striking is the difference between Akayev and Kadyrov concerning Chechen national identity and Islam. Akayev, who, Moscow views as an enemy, took the step he did because the militants have broken with the jihadist groups in Islam, while Kadyrov, who enjoys Moscow’s support, celebrated Islam over Chechen identity.
Window on Eurasia: Siberian Nationalists Issue Appeal to the World
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 12 – Siberian nationalists, encouraged by the response to their call for residents of that enormous region to declare themselves Siberian by nationality in the upcoming Russian Federation census, have now issued an appeal to the broader international community about what they see as the coming of age of the Siberian nation.
The 400-word appeal, which was posted online yesterday in both Siberian/Russian and English, argues that the willingness of people there to declare their nationality as Siberian marks “the end of the ripening and forming of Siberian identity” and thus the coming into existence of a Siberian nation (www.verkhoturov.info/content/view/1010/1/).
“We have been able to overcome the forcible imposition of an alien identity, the destruction of our culture, and the suppression of free speech which had blocked our development and self-determination,” the appeal says And it continues that “while there are difficult problems ahead,” the Siberian nationalists say they see the way clear to do so.
Among the most serious problems the nationalists say they and others in the region face are “the rehabilitation of natural resources that have been harmed by severe industrial pollution,” something that they suggest can be achieved only if Siberians “consolidate our rights to be free on our own land.”
(Indeed, although the appeal does not go into details, it is the coming together of ecological and economic concerns that is driving this movement, in particular, Moscow’s willingness to exploit Siberia even if that involves destroying it and involving Chinese investors. On this, see www.plotina.net/eurosibenergo-china-yangtze/#more-2390.)
The appeal then specifies the attitude of Siberians toward “other nations of the world.” First of all, it says, “Siberians wholly respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the [Helsinki] Final Act, “ideas which changed humanity for the better and have become the foundation of all international relations.”
Siberians, the appeal says, “will follow these principles regardless of the form that our political self-determination takes.”
Second, the appeal asserts, “Siberians do not threaten any nation which lives in peace, have no plans to attack anyone, condemn war and violence and reject double standards.” Third, Siberians support “the development and progress of all nations” and support all efforts to promote scientific and technical development.
“We see ourselves as part of humanity,” the Siberian appeal whose authors include Dmitry Verkhoturov, Yaroslav Zolotarev and Anton Patrushev ends, “and intend to devote all our efforts to promote progressive development” and “offer peace, friendship and equal cooperation” to all others.
This declaration is important even though it is clear that not all residents of Siberia share its implicit interest in the pursuit of independence. On the one hand, it is likely to be used by Moscow and Russian nationalists as evidence that the Siberian movement is “secessionist” as Russian commentators have said.
But on the other hand, the appearance of this declaration is an indication that Siberian regionalism is own rapidly evolving in a more explicitly nationalist direction, the result of policies that in and of themselves are contributing to a growing sense of victimhood among Siberians.
In this sense and more clearly than in any other predominantly ethnic Russian region in the Russian Federation, Siberia provides a clear indication of the direction other “Russian” regions are likely to follow if the powers that be continue to destroy the last remnants of federalism, something that they seem bent on doing.
Vienna, October 12 – Siberian nationalists, encouraged by the response to their call for residents of that enormous region to declare themselves Siberian by nationality in the upcoming Russian Federation census, have now issued an appeal to the broader international community about what they see as the coming of age of the Siberian nation.
The 400-word appeal, which was posted online yesterday in both Siberian/Russian and English, argues that the willingness of people there to declare their nationality as Siberian marks “the end of the ripening and forming of Siberian identity” and thus the coming into existence of a Siberian nation (www.verkhoturov.info/content/view/1010/1/).
“We have been able to overcome the forcible imposition of an alien identity, the destruction of our culture, and the suppression of free speech which had blocked our development and self-determination,” the appeal says And it continues that “while there are difficult problems ahead,” the Siberian nationalists say they see the way clear to do so.
Among the most serious problems the nationalists say they and others in the region face are “the rehabilitation of natural resources that have been harmed by severe industrial pollution,” something that they suggest can be achieved only if Siberians “consolidate our rights to be free on our own land.”
(Indeed, although the appeal does not go into details, it is the coming together of ecological and economic concerns that is driving this movement, in particular, Moscow’s willingness to exploit Siberia even if that involves destroying it and involving Chinese investors. On this, see www.plotina.net/eurosibenergo-china-yangtze/#more-2390.)
The appeal then specifies the attitude of Siberians toward “other nations of the world.” First of all, it says, “Siberians wholly respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the [Helsinki] Final Act, “ideas which changed humanity for the better and have become the foundation of all international relations.”
Siberians, the appeal says, “will follow these principles regardless of the form that our political self-determination takes.”
Second, the appeal asserts, “Siberians do not threaten any nation which lives in peace, have no plans to attack anyone, condemn war and violence and reject double standards.” Third, Siberians support “the development and progress of all nations” and support all efforts to promote scientific and technical development.
“We see ourselves as part of humanity,” the Siberian appeal whose authors include Dmitry Verkhoturov, Yaroslav Zolotarev and Anton Patrushev ends, “and intend to devote all our efforts to promote progressive development” and “offer peace, friendship and equal cooperation” to all others.
This declaration is important even though it is clear that not all residents of Siberia share its implicit interest in the pursuit of independence. On the one hand, it is likely to be used by Moscow and Russian nationalists as evidence that the Siberian movement is “secessionist” as Russian commentators have said.
But on the other hand, the appearance of this declaration is an indication that Siberian regionalism is own rapidly evolving in a more explicitly nationalist direction, the result of policies that in and of themselves are contributing to a growing sense of victimhood among Siberians.
In this sense and more clearly than in any other predominantly ethnic Russian region in the Russian Federation, Siberia provides a clear indication of the direction other “Russian” regions are likely to follow if the powers that be continue to destroy the last remnants of federalism, something that they seem bent on doing.
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