Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – Vladimir Resin, the acting mayor of the Russian capital, yesterday called for holding public hearings about all projects for the construction of churches, mosques, and synagogues, a plan that could threaten existing relationships between the city and the Moscow Patriarchate even as it creates new venues for protests against building more mosques.
During a meeting of the city government at which some religious leaders were present, Resin said that “it is necessary to initiate public hearings on each project for the construction of new churches, mosques and synagogues” so as to ensure conformity by the projects to the city’s development plan (www.rian.ru/moscow/20101005/282425392.html).
But like all such programs, this one, if it is in fact carried out, will have very different consequences for the two largest religious communities in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and the way they interact with the official bureaucracy and with the civil population there.
For the Russian Orthodox, such hearings could complicate the cozy relationship the Moscow Patriarchate has had with the city authorities, a relationship that in the past has meant that the city government has responded to the Church’s requests without either seeking input from the population.
Now that would appear likely to change, and while few Muscovites may be opposed to church construction per se, some may object to the building of a church in a particular location or of a particular size. Indeed, polls have shown that some residents of Russian cities are inclined to oppose any new construction.
Moreover, the holding of such hearings could easily become the occasion for representatives of other faiths, particularly Muslims, to make their own cases for construction of mosques or other religious sites, arguing that if the Orthodox are allowed to build more churches, they should be allowed to construct additional religious facilities as well.
For the Muslims, in contrast, such hearings almost certainly would be the occasion for those Muscovites such as the residents of the Tekstilshchiki neighborhood who oppose the building of mosques in their neighborhoods on principle to express their views, quite possibly giving them the chance to mobilize even more people to their point of view.
But such hearings, far more than the demonstrations and petitions against mosques so far, will also give the Muslim community and its leaders the opportunity to mobilize and express their view, something that could easily land those city officials charged with making a decision after such hearings in a politically difficult position.
Just how sensitive these issues are and how complicated the discussion of them in such forums will be is reflected in two items just posted online in Moscow. The first is the text of the presentation Ravil Gainutdin made to the meeting of the city government yesterday, and the second is a report by Komsomolskaya Pravda on new church construction in Moscow.
Gainutdin, head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), said that the extreme shortage of mosques in the Russian capital is “an objective fact” and harms both Moscow’s image and the ability of Islamic leaders to help integrate Muslim workers into the life of the Russian capital (www.muslim.ru/1/cont/33/35/2155.htm).
A mosque, he pointed out, “is not only a play for carrying out divine services and offering prayers. The main thing is that in mosques, parishioners receive instruction, spiritual, moral and political training, and correct guidance on their life paths,” often things migrants can get nowhere else.
And his organization, Gainutdin said, seeks to devote “great efforts in education work to prevent or cure extremist attitudes and the radicalization among Muslim young people, especially those who come to work in Moscow from the North Caucasus and from countries abroad.”
Such people, the SMR head continued, especially “the young who are cut off from their families and from parental guidance” very much need to be able to come to the mosque “for adaptation in the new for them milieu of the megalopolis and for the preservation of the best that genuine Muslim education can give.”
“In the mosque,” he said, “they will find true words and guidance which will help them orient themselves in the new situation and not commit act which alienate the residents of the capable and are capable of giving birth to conflict.” Consequently, Gainutdin concluded, Moscow needs to have more than the four mosques open there now.
Meanwhile, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” report shows why Russian Orthodox hierarchs and laity are going to fight for the construction of more churches in Moscow. The article notes that while most people speak about the existence of 836 Orthodox Church facilities there, the real number is only 263 (http://www.kp.ru/daily/24570/742375/).
That is because the others are inside institutions and thus not available “for all.” According to the Moscow Patriarchate, the city needs to have 591 more public churches in order that there be one church for every 11,200 residents, a ratio that it says is found throughout the rest of the country.
To that end, the Church is engaged in a building boom with 35 new churches either under construction or soon to be – the paper provides a list of their addresses and a map of their locations – with most of them inexpensive pre-fabricated buildings so that the Church can get them up in a hurry at the lowest possible cost.
Those 35 are part of the 200 that Yuri Luzhkov supposedly approved in conversation with Patriarch Kirill and his hierarchs shortly before the mayor’s ouster. But given Resin’s call for hearings about all new construction, it remains to be seen whether there will be new fights about any of these, just as there continue to be about possible new mosques.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Counting Russian Federation’s Nationalities Far from an Exact Science, Tishkov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – Russian experts and statisticians have worked hard to ensure that the question of national identities in the upcoming census will not be as controversial and politicized as it was in the 2002 count, according to Academician Valery Tishkov, director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.
But that does not mean, Tishkov says in an article in today’s “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” that all problems in this area have been solved –the enormous complexity of the situation means there will always be disagreements on which groups to include or exclude – or that the census later this month will not spark controversy (www.rg.ru/2010/10/06/perepis.html).
In 2002, the academician recalls, then-Patriarch Aleksii asked then-Russian President Vladimir Putin to add to the nationalities list the Kryashens, a sub-group of Tatars who practice Orthodox Christianity. Tishkov’s institute agreed, and then-Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev accused Moscow of trying to “split the Tatar nation on religious lines.”
Following that and other controversies, Russian scholars and officials agreed on “a compromise in the form of dual ethnic membership according to the principle of ‘group-sub-group,’” that Tishkov says corresponds to “the real presence among part of [the residents of Russia] of a complex ethnic self-consciousness.”
Even that compromise, however, has not made everyone happy, he continues, because activists in many groups are certain that this arrangement is intended to reduce their number to the benefit of other groups, something that they believe threatens the status and income of their own nationality.
This time around, Tishkov argues, “it is important to rein in political ambitions and ethno-centrism,” saying that the latter is “the more scandalous” because promoting one identity necessarily has the impact of reducing another. Thus, those who say “describe yourself as a Tatar” are in fact saying “don’t be a Kryashen.”
The history of Moscow’s compilation of lists of ethnic groups extends back to the 1920s when the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of the Soviet Union first compiled them. Its list was used in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 censuses. For more recent ones, in 1959, 1970, and 1989, his institute drew up the lists.
There can be no final list because ethnic self-consciousness is something changeable for any number of reasons as well as being subject to multiple interpretations both by those making declarations and those recording them, Tishkov says. Instead, the lists are going to constantly change, something some will see as politicized even when it is not.
In 1989, the list included 128 “nations and peoples.” In 2002, there were 142 “basic” ethnic names and 40 “sub-groups” included within those. Some of those changes reflected changes abroad – the breakup of Yugoslavia – and others domestic concerns – Daghestani fears of upsetting the ethnic balance there.
Because approximately 40 non-Russian peoples have some form of administrative-state status within the Russian Federation and because more than 40 have the status of “numerically small indigenous peoples,” the census must count them as accurately as possible so as to provide the basis for the distribution of funds.
Doing so, however, is not always easy, Tishkov points out. Within the districts where they have such official recognition, officials are careful to count them, but when representatives live beyond the borders of those entities, officials there may have less experience with and interest in counting them, something that can be a source of problems.
That can affect large groups like the Tatars and Bashkirs but it can also affect small ones like the Nivkh. Moreover, this pattern can sometimes take the opposite form: In 2002, for example, the Botlikhs, a numerically small ethnic community in Daghestan, were counted as a nationality in Moscow, Rostov, and Chelyabinsk but not in their home republic.
As Tishkov’s extensive discussion of these and other issues makes clear, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the findings of the 2010 census on nationality will be accepted as absolutely accurate by everyone. Instead, this enumeration like its predecessors almost certainly will revive old disputes and provoke new and unexpected ones as well.
Staunton, October 6 – Russian experts and statisticians have worked hard to ensure that the question of national identities in the upcoming census will not be as controversial and politicized as it was in the 2002 count, according to Academician Valery Tishkov, director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.
But that does not mean, Tishkov says in an article in today’s “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” that all problems in this area have been solved –the enormous complexity of the situation means there will always be disagreements on which groups to include or exclude – or that the census later this month will not spark controversy (www.rg.ru/2010/10/06/perepis.html).
In 2002, the academician recalls, then-Patriarch Aleksii asked then-Russian President Vladimir Putin to add to the nationalities list the Kryashens, a sub-group of Tatars who practice Orthodox Christianity. Tishkov’s institute agreed, and then-Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev accused Moscow of trying to “split the Tatar nation on religious lines.”
Following that and other controversies, Russian scholars and officials agreed on “a compromise in the form of dual ethnic membership according to the principle of ‘group-sub-group,’” that Tishkov says corresponds to “the real presence among part of [the residents of Russia] of a complex ethnic self-consciousness.”
Even that compromise, however, has not made everyone happy, he continues, because activists in many groups are certain that this arrangement is intended to reduce their number to the benefit of other groups, something that they believe threatens the status and income of their own nationality.
This time around, Tishkov argues, “it is important to rein in political ambitions and ethno-centrism,” saying that the latter is “the more scandalous” because promoting one identity necessarily has the impact of reducing another. Thus, those who say “describe yourself as a Tatar” are in fact saying “don’t be a Kryashen.”
The history of Moscow’s compilation of lists of ethnic groups extends back to the 1920s when the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of the Soviet Union first compiled them. Its list was used in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 censuses. For more recent ones, in 1959, 1970, and 1989, his institute drew up the lists.
There can be no final list because ethnic self-consciousness is something changeable for any number of reasons as well as being subject to multiple interpretations both by those making declarations and those recording them, Tishkov says. Instead, the lists are going to constantly change, something some will see as politicized even when it is not.
In 1989, the list included 128 “nations and peoples.” In 2002, there were 142 “basic” ethnic names and 40 “sub-groups” included within those. Some of those changes reflected changes abroad – the breakup of Yugoslavia – and others domestic concerns – Daghestani fears of upsetting the ethnic balance there.
Because approximately 40 non-Russian peoples have some form of administrative-state status within the Russian Federation and because more than 40 have the status of “numerically small indigenous peoples,” the census must count them as accurately as possible so as to provide the basis for the distribution of funds.
Doing so, however, is not always easy, Tishkov points out. Within the districts where they have such official recognition, officials are careful to count them, but when representatives live beyond the borders of those entities, officials there may have less experience with and interest in counting them, something that can be a source of problems.
That can affect large groups like the Tatars and Bashkirs but it can also affect small ones like the Nivkh. Moreover, this pattern can sometimes take the opposite form: In 2002, for example, the Botlikhs, a numerically small ethnic community in Daghestan, were counted as a nationality in Moscow, Rostov, and Chelyabinsk but not in their home republic.
As Tishkov’s extensive discussion of these and other issues makes clear, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the findings of the 2010 census on nationality will be accepted as absolutely accurate by everyone. Instead, this enumeration like its predecessors almost certainly will revive old disputes and provoke new and unexpected ones as well.
Window on Eurasia: Those Who Say Authoritarianism Inevitable in Russia Share Blame for Putin’s Suppression of Freedom, Ryzhkov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – People in Russia and the West who provide support for “the myth of Russia’s historically predetermined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” are contributing “to the continued suppression of human rights” there and thus providing “a valuable service to Vladimir Putin,” according to a former Duma deputy and now Ekho Moskvy host
But such people should remember, Vladimir Ryzhkov continues, that “each new article or book promoting these shame theories leads directly to … Russia’s continued backwardness, poverty and enslavement and [also to] an increase in Russians who emigrate to the West seeking freedom and prosperity” (www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/historically-determined-to-be-an-autocrat/418431.html and www.echo.msk.ru/blog/rizhkov/715893-echo/ ).
Putin and those around him such as Kremlin first deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov “don’t believe Russians can be trusted to vote,” Ryzhkov says, because the Russian prime minister and his supporters do not believe that the Russian people are “smart or civilized enough to vote responsibly.”
But that “condescending” view, the Ekho Moskvy journalist says, “is by no means limited to voting.” Putin and his entourage also “believe that the masses are not able to do anything,” that “Russia needs ‘a benevolent tsar’ with an iron-like power vertical to explain to the ignorant masses what is best for the country.”
When Putin eliminated the election of governors in 2004, he argued that this “would somehow help defend the country against terrorism,” but he also said that “if the people were allowed to vote, they might elect the ‘wrong’ candidates.” And since that time, he has repeated that argument “as a justification for squashing [all] political competition.”
Given that in Putin’s view, Russia’s “liberal and leftist opposition” parties are “a radical and revolutionary force,” he is fully justified in blocking them from being “elected by naïve and misguided” citizens. Only “the ‘systemic opposition’” can be permitted because those parties “obey his orders and help the Kremlin create the impression” that democracy exists.
Further, Ryzhkov continues, “to help ‘the kind tsar’ carry out his duties,” Putin placed “the major television channels under government control” and ensured that his pocket party, United Russia “dominated” those places where elections did take place or was in a position to “falsify” the outcomes, a classic example of “the end justifying the means.”
“The only exception” to Putin’s belief that “the people are ignorant and can’t be trusted with electing officials,” of course, was the elections of 2000 and 2004 when “by some miraculous stroke of fate,” Russians showed “unprecedented wisdom and responsibility” and voted for him.
In order to buttress his claims, Ryzhkov says, “Putin and his ideologues” – liked Surkov – “try to package their disdain in pseudo-historical terms,” arguing that “Russia has a unique ‘historical tradition’” and has “always been dominated by a strong autocrat in the Kremlin,” something no one is in a position to change at least for the present.
And while “Putin allows for the possibility that one day Russians might be able to overcome this 1000-year-old legacy” and become “mature and responsible enough” to take charge of their own affairs,” he makes it clear that that will occur only “sometime in the future, presumably long after Putin retires.”
This view, Ryzhkov says, allows Putin and his supporters to argue that “the systematic destruction of [Russia’s] democratic institution” that they have carried out was “not the result of manipulation, usurpation and the abuse of power but rather a natural and unavoidable manifestation of [the country’s] ‘predetermined historical path.’”
Such an argument “completely ignores” the history of liberal reform movements in Russia’s past, “including those pursued by Alexander II, Nicholas II, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,” Ryzhkov says, and thus should be dismissed as “cynical” and “cheap” political propaganda.
But at least, Putin is pushing this line to advance his own power. What is worse, Ryzhkov suggests, is when others in Russia and even more abroad “reinforce the myth of Russia’s historically pre-determined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” by their writings.
They are whether they know it or not “providing a valuable service to Putin” and other opponents of democracy and freedom in Russia and thus making “their own contribution to the continued suppression of human rights in Russia now” whose people deserve the chance to take control of their own fate.
Staunton, October 6 – People in Russia and the West who provide support for “the myth of Russia’s historically predetermined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” are contributing “to the continued suppression of human rights” there and thus providing “a valuable service to Vladimir Putin,” according to a former Duma deputy and now Ekho Moskvy host
But such people should remember, Vladimir Ryzhkov continues, that “each new article or book promoting these shame theories leads directly to … Russia’s continued backwardness, poverty and enslavement and [also to] an increase in Russians who emigrate to the West seeking freedom and prosperity” (www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/historically-determined-to-be-an-autocrat/418431.html and www.echo.msk.ru/blog/rizhkov/715893-echo/ ).
Putin and those around him such as Kremlin first deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov “don’t believe Russians can be trusted to vote,” Ryzhkov says, because the Russian prime minister and his supporters do not believe that the Russian people are “smart or civilized enough to vote responsibly.”
But that “condescending” view, the Ekho Moskvy journalist says, “is by no means limited to voting.” Putin and his entourage also “believe that the masses are not able to do anything,” that “Russia needs ‘a benevolent tsar’ with an iron-like power vertical to explain to the ignorant masses what is best for the country.”
When Putin eliminated the election of governors in 2004, he argued that this “would somehow help defend the country against terrorism,” but he also said that “if the people were allowed to vote, they might elect the ‘wrong’ candidates.” And since that time, he has repeated that argument “as a justification for squashing [all] political competition.”
Given that in Putin’s view, Russia’s “liberal and leftist opposition” parties are “a radical and revolutionary force,” he is fully justified in blocking them from being “elected by naïve and misguided” citizens. Only “the ‘systemic opposition’” can be permitted because those parties “obey his orders and help the Kremlin create the impression” that democracy exists.
Further, Ryzhkov continues, “to help ‘the kind tsar’ carry out his duties,” Putin placed “the major television channels under government control” and ensured that his pocket party, United Russia “dominated” those places where elections did take place or was in a position to “falsify” the outcomes, a classic example of “the end justifying the means.”
“The only exception” to Putin’s belief that “the people are ignorant and can’t be trusted with electing officials,” of course, was the elections of 2000 and 2004 when “by some miraculous stroke of fate,” Russians showed “unprecedented wisdom and responsibility” and voted for him.
In order to buttress his claims, Ryzhkov says, “Putin and his ideologues” – liked Surkov – “try to package their disdain in pseudo-historical terms,” arguing that “Russia has a unique ‘historical tradition’” and has “always been dominated by a strong autocrat in the Kremlin,” something no one is in a position to change at least for the present.
And while “Putin allows for the possibility that one day Russians might be able to overcome this 1000-year-old legacy” and become “mature and responsible enough” to take charge of their own affairs,” he makes it clear that that will occur only “sometime in the future, presumably long after Putin retires.”
This view, Ryzhkov says, allows Putin and his supporters to argue that “the systematic destruction of [Russia’s] democratic institution” that they have carried out was “not the result of manipulation, usurpation and the abuse of power but rather a natural and unavoidable manifestation of [the country’s] ‘predetermined historical path.’”
Such an argument “completely ignores” the history of liberal reform movements in Russia’s past, “including those pursued by Alexander II, Nicholas II, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,” Ryzhkov says, and thus should be dismissed as “cynical” and “cheap” political propaganda.
But at least, Putin is pushing this line to advance his own power. What is worse, Ryzhkov suggests, is when others in Russia and even more abroad “reinforce the myth of Russia’s historically pre-determined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” by their writings.
They are whether they know it or not “providing a valuable service to Putin” and other opponents of democracy and freedom in Russia and thus making “their own contribution to the continued suppression of human rights in Russia now” whose people deserve the chance to take control of their own fate.
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