Paul Goble
Staunton, October 5 – Contemporary “Russian nationalism,” according to a Moscow commentator who clearly wishes it were otherwise, is in many respects “just the opposite of what its name suggests,” with its self-identified supporters displaying “a nihilistic” attitude toward “the real Russian nation, its historical memory, its mentality, its saints and its statehood.”
In an essay on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Andrey Tarasenko says that “there is hardly any other milieu besides that of the Russian nationalists (for brevity, [he says he] will not use quotation marks around [that term]) in which hostility to the Russian nation is manifested so sharply” (www.russ.ru/pole/Portret-russkogo-nacionalista).
This characteristic of Russian “nationalists,” he continues, is displayed in the attitudes of those calling themselves that toward Russian Orthodoxy, Russia as great power, and Russia’s victory in the Great Fatherland War. It isn’t necessary for a Russian nationalist to agree on all of these, but if he disagrees on most, there is a problem.
With regard to Orthodoxy, few “nationalists” declare themselves atheists. Most consider themselves “believers.” But many of these do not have anything to do with the Moscow Patriarchate, preferring instead to be part of the émigré church, which despite its communion with Moscow remains a very different thing.
“The softest form of non-acceptance of the Russian Orthodox Church,” Tarasenko says, “is a rejection of its existing leadership.” But some Russian nationalists reject Christianity altogether, preferring paganism, Gnosticism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism or some other religious faith.
Such people often “consider Orthodoxy as the chief cause of all the misfortunes of the Russian nation.” One consequence of this is that increasingly “Russian nationalists who support Orthodoxy have begun to call themselves nationalists more rarely,” thus leading to a situation in which Russian nationalism and “anti-Orthodoxy” are conflated.
As far as the second factor – support of Russian statehood as it has existed – many Russian “nationalists” believe that the misfortunes of the Russian nation have arisen from the pre-1917 empire and the post-1917 Soviet Union and call for disassembling “what still remains from Russian statehood” or creating “Russian republics” on the country’s current territory.
According to Tarasenko, “a small group of Russian nationalists” who do believe in empire want to make it an empire of a new type. Instead, of it being “a prison house of peoples” as Lenin described it, they want to make it a real “’prison’ for the non-Russian peoples” so that the Russians could become “a nation of rulers.”
And Russian “nationalists” also divide on the third element, Russia’s victory in the Great Fatherland War. “For some this was a victory of ‘the godless communist regime’ with some not forgetting to add ‘Jewish-communist.’” For others, it was purchased at too high a cost. And for still others, the wrong side won.
Obviously, Tarasenko says, “one nationalist can respect the victory of the Russian people in the Great Fatherland War but be a pagan and strive for the separation of ‘a Russian Republic.’ Another can confess Orthodoxy and be a supporter of Russia as a great power but nonetheless be a follower of General Vlasov, Krasnov, Shkuro and von Pannwitz.”
“And a third cannot conceal his sympathies to Hitler and Nazism, burn icons at ‘pagan holidays’ and dream about a 100 percent racially pure ‘Nordic’ Rus in the forests of the Northern Dvina River valley,” Tarasenko says, adding that “the level of real Russophobia among these people can be different but the common trend is obvious.”
The commentator says that his use of Russophobia to describe such Russian nationalists is no accident. “How else could you call” such ideas? He asks rhetorically, because it is all too obvious that “Russian nationalists serve not the Russian people as it is but the one that it must become in their imaginations.”
And that is “the root” of the problem, he argues. “Russian nationalists do not like their own people, its history, customs and culture.” Consequently, even though they “angrily deny their Russophobia,” that is exactly the problem with them, and that attitude not only limits their ability to cooperate with others but to win support from Russians.
“Of course,” Tarasenko concedes, “there are some bright spots” in this picture, but given the dominance of these negative trends, one has to ask whether the real nationalists will adapt and be corrupted or whether they will decide that they should not be nationalists at all given what “Russian nationalists” now are.
“The orders of one of these ‘bright spots’ are just,” Tarasenko concludes, noting that that individual gave thanks regularly that the Lord God has “preserved” Russia from what would be worse than its past and current situation: “from the coming to power of the current Russian nationalists!”
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Institute Pushes Recognition of ‘Newest States’ in ‘Near Abroad’
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The director of an independent Moscow institute established just before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and which has promoted the diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since that time now says that international recognition of the independence of Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh is “inevitable.”
In a comment to the Regnum news agency yesterday, Aleksey Martynov not only made this declaration but elaborated an original legal theory on post-Soviet state construction, one that is clearly at odds with Moscow’s declared position but one that likely has supporters in the Russian capital (www.regnum.ru/news/1332158.html).
The director of the Institute of the Newest States, as his organization styles itself, argues that “the recognition by Russia of the statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in June 2008 and the upcoming recognition of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic and Nagorno-Karabakh put the final period in the history of the USSR.”
That is because, Martynov said, “Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh like Abkhazia and South Ossetia politically and legally need only recognition by Russia as the legal successor of the USSR. Subsequently, the entire world will simply be obligated to recognize these countries just as it recognizes the Russian Federation.”
If the members of the international community do not follow Russia’s lead in this, he continued, the director of this institute which has offices in Moscow and many other cities and maintains its own website in Russian and English (www.iines.org/), that would mean their “non-recognition of Russia itself with all the consequences that would flow from that.”
The reason for that, he argued, is that “not one of these newest recognized countries [the former union republics of the USSR] has taken upon itself responsibility for the common Soviet past” preferring instead “to condemn and curse it. Only Russia [which has done so] can as the metropolitan country decide the fate of the newest states in the zone of its strategic interests.”
“After the establishment of the Kosovo precedent” by the Western powers, Martynov continued, “any references to the priority of territorial integrity” need not be recognized. “Borders of states in the contemporary world” are defined by their capacity to prevent their further change, something that can of course be tested at any time.
Elsewhere in his interview, the director pointed to what he clearly viewed as his institute’s latest success, and he did so in a way that highlighted its connections with the Russian powers that be. Martynov noted that last week, a representative of South Ossetia had visited Algeria at the same time as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,
“Such coincidences in the time of the visits,” he argued, “are far from being accidental.” But to the extent that is the case, his institute might appear to fall into the category of a GONGO, that is “a government organized non-governmental organization,” one capable of promoting the government’s goals without the government having to take responsibility.
And if that is true, then the argument Martynov put forth yesterday may represent something more than the views of a single independent activist. Instead, it perhaps should be read as one part of a debate behind the scenes in Moscow as to how the Russian Federation should proceed in the future in its “near abroad.”
According to its website, “the International Institute of the Newest States is an international non-governmental organization that was created in June 2008 by a group of scholars, political scientists and international experts in the areas of conflict studies and international law” (www.iines.org/node/1).
The institute’s headquarters is in Moscow, but it has representational offices in “Kyiv, Warsaw, Simferopol, Tskhinval, Sukhum, Yerevan, Tiraspol, Western Sahara, Bucharest, Belgrad, Stepanakert and other places.” And it styles itself as “the largest expert discussion space for consideration and study of the phenomenon of the appearance of the newest states.”
The institute, the site continues, organizes “scientific conferences, symposia, and roundtables, the monitoring of social-political development of the newest states and monitoring of the media.” And it supports “the publication of materials and books of [Institute] experts” on these states and “the formation of democratic institutions and civil societies” in them.
Staunton, October 5 – The director of an independent Moscow institute established just before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and which has promoted the diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since that time now says that international recognition of the independence of Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh is “inevitable.”
In a comment to the Regnum news agency yesterday, Aleksey Martynov not only made this declaration but elaborated an original legal theory on post-Soviet state construction, one that is clearly at odds with Moscow’s declared position but one that likely has supporters in the Russian capital (www.regnum.ru/news/1332158.html).
The director of the Institute of the Newest States, as his organization styles itself, argues that “the recognition by Russia of the statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in June 2008 and the upcoming recognition of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic and Nagorno-Karabakh put the final period in the history of the USSR.”
That is because, Martynov said, “Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh like Abkhazia and South Ossetia politically and legally need only recognition by Russia as the legal successor of the USSR. Subsequently, the entire world will simply be obligated to recognize these countries just as it recognizes the Russian Federation.”
If the members of the international community do not follow Russia’s lead in this, he continued, the director of this institute which has offices in Moscow and many other cities and maintains its own website in Russian and English (www.iines.org/), that would mean their “non-recognition of Russia itself with all the consequences that would flow from that.”
The reason for that, he argued, is that “not one of these newest recognized countries [the former union republics of the USSR] has taken upon itself responsibility for the common Soviet past” preferring instead “to condemn and curse it. Only Russia [which has done so] can as the metropolitan country decide the fate of the newest states in the zone of its strategic interests.”
“After the establishment of the Kosovo precedent” by the Western powers, Martynov continued, “any references to the priority of territorial integrity” need not be recognized. “Borders of states in the contemporary world” are defined by their capacity to prevent their further change, something that can of course be tested at any time.
Elsewhere in his interview, the director pointed to what he clearly viewed as his institute’s latest success, and he did so in a way that highlighted its connections with the Russian powers that be. Martynov noted that last week, a representative of South Ossetia had visited Algeria at the same time as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,
“Such coincidences in the time of the visits,” he argued, “are far from being accidental.” But to the extent that is the case, his institute might appear to fall into the category of a GONGO, that is “a government organized non-governmental organization,” one capable of promoting the government’s goals without the government having to take responsibility.
And if that is true, then the argument Martynov put forth yesterday may represent something more than the views of a single independent activist. Instead, it perhaps should be read as one part of a debate behind the scenes in Moscow as to how the Russian Federation should proceed in the future in its “near abroad.”
According to its website, “the International Institute of the Newest States is an international non-governmental organization that was created in June 2008 by a group of scholars, political scientists and international experts in the areas of conflict studies and international law” (www.iines.org/node/1).
The institute’s headquarters is in Moscow, but it has representational offices in “Kyiv, Warsaw, Simferopol, Tskhinval, Sukhum, Yerevan, Tiraspol, Western Sahara, Bucharest, Belgrad, Stepanakert and other places.” And it styles itself as “the largest expert discussion space for consideration and study of the phenomenon of the appearance of the newest states.”
The institute, the site continues, organizes “scientific conferences, symposia, and roundtables, the monitoring of social-political development of the newest states and monitoring of the media.” And it supports “the publication of materials and books of [Institute] experts” on these states and “the formation of democratic institutions and civil societies” in them.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow is Alienating More than Minsk, Russian Analysts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The war of words between Dmitry Medvedev and Alyaksandr Lukashenka is more than just the product of tensions between Moscow and Minsk, Russian analysts say. Instead, it is part of a broader and growing alienation between the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics, one that has its roots in clashing visions of the future.
But both because of the West’s hostility to Lukashenka and his regime, one usually labeled “the last dictatorship in Europe,” and because of the West’s desire to curry favor with Moscow in pursuit of one or another goal, this general trend, widely noted by commentators in the region, has been largely ignored, let alone exploited, by Europe or the United States.
The clearest expression of this argument can be found in a commentary on Grani.ru yesterday. In it, Dmitry Shusharin, a regular writer for that portal, points out that the exchange of angry words between Medvedev and Lukashenka is part Moscow’s current propensity to be angry with all leaders of the post-Soviet states (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/182276.html).
Russia’s “tandemocracy,” he says,m had placed “great hopes” on new Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, but exactly what these would in fact look like is something that Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, along with the rest of the Russian powers that be, clearly “did not themselves know” at least in any specific detail.
“In an ideal outcome,” the Russian leaders “see relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and the other nearby neighbors if not as they were before in the USSR then as like those which the Soviet Union had with the countries of the Warsaw Pact,” a vision that they and others should have understood was not going to be realized.
For Medvedev and Putin, the orientation of the leaders of these states “toward Western values and norms of politics” is completely “unacceptable,” Shusharin says. That is why they placed such hopes on Lukashenka, whose ideology is a Russophile form of Belarusian identity, and on Yanukovich who “does not have any ideology” at all.
But now the Moscow leaders have been rejected by the first, and soon, they are likely to be rejected by the second as well, the commentator continues, an outcome Medvedev and Putin would have anticipated if they had remembered the real basis of the Warsaw Pact rather than the idealized version of it in which they apparently believe.
That military organization, led by Moscow, “was tank socialism” -- that is, Shusharin continues, “the single source, reserve and guarantee of the communist regimes in these countries was the Soviet Union and its military presence.” When that disappeared so too did the Warsaw Pact.
But even before the events of the late 1980s, Shusharin points out, those leaders who had alternative sources of power like Yugoslavia’s Tito and China’s Mao Zedong could act independently. The only difference was that the first broke with Moscow early on while the second “for a long time led the Soviet Union by the nose and used its assistance.”
Those experiences, Shusharin suggests, should serve as a lesson to Moscow but Russian leaders have not assimilated them. Moscow doesn’t understand that “for the politicians in the former Soviet republics -- even if they are oriented toward Moscow and make use of its support -- relations with Russia are not as critical as relations with their own populations,” “the source of their power within [their] countries.”
Just as Western Europe and the United States dealt with the problems of the former Warsaw Pact countries and post-Tito Yugoslavia “without the particularly active participation of Russia, Shusharin says, so now “the authoritarian regimes in Ukraine and Belarus” will eventually ask for help from “Western Europe and the US, not Russia.”
The reason that is so, he argues, is that Russia “does not guarantee [their] national sovereignty.” Instead, its leaders act as if the former Soviet republics are not full-fledged independent countries but rather something less than that, places where Russia must enjoy greater deference and influence than any of them want to offer.
The current leaders of these countries “do not intend to divide power with Moscow,” and they are very much aware that is what the Russian powers that be want. Consequently, sooner than many may expect, they will turn to Western countries, something that “again will be something completely unexpected” for the latter.
Staunton, October 5 – The war of words between Dmitry Medvedev and Alyaksandr Lukashenka is more than just the product of tensions between Moscow and Minsk, Russian analysts say. Instead, it is part of a broader and growing alienation between the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics, one that has its roots in clashing visions of the future.
But both because of the West’s hostility to Lukashenka and his regime, one usually labeled “the last dictatorship in Europe,” and because of the West’s desire to curry favor with Moscow in pursuit of one or another goal, this general trend, widely noted by commentators in the region, has been largely ignored, let alone exploited, by Europe or the United States.
The clearest expression of this argument can be found in a commentary on Grani.ru yesterday. In it, Dmitry Shusharin, a regular writer for that portal, points out that the exchange of angry words between Medvedev and Lukashenka is part Moscow’s current propensity to be angry with all leaders of the post-Soviet states (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/182276.html).
Russia’s “tandemocracy,” he says,m had placed “great hopes” on new Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, but exactly what these would in fact look like is something that Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, along with the rest of the Russian powers that be, clearly “did not themselves know” at least in any specific detail.
“In an ideal outcome,” the Russian leaders “see relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and the other nearby neighbors if not as they were before in the USSR then as like those which the Soviet Union had with the countries of the Warsaw Pact,” a vision that they and others should have understood was not going to be realized.
For Medvedev and Putin, the orientation of the leaders of these states “toward Western values and norms of politics” is completely “unacceptable,” Shusharin says. That is why they placed such hopes on Lukashenka, whose ideology is a Russophile form of Belarusian identity, and on Yanukovich who “does not have any ideology” at all.
But now the Moscow leaders have been rejected by the first, and soon, they are likely to be rejected by the second as well, the commentator continues, an outcome Medvedev and Putin would have anticipated if they had remembered the real basis of the Warsaw Pact rather than the idealized version of it in which they apparently believe.
That military organization, led by Moscow, “was tank socialism” -- that is, Shusharin continues, “the single source, reserve and guarantee of the communist regimes in these countries was the Soviet Union and its military presence.” When that disappeared so too did the Warsaw Pact.
But even before the events of the late 1980s, Shusharin points out, those leaders who had alternative sources of power like Yugoslavia’s Tito and China’s Mao Zedong could act independently. The only difference was that the first broke with Moscow early on while the second “for a long time led the Soviet Union by the nose and used its assistance.”
Those experiences, Shusharin suggests, should serve as a lesson to Moscow but Russian leaders have not assimilated them. Moscow doesn’t understand that “for the politicians in the former Soviet republics -- even if they are oriented toward Moscow and make use of its support -- relations with Russia are not as critical as relations with their own populations,” “the source of their power within [their] countries.”
Just as Western Europe and the United States dealt with the problems of the former Warsaw Pact countries and post-Tito Yugoslavia “without the particularly active participation of Russia, Shusharin says, so now “the authoritarian regimes in Ukraine and Belarus” will eventually ask for help from “Western Europe and the US, not Russia.”
The reason that is so, he argues, is that Russia “does not guarantee [their] national sovereignty.” Instead, its leaders act as if the former Soviet republics are not full-fledged independent countries but rather something less than that, places where Russia must enjoy greater deference and influence than any of them want to offer.
The current leaders of these countries “do not intend to divide power with Moscow,” and they are very much aware that is what the Russian powers that be want. Consequently, sooner than many may expect, they will turn to Western countries, something that “again will be something completely unexpected” for the latter.
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