Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – Unlike the European Union which has successfully transformed most separatist movements into regionalist ones, Moscow is transforming the regionalist movements in the Russian Federation into separatist ones, according to a leading Russian theorist on regionalism.
In a speech earlier this month in St. Petersburg on the future of northwest Russia, Vadim Shtepa argued, drawing on the work of Britain’s Roland Robertson, that “globalization, however paradoxical it may seen is connected with the growth of regionalism” in a “dialectical” process known as “glocalization” (www.ingria.info/?biblio&news_action=show_news&news_id=5059).
That places new challenges on governments and on larger political unions. In both the European Union and in the Pacific region, regions within one country are establishing direct contact with regions in others, a process that some have said will lead to “the end of the nation state” but that in fact may help keep regionalism from becoming separatism.
Unfortunately, Shtepa says, “in Russia, the world ‘regionalism’ is taboo because it is conflated with separatism. But regionalism is transformed into separatism only when this or that region is deprived of political and economic self-administration.” Europe understands this and gives regions self-government; Russia doesn’t, and the result is separatist movements.
Indeed, he continues, “Russia today is evolving not according to a federal model like that of the European Union as a whole but is trying to build a centralized ‘national state’ with ‘a titular nation.” That requires depriving the regions of any control over their affairs, and that in turn helps to promote what Moscow most opposes.
In short, Shtepa argues, the powers that be at the center are breeding their own nemesis by their approach to the regions, both predominantly ethnic Russian and non-Russian.
Regionalism movements in the Russian Federation today, he continues, combine within themselves another dialectic, that between the right and left of the political system. Therefore it is impossible to consider them” one or the other, and it is a measure of Moscow’s problems that its analysts are struggling to define regionalism or combat it.
Shtepa focuses on one interesting detail of the regionalist agenda in the Russian Federation today: hostility to the existing metropolitan centers of control so strong that many regionalists want some other center established for their regions. Thus, some Ingermanlanders want another city to be the capital, like Ottawa in Canada, and St. Petersburg to be a Montreal.
That most Moscow commentators and Moscow officials have little or no understanding of the dialectical nature of regionalism and hence are behaving in ways that undermine their own goals is shown in two other analyses published this week, one concerning Moscow’s anger about regional identities and the other containing the latest Russian attack on national republics.
In an article on “Svobodnaya pressa” yesterday, Dmitry Treshchanin details both the increasing proclivity of people Moscow considers ethnic Russian to identify as something else, including Siberians, and the angry response of most Muscovites to such declarations and their presumed meaning (svpressa.ru/society/article/31063/).
And in the other, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the LDPR head who is vice speaker of the Duma, called, as he has before, for redrawing the borders of the federal subjects and ignoring ethnicity as a factor in the formation of such units, a call that is infuriating not only non-Russians but increasingly Russian regionalists as well (116.ru/news/323188.html).
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Proposed Caspian-Black Sea Canal Would Have Enormous Geopolitical Impact
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – A Russian-Kazakhstan working group will present a plan for the construction of building a canal between the Caspian and Azov seas, an enormously expensive “gigantist” project with roots in the Stalinist 1930s and one that, if realized, would have enormous geopolitical consequences.
“In today’s “Izvestiya,” journalist Konstantin Volkov says that what his Moscow paper has been able to learn so far this “new mega-project,” one that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has supported since at least 2007, “promises to become the most expensive in the entire history of contemporary Russia” (www.izvestia.ru/obshestvo/article3146612/)
In 2009, Volkov says, the European Development Bank provided 2.7 million US dollars to study two possible routes – a “Eurasian” canal just north of the North Caucasus mountain range and a second branch of the existing Volga-Don canal which would pass somewhat further north.
According to the newspaper, the results of the study of the two, although still classified “secret,” are in fact “ready” for a “final” decision by the leaders of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, the two countries most immediately affected but hardly the only ones given the other Caspian and Black Sea littoral state and their neighbors.
But as Volkov puts it, “the question immediately arises: why in fact is it necessary to spend billions of dollars for a new link between the Caspian and the Azov?” The existing Volga-Don canal works more or less well for almost all purposes, including those that the backers of the new canal say it would fulfill.
However, as Putin put it, “the appearance of a new canal “would not simply give the Caspian littoral states a way out to the Black and Mediterranean, that is to the world ocean, but also qualitatively change their geopolitical position and allow them to become sea powers” as a result of this link.
Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin told the paper that “the question here is geopolitical: In exchange for the establishment of the Eurasia canal, Russia will increase its influence in Kazakhstan. And if to these two countries joint also Azerbaijan and Iran, who are also on the Caspian littoral, this will create a new oil cartel that won’t be overawed by OPEC.”
If this canal is built, Russia will gain some immediate economic benefits from transit fees, given that between six and ten percent of the world’s oil is in the Caspian basin. But more important, it will be able to challenge those promoting other pipeline routes such as Baku-Jehan because ships will be able to carry the oil further and less expensively.
Moreover, Volkov continues, “if alongside will be established a transcontinental route connecting the industrial regions of China with the Caspian, then the new artery will become a channel for shipping Chinese goods” and that path could become a competitor to the sea route through the Suez canal.
The projected cost of each of the possible roots is roughly 500 billion rubles (16 billion US dollars), although as Volkov points out, those projections do not include many of the ancillary construction projects that will be needed or take into consideration the possible social costs or likely overruns.
According to the “Izvestiya” journalist, Moscow hopes to get the countries of the region who will be the direct beneficiaries, including not only Kazakhstan, but Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, as well as China to help pay for the construction of this canal, a plan that means such a canal will trigger geopolitical tensions even before it goes into operation.
But the possibility this project is already generating controversy inside the Russian Federation, with ecologists questioning its impact and others the opportunity costs of spending money on such a canal at a time when Russia needs to invest in other infrastructure projects, including roads and public health facilities. See, among others the discussions at www.stoletie.ru/lenta/azov_s_kaspijem_sojedinat_2010-09-28.htm and http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2010/09/28/kaspij-soedinjat-s-azovskim-morem.html.)
Staunton, September 28 – A Russian-Kazakhstan working group will present a plan for the construction of building a canal between the Caspian and Azov seas, an enormously expensive “gigantist” project with roots in the Stalinist 1930s and one that, if realized, would have enormous geopolitical consequences.
“In today’s “Izvestiya,” journalist Konstantin Volkov says that what his Moscow paper has been able to learn so far this “new mega-project,” one that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has supported since at least 2007, “promises to become the most expensive in the entire history of contemporary Russia” (www.izvestia.ru/obshestvo/article3146612/)
In 2009, Volkov says, the European Development Bank provided 2.7 million US dollars to study two possible routes – a “Eurasian” canal just north of the North Caucasus mountain range and a second branch of the existing Volga-Don canal which would pass somewhat further north.
According to the newspaper, the results of the study of the two, although still classified “secret,” are in fact “ready” for a “final” decision by the leaders of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, the two countries most immediately affected but hardly the only ones given the other Caspian and Black Sea littoral state and their neighbors.
But as Volkov puts it, “the question immediately arises: why in fact is it necessary to spend billions of dollars for a new link between the Caspian and the Azov?” The existing Volga-Don canal works more or less well for almost all purposes, including those that the backers of the new canal say it would fulfill.
However, as Putin put it, “the appearance of a new canal “would not simply give the Caspian littoral states a way out to the Black and Mediterranean, that is to the world ocean, but also qualitatively change their geopolitical position and allow them to become sea powers” as a result of this link.
Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin told the paper that “the question here is geopolitical: In exchange for the establishment of the Eurasia canal, Russia will increase its influence in Kazakhstan. And if to these two countries joint also Azerbaijan and Iran, who are also on the Caspian littoral, this will create a new oil cartel that won’t be overawed by OPEC.”
If this canal is built, Russia will gain some immediate economic benefits from transit fees, given that between six and ten percent of the world’s oil is in the Caspian basin. But more important, it will be able to challenge those promoting other pipeline routes such as Baku-Jehan because ships will be able to carry the oil further and less expensively.
Moreover, Volkov continues, “if alongside will be established a transcontinental route connecting the industrial regions of China with the Caspian, then the new artery will become a channel for shipping Chinese goods” and that path could become a competitor to the sea route through the Suez canal.
The projected cost of each of the possible roots is roughly 500 billion rubles (16 billion US dollars), although as Volkov points out, those projections do not include many of the ancillary construction projects that will be needed or take into consideration the possible social costs or likely overruns.
According to the “Izvestiya” journalist, Moscow hopes to get the countries of the region who will be the direct beneficiaries, including not only Kazakhstan, but Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, as well as China to help pay for the construction of this canal, a plan that means such a canal will trigger geopolitical tensions even before it goes into operation.
But the possibility this project is already generating controversy inside the Russian Federation, with ecologists questioning its impact and others the opportunity costs of spending money on such a canal at a time when Russia needs to invest in other infrastructure projects, including roads and public health facilities. See, among others the discussions at www.stoletie.ru/lenta/azov_s_kaspijem_sojedinat_2010-09-28.htm and http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2010/09/28/kaspij-soedinjat-s-azovskim-morem.html.)
Window on Eurasia: Luzhkov’s Ouster Said a Defeat for Moscow Patriarchate, Setback for Russia’s Imperial Nationalists
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Window on Eurasia: Luzhkov’s Ouster Said a Defeat for Moscow Patriarchate, Setback for Russia’s Imperial Nationalists
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
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