Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Moscow’s decision to send new draftees to Daghestan resembles the steps the Russian powers that be took before the August 2008 war in Georgia, the head of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in St. Petersburg says. And these moves suggest that Moscow may be preparing for some new military campaign in the North Caucasus.
Because the defense ministry has promised not to send draftees to hotspots, Ella Polyakova reports, military commanders are forcing draftees to sign contracts as professional soldiers prior to their being dispatched in secret to Daghestan, tactics that raise some serious questions (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174595/).
Over the past few weeks, the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in the northern capital has picked the offices of the staff of internal troops there, carrying placards which reflect these concerns. “What is Russia preparing for?” asked one, and “Why are they sending draftees to Daghestan?” posed another.
The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee has been told that the draftees are being sent there to beef up security in advance of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, but few members of that group say they believe that. And Polyakova says that many are especially concerned because commanders have prohibited the soldiers from carrying mobile phones, via which they could report their locations.
All this, she continues, “reminds” her and her colleagues of “the situation before the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008” and suggests that perhaps “a new war in the Caucasus awaits us.”
But an MVD spokesman has dismissed fears. The only “concrete task” these soldiers have, Colonel Vasily Panchenkov says, is “the preservation of public order” in Daghestan. And he insisted that “no one [in the military] had forced the draftees to sign contracts” as professional soldiers.”
Such agreements were “completely voluntary,” a reflection only of “certain material stimuli. Agitation among draftees of course is carried out but they are offered the right of choice.” And Panchenkov said that the parents of most draftees understand that. Those who have picketed are a tiny minority.
In reporting this exchange in St. Petersburg, the Kavkaz Uzel.ru portal asked commentator Konstantin Kazenin for his views on the situation. He replied that he “does not see any evident connection between the Russian-Georgian conflict and the dispatch of subunits of the internal forces from Leningrad oblast to Daghestan.”
“On the other hand,” he continued, “there is now in Daghestan now a quite complicated operational situation. There are a large number of local conflicts – criminal, religious, and political – especially before the elections.” And the powers that be want to bring them under control, something that does not necessarily point to war.
The portal also recalled that in the spring of 2009, Moscow dispatched “several major echelons with untrained draftees” to the Caucasus, groups who were also “deprived of any chance to maintain contact with their relatives and friends, according to Tatyana Kuznetsova of the Inter-Regional Movement of Soldiers’ Mothers. And at that time too, no war broke out.
But both the secrecy Moscow is throwing over all these activities within the force structures, secrecy that may be intensified if the Duma gives final approval to a new law on coverage of the Russian counter-terrorist effort, and the large number of possible targets of a military campaign in the Caucasus, are exacerbating Russian worries about the future.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russia Now at Risk of ‘Religious War’ Across the Country, Experts Warn
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Increasingly sharp disputes in many cities of the Russian Federation over whether Muslims should be allowed to build a mosque, disputes that have already spilled over into violence in Syktyvkar and Moscow this week, threaten to unleash “a religious war” across the country, experts say.
The number of people now directly involved in these disputes is small and “real tensions” at the societal level” are not intense, but Aleksey Levinson, a sociologist at Moscow’s Levada Center, argues that the situation could easily get out of control because of the way the media is playing up these disagreements (www.svpressa.ru/society/article/30919/).
Speaking to “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist Anton Razmakhnin, Levinson suggests that “those who have decided now to play the anti-Islamic card are taking a great risk.” In response to such “aggressive” opposition to mosques, Russia “can get not just a war in the Caucasus but something much worse a full-scale jihad in every city where there is a conflict of this kind.”
In both the Moscow and Syktyvkar cases, Razmakhnin notes by way of introduction, the number of people involved on both sides of the disputes has been small. Moreover, these disputes have been going on for some time without attracting much attention. But coverage of massive Muslim participation in the Uraza-Bayram celebrations triggered something
When Razmakhnin asks Levinson why he was so pessimistic about the future, the latter replies that was “because “fundamentalist Islam and precisely this trend is becoming more active … after the protests is a very strong organizing and cementing phenomenon,” one that has “all the signs of a young, active and militant religion” and that no one knows how to stop.
Levinson dismisses the idea that the increasing activism of the Russian Orthodox Church could block this. In his view, the sociologist said, “the mobilizing potential of Christianity [in general and not just the Russian Orthodox Church] now is much weaker than that of Islam,” something the followers of all confessions need to understand.
“To launch a new crusade now,” he argues, “would be insanity – under current circumstances of Christian civilization, such a response would be equal to a battle between crowds of peasants and old women with an organized army. No, contemporary Christianity should not play at such a war.”
Instead, Levinson says, the best outcome is likely to be achieved by “the tactic of the soft assimilation of Islam, its integration into a secular and ecumenical civilization. Such a course of events would allow [Russia and the world] to avoid the escalation of force and new religious wars. To stand above religion and to lift the Muslim up to this level is our chance.”
“Unfortunately,” Levinson continues, the world at present is skittering “toward confrontation. And Russia is no exception. I see that a clash is very probable but we will hardly win it. But with the help of ecumenism, we could achieve a good peace, but this variant of development of events still is not very probable.”
Razmakhnin then asked another expert for her views on the clashes over the construction of mosques. Valeriya Porokhova, a specialist on Islam who has translated the Koran into Russia, says that it is important to draw a distinction between the lumpen elements that are taking part in the clashes and the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Church’s upper echelons, she says, “are more friendly to Islam for these are two traditional religions which have common interests and face common challenges.” But “at the lower level, especially among lay Orthodox activists, hostility to Islam is strong: why are there so many of them? Why are they so well-organized?” And that “threatens” peace in Russia.
She suggests that one needs to look beyond the emotions of the moment because they reflect not just religious differences but the ways in which the powers that be conduct their relations with people of faith. Instead of holding public hearings and discussions, Porokhova says, officials do everything in secret, something that sparks anger in and of itself.
“In other words,” she suggests, “the problem which really threatens peace in Russia is not in the mosques as such but in the authoritarian way in which cities take decisions, including on the most sensitive issues.” Whatever decision is reached in this way will be “insufficiently legitimate” to those on the losing side who were not able to participate in reaching it.
That reality can be seen, the specialist says, if one compares the tensions over mosques in Russia with those in European countries. There, “if a case involves a decision about prohibiting or permitting the construction of a mosque in a particular region, this decision will be taken by democratically elected authorities, and the level of trust in this decision will be greater.”
Unfortunately, Porokhova concludes, this, “the main question,” is one that in Russia, “none of the key players has raised. Instead of democratization, practically all somewhat powerful forces are pushing Russia to a new civil but now already religious war,” when the application of democracy could prevent that.
Staunton, September 23 – Increasingly sharp disputes in many cities of the Russian Federation over whether Muslims should be allowed to build a mosque, disputes that have already spilled over into violence in Syktyvkar and Moscow this week, threaten to unleash “a religious war” across the country, experts say.
The number of people now directly involved in these disputes is small and “real tensions” at the societal level” are not intense, but Aleksey Levinson, a sociologist at Moscow’s Levada Center, argues that the situation could easily get out of control because of the way the media is playing up these disagreements (www.svpressa.ru/society/article/30919/).
Speaking to “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist Anton Razmakhnin, Levinson suggests that “those who have decided now to play the anti-Islamic card are taking a great risk.” In response to such “aggressive” opposition to mosques, Russia “can get not just a war in the Caucasus but something much worse a full-scale jihad in every city where there is a conflict of this kind.”
In both the Moscow and Syktyvkar cases, Razmakhnin notes by way of introduction, the number of people involved on both sides of the disputes has been small. Moreover, these disputes have been going on for some time without attracting much attention. But coverage of massive Muslim participation in the Uraza-Bayram celebrations triggered something
When Razmakhnin asks Levinson why he was so pessimistic about the future, the latter replies that was “because “fundamentalist Islam and precisely this trend is becoming more active … after the protests is a very strong organizing and cementing phenomenon,” one that has “all the signs of a young, active and militant religion” and that no one knows how to stop.
Levinson dismisses the idea that the increasing activism of the Russian Orthodox Church could block this. In his view, the sociologist said, “the mobilizing potential of Christianity [in general and not just the Russian Orthodox Church] now is much weaker than that of Islam,” something the followers of all confessions need to understand.
“To launch a new crusade now,” he argues, “would be insanity – under current circumstances of Christian civilization, such a response would be equal to a battle between crowds of peasants and old women with an organized army. No, contemporary Christianity should not play at such a war.”
Instead, Levinson says, the best outcome is likely to be achieved by “the tactic of the soft assimilation of Islam, its integration into a secular and ecumenical civilization. Such a course of events would allow [Russia and the world] to avoid the escalation of force and new religious wars. To stand above religion and to lift the Muslim up to this level is our chance.”
“Unfortunately,” Levinson continues, the world at present is skittering “toward confrontation. And Russia is no exception. I see that a clash is very probable but we will hardly win it. But with the help of ecumenism, we could achieve a good peace, but this variant of development of events still is not very probable.”
Razmakhnin then asked another expert for her views on the clashes over the construction of mosques. Valeriya Porokhova, a specialist on Islam who has translated the Koran into Russia, says that it is important to draw a distinction between the lumpen elements that are taking part in the clashes and the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Church’s upper echelons, she says, “are more friendly to Islam for these are two traditional religions which have common interests and face common challenges.” But “at the lower level, especially among lay Orthodox activists, hostility to Islam is strong: why are there so many of them? Why are they so well-organized?” And that “threatens” peace in Russia.
She suggests that one needs to look beyond the emotions of the moment because they reflect not just religious differences but the ways in which the powers that be conduct their relations with people of faith. Instead of holding public hearings and discussions, Porokhova says, officials do everything in secret, something that sparks anger in and of itself.
“In other words,” she suggests, “the problem which really threatens peace in Russia is not in the mosques as such but in the authoritarian way in which cities take decisions, including on the most sensitive issues.” Whatever decision is reached in this way will be “insufficiently legitimate” to those on the losing side who were not able to participate in reaching it.
That reality can be seen, the specialist says, if one compares the tensions over mosques in Russia with those in European countries. There, “if a case involves a decision about prohibiting or permitting the construction of a mosque in a particular region, this decision will be taken by democratically elected authorities, and the level of trust in this decision will be greater.”
Unfortunately, Porokhova concludes, this, “the main question,” is one that in Russia, “none of the key players has raised. Instead of democratization, practically all somewhat powerful forces are pushing Russia to a new civil but now already religious war,” when the application of democracy could prevent that.
Window on Eurasia: Lavrov’s Rhetorical Shift Suggests New Approach to ‘Already Not So Newly Independent States,’ MGIMO Professor Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is “a common historical resource of Russia and the other countries” in it, a formulation, a leading Moscow scholar says, that points to “a new conception of relations with the already not very newly independent states.”
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Aleksey Bogaturov, the pro-rector of the Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that this rhetorical formula opens the way to a more realistic approach to developing relations among these states (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-09-23/3_kartblansh.html).
That is because, the MGIMO professor continues, “for the first time is established a logically explicable relationships between nostalgic emotions and rational calculations concerning the CIS,” one that does not ignore history but understands that the future will be build not only by using it but also by moving away from it.
As Bogaturov notes, “20 years ago, Russian political thought gave birth to the slogan, ‘civilized divorce,’” which long ago ceased to have much explanatory value. Meanwhile, “Western colleagues also have not distinguished themselves,” constantly referring to “’the neo-imperial ambitions’ of Moscow” without wanting or focusing on “innovations.”
Lavrov’s new formula, the MGIMO expert says, helps overcome these problems by drawing attention to the incontestable importance of “the lengthy and close co-existence of the former union republics” in the past, recognition of the combination of “positive and negative” phenomena in that past without any suggestion of “a common state future” for them.
That is important because it allows for integration without threatening the independence of the countries involved. Indeed, it makes the path to integration easier. As Bogaturov points out, “with the exception of the European Union, nowhere in the world does integration presuppose the establishment of [combined] single states.”
And “the understanding of the common historical resource also contains practically useful guidance on the genetic similarity of the economic and political processes on the space of the CIS” while calling for “a reasoned restraint” based on the recognition that “by their origins, the processes [in these countries] are similar, but the course of their development is not.”
Bogaturov suggests that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are proceeding along the path of the development of the market together with what he calls “a conservative consolidation” of political power, a path that combines “a super-powerful state with limited elements of liberal norms and formal democratic procedures.”
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova in contrast “are living according to a special rhythm.” The first has been passing through “spasms of adaptation of a tradition system to democratic procedures; the second has faced difficulties because of deep divisions within its society, the Transdniestria problem, and the question of unification with Romania.
Georgia – which has withdrawn from the CIS – represents “a curious case,” Bogaturov continues. There, “the authoritarianism of Saakashvili which is supported by foreign budgets seeks economic liberalism.” And the situations in Ukraine and Armenia are equally diverse, reflecting both domestic problems and foreign ones.
“An important component of the conception of a common historical inheritance,” Bogaturov argues, “is its highlighting of the common pool of problems involving border security.” While some deny it, “the borders of the present and former countries of the CIS and also the borders of certain Baltic states have a common historical and instrumental origin.”
That is, he suggests, because “they were drawn [in Soviet times] arbitrarily and kept in place by force or threats.”
“From this point of view, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and, let us say, Lithuania are genetically similar states.” Their borders were drawn by others: This is a historical legacy, but it is “not an imperative of future development.” Instead, “it is the basis for showing mutual tolerance.”
In addition, Bogaturov says, Lavrov’s formulation has a cultural component, one that rests on the common Russian-language space that the Soviet system established, a space across which information and ideas can move more easily than across the external borders of any of these countries in any other language.
And consequently, he concludes, the term “common historical resource” for these countries represents “a base of experience and precedent-setting comparisons for the improvement of the strategy of the consistent but careful, pragmatic, and selective coming together” of these countries in various sectors.
Staunton, September 23 – Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is “a common historical resource of Russia and the other countries” in it, a formulation, a leading Moscow scholar says, that points to “a new conception of relations with the already not very newly independent states.”
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Aleksey Bogaturov, the pro-rector of the Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that this rhetorical formula opens the way to a more realistic approach to developing relations among these states (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-09-23/3_kartblansh.html).
That is because, the MGIMO professor continues, “for the first time is established a logically explicable relationships between nostalgic emotions and rational calculations concerning the CIS,” one that does not ignore history but understands that the future will be build not only by using it but also by moving away from it.
As Bogaturov notes, “20 years ago, Russian political thought gave birth to the slogan, ‘civilized divorce,’” which long ago ceased to have much explanatory value. Meanwhile, “Western colleagues also have not distinguished themselves,” constantly referring to “’the neo-imperial ambitions’ of Moscow” without wanting or focusing on “innovations.”
Lavrov’s new formula, the MGIMO expert says, helps overcome these problems by drawing attention to the incontestable importance of “the lengthy and close co-existence of the former union republics” in the past, recognition of the combination of “positive and negative” phenomena in that past without any suggestion of “a common state future” for them.
That is important because it allows for integration without threatening the independence of the countries involved. Indeed, it makes the path to integration easier. As Bogaturov points out, “with the exception of the European Union, nowhere in the world does integration presuppose the establishment of [combined] single states.”
And “the understanding of the common historical resource also contains practically useful guidance on the genetic similarity of the economic and political processes on the space of the CIS” while calling for “a reasoned restraint” based on the recognition that “by their origins, the processes [in these countries] are similar, but the course of their development is not.”
Bogaturov suggests that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are proceeding along the path of the development of the market together with what he calls “a conservative consolidation” of political power, a path that combines “a super-powerful state with limited elements of liberal norms and formal democratic procedures.”
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova in contrast “are living according to a special rhythm.” The first has been passing through “spasms of adaptation of a tradition system to democratic procedures; the second has faced difficulties because of deep divisions within its society, the Transdniestria problem, and the question of unification with Romania.
Georgia – which has withdrawn from the CIS – represents “a curious case,” Bogaturov continues. There, “the authoritarianism of Saakashvili which is supported by foreign budgets seeks economic liberalism.” And the situations in Ukraine and Armenia are equally diverse, reflecting both domestic problems and foreign ones.
“An important component of the conception of a common historical inheritance,” Bogaturov argues, “is its highlighting of the common pool of problems involving border security.” While some deny it, “the borders of the present and former countries of the CIS and also the borders of certain Baltic states have a common historical and instrumental origin.”
That is, he suggests, because “they were drawn [in Soviet times] arbitrarily and kept in place by force or threats.”
“From this point of view, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and, let us say, Lithuania are genetically similar states.” Their borders were drawn by others: This is a historical legacy, but it is “not an imperative of future development.” Instead, “it is the basis for showing mutual tolerance.”
In addition, Bogaturov says, Lavrov’s formulation has a cultural component, one that rests on the common Russian-language space that the Soviet system established, a space across which information and ideas can move more easily than across the external borders of any of these countries in any other language.
And consequently, he concludes, the term “common historical resource” for these countries represents “a base of experience and precedent-setting comparisons for the improvement of the strategy of the consistent but careful, pragmatic, and selective coming together” of these countries in various sectors.
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