Monday, March 1, 2010

Window on Eurasia: Kaliningrad’s Boos Reorganizes Regime in Response to Public Protests

Paul Goble

Vienna, March 1 – Even as protests in his region continue, Kaliningrad Governor Georgy Boos has met with the leader of the January 31 mass meeting, called for more such consultations, and announced plans to create new deputy heads of the region’s administration in an attempt to reduce social tension and prevent the demonstrations there from getting out of hand.
In an article in today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Aleksandr Ryabushev reports that Georgy Boos had met with Konstantin Doroshok, the leader of the Justice Union and organizer of the January 31 protest meeting and announced plans to create the post of deputy head of government for internal policy (www.ng.ru/regions/2010-03-01/1_boos.html).
The incumbent of that position will be responsible for maintaining contacts with the media, social organizations and parties, a step that some protests may see as an important concession but one that some in that non-contiguous part of Russia say is only intended to make Boos appear responsive.
The Kaliningrad governor said that he and Doroshok had discussed in a private meeting 16 “problems of an exclusively economic nature,” adding that he had invited the Justice Union leader, who he indicated had presented specific ideas on how to solve the region’s economic problems, to become a member of the governor’s political consultative council
If Doroshok was pleased to be invited, other leaders of the Kaliningrad opposition were angry because they were not. One, oblast Duma deputy Solomon Ginzburg, said that such private meetings won’t do much to solve local problems but they might make Boos look good in the Kremlin.
However that may be, Boos also set up three other new deputy administration heads – one for the realization of major investment projects, a second for the development of culture and education, and a third for health and social policy, although he did not announce who would fill these positions or exactly what they would do.
Vladimir Abramov, a political analyst in Kaliningrad political analyst, told the Moscow journalist that Boos was clearly trying to reduce “social tension and demonstrate his willingness to engage in dialogue with the opposition,” something that Abramov suggested was “good policy,” although he expressed concern that Boos’ initiatives might be undercut by subordinates.
Friday’s session did not prevent a new round of demonstrations in that region, which some have called “the fourth Baltic republic” and which its residents proudly refer to as being “at the center of Europe. Indeed, yesterday’s demonstration in Chernyakhovsk advanced not only economic demands but political ones as well (echo.msk.ru/blog/sergeymuritz/660312-echo/).
Given the high unemployment and decaying infrastructure in Kaliningrad, it is not surprising that most demands at this meeting too focused on how people are to live and what work they may be able to hope for. But they also included political planks such as the removal of the district government leader and a reduction in the size of the government apparatus.
And at least a few taking part in the meeting, estimated at a total of from 1500 to 2,000, called for the return to pre-Putin system of the election of governors and mayors rather than their appointment from above, a demand Moscow is unlikely to meet but one that suggests at least some protesters are becoming more political (www.nr2.ru/272307.html).
By making even the limited concessions he has, Boos may have won over some of the demonstrators in his region, but because he made those concessions only under pressure, it is entirely likely that other Kaliningraders and Russians further afield will view his response as an indication that they should redouble their efforts in order to get more.
Moreover, if it should turn out to be the case that Boos’ promises and administrative reforms do not lead to real changes in the lives of people there, then a larger number of people are likely to join the demonstrators and what was a small challenge to the authorities there could grow into a major political crisis on the western border of the Russian Federation.

Window on Eurasia: Tatarstan’s Shaimiyev Could Lead Russia’s Muslims, Adygei Mufti Says

Paul Goble

Vienna, March 1 – Mintimir Shaimiyev, until last month the longtime president of the Republic of Tatarstan could head “a single muftiate” in the Russian Federation and the heads of the three Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs) who have been unable to agree on unity could serve as his deputies, according to the mufti of Adygeya and Krasnodar kray.
Frustrated with the lack of progress toward the creation of a single Muslim organization in Russia and the impact of that failure on the relations of the Russian umma with the Russian state, Nurbiy Emizh argues that Tatarstan politician would be a strong candidate for just such a position (www.islam.ru/rus/2010-02-27/#31293).
“Patriarch Kirill heads a Synod with bishoprics from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad,” Emizh told Islam.ru. “This is an example. The unity of Islam in Russia is a requirement. [And] the leader of Muslims must be in the first instance a politician, a good organizer and leader. It is not required that he be a scholar and theologian.”
Consequently, the Adygey mufti continued, “Mintimir Shaimiyev could head ‘a single muftiate.” He is “a very wise and interesting man and a major organizer. And [if that were to happen] the heads of the Union of Muftis, the Central MSD, and the Coordinating Center for Muslims of the North Caucasus could serve as his deputies.
While all three of them – Ravil Gainutdin, Talgat Tajuddin and Ismail Berdiyev – have relatively good relations with Shaimiyev, there is as yet no indication that they would be willing to turn to Shaimiyev even though their current efforts to move toward greater unity appear to have broken down.
On Friday, the three indicated that all of them are remain skeptical to the creation of a single muftiate in Russia, each obviously concerned that it would be headed by someone other than himself, and even to the possibility of a common Muslim coordinating council, something Tajuddin has been pushing (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=34414).
And while there is no evidence that Shaimiyev is either behind Emizh’s proposal or would agree to serve if asked, the Tatarstan leader also on Friday made several statements to a Tatarstan MSD conference which many may view as almost as the opening of his campaign for that position (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusopinions/11789/).
In his address to the meeting which was attended by Russia’s top Muslim leaders and which re-elected Shaimiyev’s friend Guzman Iskhakov to a fourth term as head of the republic MSD, the Tatarstan leader stressed just how important unity is for the Islamic community of the Russian Federation.
As far as unity is concerned, Shaimiyev said, “it is necessary to move and move and move … we must unite here, the Volga, the Urals, the central region, Siberia.” The steps already taken are important but not enough. “The path forward is complicated, but it is necessary.” And leaders must not put “their personal ambitions above service to the All High.”
Indeed, he continued, “policy in this sphere” must be “well-thought out” and “intense,” and it must involve “the popularization” of traditional Islam and countering any extremist doctrines that may appear. Young people, he said, “need to learn to think correctly and understand correctly” even though this is “not simple” (www.islam.ru/rus/2010-02-27/#31294).
To that end, Shaimiyev said, the Russian Islamic University of Kazan, which he described as “one of the best Islamic higher schools” could “become a central link in this system” for the entire country. And he said that Muslims should use the electronic media more effectively than they have in the past.
A major reason Emizh’s proposal is likely to get a hearing from both the Muslim community and Shaimiyev himself is that the Tatarstan leader has been increasingly solicitous to Islam in recent years and has indicated that he plans to stay active by promoting the annual Bolgar Forum which focuses on the adoption of Islam by the ancestors of today’s Tatars.
But the possibility that Russia’s fractious Muslim community might view Shaimiyev as a means toward unity almost certainly would disturb many Moscow officials and Russian Orthodox leaders who would see his unique combination of political skills and Islamic commitment very much as a threat to their current plans.
Given power relations in the Russian Federation, Russian officials and Orthodox hierarchs working together will likely be able to prevent Shaimiyev’s elevation, even if he and Russia’s Muslims were to agree to it. But even the proposal is significant and highlights just how necessary the Muslims of that country believe unity now is for their future.

Window on Eurasia: ‘Russian Mafia’ Abroad Now Numbers 300,000, Moscow Journal s Says

Paul Goble

Vienna, March 1 – After avoiding any use of the term “Russian mafia” in the last few years, law enforcement personnel in Europe and elsewhere are now speaking about it again, noting that it includes “up to 300,000 people” and dominates the criminal world in many countries around the world, according to a Moscow investigative journalist.
In today’s “Versia,” Ruslan Gorevoy says that law enforcement personnel in many countries -- including Spain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, France, Mexico, “and even the US” -- have been surprised by how “confidently” criminal groups consisting of people from the former USSR now dominate their national criminal worlds (versia.ru/articles/2010/mar/01/russkaja_mafija).
Indeed, the “Versiya” reporter continues, the Russian groups, which include “up to 300,000 of our compatriots,” have succeeded in pushing aside local groups and establishing their own “spheres of influence” to the point that they no longer need to “clarify relations with the help of arms.”
Gorevoy describes some of the most notorious cases involving Russian organized criminal groups abroad before using interviews with Russian officials to suggest some more general conclusions. He recalls the discovery that drug traffickers were using submarines to move their product from South America to Mexico.
These submarines, he points out, “were purchased as scrap metal” from a Ukrainian firm that was involved in decommissioning Soviet diesel subs, then repapered in the Romania city of Konstanza before sailing across the Atlantic. While they were ultimately discovered, it is impossible to say how many tons of drugs they carried or even what the situation is today.
The US navy, he notes, has taken great pride in reporting its interdiction efforts in this regard, but knowing” the abilities of Russian criminal groups, Gorvey continues, “it is possible” that such vessels may still be playing a role. The tone of his article suggests that he personally would not bet against these groups.
In Spain, the “Versiya” journalist continues, Russian criminal groups control 90 percent of the drugs and illegal arms flows and have been involved in the murder of Paddy Doyle, a leading Irish criminal who was operating there. His death and the ensuing trial led to the publication of numerous articles about Russian organized crime.
Russian officials have been dismissive of much of that coverage. Pavel Krasheninnikov, the head of the Duma’s legal affairs committee, told Gorevoy that “certain groups may have an ethnic character [there], but this still does not provide the foundation for claims about the presence of a specific national mafia of this or that country.”
Poland, Gorevoy continues, was “the first country of Europe into which organized crime from Russia began to penetrate,” pushing out, together with criminals from Ukraine and Belarus Romanian and Albanian criminal organizations that had dominated the situation there before the Russians arrived.
The Polish police have not been able to “liquidate” Russian organized crime, and “according to certain data, at the present time,” there are as many as 20,000 Russian criminals operating in that country, making it, in numerical terms at least, “the largest Russian criminal diaspora in the world.”
But it would be a mistake to focus only on Poland or Eastern European countries like Romania and Hungary, where the Russian criminal presence is large. Over the last decade, the Russian mafia has reached around the world, including Australia where it has been involved in electronic crime, Singapore, London and various countries in the Western hemisphere.
Interpol, the international police agency, does not maintain the kind of files which allow for an even approximate assessment of the number of Russian criminals operating abroad. But last year, the National Prosecutor of Italy concluded that there are “up to 300,000” criminals from Russia operating in other countries.
One of the largest or at least most profitable activities of Russian criminals abroad, the Italians said, is money laundering, with the Russian mafia “laundering” funds in the US, in the Marianas, and Guam. In addition, they added, Russian criminals are charging Mexican drug lords 30 percent for laundering drug profits from sales in the US.
In Italy itself, prosecutors reported, “representatives of the Russian mafia in 2008 formed an alliance with local [criminal groups, including the Cosa Nostra]” and took under joint control “practically 100 percent of the agricultural enterprises of Italy and at the same time practically all shippers, both international and domestic.
The German newspaper “Suddeutsche Zeitung” reports, citing sources official and otherwise, that there are approximately 160,000 Russian criminals in Europe, compared to 70,000 of Italian origin, 40,000 of American background, and 37,000 from Asian countries. The Russians have corrupted at least some officials in order to cover their tracks, the paper said
The Munich paper’s Rudolph Himelli said that “Russian mafiosi are better organized and permit themselves to commit the boldest crimes, remaining in practice unpunished,” crimes that are “of a completely different order of magnitude than those committed by Turkish immigrants or criminals from countries in Eastern Europe,” including illegal arms sales to Libya and Iraq.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the flamboyant head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and vice speaker of the Russian Duma, says that none of this information justifies any suggestion that there is a Russian mafia operating abroad let alone implying that Moscow is somehow responsible for it.
“Yes,” Zhirinovsky acknowledges, “people from the republics of the former USSR really occupy an important position in the international criminal community, and in recent years this position can even be called a dominant one. But here is one ‘but’: many of these people already have been living abroad for a long time” and have exchanged Russian passports for foreign ones.
Consequently, he continues, they are now “more the representatives of Western and not our culture.” Indeed, the LDPR leader insists, “the fact that these people left Russia may testify only that our law enforcement organs do not allow them to make their way” in their homeland, while the police in other countries are not as successful.
That argument may convince some Russians or provide a justification to some in the West who would like to ignore this issue, but Gorevoy’s article suggests that Zhirinovsky’s claims will not be persuasive to justice officials in Europe or elsewhere who on a daily basis have to combat a larger and more active Russian mafia.