Paul Goble
Vienna, May 1 – On October 31 of last year, Moscow dismissed Murat Zyazikov, the widely despised president of Ingushetia, and installed Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, a much-decorated Ingush colonel in the Russian Army, in his place, a move that many both in that North Caucasus republic and more generally marked the dawn of a new day there.
Now, six months later, Kavkaz-uzel.ru has offered an assessment of what has changed and what has not, concluding that while Yevkurov has been far more effective in working with the population and with Moscow than his predecessor, the republic he heads is still “far from stable” and in some respects may be getting even less so (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153606).
Because Zyazikov sought to suppress all independent media, falsified election results and other data, and is widely suspected of ordering the killing of at least one major opposition figure, many Ingush were prepared to see almost anyone else as an improvement. At the very least, they were ready to give the new man the benefit of the doubt.
Yevkurov, the Caucasus news service points out, made the most of this. He “began a dialogue with the opposition” and even appointed some of its members to senior positions in his administration. He developed good relations with the human rights community. And he worked hard to end blood feuds among the Ingush taips.
Moreover, Yevkurov purged the organs of power, using charges of corruption as the basis for ousting many of Zyazikov’s people. And because of his actions in reaching out to the population and fighting corruption, the current president was far more successful in getting federal funds, something that by itself helped him to build authority.
During the last few months, Kavkz-uzel.ru continues, Yevkurov has begun to purge the law enforcement agencies, many of which had become little more than Zyazikov’s personal hit squads. Yevkurov set up a hot line for Ingush to telephone in complaints about the violation of their rights by these groups.
Even more important, the new president set up a Societal Commission on Human Rights and included in its membership “deputies of parliament, representatives of the force structures, as well as leaders of non-governmental organizations and ordinary citizens of the republic,” an institution that marked a clean break from Zyazikov’s approach.
On one of the most sensitive issues, the question of the Prigorodny district from which many Ingush were forced to flee more than 15 years ago, Yevkurov made it clear that he did not intend to try to change its borders but that he supported “the most rapid return of Ingush refugees to the places of their former residence on the territory of North Ossetia.”
But at the same time, the Internet news portal continued, Yevkurov “has not yet been able to establish complete control over the situation in the region” or limit the upward trend of some of the most disturbing measures of violence in that republic which, prior to Zyazikov was an island of stability, but now ranks among the most unstable.
According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the number of killings is up sharply so far this year. Since January 1, 21 civilians, 12 officials of local force structures, and six military personnel from the outside have been killed, and over the same period, the force structures have killed 20 militants. Moreover, kidnappings have remained frequent.
. (Figures from the republic’s interior ministry are slightly different but also worrisome. During the first quarter, it reports, the authorities killed 27 militants, losing 18 uniformed law enforcement officers and two civilian officials.” In addition, the ministry said, some 44 people on the government side had been wounded during militant attacks.)
But if the statistics tell one side of the story, the attitudes of the population tell another. One Ingush man told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that Yevkurov “really enjoys the sympathy of the population. He travels throughout the republic, tries to listen to all, and gives people the chance to openly express themselves on the most pressing problems.”
Those were steps Zyazikov never took, and they are welcome. But now six months into his presidency, many in Ingushetia appear to be concerned that however open Yevkurov is to contacts with the population, he has not been able to reduce the level of violence. And with each passing week, more of them are likely asking whether openness, however welcome, is enough.
Friday, May 1, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Saudis Turn Down Moscow’s Request to Boost Russia’s Haj Quota
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 1 – The Saudi officials responsible for setting national quotas for Muslim pilgrims to Mecca announced the allocation of 20,500 slots for hajis from the Russian Federation in 2009, the exact number that country is supposed to have on the basis of existing formulas but 4500 fewer came from Russia last year and fewer than Moscow wanted to send this.
The Saudis have long allocated haj quotas on the basis of one-tenth of one percent of the estimated number of Muslims in a particular country, but in recent years, the Russian government has sought and received a higher allocation, arguing that there is pent-up demand because few Muslims were able to make the pilgrimage during Soviet times.
Saudi deference to the Russian government on this point in the past, however, angered Muslims in other countries, many of whom have been forced to wait years if not decades for the change to make the haj required of all believers capable of going on it at least once in the course of their lifetimes (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/8445/).
But Moscow’s failure to get a higher quota this year creates three problems for the Russian government. First, given that many more Muslims in the Russian Federation want to go than there are slots, at least some of them are going to see the new lower number as an indication that their country did not press hard enough.
That is especially likely because a majority of Russian hajis come from the North Caucasus -- and especially from the extremely unstable republics of Chechnya and Daghestan. Indeed, it is almost certain that anti-regime activists will point to this decline in the haj quota as one more reason for local people to support them.
Second, the number of Muslims from Russia who will actually perform the haj is likely to be larger than the number of slots, creating a problem for both Moscow which will thus be faced with losing control of the situation and the Saudis. Indeed, in announcing quotas this year, the Saudis said that Moscow must ensure that all hajis from Russia return when the haj is over.
Indeed, in both of the last two years, there were problems with Russian hajis who came on their own, did not march under the Russian flag, and sometimes remained long after the haj was completed, creating problems for all concerned and prompting the Russians to beef up their offices in Saudi Arabia to deal with the problem.
And third, both because Moscow wants to present its Muslim face to the Islamic world and because Muslims in Russia want larger quotas, the latter are likely to press for an acknowledgement by Moscow that there are in fact more than the 20.5 million Muslims in Russia the current haj quota is based on.
That sets the stage for a serious debate between Russian nationalists and the leaders of the increasingly influential Russian Orthodox Church who want to minimize the size of the Islamic community in Russia and the increasingly numerous Muslims who want recognition of the growth of their community.
As Moscow discusses plans for a census next year, such discussions are likely to intensify because given recent cutbacks in the amount of money allocated for that enumeration, there will be pressure from many Russians to eliminate questions that would highlight the growth of the Muslim community and alternatively from Muslims to do the opposite.
Meanwhile, in another development in the Muslim world that is likely to resonate in the Russian Federation, officials at the Organization of the Islamic Conference have announced plans to “impose order” on the increasing flow of fetwas, legal opinions about particular cases for Muslims but documents often treated by others as having broader applicability.
This week, at the 19th conference of the OIC’s International Islamic Academy of Fihta (IIFA), officials and scholars said they wanted to end “the current chaos in the publication of fetwas, which in part contradict one another” and thus represent a source of confusion rather than guidance for the faithful (www.islam.com.ua/news/6122/).
Whether the OIC can achieve its goal in this regard is far from clear given that the number of fetwas being issued around the world is now running at the rate of 1600 a week, according to scholars at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University who are computerizing them but without yet making a concerted effort to prioritize them.
But this action of the OIC is likely to find an echo in the Russian Federation where both the Russian government and the leaderships of the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) are certain to see this effort by the Islamic community abroad as both a model for and a justification of greater control over fetwas, both those issued in Russia and those from abroad.
And to the extent that Russian officials and Russian Muslims do so, that could lead to a tighter “power vertical” within the Islamic community of that country, contradicting the radically decentralized nature of the Muslim faith and reinforcing the government-backed MSDs at a time when ever more Muslims there are asking whether they should continue to exist.
Vienna, May 1 – The Saudi officials responsible for setting national quotas for Muslim pilgrims to Mecca announced the allocation of 20,500 slots for hajis from the Russian Federation in 2009, the exact number that country is supposed to have on the basis of existing formulas but 4500 fewer came from Russia last year and fewer than Moscow wanted to send this.
The Saudis have long allocated haj quotas on the basis of one-tenth of one percent of the estimated number of Muslims in a particular country, but in recent years, the Russian government has sought and received a higher allocation, arguing that there is pent-up demand because few Muslims were able to make the pilgrimage during Soviet times.
Saudi deference to the Russian government on this point in the past, however, angered Muslims in other countries, many of whom have been forced to wait years if not decades for the change to make the haj required of all believers capable of going on it at least once in the course of their lifetimes (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/8445/).
But Moscow’s failure to get a higher quota this year creates three problems for the Russian government. First, given that many more Muslims in the Russian Federation want to go than there are slots, at least some of them are going to see the new lower number as an indication that their country did not press hard enough.
That is especially likely because a majority of Russian hajis come from the North Caucasus -- and especially from the extremely unstable republics of Chechnya and Daghestan. Indeed, it is almost certain that anti-regime activists will point to this decline in the haj quota as one more reason for local people to support them.
Second, the number of Muslims from Russia who will actually perform the haj is likely to be larger than the number of slots, creating a problem for both Moscow which will thus be faced with losing control of the situation and the Saudis. Indeed, in announcing quotas this year, the Saudis said that Moscow must ensure that all hajis from Russia return when the haj is over.
Indeed, in both of the last two years, there were problems with Russian hajis who came on their own, did not march under the Russian flag, and sometimes remained long after the haj was completed, creating problems for all concerned and prompting the Russians to beef up their offices in Saudi Arabia to deal with the problem.
And third, both because Moscow wants to present its Muslim face to the Islamic world and because Muslims in Russia want larger quotas, the latter are likely to press for an acknowledgement by Moscow that there are in fact more than the 20.5 million Muslims in Russia the current haj quota is based on.
That sets the stage for a serious debate between Russian nationalists and the leaders of the increasingly influential Russian Orthodox Church who want to minimize the size of the Islamic community in Russia and the increasingly numerous Muslims who want recognition of the growth of their community.
As Moscow discusses plans for a census next year, such discussions are likely to intensify because given recent cutbacks in the amount of money allocated for that enumeration, there will be pressure from many Russians to eliminate questions that would highlight the growth of the Muslim community and alternatively from Muslims to do the opposite.
Meanwhile, in another development in the Muslim world that is likely to resonate in the Russian Federation, officials at the Organization of the Islamic Conference have announced plans to “impose order” on the increasing flow of fetwas, legal opinions about particular cases for Muslims but documents often treated by others as having broader applicability.
This week, at the 19th conference of the OIC’s International Islamic Academy of Fihta (IIFA), officials and scholars said they wanted to end “the current chaos in the publication of fetwas, which in part contradict one another” and thus represent a source of confusion rather than guidance for the faithful (www.islam.com.ua/news/6122/).
Whether the OIC can achieve its goal in this regard is far from clear given that the number of fetwas being issued around the world is now running at the rate of 1600 a week, according to scholars at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University who are computerizing them but without yet making a concerted effort to prioritize them.
But this action of the OIC is likely to find an echo in the Russian Federation where both the Russian government and the leaderships of the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) are certain to see this effort by the Islamic community abroad as both a model for and a justification of greater control over fetwas, both those issued in Russia and those from abroad.
And to the extent that Russian officials and Russian Muslims do so, that could lead to a tighter “power vertical” within the Islamic community of that country, contradicting the radically decentralized nature of the Muslim faith and reinforcing the government-backed MSDs at a time when ever more Muslims there are asking whether they should continue to exist.
Window on Eurasia: Duma Draft Law Against Rehabilitating Fascism Dangerous Nonsense, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 1 – A bill under consideration in the Duma designed to counter “the rehabilitation in the new independent states of Nazism,” likely to be passed and signed into law in the coming weeks, makes no sense in legal terms, is historically “stupid,” and opens the door to a dangerous form of “political theater,” according to a leading Moscow commentator.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Yevgeny Ikhlov writes that while neither he nor anyone else is against standing up against any recrudescence of totalitarianism, this particular piece of legislation is hardly the way to go about doing that. Instead, it has the capacity to make its authors and supporters look ridiculous (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9034).
First of all, he points out, the draft bill is “a legal nonsense” because, by imposing penalties on those who express a different view on the history of World War II, it directly contradicts an 11-year-old ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions Moscow is committed by treaty to respect and implement.
In September 1998, the Strasbourg court held in the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France that “the presentation of a point of view on historical events which does not correspond to an officially adopted one does not represent a misuse of freedom of speech,” and consequently, anyone charged under the terms of the new bill would certainly invoke that in his defense.
Second, Ikhlov continues, the draft legislation is “a historical stupidity. “ Instead of focusing attention on Nazism, the bill has the effect of focusing attention on the Soviet past and especially on the Stalinist period.
The bill defines “Nazism (national socialism) [as] a totalitarian ideology and the practice of its application by Hitlerite Germany, its allies, and its accomplices” that involved “totalitarian terrorist methods of power … the propaganda of the supremacy of some nations over others, the committing of military crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.”
“Doesn’t this remind you of something?” Ikhlov asks his readers, and he cites the following decision of the Russian Constitutional Court from November 30, 1992, which defined the nature of the Soviet system.
“In the country,” the Russian court held, “over the course of a lengthy period of time ruled a regime of unlimited power of a small group of communist functionaries … who used force. … the leading structures of the CPSU were the initiators and their local structures carried out repressions against millions of Soviet people, including those peoples who were deported.”
“We see,” Ikhlov continues, “that in correspondence with Russian law, in the course of a lengthy period of time … on the territory of the USSR operated a totalitarian terrorist regime. But making a hero out of it is in no way prohibited.” Instead, President Dmitry Medvedev has again made November 7th, when the Soviet state was founded, a national holiday.
Can it be, Ikhlov asks, that “the entire difference is that Nazism ranked nations and not classes?” But that too is nonsensical from the point of view of history. “Hitlerism never drew up a precise hierarchy of ethnoses, [because] it never entered into the heads [of the Nazis] to consider Jews and non-Aryans nations.”
“The sad truth of history,” the Moscow writer suggests, “is that on the territory of the USSR, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece, the Second World War was accompanied by [a series of] domestic civil wars,” conflicts that broke out because the German military gave rightist opponentts of leftist governments a chance to fight the latter.
“The hundreds and hundreds of thousands of armed collaborationists were not a form of betrayal; they were a front in a civil war,” Ikhlov says. It is thus “stupid and shameful” to fix “by law the correctness of one of the versions of this civil war, where various peoples were tragically caught “between two, let us use the words of the laws, totalitarian terrorist regimes.”
In this civil war, the Moscow commentator continues, “some ‘defended’ Auschwitz and Baby Yar; others Kolyma and the Butovo polygon.” And the draft bill’s constant but quite often incorrect reference to the decisions of the Nurnberg tribunal at the end of World War II ultimately cannot obscure that reality.
“The tragic truth of history is that all participants in World War II committed crimes of war. But the crimes of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition were called that only by historians and publicists; they were never assessed” by a duly constituted international court, and the proposed Russian legislation would not do that either.
And third, Ikhlov continues, the bill is a piece of “political theater,” intended to make propaganda points rather than become part of the rule of law, and one that appears set to serve as “a false pretext for dimwitted censorship and idiotic conflicts with the neighbors” of the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, the law contains a large number of assertions about the legal standing of the Russian Federation which are simply untrue, including the remarkable and absurd suggestion that “the Russian Federation is the continuer [rather than legal successor] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”
And on the other, this bill could lead to absurd cases in which leaders of neighboring states – Ikhlov cites the president of Ukraine and the prime minister of Estonia – are charged with violating the law, convicted by a Moscow court – since that is where their embassies are – and where the sentence is enforced by Gazprom cutting off the gas to their countries.
Despite these problems, Ikhlov says, the bill is likely to be passed by the Duma and signed by President Medvedev because no one in the Moscow political establishment will want to say anything that their opponents could and would construe as a defense of the totalitarianism of another state. Defending such a system at home, of course, is another matter entirely.
Vienna, May 1 – A bill under consideration in the Duma designed to counter “the rehabilitation in the new independent states of Nazism,” likely to be passed and signed into law in the coming weeks, makes no sense in legal terms, is historically “stupid,” and opens the door to a dangerous form of “political theater,” according to a leading Moscow commentator.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Yevgeny Ikhlov writes that while neither he nor anyone else is against standing up against any recrudescence of totalitarianism, this particular piece of legislation is hardly the way to go about doing that. Instead, it has the capacity to make its authors and supporters look ridiculous (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9034).
First of all, he points out, the draft bill is “a legal nonsense” because, by imposing penalties on those who express a different view on the history of World War II, it directly contradicts an 11-year-old ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions Moscow is committed by treaty to respect and implement.
In September 1998, the Strasbourg court held in the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France that “the presentation of a point of view on historical events which does not correspond to an officially adopted one does not represent a misuse of freedom of speech,” and consequently, anyone charged under the terms of the new bill would certainly invoke that in his defense.
Second, Ikhlov continues, the draft legislation is “a historical stupidity. “ Instead of focusing attention on Nazism, the bill has the effect of focusing attention on the Soviet past and especially on the Stalinist period.
The bill defines “Nazism (national socialism) [as] a totalitarian ideology and the practice of its application by Hitlerite Germany, its allies, and its accomplices” that involved “totalitarian terrorist methods of power … the propaganda of the supremacy of some nations over others, the committing of military crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.”
“Doesn’t this remind you of something?” Ikhlov asks his readers, and he cites the following decision of the Russian Constitutional Court from November 30, 1992, which defined the nature of the Soviet system.
“In the country,” the Russian court held, “over the course of a lengthy period of time ruled a regime of unlimited power of a small group of communist functionaries … who used force. … the leading structures of the CPSU were the initiators and their local structures carried out repressions against millions of Soviet people, including those peoples who were deported.”
“We see,” Ikhlov continues, “that in correspondence with Russian law, in the course of a lengthy period of time … on the territory of the USSR operated a totalitarian terrorist regime. But making a hero out of it is in no way prohibited.” Instead, President Dmitry Medvedev has again made November 7th, when the Soviet state was founded, a national holiday.
Can it be, Ikhlov asks, that “the entire difference is that Nazism ranked nations and not classes?” But that too is nonsensical from the point of view of history. “Hitlerism never drew up a precise hierarchy of ethnoses, [because] it never entered into the heads [of the Nazis] to consider Jews and non-Aryans nations.”
“The sad truth of history,” the Moscow writer suggests, “is that on the territory of the USSR, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece, the Second World War was accompanied by [a series of] domestic civil wars,” conflicts that broke out because the German military gave rightist opponentts of leftist governments a chance to fight the latter.
“The hundreds and hundreds of thousands of armed collaborationists were not a form of betrayal; they were a front in a civil war,” Ikhlov says. It is thus “stupid and shameful” to fix “by law the correctness of one of the versions of this civil war, where various peoples were tragically caught “between two, let us use the words of the laws, totalitarian terrorist regimes.”
In this civil war, the Moscow commentator continues, “some ‘defended’ Auschwitz and Baby Yar; others Kolyma and the Butovo polygon.” And the draft bill’s constant but quite often incorrect reference to the decisions of the Nurnberg tribunal at the end of World War II ultimately cannot obscure that reality.
“The tragic truth of history is that all participants in World War II committed crimes of war. But the crimes of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition were called that only by historians and publicists; they were never assessed” by a duly constituted international court, and the proposed Russian legislation would not do that either.
And third, Ikhlov continues, the bill is a piece of “political theater,” intended to make propaganda points rather than become part of the rule of law, and one that appears set to serve as “a false pretext for dimwitted censorship and idiotic conflicts with the neighbors” of the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, the law contains a large number of assertions about the legal standing of the Russian Federation which are simply untrue, including the remarkable and absurd suggestion that “the Russian Federation is the continuer [rather than legal successor] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”
And on the other, this bill could lead to absurd cases in which leaders of neighboring states – Ikhlov cites the president of Ukraine and the prime minister of Estonia – are charged with violating the law, convicted by a Moscow court – since that is where their embassies are – and where the sentence is enforced by Gazprom cutting off the gas to their countries.
Despite these problems, Ikhlov says, the bill is likely to be passed by the Duma and signed by President Medvedev because no one in the Moscow political establishment will want to say anything that their opponents could and would construe as a defense of the totalitarianism of another state. Defending such a system at home, of course, is another matter entirely.
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