Paul Goble
Vienna, April 28 – Twenty-three years ago, the worst nuclear power plant disaster in history occurred at Chernobyl, a disaster that devastated the region, forced Mikhail Gorbachev to launch his glasnost program, and continues to claim pre-mature deaths among those exposed to the massive release of radiation.
And this year, as on every April 26th since that time, the victims, their families and activists of various kinds paused to take part in memorial services and demonstrations in the three countries most affected, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation, and to bemoan the fact that while many people around the world recall the accident, they are forgetting its victims.
But in what is likely to strike many as an equally disturbing development, some people are now trying to profit from that disaster by organizing tours to the Chernobyl zone, from which radioactive contamination has driven the population, and by including references to the 1986 disaster in video games.
In an interview posted online today, Aleksandr Sirota, the head of the Internet-based Pripyat.com Center, said that in the pursuit of profit, tour firms in Ukraine are now offering to take people into the “zone” without any knowledge of the rules governing such visits or the risks that visitors still face there (www.ia-centr.ru/publications/4542/).
“In certain cases,” he added, “such ‘businessmen’ … simply disappear after they have collected money from those who want to go there.” But such activities have the effect of detracting attention from the fact that “the Chernobyl zone is not an amusement park” and that those who are thinking about going there need to ask themselves why they are doing it.
Such operators are not the only people who are seeking to profit from the disaster. As the interviewer pointed out, “the very popular computer game ‘Stalker’” has part of the action take place in the Chernobyl zone, something that likely is offensive to many of the victims of the nuclear accident.
Sirota, for his part, was ambivalent about that. On the one hand, he clearly indicated that he understands why some might be upset by that reminder of a tragedy in their pasts. But on the other, he asked, “what can be the harm from this game?” Almost all computer games “are based on real or imagined events.”
And there is at least one positive result from such games: “A large number of young people find out about the town of Pripyat and Chernobyl precisely from ‘Stalker.’” If they did not play that game, it is entirely possible, Sirota said, that they would not know anything about the accident at all.
The activist, who lived through the disaster as a 10-year-old child, said that at the time, the forced evacuation of the population seemed “like an attractive game, only with real military helicopters flying lower over the roofs of the houses, … with an unending line of buses carrying us and all the residents of the town ‘for three days’ into the unknown.”
“We did not know or understand then,” Sirota said, “that we were leaving out town forever.”
Sirota said he made his first return to his native Pripyat only eight years later, and it was at that time that he “finally understand” when, by making this “unique jump into the past, into childhood,” he came to recognize that as a result of the Chernobyl accident, there could be no going back not only anytime soon but ever.
That experience prompted him to become an activist, and he has made a number of visits to the exclusion zone since that time, noting the disappearance of most people and their replacement by wild pigs and other animals that are somehow able to survive in what is still a dangerously radioactive area.
There are a few people left in the zone, mostly older people who were unable to come to terms with the places to which they were evacuated. There aren’t so many of these people, Sirota said, with only 34 in the village of Teremtsy and a total of about 270 for the exclusion zone as a whole.
Sirota gave his interview both to attract attention to the center he heads and a new book his organization has just published about the disaster. The center was established was set up in 2006 in order to press the Ukrainian government to turn Pripyat into a museum city. But up to now, he said, the idea is “nothing more than a beautiful metaphor.”
The book on “The Pripyat Syndrome,” has been in the works for 15years, Sirota said. It describes the lives and in many cases deaths of the residents of Pripyat. It was released on the anniversary of the accident two days ago. And the activist said that he very much hopes that “it will find its reader.”
As to the future of Pripyat itself, Sirota said there are only two possibilities. “The first and the simplest is to leave everything as it is, to await its destruction and then forgetfulness. The second, more difficult and expensive, is to preserve this city as a reminder that no one is ensured against the repetition of such a nightmare wherever he may live.
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Lenin Should Be Celebrated as Founder of the Russian Federation, Ufa Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 28 – Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader who seized power in Russia in 1917 has been praised and condemned for many things, but now a Bashkir scholar has celebrated him for a role few have yet acknowledged: Lenin, Rustem Vakhitov argues, deserves recognition and honor for his role as the founder of the Russian Federation.
In a 4,000-word essay posted online this week, Vakhitov, an Ufa-based academic who writes frequently on contemporary affairs, saysthat that Lenin’s importance for Russians today lies in his role as the creator of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic, the predecessor of the Russian Federation (contrtv.ru/common/3111/).
Arguing that “the cult of Lenin” in Soviet times was not only something the man himself did not want but also has gotten in the way of focusing on what Lenin actually did, Vakhitov says that the best way to begin is by asking the question: “When did the state by the name of the Russian Federation in which we live arise?”
“Many people consider that this took place in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR, but this is not true,” Vakhitov insists, adding that in fact “on December 25, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed legislation according to which the RSFSR was renamed [Vakhitov’s italics] as the Russian Federation.”
In support of that contention, the Ufa scholar notes that the law began with the following words: “The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR affirms: 1. The State the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) from now on will be called the Russian Federation (RF),” as it is known to this day.
What that means, Vakhitov continues, is that in 1991, the RSFSR simply changed its name, out of which were eliminated the words ‘soviet’ and ‘socialist’ as an indication that the Russian Republic had changed its political system and state ideology.” “But,” he continues, “no new state arose as a result.”
The country “retained all the territories and borders of the RSFSR, all its industrial and economic potential, its armed forces, its interior ministry, its special forces and even its political leadership since RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin, elected according to the laws of the RSFSR was simply transformed into the RF president with all the powers he had.”
Moreover, “the Constitution of the RSFSR from 1978 continued to operate on the territory of the Russian Federation until 1993.” At the same time, of course, “the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR,” as RF President Yeltsin informed the United Nations and other international organizations on the day” the RSFSR was renamed.
“The relations between the RSFSR and the RF are themselves thus a case of continuity,” Vakhitov says. No one had “disavowed” the legal act of the creation of the RSFSR unlike the legal act which created the USSR and which Yeltsin and his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts disavowed in Belovezhskaya in December 1991.
In this way, he says, “the Russian Federation is exactly the same state as the RSFSR but under a different name, with a different social-political and economic system, and a different state shield and hymn.” One “would like to add as well a different flag but that is not precisely so: the tricolor was established … when our country was still called the RSFSR.”
Moreover, Vakhitov continues, “the RSFSR [itself] arose on October 25 (November 7), 1917, when the Second All-Russian Congress confirmed the overthrow of the Provisional Government.” That was the moment when the Russian Federation under its current name was created, something Russians should recognize and thereby acknowledge Lenin’s key role.
“In no way,” the Ufa writer continues, is he “denying the right of citizens to express their moral assessment of the figure of V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin, his political activity, and the ideology which he professed.” But his role as the founder of the state in which they live is something that they cannot deny.
Other nations have gone through the same process in dealing with their founders, Vakhitov points out, with the French still honoring figures from the 1789 revolution as founders of modern France even while decrying the extremism and often vicious anti-clericalism of those individuals.
Indeed, the legitimacy of the French Republic depends on doing precisely that, he insists, and in like manner, the legitimacy of the Russian Federation requires respect for its founder, however much many Russians may be properly horrified by many of the crimes Lenin, the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state committed.
Russians should “respect Lenin as the creator of the USSR, the geopolitical heir of the Russian Empire,” he says. They should respect him as “a Russian patriot,” and they should respect him as “one of the creators of Russian federalism, the flexible system of administering the state which,” Vakhitov says, kept the country together after 1917.
“Let us hope,” Vakhitov concludes, “that after decades of deification and demonization, finally emotions will cool and reason will return, and Lenin will become part of our history – contradictory, bloody, but at the same time part of a great and severe history, as has been the history of any great power.”
Vienna, April 28 – Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader who seized power in Russia in 1917 has been praised and condemned for many things, but now a Bashkir scholar has celebrated him for a role few have yet acknowledged: Lenin, Rustem Vakhitov argues, deserves recognition and honor for his role as the founder of the Russian Federation.
In a 4,000-word essay posted online this week, Vakhitov, an Ufa-based academic who writes frequently on contemporary affairs, saysthat that Lenin’s importance for Russians today lies in his role as the creator of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic, the predecessor of the Russian Federation (contrtv.ru/common/3111/).
Arguing that “the cult of Lenin” in Soviet times was not only something the man himself did not want but also has gotten in the way of focusing on what Lenin actually did, Vakhitov says that the best way to begin is by asking the question: “When did the state by the name of the Russian Federation in which we live arise?”
“Many people consider that this took place in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR, but this is not true,” Vakhitov insists, adding that in fact “on December 25, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed legislation according to which the RSFSR was renamed [Vakhitov’s italics] as the Russian Federation.”
In support of that contention, the Ufa scholar notes that the law began with the following words: “The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR affirms: 1. The State the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) from now on will be called the Russian Federation (RF),” as it is known to this day.
What that means, Vakhitov continues, is that in 1991, the RSFSR simply changed its name, out of which were eliminated the words ‘soviet’ and ‘socialist’ as an indication that the Russian Republic had changed its political system and state ideology.” “But,” he continues, “no new state arose as a result.”
The country “retained all the territories and borders of the RSFSR, all its industrial and economic potential, its armed forces, its interior ministry, its special forces and even its political leadership since RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin, elected according to the laws of the RSFSR was simply transformed into the RF president with all the powers he had.”
Moreover, “the Constitution of the RSFSR from 1978 continued to operate on the territory of the Russian Federation until 1993.” At the same time, of course, “the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR,” as RF President Yeltsin informed the United Nations and other international organizations on the day” the RSFSR was renamed.
“The relations between the RSFSR and the RF are themselves thus a case of continuity,” Vakhitov says. No one had “disavowed” the legal act of the creation of the RSFSR unlike the legal act which created the USSR and which Yeltsin and his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts disavowed in Belovezhskaya in December 1991.
In this way, he says, “the Russian Federation is exactly the same state as the RSFSR but under a different name, with a different social-political and economic system, and a different state shield and hymn.” One “would like to add as well a different flag but that is not precisely so: the tricolor was established … when our country was still called the RSFSR.”
Moreover, Vakhitov continues, “the RSFSR [itself] arose on October 25 (November 7), 1917, when the Second All-Russian Congress confirmed the overthrow of the Provisional Government.” That was the moment when the Russian Federation under its current name was created, something Russians should recognize and thereby acknowledge Lenin’s key role.
“In no way,” the Ufa writer continues, is he “denying the right of citizens to express their moral assessment of the figure of V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin, his political activity, and the ideology which he professed.” But his role as the founder of the state in which they live is something that they cannot deny.
Other nations have gone through the same process in dealing with their founders, Vakhitov points out, with the French still honoring figures from the 1789 revolution as founders of modern France even while decrying the extremism and often vicious anti-clericalism of those individuals.
Indeed, the legitimacy of the French Republic depends on doing precisely that, he insists, and in like manner, the legitimacy of the Russian Federation requires respect for its founder, however much many Russians may be properly horrified by many of the crimes Lenin, the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state committed.
Russians should “respect Lenin as the creator of the USSR, the geopolitical heir of the Russian Empire,” he says. They should respect him as “a Russian patriot,” and they should respect him as “one of the creators of Russian federalism, the flexible system of administering the state which,” Vakhitov says, kept the country together after 1917.
“Let us hope,” Vakhitov concludes, “that after decades of deification and demonization, finally emotions will cool and reason will return, and Lenin will become part of our history – contradictory, bloody, but at the same time part of a great and severe history, as has been the history of any great power.”
Window on Eurasia: Conviction of Activist Who Protested Baptism of Tatar Infants Decried
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 28 – Last Friday’s conviction in a Naberezhny Chelny court of a Tatar activist who had spoken out against the baptism of Tatar infants by a Russian Orthodox priest without the permission of their parents or guardians has sparked protests from the Tatar Social Center (TOTs) as well as from human and religious rights groups elsewhere,.
On Friday, the court found TOTs leader Rafiz Kashapov guilty of provoking interethnic and inter-religious hostility (under Section 1 of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code) for his article “No to Christianization!” in which he protested the baptism of infants of Tatar nationality, a traditionally Muslim people, and gave him a suspended sentence of 18 months
That article appeared on Kashapov’s blog shortly after a Russian Orthodox priest baptized the children on January 16th of this year without the knowledge or agreement of their parents. His article led to protests in several cities of Tatarstan, and his blog was subsequently suppressed by the authorities.
Now, following Kashapov’s conviction and protests by several rights groups, his own Tatar Social Center has issued an appeal to human rights groups, social and political organizations, and the media of Tatarstan and Russia, denouncing this action and demanding that the authorities reverse course.
But it is a measure of the extent to which the Russian government is in control of the media that the appeal has so far appeared only on other blogs – see, for example, the complete text at blogs.mail.ru/mail/hamm77/38E6454E2B52C97F.html – or on websites hosted beyond the borders of Russia -- mariuver.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/sud-kashapovym/#more-7976.
The declaration, signed by A.Sh. Zalyalutdinov, the chairman of the regional TOTs Assembly, and M.A. Shakirova, the secretary of that group, provides a remarkable portrait of the increasingly frequent misuse of Russia’s anti-extremist laws and the also increasingly frequent cases of official and especially judicial malfeasance in that country.
After outlining the history of Kashapov’s own protest, the declaration states that the investigation of his case occurred “with crude violations of the law,” including moves by officials that prevented the accused attorneys from gaining access to information gathered by the government.
The trial itself, the declaration continues, was “closely controlled by the Moscow FSB and the court was subject to strong pressure from the prosecutor.” Moreover, the court’s decision reflected only the testimony of “experts” from Moscow and Kazan because the judge refused to consider “the declarations of independent experts” that were offered by Kashapov.
Both the facts of the case and these violations of judicial procedure, the authors of the declaration say, provide the basis for considering that “the sentence of the court is both without foundation and illegal.” And they say that lawyers for the accused will appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Tatarstan.
“Many human rights activists, public figures and journalists,” the declaration continues, not only in Tatarstan and Russia but in foreign countries have raised their voices in defense of Rafiz Kashapov, an important public figures who has stood up for the rights and interests of the Tatars and other peoples.”
“We express our deep gratitude to them!” the appeal concludes, especially since some of them, like Ulyanovsk journalist Sergey Kryukov, have themselves become the object of Russian government persecution as a result. Kryukov’s location at the present time, the appeal notes, is unknown.
The Kashapov case, as tragic as it is for him and for the Tatars, highlights two more widespread problems in the Russian Federation, both of which have been well-documented in recent times. On the one hand, Russian courts, as Moscow statistics show, are ever more willing to convict anyone the regime brings charges against (www.vestnikcivitas.ru/pbls/650).
And on the other, the Russian government, for all the talk about “a thaw” under Dmitry Medvedev, appears to be increasingly willing to control reporting about what is actually going on, either by taking down websites as in Kashapov’s case or directly corrupting journalists (www.russiamediamonitor.com/News.html).
In Soviet times, the Western media could be counted on to report such things, but unfortunately, their interest in doing so for whatever reason has declined. And as a result, those who do notice such abuses in Russia especially beyond Moscow’s ring road have a special obligation to try to bring them to the attention of others.
Vienna, April 28 – Last Friday’s conviction in a Naberezhny Chelny court of a Tatar activist who had spoken out against the baptism of Tatar infants by a Russian Orthodox priest without the permission of their parents or guardians has sparked protests from the Tatar Social Center (TOTs) as well as from human and religious rights groups elsewhere,.
On Friday, the court found TOTs leader Rafiz Kashapov guilty of provoking interethnic and inter-religious hostility (under Section 1 of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code) for his article “No to Christianization!” in which he protested the baptism of infants of Tatar nationality, a traditionally Muslim people, and gave him a suspended sentence of 18 months
That article appeared on Kashapov’s blog shortly after a Russian Orthodox priest baptized the children on January 16th of this year without the knowledge or agreement of their parents. His article led to protests in several cities of Tatarstan, and his blog was subsequently suppressed by the authorities.
Now, following Kashapov’s conviction and protests by several rights groups, his own Tatar Social Center has issued an appeal to human rights groups, social and political organizations, and the media of Tatarstan and Russia, denouncing this action and demanding that the authorities reverse course.
But it is a measure of the extent to which the Russian government is in control of the media that the appeal has so far appeared only on other blogs – see, for example, the complete text at blogs.mail.ru/mail/hamm77/38E6454E2B52C97F.html – or on websites hosted beyond the borders of Russia -- mariuver.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/sud-kashapovym/#more-7976.
The declaration, signed by A.Sh. Zalyalutdinov, the chairman of the regional TOTs Assembly, and M.A. Shakirova, the secretary of that group, provides a remarkable portrait of the increasingly frequent misuse of Russia’s anti-extremist laws and the also increasingly frequent cases of official and especially judicial malfeasance in that country.
After outlining the history of Kashapov’s own protest, the declaration states that the investigation of his case occurred “with crude violations of the law,” including moves by officials that prevented the accused attorneys from gaining access to information gathered by the government.
The trial itself, the declaration continues, was “closely controlled by the Moscow FSB and the court was subject to strong pressure from the prosecutor.” Moreover, the court’s decision reflected only the testimony of “experts” from Moscow and Kazan because the judge refused to consider “the declarations of independent experts” that were offered by Kashapov.
Both the facts of the case and these violations of judicial procedure, the authors of the declaration say, provide the basis for considering that “the sentence of the court is both without foundation and illegal.” And they say that lawyers for the accused will appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Tatarstan.
“Many human rights activists, public figures and journalists,” the declaration continues, not only in Tatarstan and Russia but in foreign countries have raised their voices in defense of Rafiz Kashapov, an important public figures who has stood up for the rights and interests of the Tatars and other peoples.”
“We express our deep gratitude to them!” the appeal concludes, especially since some of them, like Ulyanovsk journalist Sergey Kryukov, have themselves become the object of Russian government persecution as a result. Kryukov’s location at the present time, the appeal notes, is unknown.
The Kashapov case, as tragic as it is for him and for the Tatars, highlights two more widespread problems in the Russian Federation, both of which have been well-documented in recent times. On the one hand, Russian courts, as Moscow statistics show, are ever more willing to convict anyone the regime brings charges against (www.vestnikcivitas.ru/pbls/650).
And on the other, the Russian government, for all the talk about “a thaw” under Dmitry Medvedev, appears to be increasingly willing to control reporting about what is actually going on, either by taking down websites as in Kashapov’s case or directly corrupting journalists (www.russiamediamonitor.com/News.html).
In Soviet times, the Western media could be counted on to report such things, but unfortunately, their interest in doing so for whatever reason has declined. And as a result, those who do notice such abuses in Russia especially beyond Moscow’s ring road have a special obligation to try to bring them to the attention of others.
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