Paul Goble
Vienna, August 27 – The Russian Orthodox Church may turn out to be one of the biggest losers as a result of the Kremlin’s aggression in Georgia and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, losing its position of power in the former Soviet republics and its influence in the Orthodox and Christian worlds more generally.
That is because Moscow’s actions took place despite an appeal by Iliya II, the catholicos-patriarch of Georgia, not to support separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Russian government’s rebuff of that appeal not only will alienate the Georgian autocephalous church but also give new energy to efforts by Kyiv to form a single autocephalous Orthodox Church there.
Given that nearly half the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate are in Ukraine – parishes whose number allows it to claim to be the largest Orthodox church in the world – and that many bishops there were handpicked by Moscow to ensure the election of Kirill as the next patriarch, the shift of their allegiance would have a major impact on Orthodoxy and interfaith relations.
On Monday evening, Iliya II issued an appeal to the president and prime minister of the Russian Federation asking them to refrain from going ahead with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=22353; the text of his appeal is available at www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=64905&topic=593).
Georgia, the catholicos-patriarch pointed out, has always contained many cultures and religions, which have on occasion clashed. But while each group may have its own goals, all “have a common interest in the preservation of the territorial integrity [of the country] and the maintenance of national uniqueness.”
And he continued that “it is especially sad that Russia and Georgia, two Orthodox countries,” find themselves embroiled in a military and political conflict that threatens those values. But Iliya added, a Russian move to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have far greater consequences than that.
It would, he argued, lead to more separatism around the world. “Separatism is a terrible force, which destroys the foundations of states, and if it is given the chance to develop, chaos will dominate the world.” There are “small peoples in all states,” he continued, “and if they all want political independence, wars without end will begin.”
And he concluded, recognizing these two breakaway regions would be “extremely dangerous for Russia itself, giving an impulse to the development of separatism in your country, and in the future, you will have many more problems than there are in Georgia. That is something that ought to be considered.”
Unfortunately, neither Dmitry Medvedev nor Vladimir Putin took the warnings of the Georgian church leader seriously and went ahead with recognition. But as they were doing so, the Moscow Patriarchate, clearly aware of the dangers this step represents for the Russian church, took a number of steps to try to calm the situation.
First of all, Russian Patriarch Aleksii II sent greetings to Iliya II on the 45th anniversary of the latter’s entering the priesthood (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=22365). Then, it had one of its theologians announce that the fate of Orthodox churches in Abkhazia would depend exclusively on parish members (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=178215).
And finally, today, the Moscow church announced that it was continuing conversations with the Georgian church, conversations that Archbishop Feofan of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz, the Moscow patriarchate’s man in the Caucasus, said would be based “not on political norms but on church laws” (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=22379).
But few in the Georgian church and even fewer religious leaders in Ukraine are likely to accept that line, especially given some of the radical nationalist Orthodox commentary in Moscow (For an example of its argument and tone, see Vladimir Semenko, “The Church, the Empire and ‘The Nationalities Question’” at www.rusk.ru/st.php?idar=105417).
As a result, the Moscow Patriarchate faces an uphill task to avoid suffering any more collateral damage from what the Kremlin has done in Georgia than it has experienced over the last several weeks.
UPDATE for August 28: Ukrainians want a single national Orthodox Church independent of Moscow, polls show (ura-inform.com/ru/society/2008/08/27/hram/), and Russian actions in Georgia may boost their chances of organizing one soon. In an effort to justify the transfer control of Orthodox parishes in Abkhazia from Tbilisi to Moscow, an Orthodox leader in that breakaway republic insists that Orthodox cannon law requires that the church be administratively divied along state borders (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=1028).
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Only Palestine’s Hamas Backs Kremlin’s Recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 27 – While anti-American states like Cuba and Venezuela may soon follow and while Russia may be able to pressure some of its neighbors lest they face a similar threat, in the 24 hours after Dmitry Medvedev announced Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia only Palestine’s terrorist Hamas Movement, which controls the Gaza Strip, said it backed the move.
Today, the Kavkaz-uzel.ru site surveyed the reaction of governments, international organizations and some parties abroad to Medvedev’s move. As has been widely reported, NATO, the OSCE, and the European Union and their members have denounced Moscow’s action, as has the UN secretary general (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1227889.html).
But some of the specific reactions that Kavkaz-uzel.ru reports have received less attention. Polish President Lech Kaczynski denounced Medvedev’s move as a blatant attempt to “legalize the results of the unprecedented aggression of the Russian Federation toward the Georgian state.”
Greece, which often has adopted a more than cautious approach to Russia, denounced it, with its foreign minister Dora Bakoyannnis using terms almost as harsh as those the Poles and Baltic states have employed. And Japan on the other side of the world echoed the position of Washington and the Europeans, expressing regret at what Moscow has done.
Ukraine, the site said, announced that it considered Russia’s “recognition” to be equivalent to “the occupation of part of the territory of Georgia” by means of the creation and support of “marionette regimes.” And Azerbaijan repeated its longstanding view that Georgia’s territorial integrity must be respected.
So far, the other CIS countries, including Belarus, have refrained from public comment or from following Russia’s lead. And Serbia, a country with which Russia has had close relations, has neither recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia or backed Moscow, steps that would contradict its own interest in recovering Kosovo.
According to some Russian analysts, Moscow will not pick up any support at the Shanghai Cooperation Council meeting in Dushanbe today. On the one hand, they note, “Russia does not dominate” that group, and on the other, China, which is a rising power, “is not interested in a sharp confrontation with the US and NATO (www.nr2.ru/policy/193162.html).
Not surprisingly, Abkhazia and South Ossetia greeted each other during the day, and the government of Transdniestria, the breakaway unrecognized region in Moldova, also sent messages of congratulation to the two newly “recognized” states.
But beyond that, the only bright spot -- albeit a not unproblematic one -- Moscow could possibly find in this first day after its move came from the Palestinian Hamas movement, which welcomed Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, seeing this as a precedent which would “give hope to all oppressed peoples.”
But Russian officials and those who either are dominated by them or wish to curry favor with them remained upbeat. Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, the president of the Islamic Cultural Center of Russia, predicted that by the end of this year, 50 to 60 countries will decide to recognize these two breakaway republics (www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=165843).
That seems unlikely, and in the short term, few countries are likely to follow Moscow either because they do not want to cross the Western powers, because they feel threatened by ethnic or regional challenges or because they accept Tbilisi’s argument that Russian recognition in fact amounts to Russian “annexation” of Georgian territory (www.nr2.ru/policy/193031.html).
And consequently, the move that Russian nationalist commentators and some analysts in the West have pointed to as an indication that Russia is back as a super power in fact is highlighting Moscow’s isolation and reduced its chances to have the kind of influence or play the role that its leaders have said they want it to internationally.
Vienna, August 27 – While anti-American states like Cuba and Venezuela may soon follow and while Russia may be able to pressure some of its neighbors lest they face a similar threat, in the 24 hours after Dmitry Medvedev announced Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia only Palestine’s terrorist Hamas Movement, which controls the Gaza Strip, said it backed the move.
Today, the Kavkaz-uzel.ru site surveyed the reaction of governments, international organizations and some parties abroad to Medvedev’s move. As has been widely reported, NATO, the OSCE, and the European Union and their members have denounced Moscow’s action, as has the UN secretary general (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1227889.html).
But some of the specific reactions that Kavkaz-uzel.ru reports have received less attention. Polish President Lech Kaczynski denounced Medvedev’s move as a blatant attempt to “legalize the results of the unprecedented aggression of the Russian Federation toward the Georgian state.”
Greece, which often has adopted a more than cautious approach to Russia, denounced it, with its foreign minister Dora Bakoyannnis using terms almost as harsh as those the Poles and Baltic states have employed. And Japan on the other side of the world echoed the position of Washington and the Europeans, expressing regret at what Moscow has done.
Ukraine, the site said, announced that it considered Russia’s “recognition” to be equivalent to “the occupation of part of the territory of Georgia” by means of the creation and support of “marionette regimes.” And Azerbaijan repeated its longstanding view that Georgia’s territorial integrity must be respected.
So far, the other CIS countries, including Belarus, have refrained from public comment or from following Russia’s lead. And Serbia, a country with which Russia has had close relations, has neither recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia or backed Moscow, steps that would contradict its own interest in recovering Kosovo.
According to some Russian analysts, Moscow will not pick up any support at the Shanghai Cooperation Council meeting in Dushanbe today. On the one hand, they note, “Russia does not dominate” that group, and on the other, China, which is a rising power, “is not interested in a sharp confrontation with the US and NATO (www.nr2.ru/policy/193162.html).
Not surprisingly, Abkhazia and South Ossetia greeted each other during the day, and the government of Transdniestria, the breakaway unrecognized region in Moldova, also sent messages of congratulation to the two newly “recognized” states.
But beyond that, the only bright spot -- albeit a not unproblematic one -- Moscow could possibly find in this first day after its move came from the Palestinian Hamas movement, which welcomed Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, seeing this as a precedent which would “give hope to all oppressed peoples.”
But Russian officials and those who either are dominated by them or wish to curry favor with them remained upbeat. Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, the president of the Islamic Cultural Center of Russia, predicted that by the end of this year, 50 to 60 countries will decide to recognize these two breakaway republics (www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=165843).
That seems unlikely, and in the short term, few countries are likely to follow Moscow either because they do not want to cross the Western powers, because they feel threatened by ethnic or regional challenges or because they accept Tbilisi’s argument that Russian recognition in fact amounts to Russian “annexation” of Georgian territory (www.nr2.ru/policy/193031.html).
And consequently, the move that Russian nationalist commentators and some analysts in the West have pointed to as an indication that Russia is back as a super power in fact is highlighting Moscow’s isolation and reduced its chances to have the kind of influence or play the role that its leaders have said they want it to internationally.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Latest Moves on Georgia Threaten Russia Itself, Many There Warn
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 27 – By recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, Moscow has passed a second “point of no return” -- the first was its invasion of Georgia -- a step that threatens the Russian Federation itself more than anyone else, according to a prominent Russian analyst.
And his views are increasingly being echoed not only by other analysts but by social organizations like the Soldiers’ Mothers Committees which have objected to the way the war was conducted and by opposition political groups like the Unified Civic Front, which is headed by Gari Kasparov.
In a comment to the “Novyy region” news portal, Pavel Salin, an expert at the Moscow Center for Political Conjuncture, said that “if the West reacts to the decision of Dmitry Medvedev by isolating the country, the Russian Federation could revert to autarchy with an authoritarian power more harsh than” under Putin (www.nr2.ru/moskow/193183.html).
“On Tuesday,” Salin continued, “the Russian elite passed a second ‘point of no return’ not only in relations with the West but also in its internal policy. The first was passed when it was decided to introduce forces in the then still unrecognized republics, although to the last moment, [Moscow] retained the possibility of ‘pulling back.’”
But that possibility appears to have been thrown away, the Moscow analyst said, and if Western reaction continues to be “super-tough and ensures the international isolation” of Russia, “then this will give additional trump cards to forces which are insisting on autarchy and reliable exclusively on [Russia’s] own forces for modernization.”
The only way for these groups to dominate the situation and for this strategy to have any chance of success, Salin said, is for the political regime in the Russian Federation to become “significantly more authoritarian than its analog of the times of the second administration of Vladimir Putin.”
It is not entirely clear whether Salin’s analysis is intended as a warning to Russian leaders and the West about what will happen if the former maintain their current course and the latter impose tough sanctions on Moscow, but there is no lack of clarity on these points in the declaration of Kasparov’s United Civic Front today.
The Front declares that the Kremlin’s latest move “contradicts the plan for the peaceful regulation of the situation in South Ossetia proposed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy and signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.” According to its declaration, Russia has only itself to blame for “dragging our country into a new cold war.”
Because Russia will become more authoritarian, because it will be confronted by separatist challenges within its own borders, and because it will lose access to Western financial markets, the statement continues, the Kremlin’s actions will have “catastrophic consequences” for the people of Russia (www.sobkorr.ru/news/48B500AC25693.html).
These predictions are based on the assumption that the Russian government won’t change course or offer the West something it wants on another issue and on the assumption that the West’s current toughness in response to what Moscow has done will in fact continue for a significant period of time, something that many in Western countries are already arguing against.
But however that may be, Russia is already suffering a number of immediate costs as a result of its actions and will suffer more regardless of whether either the Kremlin or Western governments change course or find some reason to agree on “larger issues” that will lead to the sacrifice of the principles each says it holds dear.
First, the Russian stock and exchange markets continue to fall to two-year lows, hitting the Russian elite in its pocketbook and making new investment more problematic (www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/370448.htm), a problem compounded by the chorus of Western experts who warn that it is now too risky to invest in the Russian Federation (www.barentsobserver.com/-risky-to-invest-in-russia.4503589-16149.html).
Second, Russia is already experiencing a “domino effect” in its own ethnic republics, with an increasing number of non-Russians not only frightened by Moscow’s increasingly nationalist course but also convinced that they are “no worse” than the Abkhazians or South Ossetians and thus deserve independence (www.olvia.idknet.com/ol270-08-08.htm).
At the very least, Moscow will have to deploy even more forces than it does at present in the North Caucasus and perhaps other regions in order to contain this and to demonstrate that it won’t allow anyone inside the Russian Federation to assume that they have the “rights” the Russian government has recognized in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And third, not only NATO but Russia’s neighbors are suspending military-to-military cooperation and thinking about increasing their defense budgets (www.barentsobserver.com/all-military-cooperation-is-suspended.4502985-16149.html), a situation that will force Moscow to respond in kind, especially since its military won in Georgia with numbers rather than quality
(On that not unimportant point, see the analysis of Anatoly Tsyganok posted online today (http://www.polit.ru/analytics/2008/08/27/vol.html) and the discussion in today’s “Novyye izvestiya” suggesting that Russia is spending ever more on defense but getting less defense capability for it (www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-27/96780/).
Addendum: The Azerbaijan news portal, 1News.AZ, reports that Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the Russian opposition, has declared on his blog that “as a result of Medvedev and Putin, we are being deprived of Russia,” adding that if Moscow continues on the path it is following now, Russia and Russians will suffer even more (1news.az/world/20080827043630243.html).
Vienna, August 27 – By recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, Moscow has passed a second “point of no return” -- the first was its invasion of Georgia -- a step that threatens the Russian Federation itself more than anyone else, according to a prominent Russian analyst.
And his views are increasingly being echoed not only by other analysts but by social organizations like the Soldiers’ Mothers Committees which have objected to the way the war was conducted and by opposition political groups like the Unified Civic Front, which is headed by Gari Kasparov.
In a comment to the “Novyy region” news portal, Pavel Salin, an expert at the Moscow Center for Political Conjuncture, said that “if the West reacts to the decision of Dmitry Medvedev by isolating the country, the Russian Federation could revert to autarchy with an authoritarian power more harsh than” under Putin (www.nr2.ru/moskow/193183.html).
“On Tuesday,” Salin continued, “the Russian elite passed a second ‘point of no return’ not only in relations with the West but also in its internal policy. The first was passed when it was decided to introduce forces in the then still unrecognized republics, although to the last moment, [Moscow] retained the possibility of ‘pulling back.’”
But that possibility appears to have been thrown away, the Moscow analyst said, and if Western reaction continues to be “super-tough and ensures the international isolation” of Russia, “then this will give additional trump cards to forces which are insisting on autarchy and reliable exclusively on [Russia’s] own forces for modernization.”
The only way for these groups to dominate the situation and for this strategy to have any chance of success, Salin said, is for the political regime in the Russian Federation to become “significantly more authoritarian than its analog of the times of the second administration of Vladimir Putin.”
It is not entirely clear whether Salin’s analysis is intended as a warning to Russian leaders and the West about what will happen if the former maintain their current course and the latter impose tough sanctions on Moscow, but there is no lack of clarity on these points in the declaration of Kasparov’s United Civic Front today.
The Front declares that the Kremlin’s latest move “contradicts the plan for the peaceful regulation of the situation in South Ossetia proposed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy and signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.” According to its declaration, Russia has only itself to blame for “dragging our country into a new cold war.”
Because Russia will become more authoritarian, because it will be confronted by separatist challenges within its own borders, and because it will lose access to Western financial markets, the statement continues, the Kremlin’s actions will have “catastrophic consequences” for the people of Russia (www.sobkorr.ru/news/48B500AC25693.html).
These predictions are based on the assumption that the Russian government won’t change course or offer the West something it wants on another issue and on the assumption that the West’s current toughness in response to what Moscow has done will in fact continue for a significant period of time, something that many in Western countries are already arguing against.
But however that may be, Russia is already suffering a number of immediate costs as a result of its actions and will suffer more regardless of whether either the Kremlin or Western governments change course or find some reason to agree on “larger issues” that will lead to the sacrifice of the principles each says it holds dear.
First, the Russian stock and exchange markets continue to fall to two-year lows, hitting the Russian elite in its pocketbook and making new investment more problematic (www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/370448.htm), a problem compounded by the chorus of Western experts who warn that it is now too risky to invest in the Russian Federation (www.barentsobserver.com/-risky-to-invest-in-russia.4503589-16149.html).
Second, Russia is already experiencing a “domino effect” in its own ethnic republics, with an increasing number of non-Russians not only frightened by Moscow’s increasingly nationalist course but also convinced that they are “no worse” than the Abkhazians or South Ossetians and thus deserve independence (www.olvia.idknet.com/ol270-08-08.htm).
At the very least, Moscow will have to deploy even more forces than it does at present in the North Caucasus and perhaps other regions in order to contain this and to demonstrate that it won’t allow anyone inside the Russian Federation to assume that they have the “rights” the Russian government has recognized in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And third, not only NATO but Russia’s neighbors are suspending military-to-military cooperation and thinking about increasing their defense budgets (www.barentsobserver.com/all-military-cooperation-is-suspended.4502985-16149.html), a situation that will force Moscow to respond in kind, especially since its military won in Georgia with numbers rather than quality
(On that not unimportant point, see the analysis of Anatoly Tsyganok posted online today (http://www.polit.ru/analytics/2008/08/27/vol.html) and the discussion in today’s “Novyye izvestiya” suggesting that Russia is spending ever more on defense but getting less defense capability for it (www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-27/96780/).
Addendum: The Azerbaijan news portal, 1News.AZ, reports that Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the Russian opposition, has declared on his blog that “as a result of Medvedev and Putin, we are being deprived of Russia,” adding that if Moscow continues on the path it is following now, Russia and Russians will suffer even more (1news.az/world/20080827043630243.html).
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s ‘Buffer’ Plan Allows Russians to Occupy Key Parts of Georgia
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 26 – Now that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has announced that Kremlin is recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, Moscow’s plan for military “buffers” around them outlined last week represents the Russian government’s clearest indication yet of how it intends to continue its illegal occupation of Georgian territory.
Last Friday night, Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov told Medvedev that the “successful withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia” had been completed, but at the same moment, General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the Russian general staff, presented a map showing the zones inside Georgia where Russian forces remain.
Nogovitsin said that these “buffer” zones were necessary to protect Russian peacekeepers and the government authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the map of these “security zones” indicates that Moscow plans to use them to ensure that it can continue to put pressure on Tbilisi, in violation of the ceasefire accord it signed (www.apsny.ge/analytics/1219778220.php).
According to Nogovitsyn, these “security zones” inside Georgia will range in width from six to 18 kilometers in most places but will extend to the city of Senaki and the approaches to the key port of Poti, which are located some 30 to 40 kilometers distance from the borders of Abkhazia.
The Russian general said that the borders of these “buffer zones” will extend in the Abkhaz sector through the Georgian population centers of Nabada, Chaladidi, Senaki, Kvia, Khudoni, Gunagua, Dzhikmuri, Ochamchire and Anaklia and in the South Ossetian sector through Perevi, Godora, Ali, Variani, Ikoti, Tsiara and Patsa.
Perhaps most ominously, Nogovitsyn said that he had no intention of discussing these arrangements or these borders with Georgian officials, thus arrogating itself the right to decide what Russian forces will do and where they will be located by asserting that “all these buffer zones are legitimate and correspond to existing agreements.”
Neither the French who prepared the ceasefire accord, the Georgians who signed it, or the Americans who have been close observers of what Moscow has been doing and not doing on the ground agree with Nogovitsyn’s claims and thus with Moscow’s assertions that it has withdrawn its forces. Instead, most observers see the Russian occupation as continuing.
In addition to Moscow’s obvious interest in putting pressure on Georgia and demonstrating to other countries in the region and around the world that it can do what it likes, the Russian military may have another reason for wanting to be stationed this far forward, one that Moscow has been unwilling to acknowledge.
According to an analysis prepared by the London Institute of Strategic Studies and published in part by “The Times” of London, Russian forces defeated their opponents not be better training or better weapons but rather by, much as the Soviet military did in World War II, by sheer numbers (www.akado.com/news/document26914/novoteka).
Among the shortcomings the Institute’s Colonel Christopher Langley pointed to in this analysis was a lack of adequate armored personnel carriers, the inability to protect senior officers – the commander of the 58th army was wounded and evacuated soon after the invasion began – and the lack of both drones and planes capable of evading Georgian ground fire.
Some senior Russian military analysts agree, including Konstantin Makienko, the deputy director of the Moscow Center for the Analysis of Strategy and Tactics, who told “The Times” that Georgian military technology was superior to Russian in this war and only Russian numbers allowed Moscow to win.
Given that NATO and the West have pledged to rearm and provide more advanced training for Georgian forces, Moscow may have concluded that the only way to ensure its continued military dominance in Georgia without tying down a massive number of troops it does not have is to use Nogovitsyn’s “buffer zones” to push any future battle line deep inside Georgia.
Vienna, August 26 – Now that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has announced that Kremlin is recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, Moscow’s plan for military “buffers” around them outlined last week represents the Russian government’s clearest indication yet of how it intends to continue its illegal occupation of Georgian territory.
Last Friday night, Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov told Medvedev that the “successful withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia” had been completed, but at the same moment, General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the Russian general staff, presented a map showing the zones inside Georgia where Russian forces remain.
Nogovitsin said that these “buffer” zones were necessary to protect Russian peacekeepers and the government authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the map of these “security zones” indicates that Moscow plans to use them to ensure that it can continue to put pressure on Tbilisi, in violation of the ceasefire accord it signed (www.apsny.ge/analytics/1219778220.php).
According to Nogovitsyn, these “security zones” inside Georgia will range in width from six to 18 kilometers in most places but will extend to the city of Senaki and the approaches to the key port of Poti, which are located some 30 to 40 kilometers distance from the borders of Abkhazia.
The Russian general said that the borders of these “buffer zones” will extend in the Abkhaz sector through the Georgian population centers of Nabada, Chaladidi, Senaki, Kvia, Khudoni, Gunagua, Dzhikmuri, Ochamchire and Anaklia and in the South Ossetian sector through Perevi, Godora, Ali, Variani, Ikoti, Tsiara and Patsa.
Perhaps most ominously, Nogovitsyn said that he had no intention of discussing these arrangements or these borders with Georgian officials, thus arrogating itself the right to decide what Russian forces will do and where they will be located by asserting that “all these buffer zones are legitimate and correspond to existing agreements.”
Neither the French who prepared the ceasefire accord, the Georgians who signed it, or the Americans who have been close observers of what Moscow has been doing and not doing on the ground agree with Nogovitsyn’s claims and thus with Moscow’s assertions that it has withdrawn its forces. Instead, most observers see the Russian occupation as continuing.
In addition to Moscow’s obvious interest in putting pressure on Georgia and demonstrating to other countries in the region and around the world that it can do what it likes, the Russian military may have another reason for wanting to be stationed this far forward, one that Moscow has been unwilling to acknowledge.
According to an analysis prepared by the London Institute of Strategic Studies and published in part by “The Times” of London, Russian forces defeated their opponents not be better training or better weapons but rather by, much as the Soviet military did in World War II, by sheer numbers (www.akado.com/news/document26914/novoteka).
Among the shortcomings the Institute’s Colonel Christopher Langley pointed to in this analysis was a lack of adequate armored personnel carriers, the inability to protect senior officers – the commander of the 58th army was wounded and evacuated soon after the invasion began – and the lack of both drones and planes capable of evading Georgian ground fire.
Some senior Russian military analysts agree, including Konstantin Makienko, the deputy director of the Moscow Center for the Analysis of Strategy and Tactics, who told “The Times” that Georgian military technology was superior to Russian in this war and only Russian numbers allowed Moscow to win.
Given that NATO and the West have pledged to rearm and provide more advanced training for Georgian forces, Moscow may have concluded that the only way to ensure its continued military dominance in Georgia without tying down a massive number of troops it does not have is to use Nogovitsyn’s “buffer zones” to push any future battle line deep inside Georgia.
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