Paul Goble
Vienna, August 21 – Having watched Moscow’s moves in Georgia and listened to various Russians suggest that the Crimea, where Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is based, is or should be Moscow’s next target, Ukrainian politicians, diplomats, and foreign policy analysts are discussing the nature and dimensions of the Russian threat and what Kyiv should do to parry it.
In addition to Russian actions and threats, this issue has heated up in recent days because of calls by senior Ukrainian officials for Russia to begin preparing to move its fleet out of Sevastopol by or possibly even before 2017, statements that most Russian politicians have refused to take seriously and most military analysts say would be very difficult.
Today, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodomyr Ogryzko said that Moscow must begin thinking about moving both men and materiel from Sevastopol now because regardless of what some may think, Kyiv will honor its agreement with Moscow but “in any case after 2017, the Russian fleet will not be on our territory (news.mail.ru/politics/1960873).
Ogryzko said that the Ukrainian government cannot understand why Russia has simply “refused” to discuss the situation or any plans to withdraw its forces and close the base. As a sovereign country, the minister said, Ukraine will meet its treaty obligations, but he underscored that Ukraine has “the right to make a choice” about any bases on its territory.
And if Ukraine makes the decision not to have such bases, the foreign minister continued, “no one, including Russia can influence our decision. … If in Moscow, they do not yet understand this, that governments live according to such rules throughout the world, then this is Russia’s problem” and not Ukraine’s.
But recent Russian behavior in Georgia and Moscow’s reactions to Kyiv’s positions on this and other issues has convinced many Ukrainians that Russia’s problem in this regard is becoming a problem for their country because of the danger that Moscow will try to destabilize its neighbor to ensure its continued control of Sevastopol or even seek to seize Crimea.
Those concerns have been exacerbated by three new developments: suggestions by some officials that Timoshenko should be charged with treason, a statement by a Crimean Tatar leader and Ukrainian parliamentarian that Moscow has many levers to use in Crimea, and an assessment by Ukrainian military analysts of what Moscow is already doing.
The first of these, charges that opposition leader Yuliya Timoshenko should be investigated for possible treason on behalf of Russia, has already been extensively discussed, with some analysts arguing that this scandal by itself represents an effort by Moscow to destabilize and discredit the Ukrainian government.
But the second and third deserve more attention. Today, Mustafa Dzhemilyev, who is both the leader of the Crimean Tatars and a deputy in the Ukrainian parliament, said that he is convinced that the large number of Crimeans who have dual citizenship with Russia by itself points to a possible South Ossetian scenario for that peninsula (www.vlasti.net/news/20236).
Moreover, he continued, unlike in South Ossetia, “there is no need [for Russia] to introduce forces [because] there is a sufficiently large and not badly armed contingent of the Russian Black Sea Fleet already there.” Consequently, Moscow could move even more quickly than in did in Georgia, he said.
“In order to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” the Crimean Tatar leader said, Kyiv should “close Russian consulates which are violating the law by handing out to citizens of Ukraine Russian passports.” Indeed, Ukrainian officials should force those “who have illegal dual citizenship to annul one of the passports.”
Moreover, Ukrainian officials must focus on the activities of pro-Russian organizations whose statements and activities are exacerbating interethnic tensions and creating the conditions for a Russian move. And Dzhemilyev said, Kyiv should insist that the Black Sea Fleet leave Sevastopol long before the 2017 date established by agreement.
The third event was the release, also today, of a report by the Kyiv Center for Research on the Army, Conversion and Disarmament, which argued that “Russia has created in the Crimea all the preconditions” for a military operation to keep control of Sevastopol, detach Crimea from Ukraine, and weaken the rest of the country as well (www.nr2.ru/kiev/192334.html).
“For the achievement of these goals, Russia doesn’t need a major military conflict with Ukraine,” the center’s analysts said. Instead, “it is sufficient to destabilize the situation in a single Crimean region” through the use of precisely targeted operations using “the forces of the Russian special services and particular units of the Black Sea Fleet.”
Moreover, they continued, Moscow will build on “to the maximum extent possible” the pro-Russian segments of the population and the pro-Russian social and political organizations that Moscow and its friends in Ukraine have been promoting ever since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991.
The center’s analysts suggested that the first stage of such a conflict might consist of “actions directed at the sharpening of relations between personnel of the Black Sea Fleet and representatives of Ukrainian authority in nearby areas,” possibly by means of “a provocation” taking the form of a supposed Ukrainian attack on the fleet.
After that happens, according to the center’s scenario, “the pro-Russian population will rise to the defense of the Russian personnel” and then there “will begin clashes with the law enforcement bodies of Ukraine.” That in turn will lead both countries to increase their military presence in Crimea, at which time Moscow will raise the issue of Ukraine’s right to Crimea.
Kyiv would then appeal to the West, the center said, but its analysts argued that Ukraine would not be any more successful in attracting anything more from Western countries than verbal support. And consequently, Russia could then “swallow” Crimea at its leisure, confident that Ukraine by itself would not be able to block its moves.
The center’s director added that he does not believe that Moscow is likely to follow such a scenario, but he added that “Russia has already created all the necessary conditions for its realization,” including official statements questioning Ukraine’s right to control Crimea, ramping up anti-Ukrainian feelings among Russians, and “also dominating Ukraine’s information space.”
Today also, Ukrainian media carried the assessments of five political analysts. Sergei Dzherdzh, the president of the Ukraine-NATO League, agreed that Russia could move in Crimea, but he suggested that “more sober” heads in Moscow were likely to act with restraint given Moscow’s experiences in Chechnya and Georgia (www.vlasti.net/news/20336).
Vadim Grechaninov, president of the Atlantic Council in Kyiv, said that Russia will launch “not a real war but an information one” and will seek to dominate Ukraine by creating “a fifth column,” a powerful pro-Russian lobby within the government, the leaders of the country’s political parties, and in the regions.
Political scientist Viktor Nebozheno said that Ukraine was entering a dangerous period because both Russian and Georgian “hawks” might seek to stage provocations in Sevastopol in order to achieve their goals elsewhere, a view echoed by the Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy’s Aleksandr Paliy, who said Russia has constantly been staging provocations in Ukraine.
But Vadim Karasev, a political scientist, said that Ukraine is in fact in a good position to counter any Russian moves of this kind. If it blocks the formation of “unrecognized formations” and “separatist groups” prepared to help Russia and if it adopts “a new regional policy” to ensure that Crimea develops, then Moscow will have a much harder time in pursuing its goals.
But “the main thing,” Karasev said, is for Ukraine “not to do anything stupid” that Moscow would then exploit.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Window on Eurasia: One Russian in Three Said to Want Negotiated Settlement with Georgia
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 21 – Nearly one in three Russians is in favor of a negotiated settlement with Georgia rather than more military action, according to a poll conducted by the Levada Center. And roughly the same share believes that when the dust settles, the situation in Georgia and the state of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi will be much as they were beforehand.
Those and other figures about Russian public opinion about the war, its causes and its consequences were released today during a Moscow press conference by Boris Dubin, the head of the Center’s research department. As of this writing, they have not been posted on the center’s own website (www.sobkorr.ru/news/48AD2C91407BD.html).
Russians who subscribe to the idea that the conflict is the result of “a war between the US and Russia and also those who blame Georgia and express the most anti-Georgian views tend to be more educated, have higher incomes, and live either in Moscow or other urban centers in European Russia.
Those who express the greatest sympathy and support for the residents of South Ossetia, in contrast, tend to be less well educated, have smaller incomes, and live in villages or small towns, a division that holds up in their assessments of what Russia should do next and what the consequences of the war for the Russian community will be.
Dubin added that 21 percent of the entire sample said that the war arose as a result of the policies of Georgia and did not reflect the “political interests” of either the United States or the Russian Federation, a possible indication that a significant fraction of Russians continue to make a careful distinction between Washington and Tbilisi.
A “smaller part of the population” – Dubin did not provide exact figures or at least the Sobkorr.ru correspondent did not report them – believes that the conflict has not ended, with an equal share agreeing with the statement that “Russia conducted itself in this conflict in an incorrect way” when it “bombed Georgia.”
Only one Russian in 20, the Levada Center expert said, said that “the causes of the conflict are connected with Russia’s policies in the Caucasus” or reflect its “goal of preserving [Moscow’s] influence there. And some young Russians even said that Georgia had the “right” to act in South Ossetia as it has.
Intriguingly, one in six of the Russians polled said that “Russia had allowed itself to be provoked by Georgia and that this will have negative consequences for the country” now and in the future. And 36 percent said that the best way to prevent the conflict from hurting Russia more was for both sides to return to the status quo ante, thus allowing passions to calm.
To get to that state, Dubin continued, 31 percent of Russians told the Levada Center pollsters that Russia and Georgia should enter into negotiations, lest as 19 percent of the sample said other countries be drawn into the conflict and thus complicate any negotiated settlement of the disputes.
At the end of Dubin’s presentation, Aleksei Grazhdankin, the deputy director of the Levada Center, said that a majority of Russians believe that the current verbal exchanges between Moscow and Western capitals will “not influence relations with the West” in general but could “possibly change relations with the United States.
The Levada Center findings at least as presented by Dubin and Grazhdankin today suggest three things. First, both and especially Dubin were focusing mostly on views held by minorities, albeit sometimes significant ones. Consequently, it is important to remember that in most cases, a larger share of Russians does not back the positions they outline.
Second, the greater support the Kremlin appears to enjoy among the urban, educated, and higher paid segment of the population not only suggests that they are more affected by the government’s media campaign but also that President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin may be able to count on this influential group as they go forward.
And third, this poll was taken even before the conflict began to cool down. It thus reflects the passions of that time, and many of the poll’s respondents are likely to have very different views or at least give very different answers once the war drops off the daily news cycle and they have time to think about its consequences and fit their views about it into a broader matrix.
Vienna, August 21 – Nearly one in three Russians is in favor of a negotiated settlement with Georgia rather than more military action, according to a poll conducted by the Levada Center. And roughly the same share believes that when the dust settles, the situation in Georgia and the state of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi will be much as they were beforehand.
Those and other figures about Russian public opinion about the war, its causes and its consequences were released today during a Moscow press conference by Boris Dubin, the head of the Center’s research department. As of this writing, they have not been posted on the center’s own website (www.sobkorr.ru/news/48AD2C91407BD.html).
Russians who subscribe to the idea that the conflict is the result of “a war between the US and Russia and also those who blame Georgia and express the most anti-Georgian views tend to be more educated, have higher incomes, and live either in Moscow or other urban centers in European Russia.
Those who express the greatest sympathy and support for the residents of South Ossetia, in contrast, tend to be less well educated, have smaller incomes, and live in villages or small towns, a division that holds up in their assessments of what Russia should do next and what the consequences of the war for the Russian community will be.
Dubin added that 21 percent of the entire sample said that the war arose as a result of the policies of Georgia and did not reflect the “political interests” of either the United States or the Russian Federation, a possible indication that a significant fraction of Russians continue to make a careful distinction between Washington and Tbilisi.
A “smaller part of the population” – Dubin did not provide exact figures or at least the Sobkorr.ru correspondent did not report them – believes that the conflict has not ended, with an equal share agreeing with the statement that “Russia conducted itself in this conflict in an incorrect way” when it “bombed Georgia.”
Only one Russian in 20, the Levada Center expert said, said that “the causes of the conflict are connected with Russia’s policies in the Caucasus” or reflect its “goal of preserving [Moscow’s] influence there. And some young Russians even said that Georgia had the “right” to act in South Ossetia as it has.
Intriguingly, one in six of the Russians polled said that “Russia had allowed itself to be provoked by Georgia and that this will have negative consequences for the country” now and in the future. And 36 percent said that the best way to prevent the conflict from hurting Russia more was for both sides to return to the status quo ante, thus allowing passions to calm.
To get to that state, Dubin continued, 31 percent of Russians told the Levada Center pollsters that Russia and Georgia should enter into negotiations, lest as 19 percent of the sample said other countries be drawn into the conflict and thus complicate any negotiated settlement of the disputes.
At the end of Dubin’s presentation, Aleksei Grazhdankin, the deputy director of the Levada Center, said that a majority of Russians believe that the current verbal exchanges between Moscow and Western capitals will “not influence relations with the West” in general but could “possibly change relations with the United States.
The Levada Center findings at least as presented by Dubin and Grazhdankin today suggest three things. First, both and especially Dubin were focusing mostly on views held by minorities, albeit sometimes significant ones. Consequently, it is important to remember that in most cases, a larger share of Russians does not back the positions they outline.
Second, the greater support the Kremlin appears to enjoy among the urban, educated, and higher paid segment of the population not only suggests that they are more affected by the government’s media campaign but also that President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin may be able to count on this influential group as they go forward.
And third, this poll was taken even before the conflict began to cool down. It thus reflects the passions of that time, and many of the poll’s respondents are likely to have very different views or at least give very different answers once the war drops off the daily news cycle and they have time to think about its consequences and fit their views about it into a broader matrix.
Window on Eurasia: Russia Will Share the USSR’s Fate if It Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Yabloko Leader Warns
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 21 – If Moscow goes ahead and recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and even more if it incorporates South Ossetia into the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation is likely to share the fate of the Soviet Union and fall apart sometime in the future, according to the leader of Yabloko.
At a Moscow press conference earlier today, Sergei Mitrokhin said that in all cases, “Russia must start from the principle of territorial integrity. And here,” he continued, Moscow “must think not only about the participants of the current conflict but also about its very own future” (nr2.ru/moskow/192376.html).
That is because, he pointed out, “in Russia there are an enormous number of such territories which after a certain time could theoretically follow the path of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” to independence. “We do not know what will take place 10, 15 or 20 years from now.”
And consequently, he argued, “it is very dangerous to set a precedent” that others may use, even when in Mitrokhin’s opinion “at the present time it is practically impossible to imagine that the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will ever agree to live within the framework of a united Georgia.
Curiously, the liberal Yabloko leader’s warning echoes in part the one nationalist LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky issued last February, albeit without the invocation of conspiracy theories and an attack on democracy and federalism as the source of all Russia’s past, present and future problems (nr2.ru/moskow/165341.html).
According to Zhirinovsky, the United States, having dismembered the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, is now seeking to do the same thing to the Russian Federation by “provoking the Kremlin to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” and thus setting off “a parade of sovereignty declarations by national republics now within Russia.”
“In order to avoid the Kosovo variant” for Russia, the flamboyant LDPR leader said, “Russia needs a unitary state. If it does not set one up, then the country will collapse.” And he added that “if our present regime with a democratic state is preserved, then we will be forced over the course of the next 30 to 40 years to follow the Kosovo variant.”
Should that occur and Russia thus be split into a number of smaller and quite different states, Zhirinovsky said, then “we will have to tell our grandchildren that they will live in a different country, learn a different language and possibly profess a different faith. I do not want this for my children.”
Both Mitrokhin and Zhirinovsky point to some of the reasons why Moscow would be taking a big risk by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states or even more by including one or the other as part of the Russian Federation. But neither of them nor most other commentators are talking about the most serious threat such an action would entail.
And that is a lesson the demise of the Soviet Union taught: The USSR died because it was based on a system of politicized, territorialized, and hierarchically arranged ethnic groups, a system that could be relatively stable only under tough authoritarian rule. But precisely that level of authoritarianism inevitably got in the way of economic growth.
And consequently, Soviet leaders in the last 25 years of the existence of the USSR were forced to make a choice between a repressive system that guaranteed relative stability but precluded any serious modernization of the economy and the relaxation of repression in order to get the economy going again at the risk of the rise of demands by non-Russian groups.
Under Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership chose the first option -- political stability even at the cost of economic decline -- a position that was sustainable only because of the oil shock of 1973. But under Gorbachev, Moscow tried to get the country’s economy by relaxing repression for a time at least, with the result that the Soviet Union is no more.
If the Kremlin recognizes Abkhazia or South Ossetia, absorbs one or both of these territories or forms a new union with Belarus as it has pledged to do or with Kyrgyzstan as a poll suggests that country’s people want (www.24.kg/community/2008/08/21/90389.html), then it will quickly find itself in much the same position that the Soviet leadership did.
On the one hand, Moscow may be able to limp on for some time given the revenues it is taking in from the sale of oil and gas abroad. But on the other, it will have to become even more repressive than now to prevent not only many non-Russians but also Russian regional groups from demanding independence.
And that repression will just as in Brezhnev’s time make it almost impossible for Russia to modernize its economy, a shortcoming that will leave it further and further behind not only Europe and the United States but also China, India, and other rapidly developing countries elsewhere.
There is, of course, yet another reason why such predictions are likely to come true if Moscow makes the wrong decision: In Soviet times, Communist ideology in many but of course far from all situations placed severe limits on manifestations of Russian nationalism, limits that made it easier to run that multi-national empire.
But as one leader in the region has pointed out, “If the Russians come back this time, they won’t be constrained by communism.” And consequently, such a combination of Russian nationalism and increasing repression will pose a more serious threat to that country’s survival over the coming decades than anything Russia’s current neighbors could possible do.
Vienna, August 21 – If Moscow goes ahead and recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and even more if it incorporates South Ossetia into the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation is likely to share the fate of the Soviet Union and fall apart sometime in the future, according to the leader of Yabloko.
At a Moscow press conference earlier today, Sergei Mitrokhin said that in all cases, “Russia must start from the principle of territorial integrity. And here,” he continued, Moscow “must think not only about the participants of the current conflict but also about its very own future” (nr2.ru/moskow/192376.html).
That is because, he pointed out, “in Russia there are an enormous number of such territories which after a certain time could theoretically follow the path of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” to independence. “We do not know what will take place 10, 15 or 20 years from now.”
And consequently, he argued, “it is very dangerous to set a precedent” that others may use, even when in Mitrokhin’s opinion “at the present time it is practically impossible to imagine that the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will ever agree to live within the framework of a united Georgia.
Curiously, the liberal Yabloko leader’s warning echoes in part the one nationalist LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky issued last February, albeit without the invocation of conspiracy theories and an attack on democracy and federalism as the source of all Russia’s past, present and future problems (nr2.ru/moskow/165341.html).
According to Zhirinovsky, the United States, having dismembered the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, is now seeking to do the same thing to the Russian Federation by “provoking the Kremlin to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” and thus setting off “a parade of sovereignty declarations by national republics now within Russia.”
“In order to avoid the Kosovo variant” for Russia, the flamboyant LDPR leader said, “Russia needs a unitary state. If it does not set one up, then the country will collapse.” And he added that “if our present regime with a democratic state is preserved, then we will be forced over the course of the next 30 to 40 years to follow the Kosovo variant.”
Should that occur and Russia thus be split into a number of smaller and quite different states, Zhirinovsky said, then “we will have to tell our grandchildren that they will live in a different country, learn a different language and possibly profess a different faith. I do not want this for my children.”
Both Mitrokhin and Zhirinovsky point to some of the reasons why Moscow would be taking a big risk by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states or even more by including one or the other as part of the Russian Federation. But neither of them nor most other commentators are talking about the most serious threat such an action would entail.
And that is a lesson the demise of the Soviet Union taught: The USSR died because it was based on a system of politicized, territorialized, and hierarchically arranged ethnic groups, a system that could be relatively stable only under tough authoritarian rule. But precisely that level of authoritarianism inevitably got in the way of economic growth.
And consequently, Soviet leaders in the last 25 years of the existence of the USSR were forced to make a choice between a repressive system that guaranteed relative stability but precluded any serious modernization of the economy and the relaxation of repression in order to get the economy going again at the risk of the rise of demands by non-Russian groups.
Under Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership chose the first option -- political stability even at the cost of economic decline -- a position that was sustainable only because of the oil shock of 1973. But under Gorbachev, Moscow tried to get the country’s economy by relaxing repression for a time at least, with the result that the Soviet Union is no more.
If the Kremlin recognizes Abkhazia or South Ossetia, absorbs one or both of these territories or forms a new union with Belarus as it has pledged to do or with Kyrgyzstan as a poll suggests that country’s people want (www.24.kg/community/2008/08/21/90389.html), then it will quickly find itself in much the same position that the Soviet leadership did.
On the one hand, Moscow may be able to limp on for some time given the revenues it is taking in from the sale of oil and gas abroad. But on the other, it will have to become even more repressive than now to prevent not only many non-Russians but also Russian regional groups from demanding independence.
And that repression will just as in Brezhnev’s time make it almost impossible for Russia to modernize its economy, a shortcoming that will leave it further and further behind not only Europe and the United States but also China, India, and other rapidly developing countries elsewhere.
There is, of course, yet another reason why such predictions are likely to come true if Moscow makes the wrong decision: In Soviet times, Communist ideology in many but of course far from all situations placed severe limits on manifestations of Russian nationalism, limits that made it easier to run that multi-national empire.
But as one leader in the region has pointed out, “If the Russians come back this time, they won’t be constrained by communism.” And consequently, such a combination of Russian nationalism and increasing repression will pose a more serious threat to that country’s survival over the coming decades than anything Russia’s current neighbors could possible do.
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