Paul Goble
Baku, May 8 – Moscow’s charge that Tbilisi preparing to invade Abkhazia is just as absurd as Stalin’s suggestion that Finland was planning to attack the USSR in 1939, according to a Moscow military analyst. But far more serious, the Russian Federation could soon find itself in a similar military situation to that in the Winter War, one in which the Russian side lost.
In an interview to Georgia’s Interpressnews agency late yesterday, Pavel Fel’gengauer, military affairs analyst for Moscow’s Novaya gazeta, discussed the current military situation in Abkhazia, Moscow’s propaganda campaign against Tbilisi, and what is likely to happen next (www.interpressnews.ge/index.php?lang_id=RUS&sec_id=50200&info_id=220818).
Fel’gengauer, who is widely recognized as one of Russia’s most astute national security analysts, said that the Russia side had introduced forces into the Tkvarchel district that “unlike peacekeepers” have “artillery and heavy weapons,” a projection of force apparently intended to help drive the pro-Tbilisi “Abkhaz government in exile” out of Kodorskiy gorge.
That has long been a goal of the Abkhaz government, many of whose members believe that a major “cause of the non-recognition of the independence of Abkhazia” by Russia is that government and its role in maintaining Georgian control of the highland districts of their breakaway republic.
Assertions by the Russian foreign ministry that “Georgia is preparing a place des armes I the Kodorsky gorge for an attack on Abkhazia are laughable,” Fel’gengauer says, because “even if the entire Georgian army were to be placed [there], it would be physically impossible to attack Sukhumi.”
Indeed, the “Novaya gazeta” commentator says, “the declarations by the Russian side [on this point] recall [Stalin’s] propagandistic preparation for the [Soviet] attack on Finland in 1939 when [Moscow] accused the Finns of aggression.” Today, “military actions are being prepared in Kodorskiy gorge but not by the Georgians.”
According to his information, Fel’gengauer said, Abkhazian units are assembling near the village of Tsebella in the lower part of the gorge. From there they can reach the upper reaches of the gorge by passing along the new road Tbilisi has built. Using howitzers and Grad rockets, they can prevent the Georgians from an effective response.
In addition, the additional Russian “peacekeeping forces” now in the Kodorskiy gorge will be in a position to prevent the Georgians from attacking Abkhazia on its flanks.” When his Georgian interlocutor noted that this was not a pleasant prospect, Fel’gengauer said that he understood but that “unfortunately, everything is going in that direction.”
But then he pointed out that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is “speaking the truth when he says that Russia does not intend to conduct a serious fight with Georgia. Moscow only wants to teach Tbilisi a lesson.”
Moscow understands that “threats by Russia against Georgia are insufficient” to force the Georgians to leave the Kodorskiy gorge and not begin military actions in other directions.” And consequently, it has introduced its own forces to help the Abkhaz achieve their goals against the pro-Tbilisi government.
But Fel’gengauer implies, Moscow may have seriously miscalculated. If events develop and get out of hand, “then Russia in reality will find itself in a worse situation than the Soviet Union did in 1939 in connection with Finland.” That is because whatever Russia’s diplomats or generals say, “in the contemporary world, no one will believe them.”
And consequently, Fel’gengauer argues in conclusion, unlike the Finns in 1939, “Georgia today will receive what it has always wanted – international support.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev Seen Expanding Putin’s Regional Amalgamation Policy
Paul Goble
Baku, May 8 – Newly installed Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will at the very least continue and may quite possibly dramatically expand the policy of his predecessor Vladimir Putin to combine federation subjects and thus reduce their total number, according to an analysis published yesterday.
In an article in Argumenty nedeli, Mikhail Tul’skiy argues that Medvedev will go ahead with the three unification referenda now scheduled during the next several years and will very likely follow staff recommendations and combine “more than ten additional regions” over the longer term (www.argumenti.ru/publications/6685).
If the new president in fact does so, that would reduce the total number of federation subjects from the current 83 (down from 89 at the start of Putin’s rule) to 74 or even fewer. More important, it would reduce the number of non-Russian regions far more seriously than the number of predominantly ethnic Russian ones.
On the one hand, such a change in the political map of the Russian Federation – one that would mean the percentage of that country’s territory nominally “non-Russian” would fall from more than 50 percent in 2005 to 30 percent or less in the future -- would play well to the increasing number of Russians who believe in the idea of “Russia for the Russians.”
But on the other, it would infuriate many of the increasingly numerous non-Russians, possibly intensifying nationalist sentiments among them and certainly making the lives of administrators in more than a few of the new and likely predominantly ethnic Russian regions far more complicated.
And consequently, as an increasing number of analysts have pointed out, the amalgamation of regions will not improve administrative efficiency in the Russian Federation as Putin and Medvedev have claimed. Instead, the creation of fewer but bitter regions may create new problems for Moscow.
Between 2005 and 2007, the Putin regime organized referenda on unification in 11 regions, winning overwhelming majorities in favor of this step in both the larger ethnic Russian federation subject and the smaller non-Russian one everywhere but not always securing an overwhelming share of all voters.
At present, three more referenda are in the works -- in Arkhangelsk oblast and the Nenets Autonomous District, in Magadan and Chukotka, and in the Altai kray and the Altai kray – although in each case there is significant and in at least one member of each pair growing resistance, something that will force Moscow to use administrative measures to get its way.
But according to Tul’sky, discussions are now taking place in the Russian government about other combinations. The “largest” under discussion would combine the country’s two capital cities with their surrounding oblasts, thus allowing the cities to expand and to put an end between the political squabbles between the city and oblast heads.
Most of the combinations now under discussion, however, like those that have already been carried out involve combining non-Russian regions where the titular nationality is relatively small with larger Russian regions. Indeed, the only exceptions were the Komi-Permyak and Agin-Buryat districts, where the titular nationality formed large portions of the population.
Three combinations sometimes mentioned in the media, however, are unlikely to happen: First of all, Moscow will not seek the unification of Adygeia with Krasnodar kray even though the Adygeis (Circassians) form only a quarter of the population of their titular republic lest they create problems in the North Caucasus during the run up to the Sochi Olympics.
Second, Moscow won’t fold in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast into Khabarovsk kray, even though Jews form only 1.2 percent of the former, lest the Russian Federation be subjected to charges of anti-Semitism. And third, Moscow will not “liquidate” Karelia where the titular nationality forms less than 10 percent of the population lest it anger Finland.
(Another combination being discussed that may not happen, Tul’sky notes, is the amalgamation of Tyumen oblast with the Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamalo-Nenets districts, whose titular nationalities are small but whose total population is larger and has a higher standard of living than in the Russian federal subject that would form the core of any unit.)
What this means, the Argumenty nedeli journalist says is that if Medvedev proceeds with this policy, he will soon have to tackle the far more difficult challenge of combining ethnic Russian regions or possibly dividing one predominantly Russian but poor oblast – Kurgan – between two wealthier ones – Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk.
Baku, May 8 – Newly installed Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will at the very least continue and may quite possibly dramatically expand the policy of his predecessor Vladimir Putin to combine federation subjects and thus reduce their total number, according to an analysis published yesterday.
In an article in Argumenty nedeli, Mikhail Tul’skiy argues that Medvedev will go ahead with the three unification referenda now scheduled during the next several years and will very likely follow staff recommendations and combine “more than ten additional regions” over the longer term (www.argumenti.ru/publications/6685).
If the new president in fact does so, that would reduce the total number of federation subjects from the current 83 (down from 89 at the start of Putin’s rule) to 74 or even fewer. More important, it would reduce the number of non-Russian regions far more seriously than the number of predominantly ethnic Russian ones.
On the one hand, such a change in the political map of the Russian Federation – one that would mean the percentage of that country’s territory nominally “non-Russian” would fall from more than 50 percent in 2005 to 30 percent or less in the future -- would play well to the increasing number of Russians who believe in the idea of “Russia for the Russians.”
But on the other, it would infuriate many of the increasingly numerous non-Russians, possibly intensifying nationalist sentiments among them and certainly making the lives of administrators in more than a few of the new and likely predominantly ethnic Russian regions far more complicated.
And consequently, as an increasing number of analysts have pointed out, the amalgamation of regions will not improve administrative efficiency in the Russian Federation as Putin and Medvedev have claimed. Instead, the creation of fewer but bitter regions may create new problems for Moscow.
Between 2005 and 2007, the Putin regime organized referenda on unification in 11 regions, winning overwhelming majorities in favor of this step in both the larger ethnic Russian federation subject and the smaller non-Russian one everywhere but not always securing an overwhelming share of all voters.
At present, three more referenda are in the works -- in Arkhangelsk oblast and the Nenets Autonomous District, in Magadan and Chukotka, and in the Altai kray and the Altai kray – although in each case there is significant and in at least one member of each pair growing resistance, something that will force Moscow to use administrative measures to get its way.
But according to Tul’sky, discussions are now taking place in the Russian government about other combinations. The “largest” under discussion would combine the country’s two capital cities with their surrounding oblasts, thus allowing the cities to expand and to put an end between the political squabbles between the city and oblast heads.
Most of the combinations now under discussion, however, like those that have already been carried out involve combining non-Russian regions where the titular nationality is relatively small with larger Russian regions. Indeed, the only exceptions were the Komi-Permyak and Agin-Buryat districts, where the titular nationality formed large portions of the population.
Three combinations sometimes mentioned in the media, however, are unlikely to happen: First of all, Moscow will not seek the unification of Adygeia with Krasnodar kray even though the Adygeis (Circassians) form only a quarter of the population of their titular republic lest they create problems in the North Caucasus during the run up to the Sochi Olympics.
Second, Moscow won’t fold in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast into Khabarovsk kray, even though Jews form only 1.2 percent of the former, lest the Russian Federation be subjected to charges of anti-Semitism. And third, Moscow will not “liquidate” Karelia where the titular nationality forms less than 10 percent of the population lest it anger Finland.
(Another combination being discussed that may not happen, Tul’sky notes, is the amalgamation of Tyumen oblast with the Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamalo-Nenets districts, whose titular nationalities are small but whose total population is larger and has a higher standard of living than in the Russian federal subject that would form the core of any unit.)
What this means, the Argumenty nedeli journalist says is that if Medvedev proceeds with this policy, he will soon have to tackle the far more difficult challenge of combining ethnic Russian regions or possibly dividing one predominantly Russian but poor oblast – Kurgan – between two wealthier ones – Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk.
Window on Eurasia: Beijing Olympics Have Brought Only More Misery to China’s Muslims
Paul Goble
Baku, May 7 – The people of Tibet have succeeded in using the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing to attract international attention to their plight and thereby to exert pressure on the Chinese government to begin talks with the Dalai Lama, but many of the 150 million Muslims in China who live in that country's western province of Xinjiang have not been so fortunate.
Instead of benefiting from the games in this way, “the Olympic torch has brought the Muslims [of that region, which they and many others call Eastern Turkestan] only misfortune,” with the Chinese regime using this occasion to step up its campaign of oppression against the Islamic nations there (www.islam.ru/world/2008-05-06/#21048).
And China’s ability to do so, without attracting the kind of support that the Tibetans have, should be a reminder to the Circassians and others in the North Caucasus who hope to use international attention to the Winter Games in Sochi in 2014 that they cannot count on getting the backing they seek unless they are able to cultivate elites abroad in the first place.
Indeed, with the exception of the French news agency AFP, the only groups beyond China experts that are now devoting much attention to the Beijing’s crackdown in Xinjiang are human rights groups like the Unrecognized Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Muslim sites in the Russian Federation like Islam.ru, Islamua.net, and Islamonline.ru.
Two exiled leaders of the Uighurs, one of the Islamic nations in that region, told the French news agency that Beijing is using the upcoming Olympic Games and its plan for the Olympic torch to pass through Xinjiang June 25-27 as occasions for stepping up repression (afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gVmcDo7Dgwp1qpl33R6iYOCumsNw).
Rebiya Kadeer, who heads the Uighur American Association, said that “many Uighurs are being detained and arrested by the Chinese authorities to prevent their peaceful protests” when the torch passes “through East Turkestan. Consequently, she said, she opposes the passage of the torch if it entails “severe repression of the Uighur people.”
And Dolkun Isa, the secretary general of the World Uighur Congress, told the French news agency that “more than 10,000 people have been rounded up in Xinjiang over the past four to five months. “Everywhere,” he said, homes, hotels are searched. People are arrested,” often “simply because they look suspicious” to the Chinese.
In order to justify their tough actions, the Chinese have put out the story that there are “terror cells” in Xinjiang that are planning to “target” the Olympics – a story that the Uighur leaders say is “fabricated.” And in order to hide what they are doing, the Beijing authorities have thrown an even tighter blanket of secrecy over the region.
Kadeer summed up what is going on in the following way: "China is using the occasion to host the 2008 Olympics as an opportunity to further demonise the Uighur people's legitimate and peaceful struggle and [thus attempt to] justify its [longstanding and] heavy-handed repression in East Turkestan.”
Baku, May 7 – The people of Tibet have succeeded in using the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing to attract international attention to their plight and thereby to exert pressure on the Chinese government to begin talks with the Dalai Lama, but many of the 150 million Muslims in China who live in that country's western province of Xinjiang have not been so fortunate.
Instead of benefiting from the games in this way, “the Olympic torch has brought the Muslims [of that region, which they and many others call Eastern Turkestan] only misfortune,” with the Chinese regime using this occasion to step up its campaign of oppression against the Islamic nations there (www.islam.ru/world/2008-05-06/#21048).
And China’s ability to do so, without attracting the kind of support that the Tibetans have, should be a reminder to the Circassians and others in the North Caucasus who hope to use international attention to the Winter Games in Sochi in 2014 that they cannot count on getting the backing they seek unless they are able to cultivate elites abroad in the first place.
Indeed, with the exception of the French news agency AFP, the only groups beyond China experts that are now devoting much attention to the Beijing’s crackdown in Xinjiang are human rights groups like the Unrecognized Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Muslim sites in the Russian Federation like Islam.ru, Islamua.net, and Islamonline.ru.
Two exiled leaders of the Uighurs, one of the Islamic nations in that region, told the French news agency that Beijing is using the upcoming Olympic Games and its plan for the Olympic torch to pass through Xinjiang June 25-27 as occasions for stepping up repression (afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gVmcDo7Dgwp1qpl33R6iYOCumsNw).
Rebiya Kadeer, who heads the Uighur American Association, said that “many Uighurs are being detained and arrested by the Chinese authorities to prevent their peaceful protests” when the torch passes “through East Turkestan. Consequently, she said, she opposes the passage of the torch if it entails “severe repression of the Uighur people.”
And Dolkun Isa, the secretary general of the World Uighur Congress, told the French news agency that “more than 10,000 people have been rounded up in Xinjiang over the past four to five months. “Everywhere,” he said, homes, hotels are searched. People are arrested,” often “simply because they look suspicious” to the Chinese.
In order to justify their tough actions, the Chinese have put out the story that there are “terror cells” in Xinjiang that are planning to “target” the Olympics – a story that the Uighur leaders say is “fabricated.” And in order to hide what they are doing, the Beijing authorities have thrown an even tighter blanket of secrecy over the region.
Kadeer summed up what is going on in the following way: "China is using the occasion to host the 2008 Olympics as an opportunity to further demonise the Uighur people's legitimate and peaceful struggle and [thus attempt to] justify its [longstanding and] heavy-handed repression in East Turkestan.”
Window on Eurasia: Chechen Mufti Demands Control over Mullahs’ Sermons
Paul Goble
Baku, May 7 – Sultan Mirzayev, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Chechen Republic, told the council of ulema in Grozny on Monday that all mullahs in that republic will have to secure his office’s approval of the texts of their Friday sermons before they deliver them, lest their words lead the young astray or promote extremism.
In reporting his order, Islamnews.ru said that his demand recalled the way things were done in Soviet times, although the agency pointed out that Mirzayev had not specified “who precisely will check the texts of the preachers” or where they will obtain the criteria they will apply in doing so (www.islamnews.ru/news-11530.html).
But Mirzayev gave some indication of the reasons for his directive and the role that public officials in the government of Ramzan Kadyrov may play in implementing it: “From now on, we must crack down hard on anything that gives rise to religious extremism,” he said, and to that end, “we must continue to work in close contact with the local authorities.”
The Kadyrov-controlled Grozny-inform.ru agency reported that the elders in the MSD’s council of the ulema were enthusiastic, although it is far from clear why they should want to give up the rights that they had only recently recovered after the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union (www.grozny-inform.ru/main.mhtml?Part=11&PubID=6679).
One of the reasons they may be going along is that Mirzayev also used the meeting to announce that Grozny plans to boost the number of Chechens going on the haj from just over 3,000 last year to 5,000 this and to put them under the leadership of Chechen MSD officials who “speak Arabic fluently.”
Both the increased number and the plan for Chechen control reflect Kadyrov’s own statements, but they put him and Chechnya at odds not only with Moscow but with other Muslim regions in the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, the Chechens are planning to send more this year even though the Saudi-imposed quota for the Russian Federation as a whole has fallen from an exceptional 26,000 to 20,500. Consequently, for Chechnya to reach that goal, other Muslim republics will have to cut their number, something they will be most unhappy to do.
And on the other, at a time when Moscow, under pressure from various Muslim groups to improve its support of Russian hajis, is increasing its control over the pilgrimage even as it increases its aid, the Chechen call for local people who know Arabic to lead the Chechen hajis represents yet another challenge to the center.
That this is a very serious challenge is underscored by the comment of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Soltanov last weekend when, accepting complaints sent in by the Russian Islamic Inheritance organization at the end of February, he said that the Russian government must take control of the process (www.islamnasledie.ru/news.php?id=1076).
As Islamnews.ru commented in its report, there have not yet any reactions from other Muslim leaders in the Russian Federation to Mirzayev’s plan to control the content of Muslim sermons in Chechnya. These leaders likely are waiting to see whether Moscow will defer to Kadyrov and Mirzayev or whether, finally, the Grozny group has gone too far.
Baku, May 7 – Sultan Mirzayev, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Chechen Republic, told the council of ulema in Grozny on Monday that all mullahs in that republic will have to secure his office’s approval of the texts of their Friday sermons before they deliver them, lest their words lead the young astray or promote extremism.
In reporting his order, Islamnews.ru said that his demand recalled the way things were done in Soviet times, although the agency pointed out that Mirzayev had not specified “who precisely will check the texts of the preachers” or where they will obtain the criteria they will apply in doing so (www.islamnews.ru/news-11530.html).
But Mirzayev gave some indication of the reasons for his directive and the role that public officials in the government of Ramzan Kadyrov may play in implementing it: “From now on, we must crack down hard on anything that gives rise to religious extremism,” he said, and to that end, “we must continue to work in close contact with the local authorities.”
The Kadyrov-controlled Grozny-inform.ru agency reported that the elders in the MSD’s council of the ulema were enthusiastic, although it is far from clear why they should want to give up the rights that they had only recently recovered after the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union (www.grozny-inform.ru/main.mhtml?Part=11&PubID=6679).
One of the reasons they may be going along is that Mirzayev also used the meeting to announce that Grozny plans to boost the number of Chechens going on the haj from just over 3,000 last year to 5,000 this and to put them under the leadership of Chechen MSD officials who “speak Arabic fluently.”
Both the increased number and the plan for Chechen control reflect Kadyrov’s own statements, but they put him and Chechnya at odds not only with Moscow but with other Muslim regions in the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, the Chechens are planning to send more this year even though the Saudi-imposed quota for the Russian Federation as a whole has fallen from an exceptional 26,000 to 20,500. Consequently, for Chechnya to reach that goal, other Muslim republics will have to cut their number, something they will be most unhappy to do.
And on the other, at a time when Moscow, under pressure from various Muslim groups to improve its support of Russian hajis, is increasing its control over the pilgrimage even as it increases its aid, the Chechen call for local people who know Arabic to lead the Chechen hajis represents yet another challenge to the center.
That this is a very serious challenge is underscored by the comment of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Soltanov last weekend when, accepting complaints sent in by the Russian Islamic Inheritance organization at the end of February, he said that the Russian government must take control of the process (www.islamnasledie.ru/news.php?id=1076).
As Islamnews.ru commented in its report, there have not yet any reactions from other Muslim leaders in the Russian Federation to Mirzayev’s plan to control the content of Muslim sermons in Chechnya. These leaders likely are waiting to see whether Moscow will defer to Kadyrov and Mirzayev or whether, finally, the Grozny group has gone too far.
Window on Eurasia: ‘Traditional’ Religions, Catholics Represented at Medvedev Inauguration
Paul Goble
Baku, May 7 – Leaders of what Russians typically call “the four traditional religions of Russia” – Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist – are scheduled to be present at the inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev as the third president of that country, thus extending the reification of this much-disputed classification into the future.
Russia’s Catholic community will be only indirectly represented by the Papal nuncio, who is not a member of the Catholic hierarchy in Russia but rather will attend as part of the diplomatic corps. And Russia’s Old Believers, Protestants, and other groups will be excluded, just as they were at other post-Soviet inaugurals.
Drawing on ITAR-TASS reporting, the Moscow Institute of Religion and Politics today reported that the leaders of the four “traditional” faiths would be in attendance: Patriarch Aleksii II of the Russian Orthodox Church and Mufti Talgat Tajuddin of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) will attend as they have since 1991.
Ravil’ Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), and Damba Ayusheyev, the head of the Buddhist Sangha, will take part as they have since 1996. And Berl Lazar, the chief rabbi of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), will extend his participation begun in 2004 (www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-19845.html).
Because religious participation has been increasing in this way, some observers thought that perhaps this inauguration would feature representatives of the Russian Federation’s other religious communities, but except for the Catholic Nuncio, who will be there not as a religious figure but as a diplomat, that did not happen.
One reason this probably did not happen is the close ties that Medvedev’s wife has with senior hierarchs in the Patriarchate, a connection that some have already suggested will become an increasingly important channel for Orthodox influence over Russian government decision making under Medvedev.
But two other factors probably played a greater role in the Kremlin’s decision on this event. On the one hand, the Orthodox Church and especially Metropolitan Kirill, the powerful head of its external relations department, have long championed the idea of traditional religions not only as the basis for national unity but as a bulwark against extremism.
Had additional religious leaders been invited to the inauguration, there would have been mounting pressure on Kirill and the government to expand the membership of the quasi-official Inter-Religious Council on which only the four “traditional” faiths are represented. Clearly, that is not something Medvedev or Putin want to see, at least not now.
And on the other, the inclusion of Protestants or other groups would have outraged many Russians who often define such groups as “totalitarian sects” more interested in undermining Russia on behalf of their Western “sponsors” than in promoting faith or morality, however attractive they may be to their members.
As outgoing president Vladimir Putin observed a few weeks ago, Medvedev is just as much a Russian nationalist “in the good sense” as he is, and the guest list for the latter’s inauguration makes it clear that Putin’s observation is true, however much some in Russia or the West may hope otherwise.
UPDATE: Portal-Credo reported that in addition to the leaders of the “traditional” religions, there were additional members of the Orthodox Church hierarchy and representatives of several other denominations. But their invitations were not broadcast in advance, as were the “traditional” ones and not seated as prominently (portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=62385&cf).
Baku, May 7 – Leaders of what Russians typically call “the four traditional religions of Russia” – Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist – are scheduled to be present at the inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev as the third president of that country, thus extending the reification of this much-disputed classification into the future.
Russia’s Catholic community will be only indirectly represented by the Papal nuncio, who is not a member of the Catholic hierarchy in Russia but rather will attend as part of the diplomatic corps. And Russia’s Old Believers, Protestants, and other groups will be excluded, just as they were at other post-Soviet inaugurals.
Drawing on ITAR-TASS reporting, the Moscow Institute of Religion and Politics today reported that the leaders of the four “traditional” faiths would be in attendance: Patriarch Aleksii II of the Russian Orthodox Church and Mufti Talgat Tajuddin of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) will attend as they have since 1991.
Ravil’ Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), and Damba Ayusheyev, the head of the Buddhist Sangha, will take part as they have since 1996. And Berl Lazar, the chief rabbi of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), will extend his participation begun in 2004 (www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-19845.html).
Because religious participation has been increasing in this way, some observers thought that perhaps this inauguration would feature representatives of the Russian Federation’s other religious communities, but except for the Catholic Nuncio, who will be there not as a religious figure but as a diplomat, that did not happen.
One reason this probably did not happen is the close ties that Medvedev’s wife has with senior hierarchs in the Patriarchate, a connection that some have already suggested will become an increasingly important channel for Orthodox influence over Russian government decision making under Medvedev.
But two other factors probably played a greater role in the Kremlin’s decision on this event. On the one hand, the Orthodox Church and especially Metropolitan Kirill, the powerful head of its external relations department, have long championed the idea of traditional religions not only as the basis for national unity but as a bulwark against extremism.
Had additional religious leaders been invited to the inauguration, there would have been mounting pressure on Kirill and the government to expand the membership of the quasi-official Inter-Religious Council on which only the four “traditional” faiths are represented. Clearly, that is not something Medvedev or Putin want to see, at least not now.
And on the other, the inclusion of Protestants or other groups would have outraged many Russians who often define such groups as “totalitarian sects” more interested in undermining Russia on behalf of their Western “sponsors” than in promoting faith or morality, however attractive they may be to their members.
As outgoing president Vladimir Putin observed a few weeks ago, Medvedev is just as much a Russian nationalist “in the good sense” as he is, and the guest list for the latter’s inauguration makes it clear that Putin’s observation is true, however much some in Russia or the West may hope otherwise.
UPDATE: Portal-Credo reported that in addition to the leaders of the “traditional” religions, there were additional members of the Orthodox Church hierarchy and representatives of several other denominations. But their invitations were not broadcast in advance, as were the “traditional” ones and not seated as prominently (portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=62385&cf).
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