Paul Goble
Vienna, November 20 – The Russian Orthodox Church has canonized more than 1600 martyrs who suffered persecution at the hands of the Soviets, almost four times the number of saints it recognized before 1917 and a step that puts it at odds with any effort to return to the communist past or even to engage in historical revisionism.
In a speech to a Moscow conference on the 90th anniversary of the re-establishment of the patriarchate, Nikolai Emel’yanov, a professor at the St. Tikhon Humanitarian University, argued that “the Russian Church has become the Church of the New Martyrs” as those who suffered for their faith in Soviet times are called.
Emel’yanov, who has overseen the collection of data over the last 15 years about some 30,000 religious who suffered between 1917 and 1991, told the meeting this week that the number of those he and his colleagues have data about continues to grow by “approximately 2,000 each year” (http://www.regions.ru/news/2109809?0).
He noted that “as a result of all the waves of repression” in Soviet times, 425 hierarchs of the church had suffered, including all four men who occupied the Patriarchal throne after its restoration in 1917 – Tikhon, Sergei, Aleksii I and Pimen. And of those who were repressed, 247 were shot, while others died in prison or the camps.
But to list these names or even provide such numbers, Emel’yanov continued, is to understate the tragedy: he estimates that in the course of the 20th century in the Soviet Union “not less than 500,000 people” suffered and many of these were killed as a result of their commitment to Orthodoxy.
A large amount of the information about these victims of the Soviet state and the initial ipulse to canonize some of the most prominent was begun by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, the émigré church with which the Moscow Patriarchate has now entered into communion in the hopes of complete union.
Indeed many commentators are likely to conclude that the data Emel’yanov provides simply reflects this Kremlin-backed process of uniting the two branches of the Orthodox Church rather than being the product of new reflectiosn by the senior members of the Moscow Church’s leadership.
While such calculations may have played a role, the Patriarchate’s willingness to move in this direction is impressive, especially since its efforts to canonize these Soviet victims means that the latter now constitute more than half of the slightly less than 3,000 saints recognized by all Orthodox churches put together.
But there is another aspect of this situation that is probably even more important, although it is one that Emel’yanov in his remarks (at least as reported in the Russian media so far) does not address: the iimpact of this Church initiative on Russian society and Russian politics and thus on the Patriarchate itself.
Because the names of these saints are now an integral part of the Church calendar, Orthodox Russians will be constantly reminded about the crimes of a state that some leaders in their country want only to praise or even at least in part restore. Such Russians and they are growing in number are unlikely to want to go along.
Not only are such Orthodox actions thus likely to serve as a check on those who remain positive about the Soviet past or are unwilling to condemn it, but they open the way to greater independence by the Church on other issues, something that could boost its authority by destroying the widespread belief that it does whatever the Kremlin wants.
Few Russian or Western analysts talk about religious groups when they enumerate the institutions of civil society, but such communities often play an equal or greater role than other “NGOs” in post-communist countries which lack a civil society tradition.
That is something the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has just demonstrated, but how far it will try to proceed in this new direction and equally how far the current Russian government will allow it to remain very significant but unfortunately very open questions.
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Neighborhood ‘Seceded from Russia This Morning,’ Russian Comedians Joke
Paul Goble
Vienna, November 20 – In a bow to the classic British film “Passport to Pimlico,” comedians at a nightclub in Moscow now joke that “this morning Southern Butovo seceded from Russia,” a crack that a leader of the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party says is no laughing matter.
Since an article appeared in Komsomol’skaya pravda about the apparent formation of a Muslim neighborhood in Butovo (http://www.kp.ru/daily24002/4/81044) only five days ago, the Russian media have been filled with comments about this possibility ranging from the humorous and dismissive to the apocalyptic.
But yesterday, the Project Russia web page of United Russia queried two of its experts on what the rise of such a neighborhood or others like it could mean for the future. Their answers, now posted online, make a bow to humorous comments but themselves land squarely among the apocalyptic.
Given their close ties to President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s ruling party, their comments deserve attention as an indication of thinking in the Kremlin even if each of the two was careful to say that he was giving his own personal reaction rather than speaking for anyone else (http://rus-proekt.ru/nrpc/2459.html).
Andrei Tatarinov, a member of the political council of the Young Guard of United Russia, said his reaction to the rise of such neighborhoods was entirely negative. Referring to the joke about the secession of southern Butovo, he said “it turns out that there is not just a dollop of truth [in that remark] but the whole truth.”
“We don’t need Islamic, Jewish, Buddhist or other segregated quarters,” he continued. “So much time has already been devoted to laying the foundations for dialogue among various religious confessions, and yet again certain people are attempting to keep themselves apart and stop this conversation.”
“If they do not want to assimilate and live in our city like all the rest of us live, then why are they here at all?!” Tatarinov asked. And he concluded his response about such neighborhoods with the question, “what then is the difference between these neighborhoods and their native auls?”
The portal also asked Dmitriy Sokolov-Mitrich, a special correspondent with “Izvestiya” and someone close to the United Russia Party, for his views. His reaction to the appearance of neighborhoods in Russian cities was equally negative but longer and somewhat more thoughtful.
Like Tatarinov, he said that the appearance of a Muslim neighborhood in Moscow could have a domino effect, leading our religious and cultural groups to form their own. And that process, he suggested, “at the very least,” could contribute to “a sharpening of social conflicts.”
The “Izvestiya” correspondent suggested that a common culture is a most important support for the existence of a stable society and state and that such a culture is best produced among a country’s citizenry when its members live mixed together in a kind of “’melting pot’” rather than separately.
But, he continued, “if groups begin to settle in separate neighborhood and open cafes only for Muslims or only for Orthodox Christians, then this will contribute to the exacerbation of inter-ethnic or religious discord” both directly and by prompting other groups to insist on the same arrangements for themselves. .
Among the latter, he suggested, could be parts of the ethnic Russian majority. But of course, Sokolov-Mitrich noted, if restaurants of schools for Russians only appeared, almost certainly those behind them would be accused of “extremism,” even though the majority group in this case would only be doing what some of the minorities have.
Moreover, the journalist said, the formation of ethnic neighborhoods in the Russian capital would eliminate “one of the few superior features” Moscow enjoys in comparison to “other world capitals – the absence of ghettos and the existence of a certain common kasha in which everyone lives together.”
“Why does it appear,” he asks rhetorically, that we seem “to need the same problems which New York and Berlin now have?”
Without acknowledging it, the “Izvestiya” journalist pointed to one of the key reasons why the situation in Moscow is moving in that direction. All too often, Russian officials block efforts by minorities to open religious and cultural institutions, and thus members of those groups try to live where the few such institutions actually exist.
Such clustering, of course, could be prevented were the state either to permit minority groups to open such institutions wherever they want did so, they would face anger among many Russians unhappy about such changes to the face of “their” city.
And because the political costs of doing the one thing that could prevent the emergence such ethnic neighbors are so high, few in the pro-Kremlin party are likely to be willing to pay them, at least during this election season. And as result, the process these two men fear so much is likely to accelerate.
Vienna, November 20 – In a bow to the classic British film “Passport to Pimlico,” comedians at a nightclub in Moscow now joke that “this morning Southern Butovo seceded from Russia,” a crack that a leader of the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party says is no laughing matter.
Since an article appeared in Komsomol’skaya pravda about the apparent formation of a Muslim neighborhood in Butovo (http://www.kp.ru/daily24002/4/81044) only five days ago, the Russian media have been filled with comments about this possibility ranging from the humorous and dismissive to the apocalyptic.
But yesterday, the Project Russia web page of United Russia queried two of its experts on what the rise of such a neighborhood or others like it could mean for the future. Their answers, now posted online, make a bow to humorous comments but themselves land squarely among the apocalyptic.
Given their close ties to President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s ruling party, their comments deserve attention as an indication of thinking in the Kremlin even if each of the two was careful to say that he was giving his own personal reaction rather than speaking for anyone else (http://rus-proekt.ru/nrpc/2459.html).
Andrei Tatarinov, a member of the political council of the Young Guard of United Russia, said his reaction to the rise of such neighborhoods was entirely negative. Referring to the joke about the secession of southern Butovo, he said “it turns out that there is not just a dollop of truth [in that remark] but the whole truth.”
“We don’t need Islamic, Jewish, Buddhist or other segregated quarters,” he continued. “So much time has already been devoted to laying the foundations for dialogue among various religious confessions, and yet again certain people are attempting to keep themselves apart and stop this conversation.”
“If they do not want to assimilate and live in our city like all the rest of us live, then why are they here at all?!” Tatarinov asked. And he concluded his response about such neighborhoods with the question, “what then is the difference between these neighborhoods and their native auls?”
The portal also asked Dmitriy Sokolov-Mitrich, a special correspondent with “Izvestiya” and someone close to the United Russia Party, for his views. His reaction to the appearance of neighborhoods in Russian cities was equally negative but longer and somewhat more thoughtful.
Like Tatarinov, he said that the appearance of a Muslim neighborhood in Moscow could have a domino effect, leading our religious and cultural groups to form their own. And that process, he suggested, “at the very least,” could contribute to “a sharpening of social conflicts.”
The “Izvestiya” correspondent suggested that a common culture is a most important support for the existence of a stable society and state and that such a culture is best produced among a country’s citizenry when its members live mixed together in a kind of “’melting pot’” rather than separately.
But, he continued, “if groups begin to settle in separate neighborhood and open cafes only for Muslims or only for Orthodox Christians, then this will contribute to the exacerbation of inter-ethnic or religious discord” both directly and by prompting other groups to insist on the same arrangements for themselves. .
Among the latter, he suggested, could be parts of the ethnic Russian majority. But of course, Sokolov-Mitrich noted, if restaurants of schools for Russians only appeared, almost certainly those behind them would be accused of “extremism,” even though the majority group in this case would only be doing what some of the minorities have.
Moreover, the journalist said, the formation of ethnic neighborhoods in the Russian capital would eliminate “one of the few superior features” Moscow enjoys in comparison to “other world capitals – the absence of ghettos and the existence of a certain common kasha in which everyone lives together.”
“Why does it appear,” he asks rhetorically, that we seem “to need the same problems which New York and Berlin now have?”
Without acknowledging it, the “Izvestiya” journalist pointed to one of the key reasons why the situation in Moscow is moving in that direction. All too often, Russian officials block efforts by minorities to open religious and cultural institutions, and thus members of those groups try to live where the few such institutions actually exist.
Such clustering, of course, could be prevented were the state either to permit minority groups to open such institutions wherever they want did so, they would face anger among many Russians unhappy about such changes to the face of “their” city.
And because the political costs of doing the one thing that could prevent the emergence such ethnic neighbors are so high, few in the pro-Kremlin party are likely to be willing to pay them, at least during this election season. And as result, the process these two men fear so much is likely to accelerate.
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