Paul Goble
Vienna, November 12 – Azerbaijanis, among the most secular of nations in the Muslim world, have long self-confidently joked that even Osama bin Laden himself could not put a chador on an Azerbaijani woman. But three recent events suggest that Baku may now face three potentially serious ethno-religious challenges.
First, at the end of October, the Azerbaijani security services blocked what they described as an Islamist plot to blow up the U.S. and other Western embassies, the latest but far and away the most dramatic indication that radical Muslims have gained at least a small foothold there (http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=5315).
Some analysts downplayed this event, arguing that Baku had announced it either to solidify its ties to Washington or to justify the imposition of tighter controls over the population, both the majority of commentators in Baku and the Western governments took these reports seriously.
But many analysts in Baku pointed out that “the Wahhabi virus” and Salafi’i Islam have long infected Azerbaijani society. The U.S. State Department on October 29 confirmed the report, and both the American and British embassies in the Azerbaijani capital cut back on their operations in order to enhance security.
One consequence of these failed attacks was that the Baku authorities reportedly directed booksellers in the Azerbaijani capital to remove from their shelves any book that might have an explicitly Islamist message, including a few that some Muslims would dispute as falling into that category (http://www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=26225).
Second, last week, both the Iranian authorities and the American embassy in Baku took steps that underscore and possibly heighten the importance and influence of Nakhichevan, the non-contiguous portion of Azerbaijan from which much of Baku’s political elite springs and in which Shiite influence is especially strong.
On Wednesday, officials announced the opening of bus service between Baku and Nakhichevan via Iran. According to the Mediaforum.az report on that date, operators are selling tickets at the airport rather than at the bus station, passengers must have foreign passports, and the Iranian government is providing transit visas.
Residents of Nakhichevan will get such visas at no cost, while those who are residents of Azerbaijan proper will get them for 20 manats (approximately 24 U.S. dollars). The cost of a one-way ticket is 20 manats, the news service said, and on the first day, the bus line operators sold 34 tickets.
The same day -- but not by bus -- the American ambassador to Azerbaijan, Anne Derse, traveled to Nakhichevan and met with the leaders of various opposition political parties there. Baku commentators viewed her visit as an American affirmation of their country’s territorial integrity (http://www.day.az/print/news/politics/97373.html).
While that reading is undoubtedly correct and will certainly be invoked by Azerbaijan in its dispute with Armenia over the future status of Karabakh, Derse’s visit may be more important as an indication of Nakhichevan’s importance not only within Azerbaijan but also as a land between that country and Iran.
On the one hand, Nakhichevan is the homeland of both the current Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev and his late father, Heidar, and like many non-contiguous border areas in other countries whose people feel pressures from their neighbors, it has been a powerful source of Azerbaijani nationalism.
And on the other, in 15 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nakhichevan has been a region in which Shiite religious groups tied to Iran have been especially active. Indeed, at one point, Baku moved to close many of what it has always referred to as the “Iranian” mosques down.
Given rising tensions between the United States and Iran and given Baku’s close ties with Washington, that makes Tehran’s latest move on the bus route and Ambassador Nerse’s visit there almost a test of strength, one that many both in that region of Azerbaijan and elsewhere will likely be tracking into the future.
And the third development, clearly linked to the first two, has been an explosion of Baku media attention to the part of Iran known as “Southern Azerbaijan.” Nearly three times as many Azeris live in Iran – more than 20 million – as do in the Republic of Azerbaijan, and many in Baku take an active interest in that community.
With tensions between Iran and the West heating up, some in the Azerbaijani capital have even begun to think that Washington might be interested in exploiting this issue to weaken Tehran and even possibly prepared to help Baku annex it, a step that if successful could dramatically increase Azerbaijan’s international clout.
So frequent have been such suggestions that a Moscow analyst a week ago published an article in Baku’s Zerkalo – an article that has been posted on a number of Russian news and commentary portals – warning the Azerbaijanis about the dangers of such talks (http://www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=26060&dd=118yr=2008).
Even if nothing comes of this, Zurab Todua of the Moscow Institute of Religion and Politics pointed out, talking about changing borders not only puts Azerbaijanis at odds with an international community that is very much opposed to anything such move but undercuts their position on Nagorno-Karabakh, however much they may dispute it.
But more than that, Todua continued, the likely reactions of the various participants in such a conflict are almost guaranteed to be different than the ones those Azerbaijanis making this argument assume – and those differences could ultimately land Baku in even more hot water.
First, whatever some Azerbaijanis may believe, the United States would be loathe to support any border changes, however much some in Baku may want to believe otherwise. And that reality could leave the country more isolated than anyone is likely to be able to imagine.
Second, the Iranians would certainly react to any effort this direction and even any direct involvement in a war with Tehran not only by launching their own attacks on the Republic of Azerbaijan and exploiting Shiite sympathizers already there but also by loosing or at least not blocking damaging refugee flows northward.
And third – and it is clear that this is the aspect of the situation that Todua thinks is most critical – the ethnic Azerbaijanis are more integrated into Iranian society than some in Baku may believe and would likely become more attached to Tehran rather than less were any effort made to transfer sovereignty.
Obviously, the Moscow analyst’s argument reflects the interest of many there to keep Baku from allying itself with Washington in the event of a crisis with Iran. But his words also call attention to the dangers inherent in that part of the world in even talking about bringing political borders into line with ethnographic or religious ones.
Monday, November 12, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Faces Deteriorating Situation in North Caucasus, Russian General Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, November 12 – A senior Russian general who fought in the second post-Soviet Chechen war and has been an advisor to his country’s defense minister says that the security situation across the Northern Caucasus is deteriorating rapidly, a view very much at odds with the upbeat assessments offered by President Vladimir Putin.
In an interview published in this week’s Moskovskiye novosti, Lt.Gen. Vladimir Shamanov said that the weakness of government institutions there, a variety of social problems that remain unresolved, and the ways in which the militants have evolved in recent times mean “the counter-terrorist operation is not ended.”
And while some progress has been made against the anti-Russian opposition in Chechnya, the general said, Moscow now faces a more serious challenge in Daghestan and Ingushetia, both from Chechen fighters who have fled there and from home-grown militants (http://www.mn.ru/issue/2007-44-31).
Shamanov, who gained a reputation for brutality in Moscow’s Chechen campaigns but who has long argued that Moscow has focused too narrowly on that republic alone, pointed to three additional factors which he said were leading to the spread of violence across that region.
First, he argued that “corrupt North Caucasian elites” now represent “no less a danger for the country than international terrorist centers” not only because they do not effectively run their republics but also because they have little or no authority with the populations supposedly under their control.
As a result, their ethnic and religious opponents find it easy to mobilize public opinion against them, to bring in funds from outside or extract them from fearful or complicit officials, and to deny the governments there the chance to seize the initiative in the conflict.
Second, Shamanov said, underlying social problems provide a breeding ground for the militants. Not only is their massive unemployment and “shockingly” low levels of education among young people, but also the ethnic Russian communities on whom Moscow could rely have left and are not coming back.
And third, across the region, there are ever more Muslim institutions such as mosques and medressahs. While some are completely loyal and deserve to be protected, many have radicalized public opinion and become recruitment centers for anti-Russian militants.
The central Russian government has not addressed these problems by insisting on better performance from the regional governments, improving the economic situation there, or addressing the ideological challenges from some Muslim communities and other militants against it.
Instead, it has assumed that the use of military force is sufficient and that it now has the situation well in hand. In fact, Shamanov continued, Moscow is only setting itself up for more problems ahead, not only by these policy failures but also by its plans for the Sochi Olympics, an event that the militants are certain to try to disrupt.
Shamanov’s argument was echoed in two other articles that appeared in the Russian media at the end of last week. In the same issue of Moskovskiye novosti, Ruslan Martagov said that the current lull in the fighting between Moscow and the militants will not last (http://www.mn.ru/issue/2007-44-28).
A Chechen who opposed Dzhokar Dudayev in the early 1990s and has worked with pro-Moscow groups there later, Martagov argued that Russian officials have failed to recognize or adapt their actions to the fact that “terrorism and frontal military actions are completely different things.”
Terrorism is an effective strategy, he continued, only if the regime against which it is directed is dependent to some degree on popular attitudes, something that is clearly not the case in the Russian Federation at the present time. After all, “why sacrifice dozens of one’s own and bury hundreds of hostages without any result?”
One indication of this, he said, is that the leaders of the Chechen militants now say that young people should not come into the mountains to take part in the fight against Moscow but rather “form cells, gather arms and wait for a signal [to take action] at their places of residence.”
Another is that more and more Chechens accept that argument of London-based Ichkeria diplomat Akhmed Zakayev that with the installation of the Kadyrov regime in Grozniy, Moscow is regardless of its intentions “financing and arming a future independent Chechnya.”
That is all the more the case, Martagov said because “the [Muslim] clericalization of public life in Chechnya is opening for the advocates of religious extremism the broadest possibilities,” something that helps promote the independence of Chechnya whatever anyone may think.
In this situation then, Martagov concluded, Moscow may think it is winning, but whatever its victories on the ground may be, they are not only short term but quickly reversible, especially if the Russian government continues to fail to recognize the ways in which its opponents are recasting themselves.
A second and even more thoughtful argument about the worsening situation in the region was offered by Igor Dobayev, a specialist on ethnic and religious movements of the Caucasus at the Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (kavkaz.geopolitika.ru/analit/islam?PHPSESSID=a4109bcd6bf121ef4961242397e78f0).
Among other points he makes in addition to those offered by Shamanov and Martagov, Dobayev suggested that Moscow bears much of the blame for the rise of Islamism not only because it opened the way for it by suppressing more moderate groups but also because it initially failed to recognize the dangers of imams trained abroad.
In the 1990s, he pointed out, most Muslims in the region were traditionalists who supported the Russian government, but when members of ethnic groups there tried to organize political parties, Moscow forcibly disbanded them, thus leaving the field open for the radicals who said that Muslims should not cooperate with a non-Islamic state.
And the central government was too slow to recognize the dangers arising from Muslims trained in Islamic center in the Middle East and South Asia. “In the course of the 1990s,” Dobayev wrote, “more than 4,000 young people received Islamic education abroad,” with a large share of them radicalized by it.
Now, the fruits of those failures are ripening, the scholar noted, with polls showing that 54.5 percent of all residents of Daghestan supporting fundamentalist movements, and with that figure rising to more than 82 percent in highland portions of that republic.
Unless Moscow and its allies in the region recognize that repression alone will be counter-productive, that the battle is an ideological one, and that their best hope is to cut off funding to their opponents, Dobayev concluded, the Russian government will face an increasingly bleak situation in the North Caucasus.
Vienna, November 12 – A senior Russian general who fought in the second post-Soviet Chechen war and has been an advisor to his country’s defense minister says that the security situation across the Northern Caucasus is deteriorating rapidly, a view very much at odds with the upbeat assessments offered by President Vladimir Putin.
In an interview published in this week’s Moskovskiye novosti, Lt.Gen. Vladimir Shamanov said that the weakness of government institutions there, a variety of social problems that remain unresolved, and the ways in which the militants have evolved in recent times mean “the counter-terrorist operation is not ended.”
And while some progress has been made against the anti-Russian opposition in Chechnya, the general said, Moscow now faces a more serious challenge in Daghestan and Ingushetia, both from Chechen fighters who have fled there and from home-grown militants (http://www.mn.ru/issue/2007-44-31).
Shamanov, who gained a reputation for brutality in Moscow’s Chechen campaigns but who has long argued that Moscow has focused too narrowly on that republic alone, pointed to three additional factors which he said were leading to the spread of violence across that region.
First, he argued that “corrupt North Caucasian elites” now represent “no less a danger for the country than international terrorist centers” not only because they do not effectively run their republics but also because they have little or no authority with the populations supposedly under their control.
As a result, their ethnic and religious opponents find it easy to mobilize public opinion against them, to bring in funds from outside or extract them from fearful or complicit officials, and to deny the governments there the chance to seize the initiative in the conflict.
Second, Shamanov said, underlying social problems provide a breeding ground for the militants. Not only is their massive unemployment and “shockingly” low levels of education among young people, but also the ethnic Russian communities on whom Moscow could rely have left and are not coming back.
And third, across the region, there are ever more Muslim institutions such as mosques and medressahs. While some are completely loyal and deserve to be protected, many have radicalized public opinion and become recruitment centers for anti-Russian militants.
The central Russian government has not addressed these problems by insisting on better performance from the regional governments, improving the economic situation there, or addressing the ideological challenges from some Muslim communities and other militants against it.
Instead, it has assumed that the use of military force is sufficient and that it now has the situation well in hand. In fact, Shamanov continued, Moscow is only setting itself up for more problems ahead, not only by these policy failures but also by its plans for the Sochi Olympics, an event that the militants are certain to try to disrupt.
Shamanov’s argument was echoed in two other articles that appeared in the Russian media at the end of last week. In the same issue of Moskovskiye novosti, Ruslan Martagov said that the current lull in the fighting between Moscow and the militants will not last (http://www.mn.ru/issue/2007-44-28).
A Chechen who opposed Dzhokar Dudayev in the early 1990s and has worked with pro-Moscow groups there later, Martagov argued that Russian officials have failed to recognize or adapt their actions to the fact that “terrorism and frontal military actions are completely different things.”
Terrorism is an effective strategy, he continued, only if the regime against which it is directed is dependent to some degree on popular attitudes, something that is clearly not the case in the Russian Federation at the present time. After all, “why sacrifice dozens of one’s own and bury hundreds of hostages without any result?”
One indication of this, he said, is that the leaders of the Chechen militants now say that young people should not come into the mountains to take part in the fight against Moscow but rather “form cells, gather arms and wait for a signal [to take action] at their places of residence.”
Another is that more and more Chechens accept that argument of London-based Ichkeria diplomat Akhmed Zakayev that with the installation of the Kadyrov regime in Grozniy, Moscow is regardless of its intentions “financing and arming a future independent Chechnya.”
That is all the more the case, Martagov said because “the [Muslim] clericalization of public life in Chechnya is opening for the advocates of religious extremism the broadest possibilities,” something that helps promote the independence of Chechnya whatever anyone may think.
In this situation then, Martagov concluded, Moscow may think it is winning, but whatever its victories on the ground may be, they are not only short term but quickly reversible, especially if the Russian government continues to fail to recognize the ways in which its opponents are recasting themselves.
A second and even more thoughtful argument about the worsening situation in the region was offered by Igor Dobayev, a specialist on ethnic and religious movements of the Caucasus at the Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (kavkaz.geopolitika.ru/analit/islam?PHPSESSID=a4109bcd6bf121ef4961242397e78f0).
Among other points he makes in addition to those offered by Shamanov and Martagov, Dobayev suggested that Moscow bears much of the blame for the rise of Islamism not only because it opened the way for it by suppressing more moderate groups but also because it initially failed to recognize the dangers of imams trained abroad.
In the 1990s, he pointed out, most Muslims in the region were traditionalists who supported the Russian government, but when members of ethnic groups there tried to organize political parties, Moscow forcibly disbanded them, thus leaving the field open for the radicals who said that Muslims should not cooperate with a non-Islamic state.
And the central government was too slow to recognize the dangers arising from Muslims trained in Islamic center in the Middle East and South Asia. “In the course of the 1990s,” Dobayev wrote, “more than 4,000 young people received Islamic education abroad,” with a large share of them radicalized by it.
Now, the fruits of those failures are ripening, the scholar noted, with polls showing that 54.5 percent of all residents of Daghestan supporting fundamentalist movements, and with that figure rising to more than 82 percent in highland portions of that republic.
Unless Moscow and its allies in the region recognize that repression alone will be counter-productive, that the battle is an ideological one, and that their best hope is to cut off funding to their opponents, Dobayev concluded, the Russian government will face an increasingly bleak situation in the North Caucasus.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
