Paul Goble
Vienna, November 7 – A remarkable conference took place in Moscow last week devoted to an even more remarkable man: the preservationist and restorer Petr Baranovskiy who almost single-handedly took on the Soviet leadership and saved some 90 churches, including St. Basil’s on Red Square, from almost certain destruction.
The meeting, which took place October 31-November 1 as the result of the efforts of preservationists and Orthodox Church figures, brought together his daughter and others who knew the late Baranovskiy, to talk about his achievement and to urge that a monument to his work be erected (http://www.rusk.ru/st.php?idar=24298).
During his life, they said, Baranovskiy (1892-1984) often came into conflict with senior communist party officials and like so many others was dispatched to the camps and then exiled as a result. But on several occasions, his resistance to their plans helped preserve some of the most familiar and beloved Moscow buildings.
In the early 1930s, Stalin’s ally Lazar Kaganovich approached the then young preservationist and said that the Kremlin wanted to “sell” St. Basil’s to the Americans or failing that to tear it down to make it easier to stage May Day and Revolution Day anniversary parades.
Baranovskiy, his daughter said, reacted with horror – “What right do You have to do that?” he supposedly inquired – and fired off a telegram to Stalin asking that the Soviet leader prevent the destruction of the Cathedral of Basil the Blessed lest its demolishment “bring political harm to Soviet power.”
Stalin’s shadowy aide Aleksandr Poskrebyshev brought the letter to the atttention of Stalin who in the course of a Politburo meeting told his colleagues to leave the famous church alone. But someone on the Politburo did not forget what Baranovskiy had done and later had him dispatched to the camps as a spy and enemy of the people.
While in the camps, he somehow managed to organize a museum that, his daughter recounted, recalled in its outline the shape of a church -- albeit without the cross. And after he was released, he was banned from living in major cities like Moscow but continued to commute in to help restore architectural treasures.
During one of these visits, the preservationist secretly photographed the Kazan Cathedral from the window of the History Museum, and it was on the basis of his photo that that architects were able to restore the church in1994 after the fall of the communist regime that had desecrated it.
On yet another occasion, his students and supporters said, Baranovskiy intervened to prevent the Soviet government from undermining the foundations of the Ivan the Great Bell Tower in the Kremlin when the regime decided to build a new auditorium for party congresses and other mass meetings.
Had he not done so and convinced the party leadership to shift the building slightly, it is entirely possible that the tower, which among other things is the subject of a classical Russian observation about the nature of wishes, would have ended up as Moscow’s answer to the leaning tower of Pisa.
But in addition to this work with historical monuments, Baranovskiy played another and quite possibly even more important role: he was one of the founders of the Rodina Club in the early 1960s. That organization brought together and promoted the emergence of one straine of unofficial Russian nationalism in the late Soviet period.
Asked whether Baranovskiy did what he did because of a deep religious faith, his daughter responded that he was not a “churched” believer, but those who say he was an atheist are telling “an untruth.” “He was a believer,” she said, “but at that time, he did not have the right to demonstrate his faith.”
According to her, in his reflections about his efforts under the atheistic Soviet regime, Petr Baranovskiy, the man who saved St. Basil’s, said with conviction, “I serve God in another way.” Those who live in Moscow today or visit that city remain in his debt because he did just that.
Wednesday, November 7, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Muslim Forum Publishes New Action Plan, Appeal to Putin
Paul Goble
Vienna, November 7 – Russia’s Muslims currently seek a far higher profile in their country’s national life than they have had up to now, according to provisions of a resolution adopted by the Third All-Russian Muslim Forum and that body’s public address to President Vladimir Putin.
Three of that meeting’s decisions – to create a Russia-wide Ulema Council, a League of Muslim Journalists, and a new continuing body to define the goals of the Russian umma – were already announced in media reporting on its November 1-4 deliberations.
But with the release of its resolution (http://www.nasledie.ru/news.php?id=763) and its open letter to Putin (http://www.islamrf.ru/articles.php?razdel=1&sid=956), that body’s specific goals and its effort to position itself in the Russian social and political system are far clear.
According to the resolution, its participants want, in addition to the steps announced earlier, to push for the creation of a new ministry for religious affairs, organize the next Muslim forum in Ufa and another meeting in Uzbekistan, and use the Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs) and mosques to integrate immigrants.
And according to the open letter to Putin, the Muslims at this meeting support his policies so much that they hope the Russian constitution will be changed so that he can remain in office, as the citizens of Russia, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, so overwhelmingly want.
If the last of these ideas is not terribly controversial and if the resolution itself talks mostly in upbeat terms about the growing role of Muslims in Russian life, each of the specific goals now being announced puts the Forum and its organizers in the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR) on a collision course with a variety of other groups.
By urging the creation of a new ministry for religious affairs, this meeting has put itself at odds with the Russian Orthodox Church whose leaders oppose the establishment of any state agency for religion because such an institution would limit the Moscow Patriarchate’s freedom of action and elevate the status of other faiths.
By suggesting that the next Muslim Forums should be in Ufa and Tashkent, the participants are taking direct aim at the Central MSD which is based in Ufa, is headed by Supreme Mufti Talgat Tajuddin who opposes the SMR, and presumes to speak for Russia’s Muslims in discussions with those in other post-Soviet states.
And by arguing that Muslim religious institutions should help integrate immigrants from Muslim countries, the Forum is challenging the state’s prerogatives in this area (ones that the authorities are not fulfilling very well, it should be said) and undoubtedly angering many Russians who oppose immigration’s Islamic component.
That the Forum’s leadership felt confident enough to advance these goals, especially in such a public way, appears to reflect a belief among the Muslims there that the election season is the perfect time to float such ideas because their increasing numbers mean that at least some politicians will pick up on what they say.
Whether this calculation and the pro-Kremlin rhetoric in which the resolution and open letter are cast will prove sufficient to achieve these policy goals, of course. is far from clear. But compared to the resolutions issued by other Muslim meetings in Russia since 1991, this one is at least potentially the most far-reaching in its implications.
Vienna, November 7 – Russia’s Muslims currently seek a far higher profile in their country’s national life than they have had up to now, according to provisions of a resolution adopted by the Third All-Russian Muslim Forum and that body’s public address to President Vladimir Putin.
Three of that meeting’s decisions – to create a Russia-wide Ulema Council, a League of Muslim Journalists, and a new continuing body to define the goals of the Russian umma – were already announced in media reporting on its November 1-4 deliberations.
But with the release of its resolution (http://www.nasledie.ru/news.php?id=763) and its open letter to Putin (http://www.islamrf.ru/articles.php?razdel=1&sid=956), that body’s specific goals and its effort to position itself in the Russian social and political system are far clear.
According to the resolution, its participants want, in addition to the steps announced earlier, to push for the creation of a new ministry for religious affairs, organize the next Muslim forum in Ufa and another meeting in Uzbekistan, and use the Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs) and mosques to integrate immigrants.
And according to the open letter to Putin, the Muslims at this meeting support his policies so much that they hope the Russian constitution will be changed so that he can remain in office, as the citizens of Russia, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, so overwhelmingly want.
If the last of these ideas is not terribly controversial and if the resolution itself talks mostly in upbeat terms about the growing role of Muslims in Russian life, each of the specific goals now being announced puts the Forum and its organizers in the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR) on a collision course with a variety of other groups.
By urging the creation of a new ministry for religious affairs, this meeting has put itself at odds with the Russian Orthodox Church whose leaders oppose the establishment of any state agency for religion because such an institution would limit the Moscow Patriarchate’s freedom of action and elevate the status of other faiths.
By suggesting that the next Muslim Forums should be in Ufa and Tashkent, the participants are taking direct aim at the Central MSD which is based in Ufa, is headed by Supreme Mufti Talgat Tajuddin who opposes the SMR, and presumes to speak for Russia’s Muslims in discussions with those in other post-Soviet states.
And by arguing that Muslim religious institutions should help integrate immigrants from Muslim countries, the Forum is challenging the state’s prerogatives in this area (ones that the authorities are not fulfilling very well, it should be said) and undoubtedly angering many Russians who oppose immigration’s Islamic component.
That the Forum’s leadership felt confident enough to advance these goals, especially in such a public way, appears to reflect a belief among the Muslims there that the election season is the perfect time to float such ideas because their increasing numbers mean that at least some politicians will pick up on what they say.
Whether this calculation and the pro-Kremlin rhetoric in which the resolution and open letter are cast will prove sufficient to achieve these policy goals, of course. is far from clear. But compared to the resolutions issued by other Muslim meetings in Russia since 1991, this one is at least potentially the most far-reaching in its implications.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Moves to Gut a Republic It Cannot Afford to Suppress
Paul Goble
Vienna, November 7 – After objections by Circassians both in the Russian Federation and abroad effectively blocked the Kremlin’s plan to fold Adygeia into Krasnodar kray, Moscow has sought to downgrade that republic in another way by removing the representations of key federal institutions there.
But that strategy, which Adygeis and other Circassian peoples quickly interpreted as an alternative path to the destruction of their homeland, has now sparked a new round of protests by Circassians there and elsewhere, including a direct appeal to President Vladimir Putin.
As part of Putin’s own policy of amalgamating smaller non-Russian federal units with larger and predominantly ethnic Russian ones, Moscow two years ago sought to combine Adygeia with Krasnodar kray, a move that many in the Russian capital expected to proceed as easily as had earlier steps of this kind.
But unlike in several others cases elsewhere, the people and government of Adygeia strongly objected, as did both politicians in the two other Circassian units in the Russian Federation, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia, and the leaders of the six million Circassians in the Middle East and Europe.
These various groups organized protest meetings and even established an international committee of solidarity with the Adygei Republic, a move that because of the prominence of some of its members led the Russian government to back away from its plans to eliminate Adygeia.
Shortly thereafter, however, Moscow adopted another tact, one intended to “liquidate” the republic de facto if not yet de jure. It shifted out of Adygeia the offices of the federal veterinary, natural resources, and narcotics control agencies, and now it has announced plans to shift to Krasnodar the federal tax service representation as well.
Although some local politicians were prepared to accept Moscow’s argument that this was all being done in the name of efficiency and fighting corruption, most were outraged, seeing what the central authorities were doing as “a direct threat to the status of the republic” (http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/smi/poesdi/).
First of all, they demanded that the leadership of the Southern Federal District take up their cause, and now they have sent an appeal to Putin and the Russian government disputing the center’s claims and underscoring just how unhappy they and all Chechens are with what Moscow is doing.
The open letter noted that the Adygei tax office had significantly improved collections over the past year and was every bit as efficient as those in other republics of the Southern Federal District where no one was talking about shifting this agency to someplace else.
And the authors of this appeal concluded by pointedly suggesting that initiatives from Moscow like this one can quickly and easily “lead to negative consequences not only in the economy of the republic but also destabilize the political situation across the region.”
Whether Moscow will back off again in the hopes of not offending the powerful Circassian diasporas in Turkey and Jordan remains to be seen, of course, but yesterday saw the appearance of another article on the situation in the North Caucasus that may help to convince the central authorities to do just that.
In an essay posted on the APN website, analyst Yuriy Soshin argues that the North Caucasus is moving quickly from “a crisis to a catastrophe” and that the reasons for that are not to be found in the actions of Islamists coming in from abroad but rather in the failure of government institutions there and in Moscow.
“The underlying cause of the current Caucasus crisis,” he writes, “is a crisis of government power. Not international terrorism, not the efforts of some kind or other of foreign enemies, but rather the impossibility of the adequate function of the state-administrative machine is giving birth to the destabilization of public life.”
He describes in extraordinary detail how Moscow has supported or at least not challenged corrupt local regimes if they are able to present themselves as being in control of the situation and loyal to the center, but the result is that these regimes have little public support or ability to act more generally.
And because Moscow has failed to build up genuine political institutions in the past, he continues, it faces a real crisis now, one that the central government could exacerbate by precipitate moves of the kind that central officials appear to be making in Adygeia (http://www.apn.ru/publications/print18277.htm).
Vienna, November 7 – After objections by Circassians both in the Russian Federation and abroad effectively blocked the Kremlin’s plan to fold Adygeia into Krasnodar kray, Moscow has sought to downgrade that republic in another way by removing the representations of key federal institutions there.
But that strategy, which Adygeis and other Circassian peoples quickly interpreted as an alternative path to the destruction of their homeland, has now sparked a new round of protests by Circassians there and elsewhere, including a direct appeal to President Vladimir Putin.
As part of Putin’s own policy of amalgamating smaller non-Russian federal units with larger and predominantly ethnic Russian ones, Moscow two years ago sought to combine Adygeia with Krasnodar kray, a move that many in the Russian capital expected to proceed as easily as had earlier steps of this kind.
But unlike in several others cases elsewhere, the people and government of Adygeia strongly objected, as did both politicians in the two other Circassian units in the Russian Federation, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia, and the leaders of the six million Circassians in the Middle East and Europe.
These various groups organized protest meetings and even established an international committee of solidarity with the Adygei Republic, a move that because of the prominence of some of its members led the Russian government to back away from its plans to eliminate Adygeia.
Shortly thereafter, however, Moscow adopted another tact, one intended to “liquidate” the republic de facto if not yet de jure. It shifted out of Adygeia the offices of the federal veterinary, natural resources, and narcotics control agencies, and now it has announced plans to shift to Krasnodar the federal tax service representation as well.
Although some local politicians were prepared to accept Moscow’s argument that this was all being done in the name of efficiency and fighting corruption, most were outraged, seeing what the central authorities were doing as “a direct threat to the status of the republic” (http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/smi/poesdi/).
First of all, they demanded that the leadership of the Southern Federal District take up their cause, and now they have sent an appeal to Putin and the Russian government disputing the center’s claims and underscoring just how unhappy they and all Chechens are with what Moscow is doing.
The open letter noted that the Adygei tax office had significantly improved collections over the past year and was every bit as efficient as those in other republics of the Southern Federal District where no one was talking about shifting this agency to someplace else.
And the authors of this appeal concluded by pointedly suggesting that initiatives from Moscow like this one can quickly and easily “lead to negative consequences not only in the economy of the republic but also destabilize the political situation across the region.”
Whether Moscow will back off again in the hopes of not offending the powerful Circassian diasporas in Turkey and Jordan remains to be seen, of course, but yesterday saw the appearance of another article on the situation in the North Caucasus that may help to convince the central authorities to do just that.
In an essay posted on the APN website, analyst Yuriy Soshin argues that the North Caucasus is moving quickly from “a crisis to a catastrophe” and that the reasons for that are not to be found in the actions of Islamists coming in from abroad but rather in the failure of government institutions there and in Moscow.
“The underlying cause of the current Caucasus crisis,” he writes, “is a crisis of government power. Not international terrorism, not the efforts of some kind or other of foreign enemies, but rather the impossibility of the adequate function of the state-administrative machine is giving birth to the destabilization of public life.”
He describes in extraordinary detail how Moscow has supported or at least not challenged corrupt local regimes if they are able to present themselves as being in control of the situation and loyal to the center, but the result is that these regimes have little public support or ability to act more generally.
And because Moscow has failed to build up genuine political institutions in the past, he continues, it faces a real crisis now, one that the central government could exacerbate by precipitate moves of the kind that central officials appear to be making in Adygeia (http://www.apn.ru/publications/print18277.htm).
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