Thursday, November 1, 2007

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Wants More Specialists, Not More Ethnic Russians

Paul Goble

Vienna, November 1 – The Kremlin’s effort to attract Russian-speaking “compatriots” living abroad is intended not so much to boost the number of ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation, as many nationalists fervently hope, but rather to attract highly trained specialists the country’s economy can put to use.
According to Sergei Panteleyev, the director of the Moscow Institute on the Russian World Abroad, the widespread notion in Moscow that the Kremlin has designed its compatriots program to address the demographic decline of the Russian nation is just one of the “myths” about this policy.
In a speech last week to a conference on the media and migration issue, Panteleyev said that there are seven “myths” about this program that the media have created and that are interfering with the government’s ability to fulfill President Vladimir Putin’s plans (http://russkie.org/index.php?module=fullitem&id=11287).
The first such myth, he said, is that the Kremlin’s compatriot return policy is “a program of repatriation,” despite the fact that the program as announced by the government denies this and “the state organs involved have never defined it in such a way.
“Classical” programs of national repatriation, like those in Germany, Israel and Kazakhstan “are based on a precise religious-ethnic identification of the resettlers” and thus are intended to serve as “a factor in ‘the unification of the nation,’” Panteleyev explained.
But Moscow’s current program is explicitly “directed at combining the potential of compatriots living abroad with the requirements of the development of Russia’s regions” and their economies. Thus, he continued, it “bears primarily not an ideological but a technocratic character.
The second myth, Panteleyev said, is that the program is intended to be “massive, broad and so on.” If it were a repatriation program that might be the case, but since it isn’t, he said, Moscow wants to bring to Russia “far from all compatriots.” Instead, it wants only the more limited number who can contribute in specific places.
Thus, Panteleyev pointedly noted, if someone who lives abroad, speaks Russian and wants to be return does not have the skills that a specific Russian firm or institution needs, then, the Russian government under the terms of the program as it exists will not provide him with any help to come to the country.
The third myth, related to the other two, is that the program is intended to promote “the massive resettlement of [ethnic] Russians in Russia.” That is not the case, Panteleyev said. Indeed, he suggested that “the ethnic factor alone is not connected in any way with this program.”
The fourth myth is that the program is designed to allow the authorities to legalize the status of the large number of illegal immigrants already in the country. But Panteleyev noted, the program makes no provision for doing anything for those who are already in the country.
The fifth myth is the widely-reported notion that “’bureaucrats are sabotaging the fulfillment of the President’s program.’” That is simply not the case, Paneteleyev argued, noting that the media are hyping problems in certain areas but overwhelmingly officials are on board with the program and working hard to see it implemented.
The sixth myth is that “the resettlers will be provided with work and housing” ahead of Russian citizens already living here. That is only half true: Resettlers will not be supported unless there is a job for them, but they will not jump to the head of the line for housing under the program’s terms.
And the seventh myth, Panteleyev said, is the most incorrect of all. It holds that no one wants to come to Russia or less radically that those who did want to come have already returned. In his experience, the institute director said, there is clear evidence that neither of these claims is true.
Panteleyev’s comments on the non-ethnic foundation of this program are certain to disappoint or even enrage Russian nationalists in this election season, but his words on how Moscow officials should now act in order to overcome these myths will disturb all those concerned with Russian government interference in and control of the media.
At the end of his remarks, Panteleyev suggests that the best way to dispel these myths is to arrange “a closer interaction of responsible state organs with reliable experts and the media” in order to form “’a pool’” to provide media assistance to the government in implementing President Putin’s program.

Window on Eurasia: Why Russia’s Diabetics Aren’t Getting the Insulin They Need

Paul Goble

Vienna, November 1 – Despite dramatic increases in the incidence of diabetes in the Russian Federation, that country still lacks a domestic producer and has not been willing or able to purchase sufficient supplies abroad to meet domestic requirements, according to two Moscow investigators who have examined this situation.
As a result, Boris Mironov and Vladimir Chertovich say in an article posted online this week, many Russian diabetics are not getting the medicines they need, a shortcoming in Russian pubic health that often produces other illnesses and premature deaths (http://www.polemics.ru/article/?articleID=9290&hideText=0&itemPage=1).
To a large extent, of course, the story of Russia’s insulin shortage is part of broader problems there: the reduction of state subsidies for medications, the collapse of the health delivery system in certain regions, and even the inability of many Russians to get to drug outlets because of Russia’s diminished system of public transport.
But these problems have been compounded by new reports suggesting that a decision the Russian health ministry made last February when it directed public hospitals and clinics to screen guestworkers for disease and then to those needing it at low cost (http://www.rustrana.ru/article.php?nid=346440).
That decree, recent reports suggest, has led to a sharp rise in the number of immigrants who come to Russia not to work but rather to obtain inexpensive medical treatment and also to anger among many Russians who conclude that their government appears to be discriminating in favor of immigrants and against Russian citizens.
What makes the insulin situation especially infuriating, Mironov and Chertovich say, is that the Russian government has allocated millions of rubles to remedy it, steps health ministry officials have pointed to with pride, but so far, these funds have not helped any diabetics but rather enriched corrupt officials and businessmen.
The two journalists describe how the health ministry has repeatedly given large sums of money to Russian and foreign companies to manufacture insulin even after these companies have failed to deliver on their promises. Only recently, when some of these funds ended up in the U.S., did prosecutors charge anyone with corruption or fraud.
Such charges represent a useful first step, Mironov and Chertovich admit, but they argue that what has really occurred in this case is “not theft and not corruption” alone. Rather, they write, it is something much worse: “the intentional murder of the nation” by depriving its citizens of needed medicines.
And they conclude in anger that when it comes to the lack of insulin for diabetics and the deaths that have and will result, “the murderers are the power structures of Russia” who allowed this to happen, even though they have sought to present themselves as the guardian of the country.

Window on Eurasia: Is the Kremlin Worried about a Muslim Boycott of Elections?

Paul Goble

Destin, FL, October 31 – This week, the Inter-Religious Council of Russia took the unusual step of publicly declaring that anyone who does not vote in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections is taking a step that is not only “criminal” but threatening to the future of the country.
The Council which unites the so-called “traditional” religions of Russia – Orthodox Christians, traditional Muslims, Jews and Buddhists – posted this declaration on the website of the state Central Election Commission, from which other media outlets have picked it up (http://mediacratia.ru/owa/mc/mc_region_time.html?a_id=23440).
On the one hand, this statement probably reflects no more than the kind of public-spirited action that the authorities expect from this group. After all, the council added that it was calling on all political parties to avoid inflammatory statements about religion and nationality and to relate to these issues “especially delicately.”
But on the other, there is at least one clear indication that some in the Muslim community, angered by the increasingly nationalistic and anti-Islamic attitudes of the major Russian parties, are considering a possible call for a boycott, something that the Kremlin certainly would not want to see happen.
During a roundtable discussion on “Islamophobia in Russia: the Role of the Force Structures, Elections and the Media” last week, Orkhan Dzhemal, an outspoken Muslim journalist and deputy editor of Smysl’, said that Muslims were now forced to consider not voting in order to put pressure on those in power.
As things stand now in Russia, he said, “We cannot create an Islamic party, and we cannot form a non-Russian party.” But that does not mean, he continued, that the more than 20 million Muslims in Russia do not have “other methods of defending [their] interests” (http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/gost/krisob).
And saying the time for just talking was past, he added “Only pressure, only a firm position within the law can force our opponents to compromise. Let’s set ourselves this task: until parties include in their programs sections on internationalism and on struggling with Islamophobia, we will work for a boycott of the elections in the regions.”
None of the other panelists at this session joined him in this call, but Dzhemal is both clever and influential. Ant he defended his position as being in the interests not only of Muslims but of Russians as well, however poorly the latter may understand this at the time.
“If we allow Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes to develop,” he said, then sooner or later” parts of Russia will fall away just as the non-Russian republics did in 1991. And that would be a disaster for everyone because it would transform Russia from its status as “one of the key powers of Eurasia” into a petty state.
Indeed, if Russian nationalism of the anti-Islamic variety continues to grow, then, Dzhemal suggested, “Russia could become Georgia, Belarus or Pakistan. It is possible that this would not be a bad state but …[think what it would mean in terms of] status. The sense of statehood would suffer!”
On the basis of public opinion polls, it would seem that a far greater threat to high levels of participation in the upcoming elections is widespread public indifference arising in many cases from the growing sense that voting is irrelevant because everything has been decided behind the scenes.
But if there is one thing that President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated again and again it is this: he does not like to leave much to chance. And consequently, it is entirely possible that he sought to enlist the country’s religious leadership to get out the vote, lest a possible election boycott by a few Muslims undermine the image he wishes to project.

Window on Eurasia: Halloween is Not ‘Kowtowing’ to the West, Russians Assured

Paul Goble

Destin, FL, October 31 – Over the last two decades, ever more Russians have marked Halloween in much the same way that young people in the United States routinely do, but some Russians and especially some religious and educational leaders there have warned against its celebration.
But according to a commentary on a website media throughout the Russian Federation regularly draw on, Russians should not view this holiday as a form of “kowtowing” to the West but rather simply as an occasion to dress up or to make money on those who do (http://www.prs.ru/articles/?id=17927).
According to Moscow essayist Vladimir Nemira, Halloween has had a complicated history. Long associated with the Church as All Hallow’s Eve, Halloween assumed its current form as a result of the actions of Irish immigrants to the U.S. who stressed its tricks and the Boy Scouts who stressed the treats.
From the U.S., it spread to Russia, but that is largely irrelevant, Nemira says, because “the majority of Russians do not have any idea what they really are celebrating” and would be quite prepared to mark the Chukchi Day of the Whale if they had heard of it – as long as that meant partying.
In short, the way in which people mark this holiday in the Russian Federation is virtually identical to the ways in which people in the West do so. There is only one major difference, Nemira says: Russians always commemorate the day during the weekend before October 31 rather than on the day itself.
Such a permissive attitude toward this entirely secular day has not been the rule in Russia even in recent years. In 2003, Nemira recalls, the Russian Orthodox Church sought to ban any commemoration of Halloween. And responding to the church, the Moscow city educational department actually prohibited its celebration in schools there.
Supporting their cause were a group of psychologists who warned against what were supposedly the baleful influences of images of ghosts, goblins and witches. But as the Moscow writer argues, most Russians now have decided to lighten up and just have a good time.
(This more enlightened approach in Moscow was anticipated by support for the holiday in smaller Russian cities in Siberia earlier in this decade. On that, see the discussion in “Vecherniy Novosibirsk,” October 29, 2005, which is posted online at http://www.vn.ru/29.10.2005/society/71105/).
But there is one problem that the celebration of Halloween may exacerbate: It may lead ever more Russians to believe in magic as a force in their lives. According to a recent poll, one Russian in three – and many Duma members --believe that magic affects people’s lives (http://www.regions.ru/news/2105804/).
However that may be, Happy Halloween!