Paul Goble
Vienna, October 23 – In this electoral season, Russian politicians are learning what their counterparts in other countries already know: treating believers and their faiths with respect is a requirement for victory but identifying oneself too closely with either is almost certainly a recipe for defeat.
That might seem counter-intuitive, Moscow commentator Pavel Umnov argues in an essay posted online this week, given all the attention religion receives in the Russian media and especially the appearance of political figures at religious observances www.russ.ru/layout/set/print/politics/docs/cerkov_protiv_politiki_politika_protiv_cerkvi.
But a close examination of how President Vladimir Putin and the most successful Russian politicians behave shows that in addition to legal prohibitions and church injunctions against mixing religion and politics, they recognize that they must act in ways that do not offend their country’s overwhelmingly secular electorate.
As in so many areas, Putin is the prime example of this. He always “distances himself from conversations about h is religiosity,” Umnov points out, and he “consistently stresses that the religious convictions of an individual and his faith are Privatsache, aspects of his private life.”
And his own party, United Russia, while interested in using the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church to legitimize itself in the eyes of some Russians is very careful to keep the faith and its propositions at arms’ length because the party’s program shows it to be “the ideological opponent” of the church on many important questions.
But underlying such political calculations – and Umnov suggests that all of Russia’s major parties make them – are three fundamental facts of political life in Russia concerning religion that someone running for office can ignore only at the near certainty that he will lose votes and possibly a chance at office.
First, Umnov says, as survey after survey confirms, Russians overwhelmingly identify with religions, at least the traditional ones, as cultural markers rather than as sets of beliefs. And as a result, they are typically disturbed by those, politicians or not, who suggest that religion is more than a cultural variable.
Second, he continues, those who try to wear their Orthodox Christianity or Islam on their sleeves as it were almost invariably generate a negative response among voters because of the myths about these faiths that most Russians have assimilated either in Soviet times or more recently.
While they may admire the Russian Orthodox Church in the abstract, Umnov says, they cannot forget its close ties to the state and the moral shortcomings of some of its clergy and thus are unwilling to hand over to those who identify with its basic premises the power to tell them how to live.
“Leave me in peace” says the average Russian voter, fearful that those who are actively religious – Orthodox Christian, Islamic or any other major faith -- will not be inclined to do just that but rather to get involved in parts of his life from which the state has only recently left.
And third, there is the fear that those who speak about their faith too often may seek to promote the clericalization of what is a fundamentally secular society, with the result being “a threat to the freedom of the voter. That is all the more so now, after some hierarchs, such as Metropolitan Kirill have given their views on human rights, homosexuality, and so on.
And consequently, Umnov concludes, “it is much more effect to use in politics the positive image of religion” with the image of the church, mosque or synagogue shimmering in the background than to try to link together politics and genuine religious beliefs.
In words that could have come out of the mouth of many American campaign managers, Umnov notes, politicians who hope to succeed need to manifest tolerance and respect by in serial fashion being “photographed with the Patriarch,” donning a soccer uniform, and drinking tea with religious elders of other faiths.
All that has lead some to conclude that faith is playing a bigger role in politics in Russia now than ever before, Umnov suggests. But the reality is that this use of religious symbols does not represent the introduction of religious ideas into political life but rather a way to keeping them out -- at least for voters fearful of what their entrance might mean.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Tadzhuddin Builds a ‘Power Vertical’ for Russia’s Muslims
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 23 – Talgat Tadzhuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa and the self-styled supreme mufti of Holy Rus’, is working behind the scenes to construct a “power vertical” for himself and Russia’s Muslims modeled directly on the secular one President Vladimir Putin has erected.
The last of the Soviet-appointed muftis in Russia, Tadzhuddin has generally attracted attention either for his incautious public statements – such as his ill-fated and now retracted fetwa declaring a jihad agains the United States over Iraq – or his behavior – including using a bottle of champagne to “christen” a mosque.
And for those reasons and because of his flamboyant public dress – he is never seen except with an oversized bright green turban – he is often dismissed as a buffoon. But his skills at reading what the country’s political leaders want and in behind-the-scenes bureaucratic infighting are legendary and have kept him in office since 1980.
Now, several hints in the media suggest, he is engaged in what may be his grandest political effort yet, one intended simultaneously to drive from the scene the leaders of rival MSDs and to integrate his Central MSD and its subordinate parts more closely with the Russian state.
Not surprisingly, he has not telegraphed each of his steps in this campaign lest he unintentionally give time for opposition to mobilize against them, but that very fact means that much of what he is doing inevitably remains obscure and what is known all too often stands revealed only by accident or after the fact.
Last December, the Central MSD at Tadzhuddin’s insistence decided to create the position of “main mufti” in each of the seven federal districts that Putin created and to retain for itself the power to appoint its own selections to these posts, a decision reported in the media only in February of this year (http://www.regions.ru/news/2054673).
Then, in March, the Central MSD named Rinat Rayev, the rector of the Islamic university in Chelyabinsk, as the “main mufti of the Urals Federal District” and apparently handed over to him the power to appoint muftis for each of the oblasts and krays there (http://www.ean66.ru/news?/id=20053).
Last week, the full extent of Tadzhuddin’s aspirations became clear when Rayev met with Kurgan Governor Oleg Bogomolov, and the two agreed to work together to eliminate the influence there of Nugman Ashirov, the head of the MSD for Asiatic Russia and someone Moscow and other Muslims have accused of Wahhabism as well as theft.
Bogomolov complained that one of Ashirov’s underlings had misappropriated funds intended for the construction of a mosque and that said that as governor he was prepared to do anything he could “so that [he] would not see this Ashirov anymore in the Urals!” (http://www.kurgan.ru/news/print_version.php?id=1833&tab=news).
Given that Ashirov has been at odds with Tadzhuddin and his organization for a long time – the Siberian is allied with the rival Union of Muftis of Russia and its chief, Ravil’ Gainutdin – that was clearly music to Rayev’s ears, who promptly pressed Bogomolov for more support.
The “main mufti” said that he would like to open a medressa and get the state to certify its graduates. Bogomolov indicated that he could give such an institution a license but pointed out that existing law precluded his providing it on his own with the kind of accreditation Rayev sought.
And then, Rayev called for setting up a representation of his own office in Kurgan to supervise Muslim parishes there. According to the Kurgan.ru, Bogomolov did not respond. But according to Interfax-Religion, the governor approved Rayev’s proposal (http://www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/print.php?news&id=20965).
In this case, the regional news agency is probably the more accurate source, but the Moscow-based Interfax, which often reflects official opinion, may be the more important one, pointing in a direction that reflects how those at the center would like things to go.
But however that may be, the Rayev meeting does provide an intriguing glimpse into Tadzhuddin’s plan, one that would both ally his organization more closely to the state than it has been since Soviet times and exploit that alliance to impose order on the fractious Muslim communities of the Russian Federation.
It thus appears that Tadzhuddin hopes to create a four-tired structure, with the Central MSD (headed by himself) overseeing and appointing the seven “main muftis” in the federal districts. They in turn would oversee and appoint Muslim representations in each oblast, kray and republic, and the latter appoint mullahs and supervise parishes.
Such an arrangement would render the existence of any other MSD superfluous, at least from the point of view of Tadzhuddin and his supporters in the Russian government, and it would dramatically increase the interaction between and the mutual dependence of state structures and Muslim ones at all levels.
Can Tadzhuddin achieve his end? He faces at least three opponents. First, the leaders of other MSDs – there are now more than 60 in the Russian Federation alone – are unlikely to go quietly given that subordinating themselves to Tadzhuddin’s plan would seriously reduce if not eliminate the basis of their power.
Second, there are likely to be many in the government who fear giving Tadzhuddin so much uncontested power. However much they might like the idea of a “Muslim patriarch,” they may ultimately prefer to be able to play divide and power politics among the country’s increasingly large Muslim population.
And third, there are many Muslims, especially among the most intellectually sophisticated, who object to the entire MSD system, a structure lacking any theological justification in Islam, violating the faith’s reliance on elections and also one created and maintained by the Russian state precisely to control its Muslim population.
Representatives of all three can be counted on to speak out frequently and vehemently against Tadzhuddin’s efforts especially as additional parts of it become more visible. And consequently, in the coming months, many observers are likely to conclude that he has lost.
But Tadzhuddin, 59, has often won out despite his public failings because he knows how to operate most effectively out of the public eye – exactly the place that ever more of the most important political transactions now take place in the Russian Federation of his role model Vladimir Putin.
Vienna, October 23 – Talgat Tadzhuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa and the self-styled supreme mufti of Holy Rus’, is working behind the scenes to construct a “power vertical” for himself and Russia’s Muslims modeled directly on the secular one President Vladimir Putin has erected.
The last of the Soviet-appointed muftis in Russia, Tadzhuddin has generally attracted attention either for his incautious public statements – such as his ill-fated and now retracted fetwa declaring a jihad agains the United States over Iraq – or his behavior – including using a bottle of champagne to “christen” a mosque.
And for those reasons and because of his flamboyant public dress – he is never seen except with an oversized bright green turban – he is often dismissed as a buffoon. But his skills at reading what the country’s political leaders want and in behind-the-scenes bureaucratic infighting are legendary and have kept him in office since 1980.
Now, several hints in the media suggest, he is engaged in what may be his grandest political effort yet, one intended simultaneously to drive from the scene the leaders of rival MSDs and to integrate his Central MSD and its subordinate parts more closely with the Russian state.
Not surprisingly, he has not telegraphed each of his steps in this campaign lest he unintentionally give time for opposition to mobilize against them, but that very fact means that much of what he is doing inevitably remains obscure and what is known all too often stands revealed only by accident or after the fact.
Last December, the Central MSD at Tadzhuddin’s insistence decided to create the position of “main mufti” in each of the seven federal districts that Putin created and to retain for itself the power to appoint its own selections to these posts, a decision reported in the media only in February of this year (http://www.regions.ru/news/2054673).
Then, in March, the Central MSD named Rinat Rayev, the rector of the Islamic university in Chelyabinsk, as the “main mufti of the Urals Federal District” and apparently handed over to him the power to appoint muftis for each of the oblasts and krays there (http://www.ean66.ru/news?/id=20053).
Last week, the full extent of Tadzhuddin’s aspirations became clear when Rayev met with Kurgan Governor Oleg Bogomolov, and the two agreed to work together to eliminate the influence there of Nugman Ashirov, the head of the MSD for Asiatic Russia and someone Moscow and other Muslims have accused of Wahhabism as well as theft.
Bogomolov complained that one of Ashirov’s underlings had misappropriated funds intended for the construction of a mosque and that said that as governor he was prepared to do anything he could “so that [he] would not see this Ashirov anymore in the Urals!” (http://www.kurgan.ru/news/print_version.php?id=1833&tab=news).
Given that Ashirov has been at odds with Tadzhuddin and his organization for a long time – the Siberian is allied with the rival Union of Muftis of Russia and its chief, Ravil’ Gainutdin – that was clearly music to Rayev’s ears, who promptly pressed Bogomolov for more support.
The “main mufti” said that he would like to open a medressa and get the state to certify its graduates. Bogomolov indicated that he could give such an institution a license but pointed out that existing law precluded his providing it on his own with the kind of accreditation Rayev sought.
And then, Rayev called for setting up a representation of his own office in Kurgan to supervise Muslim parishes there. According to the Kurgan.ru, Bogomolov did not respond. But according to Interfax-Religion, the governor approved Rayev’s proposal (http://www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/print.php?news&id=20965).
In this case, the regional news agency is probably the more accurate source, but the Moscow-based Interfax, which often reflects official opinion, may be the more important one, pointing in a direction that reflects how those at the center would like things to go.
But however that may be, the Rayev meeting does provide an intriguing glimpse into Tadzhuddin’s plan, one that would both ally his organization more closely to the state than it has been since Soviet times and exploit that alliance to impose order on the fractious Muslim communities of the Russian Federation.
It thus appears that Tadzhuddin hopes to create a four-tired structure, with the Central MSD (headed by himself) overseeing and appointing the seven “main muftis” in the federal districts. They in turn would oversee and appoint Muslim representations in each oblast, kray and republic, and the latter appoint mullahs and supervise parishes.
Such an arrangement would render the existence of any other MSD superfluous, at least from the point of view of Tadzhuddin and his supporters in the Russian government, and it would dramatically increase the interaction between and the mutual dependence of state structures and Muslim ones at all levels.
Can Tadzhuddin achieve his end? He faces at least three opponents. First, the leaders of other MSDs – there are now more than 60 in the Russian Federation alone – are unlikely to go quietly given that subordinating themselves to Tadzhuddin’s plan would seriously reduce if not eliminate the basis of their power.
Second, there are likely to be many in the government who fear giving Tadzhuddin so much uncontested power. However much they might like the idea of a “Muslim patriarch,” they may ultimately prefer to be able to play divide and power politics among the country’s increasingly large Muslim population.
And third, there are many Muslims, especially among the most intellectually sophisticated, who object to the entire MSD system, a structure lacking any theological justification in Islam, violating the faith’s reliance on elections and also one created and maintained by the Russian state precisely to control its Muslim population.
Representatives of all three can be counted on to speak out frequently and vehemently against Tadzhuddin’s efforts especially as additional parts of it become more visible. And consequently, in the coming months, many observers are likely to conclude that he has lost.
But Tadzhuddin, 59, has often won out despite his public failings because he knows how to operate most effectively out of the public eye – exactly the place that ever more of the most important political transactions now take place in the Russian Federation of his role model Vladimir Putin.
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