Paul Goble
Vienna, September 5 – The Russian government should use its current enormous earnings from the sale of oil and gas abroad to finance the resettling of ethnic Russians in border regions of the country, according to Alu Alkhanov, the former president of Chechnya and current Russian Federation deputy justice minister.
In an interview in yesterday’s “Argumenty i Fakty,” Alkhanov argues that such an effort is necessary now lest the continuing departure of ethnic Russians from the periphery of Russia threaten both the well-being of these areas and even the country’s territorial integrity (http://www.regions.ru/news/2095233/).
Not surprisingly given his own background, Alkhanov points to the collapse of the ethnic Russian presence in the North Caucasus. Between the 1989 and 2002 censuses, he notes, the percentage of ethnic Russians declined across this region from 26 percent – or about one in four – to 15 percent – or less than one in six.
In some places the decline was relatively small. In Adygeia, the Russian share fell only three percent from 68 percent to 65 percent, but in others, this decline was enormous: In Ingushetia, the Russian presence fell from 10 percent to one percent, and in Chechnya, it fell from 25 percent to only four percent.
The impact of the departure of the ethnic Russians has been three-fold: First, it has emboldened nationalist radicals. Second, it has harmed the social-economic and spiritual well being of the regions they have left. And third, it has undermined “the constitutional principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian state.”
The leaders of some republics have done a great deal: he mentions the Chechnya’s late Akhmat Kadyrov (but significantly not his son and the current leader who ousted Alkhanov) and Ingushetiya’s M. Zyazikov. But he pointedly remarks that they lack the resources needed to do the job.
What Alkhanov says he would like to see is an effort “at the level of a fifth national project,” one that would draw on “the many examples of the successful resolution of such major problems” in the history of Russia. But the examples he gives of this are somewhat troubling.
Alkhanov suggests that Moscow should study the experience of returning those peoples deported by Stalin, the use of Grozniy as “one of the centers of traditional cultural influence of Russia in the North Caucasus,” and changes in the size of ethnic Russian communities as one of the measures of a regional leader’s success.
In many ways, the outflow of ethnic Russians from the republics of the North Caucasus and elsewhere recapitulates what happened in the last two decades of the Soviet Union: the ethnic homogenization of most republics that helped to power the national movements that contributed to the end of the USSR.
And consequently, it is not surprising that many in Moscow are concerned about the implications of these new demographic shifts. But in addition to the obvious problems of pushing Russians to return to regions marked by violence, there are three other reasons why this task may well be beyond Moscow’s capacity.
First, the number of potential returnees is small: Earlier studies suggest that ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus had adapted well. If they have decided to leave, it is almost certain that no other Russians would be willing to take the risk of moving there. (http://www.russ.ru/[p;otocs/lyudi/russkij_vopros_v_ingushetii).
Second, the economic situation across the North Caucasus is so dire that Moscow could make the situation more attractive only by investing sums that other regions would almost certainly oppose even if they were justified by reference to national security (http://www.nr2.ru/policy/138149.html).
And third – and most worrisome of all -- there is growing evidence, not only in Ingushetia where it has attracted widespread attention this week but elsewhere as well that non-Russian radicals are targeting ethnic Russians to cause ever more of those who remain to think about leaving (http://sknews.ru/paper/2007/30/article.php?id=2&uin=3).
Wednesday, September 5, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Metropolitan Kirill’s ‘Russian Doctrine’ Denounced as Anti-Semitic
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 5 – The new “Russian Doctrine” released last month by the World Russian Public Assembly and openly supported by Metropolitan Kirill, the second highest ranking prelate of the Moscow Patriarchate, is not only Stalinist and anti-Western but anti-Semitic as well, according to a leading Russian commentator.
Indeed, Aleksei Makarkin says in an essay published today, this document contains little or nothing Benito Mussolini or other fascist backers of “a corporate state” would not have signed onto. And it can thus best characterized as a manifestation of “Orthodox Stalinism” (http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=7368).
And that makes it all the more troubling that this document is being pushed forward by Metropolitan Kirill, who may be protecting himself from criticism from nationalists within his church but who does not credit to himself or to it by associating himself with the notions this new “doctrine” contains.
The Doctrine, Makarkin notes, might have passed unnoticed if its only support were the participants of the World Russian Public Assembly. But Metropolitan Kirill’s involvement not only guarantees that it will attract attention but also that the ideas it contains have significant support in the Russian elite.
In presenting the document last month, Kirill argued that its contents reflected what he calls “dynamic conservatism” – something the metropolitan has spoken about before -- but Makarkin suggests that in fact, the newly-released Doctrine is “reactionary, not conservative” in “an ultra-radical, retrograde form.”
According to the Doctrine, Makarkin continues, “the party-parliamentary system in the present-day world is degrading and degenerating into a cover for shadowy lobbying.” The only way out, its authors say, is “corporate representation for various classes and professional communities.
Such a notion, the deputy director of the Moscow Center for Political Technologies argues, is not only “incompatible with the democratic path of development of the country” but also represents “a variant” of the views of the followers of “a Russian Khomeini.”
The doctrine specifies – and here Makarkin quotes it directly – that “national power in Russia must become a combination of three state foundations in their concrete political forms – direct democracy … a competent aristocracy … and a single head (the Chief of State.”
In such a system, the doctrine says, the chief of state will have “almost dictatorial authority” while the lower-standing portions of state power will only have the opportunity to voice their support for what the leader says and does, “just as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously” approved what the Politburo decreed.
In addition to attacking democracy in this way, the doctrine also calls for reducing the importance of human rights as a measure of societal well-being and the use of censorship for both moral reasons and political ones: The media must not disseminate any ideas of “the traitors and enemies of Russia.”
Those who support this doctrine, Makarkin notes, will define exactly who those “traitors and enemies” are.
But what is certain to set off alarm bells in many quarters is the openly anti-Semitic content of the doctrine. Kirill, who for more than a decade has pushed the notion of “four traditional religions of Russia – Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism,” in this case supports a document that speaks about only three.
And as Makarkin notes, “it is not difficult to guess who has been left out.” Indeed, he says, the only role left for Jews in Russia is to support “the foreign political activities of the state” – again, a view very much like that of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin who was eager to use the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee at one time and then killed its members.
That the authors of the Russian Doctrine have equally negative views about Jews is suggested by their open support for Stalin’s campaign against “cosmopolitanism,” a code word for his efforts at the end of his life to oust Jews from all prominent places in Russian life and even to exile that community to the Russian Far East.
But the Russian Doctrine does not limit itself to panegyrics to Stalin on this point alone. It also specifies something very much at odds with the historical record: “The former seminarist Stalin,” it says, did a great deal in order that the real ‘illegality’ in post-revolutionary Russia did not increase but on the contrary was seriously reduced.”
And the Doctrine suggests that Stalin was responsible for the revival of the Orthodox Church, with not a word about his own attacks on the clergy and believers before, during and after World War II. (For a summary of his depradations in this area, see http://www.rusidea.org/?a=25090409.)
Makarkin suggests that this Doctrine is dangerous in two ways: On the one hand, its appearance suggests that there is growing support for just such “Orthodox Stalinism” in Russia, support that will only feed the current authoritarianism of the Kremlin and delay the appearance of democracy.
And on the other, however calculating Kirill may be – and he is one of the savviest politicians in the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy – he has discredited himself and his Church by associating with a doctrine that all those of good will should quickly and completely denounce.
But there is a third danger arising from such a Doctrine that Makarkin does not mention but that could prove to be even more fateful for the future of the Russian Federation: Its appearance could trigger other nations and regions to come up with their own national doctrines.
Indeed, there are suggestions that leaders in the North Caucasus are doing just that (see http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print//politics/docts/kavkazskij_proekt_chast_ii). . And if they do, a Doctrine urging “a Russia for the Russians” may trigger not the rebirth of Russia but rather a new wave of national assertiveness by other nations instead.
Vienna, September 5 – The new “Russian Doctrine” released last month by the World Russian Public Assembly and openly supported by Metropolitan Kirill, the second highest ranking prelate of the Moscow Patriarchate, is not only Stalinist and anti-Western but anti-Semitic as well, according to a leading Russian commentator.
Indeed, Aleksei Makarkin says in an essay published today, this document contains little or nothing Benito Mussolini or other fascist backers of “a corporate state” would not have signed onto. And it can thus best characterized as a manifestation of “Orthodox Stalinism” (http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=7368).
And that makes it all the more troubling that this document is being pushed forward by Metropolitan Kirill, who may be protecting himself from criticism from nationalists within his church but who does not credit to himself or to it by associating himself with the notions this new “doctrine” contains.
The Doctrine, Makarkin notes, might have passed unnoticed if its only support were the participants of the World Russian Public Assembly. But Metropolitan Kirill’s involvement not only guarantees that it will attract attention but also that the ideas it contains have significant support in the Russian elite.
In presenting the document last month, Kirill argued that its contents reflected what he calls “dynamic conservatism” – something the metropolitan has spoken about before -- but Makarkin suggests that in fact, the newly-released Doctrine is “reactionary, not conservative” in “an ultra-radical, retrograde form.”
According to the Doctrine, Makarkin continues, “the party-parliamentary system in the present-day world is degrading and degenerating into a cover for shadowy lobbying.” The only way out, its authors say, is “corporate representation for various classes and professional communities.
Such a notion, the deputy director of the Moscow Center for Political Technologies argues, is not only “incompatible with the democratic path of development of the country” but also represents “a variant” of the views of the followers of “a Russian Khomeini.”
The doctrine specifies – and here Makarkin quotes it directly – that “national power in Russia must become a combination of three state foundations in their concrete political forms – direct democracy … a competent aristocracy … and a single head (the Chief of State.”
In such a system, the doctrine says, the chief of state will have “almost dictatorial authority” while the lower-standing portions of state power will only have the opportunity to voice their support for what the leader says and does, “just as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously” approved what the Politburo decreed.
In addition to attacking democracy in this way, the doctrine also calls for reducing the importance of human rights as a measure of societal well-being and the use of censorship for both moral reasons and political ones: The media must not disseminate any ideas of “the traitors and enemies of Russia.”
Those who support this doctrine, Makarkin notes, will define exactly who those “traitors and enemies” are.
But what is certain to set off alarm bells in many quarters is the openly anti-Semitic content of the doctrine. Kirill, who for more than a decade has pushed the notion of “four traditional religions of Russia – Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism,” in this case supports a document that speaks about only three.
And as Makarkin notes, “it is not difficult to guess who has been left out.” Indeed, he says, the only role left for Jews in Russia is to support “the foreign political activities of the state” – again, a view very much like that of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin who was eager to use the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee at one time and then killed its members.
That the authors of the Russian Doctrine have equally negative views about Jews is suggested by their open support for Stalin’s campaign against “cosmopolitanism,” a code word for his efforts at the end of his life to oust Jews from all prominent places in Russian life and even to exile that community to the Russian Far East.
But the Russian Doctrine does not limit itself to panegyrics to Stalin on this point alone. It also specifies something very much at odds with the historical record: “The former seminarist Stalin,” it says, did a great deal in order that the real ‘illegality’ in post-revolutionary Russia did not increase but on the contrary was seriously reduced.”
And the Doctrine suggests that Stalin was responsible for the revival of the Orthodox Church, with not a word about his own attacks on the clergy and believers before, during and after World War II. (For a summary of his depradations in this area, see http://www.rusidea.org/?a=25090409.)
Makarkin suggests that this Doctrine is dangerous in two ways: On the one hand, its appearance suggests that there is growing support for just such “Orthodox Stalinism” in Russia, support that will only feed the current authoritarianism of the Kremlin and delay the appearance of democracy.
And on the other, however calculating Kirill may be – and he is one of the savviest politicians in the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy – he has discredited himself and his Church by associating with a doctrine that all those of good will should quickly and completely denounce.
But there is a third danger arising from such a Doctrine that Makarkin does not mention but that could prove to be even more fateful for the future of the Russian Federation: Its appearance could trigger other nations and regions to come up with their own national doctrines.
Indeed, there are suggestions that leaders in the North Caucasus are doing just that (see http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print//politics/docts/kavkazskij_proekt_chast_ii). . And if they do, a Doctrine urging “a Russia for the Russians” may trigger not the rebirth of Russia but rather a new wave of national assertiveness by other nations instead.
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