Window on Eurasia: Regional Identity Trumps Ethnicity, RF Patriotism in Siberia

Paul Goble

Vienna, July 19 – Transbaikal residents overwhelmingly identify themselves as “Siberians” regardless of their ethnicity, a new survey shows. And while most would settle for greater autonomy, a significant share says that they would welcome independence should the Russian Federation dissolve in the future.
In an article provocatively titled “Will the Russian Federation Survive Until 2014?” Vitaly Kamyshev, a “Sibiryak” himself, reports that Irkutsk’s “Who’s Who” Agency determined that 80 percent of residents there identify as “Siberians” while only 12 percent say they are “Russians” (http://www.apn.ru/publications/print17435.htm).
The same poll also found that approximately three Transbaikal residents out of five want greater autonomy for Siberia as a whole and that one in four – some 25 percent – are for a Siberia independent of the Russian Federation. (Unfortunately, Kamyshev does not give details on exactly when this poll was conducted or how many it queried.)
One reason for this perhaps surprising choice is the campaign by local Siberian activists to promote the ideas of 19th century “oblastniki” like Grigoiy Potanin and Nikolai Yadrintsev, who argued that Russia treated “Siberia as a colony,” and thus to gain seats for themselves in local legislatures, the last place where real electoral politics occur.
But to far greater extent, this striking shift in self-identifications is an obvious reaction to three policies of President Vladimir Putin. First, his re-centralization of power and his reduction in the size of inter-regional transfers have re-ignited long-simmering tensions between Moscow and the regions.
Second, Putin himself has unwittingly put regionalism in play by his efforts to combine existing federal units into new and larger ones, a process by which he clearly hopes to push out the ethnic dimension of Russian federalism. In Siberia and the Russian Far East, five small regions are now set to be combined with larger ones.
On the one hand, that has the effect of undermining the importance of ethnicity as Putin wants, at least in some cases, but only at the cost of leading non-Russian elites to seek new accords on a regional basis with Russian ones, an effort that by itself makes regional identities more important than ethnic ones.
On the other, by putting the question of the borders of regions into play again, Putin has unintentionally encouraged others especially in places far from Moscow to think about how they would redraw the political map of the Russian Federation in order to maximize their power.
Elites in Khabarovsk kray, for example, having gotten approval to absorb two numerically small non-Russian areas, now talk openly about a greater Khabarovsk that would both become the largest federal unit in the country and have much greater influence in national politics.
And third, Putin has sought to downplay ethnic Russian identity as well by promoting the non-ethnic “Rossiyane” as the future civic nation the Russian president says the country must have given its ethnic divisions. That does not satisfy many ethnic Russians or many ethnic non-Russians, and regionalism may become the choice of both.
Now as in the past, Moscow has sought to limit the rise of Siberian identity by playing up what it says is the threat of Chinese colonization of the region. But that argument, Kamyshev says, may be wearing thin: Ever more people in Siberia believe they are a colony already and some think they would be better off with a different master.
None of this, of course, is to say that Siberian regionalism as either an identity or a movement is strong enough to pose any immediate threat to Moscow. But it is to suggest that downplaying ethnicity as Putin has done may not translate directly and without any problems into Russian patriotism.
Instead, as this Irkutsk poll suggests, many who others view as members of particular nationalities or as inevitable “Rossiyane” may decide to view themselves in regionalist terms, a development that could pose serious challenges for Russia’s development not only in 2014 but perhaps much sooner.

Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Moves to Control Foreign Aid to Russia’s Muslims

Paul Goble

Vienna, July 19 – A new foundation, jointly created by the Office of the Russian President and that country’s most important Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs), will help the Kremlin gain effective control of the influx of funds from Middle Eastern countries to Muslim groups in the Russian Federation.
Established in November 2006 as an NGO, the Foundation for the Support of Islamic Culture has not attracted much attention, but a speech by a Kremlin advisor earlier this month suggests that this institution may already be playing a significant role in regulating Muslim activities in Russia funded from abroad.
Getting a handle on such aid flows has been a major concern of the Russian state since the early 1990s when Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East sent massive amounts of money to help rebuild the Muslim community in the Russian Federation, aid that many believe triggered Islamist radicalism there.
In remarks to a July 11 roundtable in Moscow entitled “Will Increased Criminal Responsibility for Inciting Racial and National Hatred Bring Peace to the Peoples of Russia?” that were posted online yesterday, Aleksei Grishin, an advisor to President Putin, said that punishment was not enough (http://www.islamnn.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1817).
According to Grishin, who was explicitly picking up on the earlier and much-commented-upon speech of Putin aide Vladislav Surkov, inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace in the Russian Federation requires both harsher punishments but also moral training and enlightenment of the population.
“Moral training,” Grishin said, “is a joint function of the family and the state, enlightenment is a function of the state and civil society, but punishment is a function only of the state.” Consequently, the state must work closely with a variety of NGOs to achieve its ends.
One example of this is the Foundation for the Support of Islamic Culture, Grishin continued. Its task, he said, “is to accumulate funds both from internal sources and from Islamic states abroad who want to help the Muslims of Russia with the goal of further financing measures for spiritual enlightenment and education.”
Were the Foundation a true NGO, such a task would be entirely natural and thus not deserve particular attention. But because it is in fact a GONGO – a government-organized NGO of the kind typical of Soviet times – the group clearly aspires to play the gatekeeper role the Russian government wants.
And because it will control one of the most important sources of funds for Muslim groups, this Foundation will provide yet another means for “loyal” MSDs – like the Central MSD of Talgat Tadzhuddin and the Union of Muftis of Russia under Ravil’ Gainutdin – to assume an even higher profile relative to other Muslim groups.
But at the same time, the obvious Russian government involvement in the Foundation may have the effect of prompting Muslim governments abroad to use alternative channels, a possibility that by its very nature could contribute to an increase in Islamist radicalism that Moscow hopes to restrict.