Window on Eurasia: Geopolitical Competition in the Southern Caucasus Heats Up

Paul Goble

Vienna, June 22 – Five events during the past week call attention to a dramatic intensification of the geopolitical competition among the Russian Federation, the United States and Iran for influence in the southern Caucasus, the Caspian basin and even further afield.
First, last Saturday and Sunday, representatives of all four of the so-called “unrecognized” states which some refer to as CIS-2 or the anti-GUAM met in Tiraspol to map out common strategies for achieving their goal of seceding from the countries of which they are part.
In the past, the government of Nagorno-Karabakh held itself aloof from the meetings of the other three – Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Osetia – but this time it was represented by Arman Melikan, an advisor to the Nagorno-Karabakh president (http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=4738).
His presence suggests that many in Stepanakert are increasingly frustrated by the continuing stalemate between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of that region, a stalemate that was highlighted earlier this month at a meeting between the presidents of those two countries.
Or the participation of a representative of Nagorno-Karabakh may reflect Moscow’s interest in stirring the pot in the southern Caucasus especially in the face of other recent developments in the region that suggest the Russian Federation is losing influence there.
Second, on Monday and Tuesday, the leaders of the four GUAM states – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova – met in Baku to develop a common strategy designed to foil the efforts of Moscow and the “unrecognized” states to threaten their territorial integrity and undermine their march toward the West.
Although the meeting limited itself largely to declarations about issues large and small, it may be a turning point for a grouping that the Russian government has done all it can to undermine lest GUAM undermine Moscow’s influence across the post-Soviet region.
On the one hand, precisely because of its democratic credentials, Ukraine used this meeting to advance its claim as an alternative to Russia as “a center of attraction” for other former Soviet republics, thus solidifying its claims to be a bridge between east and west.
And on the other, there was one important new participant: Poland. It was represented not by a diplomat from the foreign ministry but by that country’s president, Lech Kaczynski. His presence marks a breakthrough for GUAM whose members have long sought to attract as possible members countries that were not part of the USSR.
Although Kaczynski did not say much more than express his doubts about the possible joint Russian-American exploitation of the Gabala radar station, his attendance alone highlights Poland’s growing role and makes the survival of GUAM more likely (http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print/politics/reakcli/klub_proigravshih).
Third, on Wednesday, the foreign ministers of the Caspian Sea littoral states met in Tehran in the latest effort to reach an accord dividing up that body’s seabed and governing the use by those states and third parties of the Caspian. The ministers made little progress.
The representatives of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan insisted on a full and final division of the Caspian sea into national sectors, something Moscow opposes: Such an accord would make possible the construction of trans-Caspian pipelines bypassing Russia easier and even create conditions for a NATO naval force there.
Because those are developments that Iran does not want to see either, Moscow’s “single ally” in these discussions was Iran, Moscow’s “Kommersant” pointed out. And that in turn is likely to have the effect of reducing Moscow’s influence in the region still further (http://www.prognosis.ru/news/news/2007/6/21/kaspii_partition.html).
Fourth, on Thursday, an Azerbaijani commentator in a major Baku newspaper called for the destruction of the Gabala radar site instead of any possible joint American-Russian use. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has already indicated he is prepared to talk about this issue, but the “Zerkalo” article may make that more difficult.
In his article, R. Mirkadyrov notes that Azerbaijan has gotten little out of it in recent times except hot air: For the last two years, he points out, Russia has not even paid what he calls “the miserly” rent of seven million dollars a year it agreed to in a 2006 bilateral accord (http://www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=35243).
And fifth, also on Thursday, Iranian and Georgian news agencies reported that Tehran business interests are now ready to invest one billion U.S. dollars in Georgia and a similar amount in Armenia. Such investments almost certainly would expand Iran’s influence in the region (http://www.ng.ru/cis/2007-06-21/8_armenia.html).
Not surprisingly, American officials warned of the dangers involved of accepting so much Iranian money, but the problems for Russia may be even more immediate: If one or both of these countries should tilt toward Tehran, Moscow’s influence in the southern Caucasus would fall to a new low.
It is uncertain whether Tehran’s offer will ever be realized, and it is far from clear what it or any of the other steps taken this week will ultimately mean. But quite clearly, the southern Caucasus is again very much in active play on the world’s geopolitical chessboard.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Presses Saudis to Double Russia's Haj Quota

Paul Goble

Vienna, June 22 –Akhmed Balilov, the chairman of the Russian Federation Council on the Haj, is in Saudi Arabia this week pushing for a doubling of Russia’s haj quota so as to allow up to 40,000 Muslims from Russia this year to make the required pilgrimage to Mecca.
The results of his meetings are not yet known, and they may not be announced for some time or even publicly because the Russian request is unprecedented. As the rulers of the holiest sites of Islam, the Saudis for decades have set national quotas for the haj of one tenth of one percent of Riyadh’s estimate of the number of Muslims in each country.
For Russia, the Saudis have thus set a quota of 20,000 – based on the figure of 20 million Muslims in the Russian Federation. But last year, the number of Russia’s Muslims making the haj was at least 19,500 and may have even exceeded the formal Saudi number (http://www.riadagestan.ru/rubric.php?name=nation, June 20)
As a result, last month, during his meetings with Saudi leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin asked that they agree to double this number because the Soviet system did not permit very many Muslims to make this pilgrimage and thus there is enormous pent up demand.
Now, Balilov is trying to secure Riyadh’s accord to that request, but whether he succeeds or not, this situation is striking for three reasons: First, the Saudi estimate is based on the number of “ethnic” Muslims in the Russian Federation, not on the number of actual believers.
Second, Moscow’s effort to set a higher number for Russian hajis suggests that the Kremlin believes it now must respond or at least be seen to respond to greater Islamic activism inside the country even at a time when hostility to Muslims is growing among many Russian nationalists.
And third – and this could be the most important aspect– Moscow is seeking to raise the quota even though that almost inevitably means that more of Russia’s Muslims who make the haj will bring back to their own community at least some of the ideas associated with Wahhabism, the Saudi strain of Islam.
If the Saudis agree, the number of Russia’s Muslims making the haj will certainly approach the 40,000 figure: According to RIA “Dagestan,” 13,000 Muslims in the Russian Federation have said they want to go, a number that is sure to increase despite the fact that the cost of the pilgrimage will be 20 percent higher this year than last.