Paul Goble
Vienna, June 7 – A young Komi who had followed the animist traditions of his own nation in north-central Russia converted to Islam in Estonia where he went to study and work, a re-identification that he suggests at least some other members of Finno-Ugric nationalities in Russia may choose given the existential crisis they find themselves in.
In an interview posted on the Islam.ru, Andrei Tentyukov, 30, discussed why he converted to Islam after moving to Estonia seven years ago, why others from Russia’s Finno-Ugric nationalities may follow his path, and also what Islamic resources now exist in Estonia (http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/gost/tentukov/?print_page).
Tentyukov said that the beliefs he grew up with led him to be concerned about protecting the natural environment, beliefs that after he moved to Estonia led him to explore what Islam had to say on that subject. Pleased with what he found, he converted. Coming to Islam “in Estonia through Tatar culture.”
Very few Finno-Ugric people have made this shift yet, he acknowledged. On the one hand, until very recently, most of them were satisfied with their own traditional religions, faiths that they believe have allowed them to maintain their distinct identities over the centuries.
And on the other, he pointed out, few Muslim leaders or even ordinary believers up to now have known enough about Finno-Ugric cultures to be able to craft their message in terms that would make it attractive to peoples who felt self-sufficient in religious terms.
But now that is beginning to change: “Finno-Ugric peoples are living through a crisis,” one brought on by the enormous social and political changes in Russia over the last few decades. And ever more Muslims living among these peoples have learned enough about them to be able to reach out and communicate with them.
The situation of the small Muslim community in Estonia, Tentyukov continued, is an example of this. In that Baltic state, “there are almost no conflicts rooted in religion” – Estonia is one of the most non-religious countries in Europe – and consequently, Muslims can live their own life and interact with others in non-threatening ways.
There are no Islamic political parties there, but four key institutions exist: the Islamic Community of Estonia founded in Tallinn in 2004, the Nur Center of Islamic Religion and Culture set up in Maardu in 2001, the Estonian Center of Islamic Research created in Tartu in 2006, and the Islamic Crescent in Estonia established in 2000.
The Estonian Center of Islamic Research maintains its own website, http://www.islam.ee. There are two Islamic sites in Estonian, http://islam.forumsvibe.com and http://www.islam.pri.ee. In addition, there are sites connected with traditionally Islamic national minorities, such as the Azerbaijanis (http://www.azeri.ee).
Given all that and given Islam’s commitment to environmentalism, an issue of overriding importance to Finno-Ugric peoples, Tentyukov told Islam.ru, it is not surprising that he turned to Islam in Estonia or that other Finno-Ugric people may do the same either while visiting there or even when they remain in their own homelands.
Thursday, June 7, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Nursi Case More About Political Loyalty than Religious Extremism
Paul Goble
Vienna, June 7 – The Russian government has sought to ban the works of Said Nursi ostensibly for their supposed “Islamic extremism,” but in fact Moscow is far more worried that his writings and especially their dissemination via Turkish lycees in the Russian Federation will promote pan-Turkist ideas among the country’s Muslim elites.
That conclusion is suggested by Georgiy Engel’gardt, a Moscow specialist on ethnic and religious questions, in an article entitled “Pan-Turkism in Lycee Auditoriums: The Real Basis for Charges Against the Nursiites in Russia” that appears in the current issue of “NG-Religii” (http://religion.ru/printed/3021).
Implicitly acknowledging that the explicit charges against Nursi are far from convincing – the same issue of this journal features an article in which experts dispute that the writings of Nursi are extremist (http://religion.ru/printed/3020) -- Engel’gardt argues that “suspiciousness” about him did not arise “for no reason at all.”
Russia’s security structures, the Moscow analyst says, have had a variety of concerns about the Nursiites beginning in the early 1990s when the latter opened a network of more than 30 lycees and colleges in Tatarstan, Khakassia, Karachai-Cherkessia and other non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation.
The programs of the these institutions, the security services became convinced, were designed to promote “the indoctrination of young people in the spirit of pan-Turkism and the superiority of Turkish culture,” ideas that Engel’gardt argues have long been associated with Nursi – but ones, of course, that have little to do with Islamism.
And because these schools routinely sent a portion of their graduates to higher educational institutions in Turkey itself, the analyst writes, the Russian security services began to ask themselves “a completely justified question: to whom would [the elite trained in these colleges and lycees] be loyal – Russia or Turkey?”
The followers of Nursi, he continues, represent “one of the leading Islamic forces of contemporary Turkey, enjoying great influence both within that state and beyond its borders, in the first instance of the [often politically radicalized] Turkish diaspora in Europe.”
These ties have meant that the relationship between the Nursi movement and the Turkish government has not been a smooth or easy one: In 1999, Ankara banned the activity of the movement in Turkey and, by threatening his arrest, forced its most important leader to flee to the United States.
But despite these tensions, many in the Turkish government who are interested in expanding Ankara’s influence across the Turkic world appear to view the Nursiites as allies, albeit ones that Turkey cannot openly acknowledge lest it offend the governments of the countries, many in the post-Soviet region, where the Nursis function.
Consequently, Engel’gardt argues, it is important to recognize that the followers of Said Nursi “are in essence a political organization, which has branches in many countries” and whose current leader is currently living and functioning on the territory of the United States.
In 1999 and 2000, Moscow moved to limit the influence of the Nursis in the Russian Federation by restricting or even closing down many of the Turkic lycees there, but that alone did not end the influence of Nursi on the intellectual life of many Turkic Muslim groups there.
As a result, Engel’gardt continues, the Russian security services feared that even though the Nursiites and the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir are “not one and the same thing,” the former could potentially have the kind of destabilizing influence in some of Russia’s regions that the latter already has had in Central Asia.
Russian concerns about the Nursiites were reinforced by the attitude of many Muslim leaders there. They did not view the Nursiites as competitors. The Nursiites continued to attend local mosques, and they appeared to promise further growth for Islam in Russia just as they had in Turkey.
These factors together led the Russian government to conclude that they had every reason to try to restrict the influence of Said Nursi. “One can criticize their method – the banning of texts,” Engel’gardt concludes. “But one ought not to consider this prohibition in isolation from the reputation the Nursiites have in Russia.”
Vienna, June 7 – The Russian government has sought to ban the works of Said Nursi ostensibly for their supposed “Islamic extremism,” but in fact Moscow is far more worried that his writings and especially their dissemination via Turkish lycees in the Russian Federation will promote pan-Turkist ideas among the country’s Muslim elites.
That conclusion is suggested by Georgiy Engel’gardt, a Moscow specialist on ethnic and religious questions, in an article entitled “Pan-Turkism in Lycee Auditoriums: The Real Basis for Charges Against the Nursiites in Russia” that appears in the current issue of “NG-Religii” (http://religion.ru/printed/3021).
Implicitly acknowledging that the explicit charges against Nursi are far from convincing – the same issue of this journal features an article in which experts dispute that the writings of Nursi are extremist (http://religion.ru/printed/3020) -- Engel’gardt argues that “suspiciousness” about him did not arise “for no reason at all.”
Russia’s security structures, the Moscow analyst says, have had a variety of concerns about the Nursiites beginning in the early 1990s when the latter opened a network of more than 30 lycees and colleges in Tatarstan, Khakassia, Karachai-Cherkessia and other non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation.
The programs of the these institutions, the security services became convinced, were designed to promote “the indoctrination of young people in the spirit of pan-Turkism and the superiority of Turkish culture,” ideas that Engel’gardt argues have long been associated with Nursi – but ones, of course, that have little to do with Islamism.
And because these schools routinely sent a portion of their graduates to higher educational institutions in Turkey itself, the analyst writes, the Russian security services began to ask themselves “a completely justified question: to whom would [the elite trained in these colleges and lycees] be loyal – Russia or Turkey?”
The followers of Nursi, he continues, represent “one of the leading Islamic forces of contemporary Turkey, enjoying great influence both within that state and beyond its borders, in the first instance of the [often politically radicalized] Turkish diaspora in Europe.”
These ties have meant that the relationship between the Nursi movement and the Turkish government has not been a smooth or easy one: In 1999, Ankara banned the activity of the movement in Turkey and, by threatening his arrest, forced its most important leader to flee to the United States.
But despite these tensions, many in the Turkish government who are interested in expanding Ankara’s influence across the Turkic world appear to view the Nursiites as allies, albeit ones that Turkey cannot openly acknowledge lest it offend the governments of the countries, many in the post-Soviet region, where the Nursis function.
Consequently, Engel’gardt argues, it is important to recognize that the followers of Said Nursi “are in essence a political organization, which has branches in many countries” and whose current leader is currently living and functioning on the territory of the United States.
In 1999 and 2000, Moscow moved to limit the influence of the Nursis in the Russian Federation by restricting or even closing down many of the Turkic lycees there, but that alone did not end the influence of Nursi on the intellectual life of many Turkic Muslim groups there.
As a result, Engel’gardt continues, the Russian security services feared that even though the Nursiites and the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir are “not one and the same thing,” the former could potentially have the kind of destabilizing influence in some of Russia’s regions that the latter already has had in Central Asia.
Russian concerns about the Nursiites were reinforced by the attitude of many Muslim leaders there. They did not view the Nursiites as competitors. The Nursiites continued to attend local mosques, and they appeared to promise further growth for Islam in Russia just as they had in Turkey.
These factors together led the Russian government to conclude that they had every reason to try to restrict the influence of Said Nursi. “One can criticize their method – the banning of texts,” Engel’gardt concludes. “But one ought not to consider this prohibition in isolation from the reputation the Nursiites have in Russia.”
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