Paul Goble
Vienna, June 4 – A wave of violence in Stavropol kray between ethnic Russians and people from the Caucasus has raised fears that the country may be facing an inter-ethnic crisis “one hundred times worse” than last summer’s clashes in the Karelian city of Kondopoga.
The clash between Russians and Caucasians in Stavropol’s capital on May 24 in which the militia had to fire over the heads of those involved and in which one North Caucasian was killed and 30 from both sides hospitalized now appears to have given birth to yet another tragedy.
Yesterday, officials found the bodies of two young Stavropol residents who had been killed by knife wounds, and both officials and residents of that southern Russian region are now saying that “the Caucasians are in this way taking revenge for their own losses” and that they fear more ethnic clashes are ahead.
But such views, to the extent that they shape the response of the government and the local population, are perhaps even more dangerous than the clashes themselves, according to Sergei Markedonov, one of Moscow’s leading specialists on inter-ethnic relations in the Caucasus (http://politcom.ru/article.php?id=4651).
In an essay posted online today, Markedonov argues that officials must stop deceiving themselves on two points. On the one hand, they must cease to tell themselves and others that “all arguments in Russia occur because the neighbors don’t agree among themselves” about graffiti.
And on the other, they must recognize that the only way to keep the situation from spiraling out of control not only in hotspots like Stavropol but across the country is to focus “not [on] collective rights but [on] the guilt of individuals.” Otherwise, they will only exacerbate popular feelings.
Unfortunately, the Moscow analyst continues, Russian officials both in the regions and in the center do not appear to have learned this lesson up to now. “The under-rating of the ethnic motivation” of clashes in the 1950s and 1960s, he suggests, led directly to the tragedies of Karabakh and Chechnya in the 1980s and 1990s.
Two other reports over the last several days suggest, however, that many officials do not yet understand this danger and are failing to recognize that what they do will have the most profound consequences for inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace in the Russian Federation.
Today, prosecutors in Karelia announced that six “natives of the Caucasus” have been charged with inciting violence and in one case with murder in the disturbances that led to the mass evacuation of Chechens from Kondopoga at the end of last summer. All six are under arrest, officials said (http://www.kavkaz.memo.ru/, June 4).
The issue here, of course, is not whether prosecutors have charged the right people but rather that by identifying the ethnicity of those involved and by not charging members of other ethnic groups – in particular, the dominant Russians – at the same time, they have raised rather than lowered ethnic tensions there and elsewhere.
And a second development, reported on Saturday, is even more likely to disturb the situation. Arkadiy Yedelyev, Russia’s deputy interior minister, said that his agency has “evidence that the organizers” of the Nalchik violence in 2005 had “ties with the special services of the West” which are interested in “the destabilization” of the situation.
At a press conference in the KBR, Yedelyev added that these people and their Sufi murid allies had “until recently been on the territory” of that North Caucasus republic, that they remain at large and “have not laid down their arms” (http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=12668).
While the deputy minister suggested that economic problems and unsolved crimes were to blame for instability there, his words about the ethnicity of those involved and their supposed links to outsider agitators, this time in the form of Western intelligence services, virtually invite a new witch hunt.
If they do lead to that result, the spectre of Kondopoga which many are again raising will almost certainly spread and threaten stability not only in the Caucasus but across the Russian Federation as a whole.
Monday, June 4, 2007
Window on Eurasia: ‘Traditional’ Muslims May Pose a Bigger Threat than Moscow Imagines
Paul Goble
Vienna, June 4 – In focusing on Wahhabism, Moscow has assumed that it has a firm ally in what Russians call “traditional” Islam, failing to recognize that Muslims in this group are both diverse and increasingly politicized and thus represent a serious challenge to Russian policies, according to one of Moscow’s leading specialists on Islam.
In a two-part article in the latest issues of “Svobodnaya mysl’,” Aleksandr Malashenko, director of the “Religion, Society and Stability” Program at the Carnegie Center in Moscow, surveys the complicated relationship between the post-Soviet state and Russia’s Muslims (http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-exchange/index-13339.html).
Among his numerous insights, perhaps the most striking is his insistence that Russian officials dealing with Islam have not only failed to understand those they have identified within that community as their enemy but also signally failed to understand those Muslims the they assume are Moscow’s friends.
If the first observation is common ground among both Muslims and the expert community in both the Russian Federation and the West, the second is not – and given Malashenko’s authority within it, that makes his argument on this point particularly worthy of attention.
In the view of most Russian officials, one that is in many respects a survival from the past, Malashenko says, “traditional Islam” in Russia is a homogenous mass that is inherently non-political, completely loyal to those in power in Moscow, and invariably hostile to all brands of Islam coming in more abroad.
None of these assumptions is justified, the Moscow scholar argues. First, Islam, even in its “traditional” form, is extremely diverse, even increasingly so. Treating this community as if it were all of a piece, as Moscow has been inclined to do, gives an opening to the radicals they do not deserve.
Second, the “absolutely inert” Muslims of the late Soviet period no longer exist. Like other Russian Federation citizens, they have been profoundly affected by the turmoil of the last two decades. Even though they remain deeply conservative, that does not mean that they do not want to view themselves as an “independent” force.
And third, Malashenko continues, Russia’s “traditional” Muslims are curious about their faith. If Russian officials do not allow them to learn about it from national sources, as is often the case, then they are likely to be at least curious and possibly attracted by some Islamic ideas coming in from abroad.
These assumptions, Malashenko continues, represent the continuation of Soviet and even tsarist-era ones, and reflect a profound but incorrect belief that Islam “must remain what it was, must operate on ‘traditional values,’ must help drive out deviations and heresies and act together with the ruling regime.”
Such a model is suggested to these officials by the Russian state’s relationship with the Orthodox Church, Malashenko says, because that Church “remains deeply traditional” and wants to be “close to the establishment.” It is “humbly conformist” toward the state, and it is unlikely go beyond the state’s ideology on most questions.
Indeed, given the composition of the Church’s clerical hierarchy, such a development is “simply impossible,” Malashenko argues. “The extreme, fundamentalist form” of Orthodoxy, although it “occupies a definite niche” among Orthodox believers “nevertheless is strictly dosed out.”
But none of these characteristics is true of Islam as a body of believers, even if there are some muftis who seek to curry favor by presenting themselves as at least or even more loyal and subservient to the state than do members of the clerical hierarchy of the Patriarchate, Malshenko suggests.
Fundamentalism is a longstanding part of the Islamic ideological spectrum, and consequently, as Malashenko argues, “in Islam in contrast to Orthodoxy there exists an independent religious opposition,” one that could under certain circumstances quickly broaden its influence and thereby contribute to the destabilization of society.
But because most Russian officials assume they can deal with “traditional” Muslims the same way they do with the Orthodox – a notion that informed tsarist and Soviet policy as well – they seldom recognize that “traditional” Muslims may well prove to be a far greater challenge than are the limited number of “extremists.”
Vienna, June 4 – In focusing on Wahhabism, Moscow has assumed that it has a firm ally in what Russians call “traditional” Islam, failing to recognize that Muslims in this group are both diverse and increasingly politicized and thus represent a serious challenge to Russian policies, according to one of Moscow’s leading specialists on Islam.
In a two-part article in the latest issues of “Svobodnaya mysl’,” Aleksandr Malashenko, director of the “Religion, Society and Stability” Program at the Carnegie Center in Moscow, surveys the complicated relationship between the post-Soviet state and Russia’s Muslims (http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-exchange/index-13339.html).
Among his numerous insights, perhaps the most striking is his insistence that Russian officials dealing with Islam have not only failed to understand those they have identified within that community as their enemy but also signally failed to understand those Muslims the they assume are Moscow’s friends.
If the first observation is common ground among both Muslims and the expert community in both the Russian Federation and the West, the second is not – and given Malashenko’s authority within it, that makes his argument on this point particularly worthy of attention.
In the view of most Russian officials, one that is in many respects a survival from the past, Malashenko says, “traditional Islam” in Russia is a homogenous mass that is inherently non-political, completely loyal to those in power in Moscow, and invariably hostile to all brands of Islam coming in more abroad.
None of these assumptions is justified, the Moscow scholar argues. First, Islam, even in its “traditional” form, is extremely diverse, even increasingly so. Treating this community as if it were all of a piece, as Moscow has been inclined to do, gives an opening to the radicals they do not deserve.
Second, the “absolutely inert” Muslims of the late Soviet period no longer exist. Like other Russian Federation citizens, they have been profoundly affected by the turmoil of the last two decades. Even though they remain deeply conservative, that does not mean that they do not want to view themselves as an “independent” force.
And third, Malashenko continues, Russia’s “traditional” Muslims are curious about their faith. If Russian officials do not allow them to learn about it from national sources, as is often the case, then they are likely to be at least curious and possibly attracted by some Islamic ideas coming in from abroad.
These assumptions, Malashenko continues, represent the continuation of Soviet and even tsarist-era ones, and reflect a profound but incorrect belief that Islam “must remain what it was, must operate on ‘traditional values,’ must help drive out deviations and heresies and act together with the ruling regime.”
Such a model is suggested to these officials by the Russian state’s relationship with the Orthodox Church, Malashenko says, because that Church “remains deeply traditional” and wants to be “close to the establishment.” It is “humbly conformist” toward the state, and it is unlikely go beyond the state’s ideology on most questions.
Indeed, given the composition of the Church’s clerical hierarchy, such a development is “simply impossible,” Malashenko argues. “The extreme, fundamentalist form” of Orthodoxy, although it “occupies a definite niche” among Orthodox believers “nevertheless is strictly dosed out.”
But none of these characteristics is true of Islam as a body of believers, even if there are some muftis who seek to curry favor by presenting themselves as at least or even more loyal and subservient to the state than do members of the clerical hierarchy of the Patriarchate, Malshenko suggests.
Fundamentalism is a longstanding part of the Islamic ideological spectrum, and consequently, as Malashenko argues, “in Islam in contrast to Orthodoxy there exists an independent religious opposition,” one that could under certain circumstances quickly broaden its influence and thereby contribute to the destabilization of society.
But because most Russian officials assume they can deal with “traditional” Muslims the same way they do with the Orthodox – a notion that informed tsarist and Soviet policy as well – they seldom recognize that “traditional” Muslims may well prove to be a far greater challenge than are the limited number of “extremists.”
Window on Eurasia: Putin, Patriarch Praise Cossacks as Defenders of Russian Values
Paul Goble
Vienna, June 4 – President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Aleksii II praised Russia’s Cossacks past and present as defenders of the nation and its values, the latest effort by each of these leaders to build authority by drawing on traditionalist symbols but one over parts of which they could find it difficult to maintain control.
On Friday, some 1100 Cossacks from 12 of the Cossack “forces” assembled in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior for the Third Great Cossack Krug (“Circle”), the highest decision-making body of the now more than two million Cossacks of the Russian Federation (http://www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=171713).
The session opened with messages from both Putin and Aleksii II. Putin said that “the Cossacks had always in faith and truth had heroically fought for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, worked in a self-sacrificing manner, and made an important contribution to the spiritual-patriotic training of the rising generation.”
The Russian president made two other points. On the one hand, he said that he considers it “important that the current generation of Cossacks preserve in a holy way and multiply the richest traditions of their forefathers and strive to effectively participate in the life of the country and society.”
And on the other, he indicated that he considers the rebirth of the Cossack community in Russia as a special category of state employees and as representatives of a “unique” and valued culture. Not surprisingly, news services reported, the assembled Cossacks responded enthusiastically to Putin’s remarks.
The patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church for his part said that “Always, at all times of the existence of our Fatherland, the Cossack community guarded the peace and stability of the people of Russia, finding its strength and courage in the treasure house of Orthodoxy.”
The Church in turn, Aleksii continued, “recognizing the importance of military service, blesses the glorious achievements of its true sons who have not shied away from shedding their blood and even life itself on the fields of battle.” And he suggested that Cossacks today can play a similar role as “bearers of traditional Christian moral values.”
The krug also cheered his words. But many who know something about the Cossacks are certain to be troubled, not only because these statements are inaccurate – many Cossacks are not Christians, for example – but also because they have a record of dealing often brutally with those they view as the domestic enemies of the state.
And that raises an even more disturbing danger, one that seems even more likely on the basis of two other developments last week: Putin and the patriarch may be quite happy to try to exploit these symbols of Russia’s past, but in so doing, they may set in train forces that they will not easily be able to control.
The day before the krug assembled, the apparatus of the Russian Orthodox Church assembled a roundtable at which participants called for dropping all Soviet-era names from streets and other locations and also changing other names that may now be politically incorrect (http://www.pravay.ru/news/12411?print=1).
At this session, Valentin Lebedev, the head of the nationalist Union of Orthodox Citizens, called for changing the name of the Voiekovskaya metro station on the July 17 anniversary of the murder of the Imperial Family because “the name of the tsar killer Voyekov ought to disappear from the map of Russia.”
In doing so, he was repeating a proposal that many Russians have made over the past two decades and one that the Kremlin today could perhaps live with, despite the opposition of many on the left. But other participants at the session made proposals that could cause the Russian government difficulties.
On the one hand, some proposed renaming Moscow’s Tallinn Street “Kolyvanskaya,” an adjective derived from an earlier Russian name of the Estonian capital. And on the other, others suggested that there should be no memorialization in Russian toponymy of former President Boris Yeltsin.
Stage-managing such popular anger is likely to be far more difficult than creating conditions under which it emerges in the first place, a reality that may give some Russian officials pause in this area. But there was another development last week that seems far more likely to have both those consequences.
As “Kommersant” reported on Friday, the Kremlin with “the full support of the Russian Orthodox Church” plans to create “a so-called Orthodox corps” within the “Nashi” organization to give lessons in Orthodox Christianity in the schools and “defend the church” (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?DocID=770546&IssueId=36293).
This new group is to be formed in June, the paper said, and already several commentators have suggested that this new grouping will be used as “an instrument of political struggle” and castigated it as “speculation on faith with the goal of winning authority.”
Its supporters see no problem with that. Deacon Andrei Kurayev, a professor at the Moscow Spiritual Academy, told “Kommersant” that “it is necessary that a taste for social-political life be developed among Orthodox young people,” who the outspoken churchman said need to learn how to react to events in a useful way.
His last remark, the newspaper suggested, represented an implicit criticism of the actions of the Union of Orthodox Banner Carriers, whose members participated in the violent dispersal of gay parades in Russia in 2006 and 2007. But nothing Kurayev said indicated just how the new Nashi group would restrain them.
Another backer of the group saw even more expansive possibilities. Kirill Frolov, who heads the Moscow Section of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, said he was confident that the new Orthodox corps would take “an active part in actions and pickets organized” by his group.
That is precisely what those opposed to Nashi fear, but it is possible that this creature at some point could turn on its backers as well – or at the very least prove beyond their capacity to control.
Vienna, June 4 – President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Aleksii II praised Russia’s Cossacks past and present as defenders of the nation and its values, the latest effort by each of these leaders to build authority by drawing on traditionalist symbols but one over parts of which they could find it difficult to maintain control.
On Friday, some 1100 Cossacks from 12 of the Cossack “forces” assembled in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior for the Third Great Cossack Krug (“Circle”), the highest decision-making body of the now more than two million Cossacks of the Russian Federation (http://www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=171713).
The session opened with messages from both Putin and Aleksii II. Putin said that “the Cossacks had always in faith and truth had heroically fought for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, worked in a self-sacrificing manner, and made an important contribution to the spiritual-patriotic training of the rising generation.”
The Russian president made two other points. On the one hand, he said that he considers it “important that the current generation of Cossacks preserve in a holy way and multiply the richest traditions of their forefathers and strive to effectively participate in the life of the country and society.”
And on the other, he indicated that he considers the rebirth of the Cossack community in Russia as a special category of state employees and as representatives of a “unique” and valued culture. Not surprisingly, news services reported, the assembled Cossacks responded enthusiastically to Putin’s remarks.
The patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church for his part said that “Always, at all times of the existence of our Fatherland, the Cossack community guarded the peace and stability of the people of Russia, finding its strength and courage in the treasure house of Orthodoxy.”
The Church in turn, Aleksii continued, “recognizing the importance of military service, blesses the glorious achievements of its true sons who have not shied away from shedding their blood and even life itself on the fields of battle.” And he suggested that Cossacks today can play a similar role as “bearers of traditional Christian moral values.”
The krug also cheered his words. But many who know something about the Cossacks are certain to be troubled, not only because these statements are inaccurate – many Cossacks are not Christians, for example – but also because they have a record of dealing often brutally with those they view as the domestic enemies of the state.
And that raises an even more disturbing danger, one that seems even more likely on the basis of two other developments last week: Putin and the patriarch may be quite happy to try to exploit these symbols of Russia’s past, but in so doing, they may set in train forces that they will not easily be able to control.
The day before the krug assembled, the apparatus of the Russian Orthodox Church assembled a roundtable at which participants called for dropping all Soviet-era names from streets and other locations and also changing other names that may now be politically incorrect (http://www.pravay.ru/news/12411?print=1).
At this session, Valentin Lebedev, the head of the nationalist Union of Orthodox Citizens, called for changing the name of the Voiekovskaya metro station on the July 17 anniversary of the murder of the Imperial Family because “the name of the tsar killer Voyekov ought to disappear from the map of Russia.”
In doing so, he was repeating a proposal that many Russians have made over the past two decades and one that the Kremlin today could perhaps live with, despite the opposition of many on the left. But other participants at the session made proposals that could cause the Russian government difficulties.
On the one hand, some proposed renaming Moscow’s Tallinn Street “Kolyvanskaya,” an adjective derived from an earlier Russian name of the Estonian capital. And on the other, others suggested that there should be no memorialization in Russian toponymy of former President Boris Yeltsin.
Stage-managing such popular anger is likely to be far more difficult than creating conditions under which it emerges in the first place, a reality that may give some Russian officials pause in this area. But there was another development last week that seems far more likely to have both those consequences.
As “Kommersant” reported on Friday, the Kremlin with “the full support of the Russian Orthodox Church” plans to create “a so-called Orthodox corps” within the “Nashi” organization to give lessons in Orthodox Christianity in the schools and “defend the church” (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?DocID=770546&IssueId=36293).
This new group is to be formed in June, the paper said, and already several commentators have suggested that this new grouping will be used as “an instrument of political struggle” and castigated it as “speculation on faith with the goal of winning authority.”
Its supporters see no problem with that. Deacon Andrei Kurayev, a professor at the Moscow Spiritual Academy, told “Kommersant” that “it is necessary that a taste for social-political life be developed among Orthodox young people,” who the outspoken churchman said need to learn how to react to events in a useful way.
His last remark, the newspaper suggested, represented an implicit criticism of the actions of the Union of Orthodox Banner Carriers, whose members participated in the violent dispersal of gay parades in Russia in 2006 and 2007. But nothing Kurayev said indicated just how the new Nashi group would restrain them.
Another backer of the group saw even more expansive possibilities. Kirill Frolov, who heads the Moscow Section of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, said he was confident that the new Orthodox corps would take “an active part in actions and pickets organized” by his group.
That is precisely what those opposed to Nashi fear, but it is possible that this creature at some point could turn on its backers as well – or at the very least prove beyond their capacity to control.
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