Paul Goble
Vienna, May 11 – Next week, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) will acknowledge the supremacy of the Moscow Patriarchate, an action with immense ideological consequences but equally one having an enormous impact on the ownership and control of numerous valuable properties outside of the Russian Federation.
Not surprisingly, most commentaries have focused on the end of the schism between the Moscow Patriarchate and ROCOR, the so-called “émigré church’ formed in the 1920s by those who had fled the Russian revolution and who refused to subordinate themselves to the Moscow Patriarchate which had been subordinated to the Soviet state.
Bringing the two churches together – or, more precisely, reabsorbing ROCOR into the body of the church under the Moscow Patriarchate – reflects the aging of ROCOR parishioners and the desire of many -- but far from all -- of its members, the Patriarchate itself, and the Kremlin to mark the emergence of a post-Soviet Russia.
But however that may be and whether the new union will play out as its authors in Moscow clearly hope, there is one issue that seems certain to remain a bone of contention for some time ahead. That concerns the control of property hitherto owned by the émigré church around the world.
At the doctrinal level, the Moscow Patriarchate believes that all church property belongs to it and can be disposed of as the patriarch himself dictates, but the émigré church has always believed that the ownership of churches and church property remains vested in individual congregations.
That difference, which has not yet been bridged at the level of practice however much the leaders of each side have wanted to declare otherwise, has some important consequences, at least among the still numerous émigré parishes existing in various Western countries.
In most Western legal systems, even a single member of a congregation can bring a suit in court challenging as a legally impermissible un-reimbursed taking of property that the transfer of control from an individual ROCOR parish to the Moscow Patriarchate in the minds of many clearly represents.
Not all such parishes are likely to bring such suits and not all of them will be successful, but at least some suits will be brought and be successful – and that could tie up the Moscow Patriarchate and its Kremlin backers for years and put them at odds not only with small émigré parishes but with the countries in which the later are located.
That possibility was very much on public view this week when a French court effectively found for the emigres by holding that the émigré Russian Cathedral of St. Nicholas in Nice is a French national monuments and cannot be transferred without that state’s permission (http://www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=723699).
In this particular case, the original suit was brought last November by the Russian embassy in Paris. Moscow sought to have the court find that Russia and not the émigré church is “the sole legal owner of the Orthodox cathedral.” But both the court of the first instance and the court of appeals has ruled against the Russian embassy.
Reluctant to press the case lest it disturb Franco-Russian relations, the embassy has now indicated that it views the Nice cathedral as “the common cultural property” of the Russian and French peoples and only seeks a court order to end the émigré practice of charging admission to the church’s fabulous collection of icons.
That outcome and that request are unlikely to pleasure the Moscow Patriarchate or all emigres. And thus this case is likely to be the harbinger of more legal and religious tensions among the Patriarchate, the Kremlin, the émigré parishes, and Western states, however much church leaders celebrating their reunion this week may hope otherwise.
Friday, May 11, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Estonia’s Actions Unite Russians -- Around Soviet Values
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 11 – Estonia’s dismantling of the Soviet war memorial in the center of Tallinn in advance of the commemoration of Victory Day on May 9th has united Russians not as a new political nation as some had hoped but rather around Soviet-era values and expectations, according to a leading Russian analyst
Russians overwhelmingly and across all social, economic and political groups, according to polls, indicated that they have been paying close attention to what was going on in Estonia and have very definite opinions about what it means for Russia and Russians (http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dom0719_2/d071910).
Indeed, several Russian commentators have suggested that Estonia’s actions and the support Tallinn has garnered among Western governments have had the unintended consequence of promoting national unity among the population of the Russian Federation (see, for example, L. Byzov’s article at http://www.polit-NN.ru, May 7).
Indeed, Byzov wrote, “just as was the case with [President Vladimir] Putin’s speech in Munich, world public opinion, which has been more on the side of Estonia than on the side of Russia,” either has “no importance” or, “the sharper it is, the more it will generate support for [the Kremlin] among Russians.”
But Vadim Shteppa has suggested that it is important to understand the basis of this unity because it reflects not the rise of a new and politically defined Russian nation but rather a continuing confusion between Russian and Soviet the reinforcement of Soviet-era values (http://www.nazlobu.ru/publications/article1861.htm).
The reasons for this development have deep roots in Russian history, the Russian commentator suggests. In almost all cases, he notes, “any nation as a subject of history begins with civil self-organization and self-administration,” characteristics that were typical of Novgorod the Great in medieval times.
“But,” he continues, “’the Russian Athens’ was defeated by ‘the third Rome’ in which free citizens were transformed into ‘subjects of the state.’ If in Europe after the destruction of the Roman empire arose new nations, then in Russia, this ‘third Rome’ tradition continues even now” and has been reinforced by recent events.
As in the past, so today, “the powers-that-be are very much afraid that the Russians will transform themselves into a nation and perhaps not just one and will become an independent subject of history” rather than an object under the control of those at the top of the political system.
Consequently, Russia’s rulers have an interest in exploiting any event -- and especially those like the Estonian actions and the Victory Day commemorations -- to ensure that “there will not be any independent political nation” but instead a “Soviet-people” population prepared to do what the Kremlin wants.
“’The Soviet people,’” Shteppa notes, “were forced to defend a Marxist state” because “the Bolsheviks … built a Leviathan based on camps and collective farms” and they evaluated every nation positively “only to the degree that it served” the Communist Party.”
Thus, throughout most of Russian history but not the history of other nations, the people have been made to serve the state rather than the state the people. And never has the Kremlin’s effort to maintain this situation been more transparently obvious than in the way it now marks Victory Day and reacts to Estonian actions.
“Only in Russia,” Shteppa writes, “is Victory Day treated not as an occasion for reconciliation but just the reverse – [as an occasion] for standing up against the surrounding world [and issuing] threats against those countries which are brave enough to re-evaluate the role of Soviet ‘liberators.’”
In the West, days marking victories in either international or civil wars typically have been the occasion for the formation of a new national unity. And Shteppa offers the case of Spain in the 1970s as an example of the ways in which such reconciliation can open the way to a new nation and new freedoms.
“But in Russia, unfortunately,” the commentator says, the dominant political players see themselves and their country as “’legal successors’” to the USSR and consequently view “any pan-national reconciliation” as their prelude to their own “political death.”
And because that is so, “the cult of ‘Victory’ firmly rivets ‘the Russian’ to ‘the Soviet’” and thereby pushes off into the future the national reconciliation that would allow Russians to stop viewing other countries as enemies and to start thinking of themselves not as objects of the state but as subjects of their own history.
Vienna, May 11 – Estonia’s dismantling of the Soviet war memorial in the center of Tallinn in advance of the commemoration of Victory Day on May 9th has united Russians not as a new political nation as some had hoped but rather around Soviet-era values and expectations, according to a leading Russian analyst
Russians overwhelmingly and across all social, economic and political groups, according to polls, indicated that they have been paying close attention to what was going on in Estonia and have very definite opinions about what it means for Russia and Russians (http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dom0719_2/d071910).
Indeed, several Russian commentators have suggested that Estonia’s actions and the support Tallinn has garnered among Western governments have had the unintended consequence of promoting national unity among the population of the Russian Federation (see, for example, L. Byzov’s article at http://www.polit-NN.ru, May 7).
Indeed, Byzov wrote, “just as was the case with [President Vladimir] Putin’s speech in Munich, world public opinion, which has been more on the side of Estonia than on the side of Russia,” either has “no importance” or, “the sharper it is, the more it will generate support for [the Kremlin] among Russians.”
But Vadim Shteppa has suggested that it is important to understand the basis of this unity because it reflects not the rise of a new and politically defined Russian nation but rather a continuing confusion between Russian and Soviet the reinforcement of Soviet-era values (http://www.nazlobu.ru/publications/article1861.htm).
The reasons for this development have deep roots in Russian history, the Russian commentator suggests. In almost all cases, he notes, “any nation as a subject of history begins with civil self-organization and self-administration,” characteristics that were typical of Novgorod the Great in medieval times.
“But,” he continues, “’the Russian Athens’ was defeated by ‘the third Rome’ in which free citizens were transformed into ‘subjects of the state.’ If in Europe after the destruction of the Roman empire arose new nations, then in Russia, this ‘third Rome’ tradition continues even now” and has been reinforced by recent events.
As in the past, so today, “the powers-that-be are very much afraid that the Russians will transform themselves into a nation and perhaps not just one and will become an independent subject of history” rather than an object under the control of those at the top of the political system.
Consequently, Russia’s rulers have an interest in exploiting any event -- and especially those like the Estonian actions and the Victory Day commemorations -- to ensure that “there will not be any independent political nation” but instead a “Soviet-people” population prepared to do what the Kremlin wants.
“’The Soviet people,’” Shteppa notes, “were forced to defend a Marxist state” because “the Bolsheviks … built a Leviathan based on camps and collective farms” and they evaluated every nation positively “only to the degree that it served” the Communist Party.”
Thus, throughout most of Russian history but not the history of other nations, the people have been made to serve the state rather than the state the people. And never has the Kremlin’s effort to maintain this situation been more transparently obvious than in the way it now marks Victory Day and reacts to Estonian actions.
“Only in Russia,” Shteppa writes, “is Victory Day treated not as an occasion for reconciliation but just the reverse – [as an occasion] for standing up against the surrounding world [and issuing] threats against those countries which are brave enough to re-evaluate the role of Soviet ‘liberators.’”
In the West, days marking victories in either international or civil wars typically have been the occasion for the formation of a new national unity. And Shteppa offers the case of Spain in the 1970s as an example of the ways in which such reconciliation can open the way to a new nation and new freedoms.
“But in Russia, unfortunately,” the commentator says, the dominant political players see themselves and their country as “’legal successors’” to the USSR and consequently view “any pan-national reconciliation” as their prelude to their own “political death.”
And because that is so, “the cult of ‘Victory’ firmly rivets ‘the Russian’ to ‘the Soviet’” and thereby pushes off into the future the national reconciliation that would allow Russians to stop viewing other countries as enemies and to start thinking of themselves not as objects of the state but as subjects of their own history.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Tourism Officials Outraged by Chinese Guides’ Comments on Russia, Russians
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 11 – Tourism officials in Moscow have expressed outrage that Chinese tour guides working in the Russian capital have described Russians as “wild men, drunkards and idlers” and Russia’s history as that of “a barbarian kingdom which illegally took away the Far East and Siberia from China.”
But as of today, more senior Russian officials appear to have decided not to make a diplomatic issue out of this case but rather to impose stricter licensing requirements on those who guide Chinese visitors around Moscow and other portions of the Russian Federation (http://www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=171432).
At least so far, this issue, raised by interviews given by Russian tourism officials in the current issue of the Russian nationalist newspaper “Tvoi den’,” and so far discussion of it has been confined almost entirely to the nationalist portion of the Russian Internet. But the officials’ anger suggests that it is likely to spread to mainstream media.
“Up to now,” Nadezhda Nazina, deputy head of Rosturizm, said, “only tour guides of Baltic delegations permitted themselves to make such comments. But in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, this is the policy of the government, but in this case, [she hoped], it is simply personal antipathy and ignorance of individual representatives of the Chinese Peoples Republic.”
In a similar vein, Dmitriy Shul’tsev, the head of the Tourism Committee in the Moscow city government, expressed the hope that what had taken place reflected the failure of Chinese tour operators to recruit and train those who lead Chinese visitors to Russia in the proper way.
But Shul’tsev warned that the city of Moscow will demand significant improvements in this area, including requiring that all tour guides now be tested for their knowledge of Russian history before they are given their licenses to practice their trade in the Russian capital.
And both he and other Russian officials, “Tvoi Den’” reported, made clear that if it should turn out that the comments of the Chinese tour guides were not the work of individuals but reflected “the official policy” of China, then officers of Russian security agencies would be asked to get involved.
Vienna, May 11 – Tourism officials in Moscow have expressed outrage that Chinese tour guides working in the Russian capital have described Russians as “wild men, drunkards and idlers” and Russia’s history as that of “a barbarian kingdom which illegally took away the Far East and Siberia from China.”
But as of today, more senior Russian officials appear to have decided not to make a diplomatic issue out of this case but rather to impose stricter licensing requirements on those who guide Chinese visitors around Moscow and other portions of the Russian Federation (http://www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=171432).
At least so far, this issue, raised by interviews given by Russian tourism officials in the current issue of the Russian nationalist newspaper “Tvoi den’,” and so far discussion of it has been confined almost entirely to the nationalist portion of the Russian Internet. But the officials’ anger suggests that it is likely to spread to mainstream media.
“Up to now,” Nadezhda Nazina, deputy head of Rosturizm, said, “only tour guides of Baltic delegations permitted themselves to make such comments. But in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, this is the policy of the government, but in this case, [she hoped], it is simply personal antipathy and ignorance of individual representatives of the Chinese Peoples Republic.”
In a similar vein, Dmitriy Shul’tsev, the head of the Tourism Committee in the Moscow city government, expressed the hope that what had taken place reflected the failure of Chinese tour operators to recruit and train those who lead Chinese visitors to Russia in the proper way.
But Shul’tsev warned that the city of Moscow will demand significant improvements in this area, including requiring that all tour guides now be tested for their knowledge of Russian history before they are given their licenses to practice their trade in the Russian capital.
And both he and other Russian officials, “Tvoi Den’” reported, made clear that if it should turn out that the comments of the Chinese tour guides were not the work of individuals but reflected “the official policy” of China, then officers of Russian security agencies would be asked to get involved.
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