Window on Eurasia: Ever More Russians Arming Themselves for Self-Defense

Paul Goble

Vienna, April 25 – Some 4.5 million Russians – including more than 400,000 Moscow residents -- now have licenses to carry guns, statistics that almost certainly understate the number of those bearing firearms and that certainly understate the number carrying weapons such as stun guns and knives for which registration is not required.
Prior to the adoption of Russia’s 1997 gun law, most gun owners in the Russian Federation were hunters, but since that time ever more urban residents have purchased guns and other weapons for self-defense, the Moscow newspaper “Novyye izvestiya” reported yesterday (http://www.newizv.ru/news/2007-04-24/68497/).
“By purchasing arms,” the paper said, “residents of Moscow” and other Russian cities “intend to be in a position to defend themselves from skinheads, football fanatics and simply street bandits.” But as it notes, “all these groups also have the right to arms for their own self-defense.”
That these are serious concerns among many Muscovites was reflected in the results of a Levada Center poll released yesterday. Residents of the Russian capital were asked to name the five or six problems of the city that most disturbed them (http://www.levada.ru/press/2007042404.html).
The survey found that Russians ranked the increasing influx of migrants who many Russians believer are responsible for crime, the growth of drug and alcohol consumption, and a growth of crime more generally ranked second, fourth, and fifth on this list.
As a result, both Moscow and Russia as a whole ever more frequently hear the sound of an exchange of gunfire, something Russian militiamen are increasingly concerned about. Moscow militia officials told “Novyye izvestiya” that they would like to see the population have as few arms “as possible” so that violence might decline.
According to militia officials, “the majority of people do not know how to use arms or use them for other than self-defense;” and consequently, the police would like to see “the introduction of compulsory instruction” in gun use for any Russian who wants a license to carry a firearm.
But as the newspaper points out, many Russians currently have guns for which they have no licenses, and even more Russians are purchasing weapons like stun guns and knives for which the Russian government does require licenses.
And consequently, “Novyye izvestiya” points out, the domestic arms race in the Russian Federation is unlikely to slow anytime soon, with some Russians buying arms to protect themselves against others who are purchasing weapons either for the same reason or for some other.

Window on Eurasia: Instruction on Religion Increasing Rapidly in Russian Schools

Paul Goble

Vienna, April 25 – More than 800,000 school children in the Russian Federation are now taking courses on religion or religious subjects, an increase of almost 20 percent over last year and one certain to rise even more in the 2007/08 academic year when such courses are slated to be introduced in additional Moscow and Tatarstan schools.
Yesterday, the Social Chamber’s Commission on Tolerance and Freedom of Conscience released data on the number of pupils now taking courses in religion, comparative religion or religious culture in 72 of the 88 regions of the Russian Federation (http://www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/print.php?act=news&id=17895).
According to the commission, 700,000 to 800,000 of students in these federation subjects were studying religion in one way or another, a figure 15 to 18 percent higher than last year, and “not fewer” than 20,000 to 30,000” teachers were involved in their instruction.
“The overwhelming majority of those studying in government and municpal general education institutions – about 500,000 to 600,000 – are studying courses on Orthodox culture,” Interfax reported. An additional 150,000 to 200,000 pupils are studying Islamic culture.
In addition, the Russian news agency said, some 50,000 young people are being instructed in religious studies, 10,000 in the history and culture of Judaism, 10,000 in Buddhist thought, and 10,000 in the traditional faiths of the numerically small peoples of the Russian North.
In almost all parts of the country, the commission reported, courses on offer are those of the religious culture “traditional for these locations: Orthodoxy, Islam or Buddhism.” Moreover, it found that the number of courses in religious culture outnumber those on the philosophy of religions as such” by a factor of ten.
The number of pupils studying religion in Russian schools is certain to jump this fall, perhaps by more than the increase from last year to this. That is because schools in Moscow and in Tatarstan will then begin offering such courses http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=13206 and http://www.religio.ru/14703_print.html).
Virtually all such religious courses on offer in Russia today are voluntary rather than required and are defined as cultural and historical rather than theological. But the religious content of many has offended both those committed to a secular society and members of local minorities who fear their children will be converted.
Many in leadership positions of Russia’s so-called “traditional” religions – Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism – have pushed hard over the last decade for the inclusion of such courses as part of a broader effort to help Russia’s citizens recover from the depredations of Soviet-era atheism.
In the last several years, more and more Russian officials have come to support the offering of such courses, as long as instruction in them is defined as non-theological. Part of the reason for this is because many of these officials either feel the same way their co-religionists do or because they want to curry favor with such groups.
At the same time, however, there is another and perhaps more influential factor at work: As advocates of such courses have noted, sociological research suggests that Russians who follow one of the traditional faiths not only tend to have more children and suffer from fewer social pathologies but also seem more inclined to participate in public life (For such studies, see http://www.pravaya.ru/news/11988?print=1 and http://www.eparhia-saratov.ru/txts/journal/articles/02society/20070404.html).
No one can dispute the importance of the values advanced by most religions for the recovery of Russian society, but using the public schools as the primary means to promote these values at least in the case of the Russian Federation seems fraught with two overwhelming dangers.
On the one hand, the tradition of secularism in Russian society is still relatively weak, and consequently, the introduction of religious courses, however defined in the schools, makes it unlikely that the rising generation of Russians will make the kind of distinction between church and state on which a civil society rests.
And on the other, given the diversity of faiths within the Russian Federation and especially the cleavage between Orthodox Christianity and Islam, there is a very real danger that such courses, with the suggestion that local or national officials support this or that faith, will exacerbate divisions in that country rather than help to overcome them.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Said Failing to Combat ‘Superhigh’ Mortality among Men

Paul Goble

Vienna, April 25 – Moscow has attempted to address the Russian Federation’s demographic crisis by seeking to promote an increase in birthrates among Russians, but it has “no programs” to combat the “superhigh” mortality rates among working age men, according to one of Russia’s leading demographers.
In an interview posted on the Kreml.org portal yesterday, Yuriy Krupnov, the director of the Moscow Institute of Demography, Migration and Regional Development, said that even the consequences of the government’s pro-natalist policies were being overstated (http://www.kreml.org/interview/147922205?mode=print).
Recently, Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov proclaimed that the recent increase in birthrates is the result of Moscow’s policies, but that is not in fact the case, Krupnov said, however welcome any boost for the population of the Russian Federation may be.
Instead, he argued, the small uptick in birthrates over the last year is the result of the “children of perestroika” – those born between 1985 and 1988 – reaching childbearing age. Because they outnumbered both those born just before that period and just after it, this cohort is having more children even if fertility rates are not higher.
But Krupnov was more critical of the government’s failure to reduce mortality especially among working age men, something that has plagued Russia for the last generation and that currently threatens both the growth of its economy and the stability of its society.
At present, Krupnov stressed, “there are simply no programs for lowering morality -- or more properly, super-mortality -- in Russia at present.” Instead of doing something to counter this unfortunate trend, the government is simply having its statistical agencies keep count.
And those numbers are disturbing, even “tragic,” he said. Over the last seven years, he noted, mortality rates among working age men have “increased already more than 20 percent. [And] therefore there has been no improvement” in the demographic situation of the Russian Federation regardless of what some officials may claim.