Paul Goble
Vienna, April 20 –Officials in the Moscow suburb of Khimki used bulldozers on Monday to disinter the bodies of six Soviet heroes from World War II this week and then left some of the veterans’ remains lying about in the weather for three days, outraging many Russians and prompting questions about Moscow’s criticism of Estonia.
Today’s “Novyye izvestiya” published a detailed article about the case, including interviews with local residents and officials but also photographs of the disturbed ground from which the bodies had been taken, the bones left behind, and the war memorial itself quickly refurbished after public complaints (http://www.newizv.ru/print/68316).
In the paper’s coverage of what they described as “a scandal around the actual tearing down of a monument to the defenders of Moscow,” Lyudmila Nazdracheva and Viktor Tkachev described the way in which officials had carried out the botched reburial operation and the feelings of local residents.
On Monday of this week, Nazdracheva and Tkachev wrote, the Khimki administration send in a bulldozer to dig up the graces as well as an ambulance to carry them off, three militiamen to guard the operation, and several Tajik workers with shovels to dig up what the bulldozer could not.
One eyewitness told the journalists that the bones had been gathered up and placed in black boxes but the Tajiks shouted at the time that “they had forgotten two bones. For three days, these graves stood open. And only on Thursday, when people raised a scandal did officials put the monument in order as if nothing had happened.”
The “Novyye izvestiya” journalists provided one grizzly picture of one of the bones but pointedly noted that they would turn over the remains to those responsible for providing these dead heroes with what should be but so far has not been a dignified reburial.
Pressed by the public and the journalists to explain why this had taken place, the Khimki administration said that they had approved plans to move the graves because they wanted to widen the road and had secured the agreement of both the relatives of those buried there and local groups of veterans.
A leader of one veterans’ organizations confirmed that his group had approved the measure: there was simply no alternative to reburial given that the road was going to be widened, he said. “Even according to the norms of Christian morality,” he continued, this was what had to be done.
As for the refurbishing of the war memorial itself, Khimki officials said they had to clean it up because prostitutes had frequented the area – but the “Novyye izvestiya” journalists said that they had been told by one local resident that the prostitutes had left that spot after a militia post opened there two years ago.
But as appalling as all this clearly is to the residents of a country where World War II is one of the few things all residents honor, there is another side to this case that may cast an even longer shadow.
Over the past year, Russian officials have conducted an intense propaganda barrage against Tallinn’s plans to relocate a Soviet war memorial and the graves of Soviet soldiers out of the center of the Estonian capital. Russian officials have suggested that such steps show that Estonia wants to dishonor those who fought against Hitler.
But as one Khimki resident told the “Novyye izvestiya” journalists, “it is not clear why we are fighting with the Estonians who have decided to rebury Soviet soldiers [when officials in Moscow] are doing the same thing.” So far, the Estonian media have not picked up this story, but they or at least Estonian officials are certain to do so.
UPDATE ON APRIL 23: On Sunday, April 22, a group of members of the Union of Communist Youth and related movements staged a protest at the site of the reburial. The militia dispersed the meeting because participants did not have a permit. Several of those taking part were arrested, beaten, and have now declared a hunger strike (http://www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=95152). In a related development, last Wednesday, April 18, Duma vice speaker Vladimir Katrenko asked a parliamentary question to RF Procurator General Yuriy Chaika concerning the decision of the Stavropol' authorities to tear down a monument to Cossacks who fought in World War II. Katrenko told journalists that such actions by Russian officials were especially troubling given their criticism of Estonia (http://www.annews.ru/news/detail.
php?ID=79832).
UPDATE ON APRIL 27: Even as Russian officials continue to denounce Estonia’s removal of a Soviet war memorial in Tallinn and Russian prosecutors consider two suits brought by those who protested against the exhumation of the graves of World War II heroes in Khimki, officials in that Moscow suburb acknowledged that they currently have no idea where the remains had been taken, Moscow’s “Gazeta” newspaper has reported (http://www.polit.ru/news/2007/04/27/himki_print.html).
Friday, April 20, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Said Repeating Brezhnev-Era Mistakes in North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 20 – The Russian government’s recent policies in the Northern Caucasus increasingly resembles the approach adopted by the Soviet regime during its period of stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev, according to one of Moscow’s leading experts on ethnic and religious politics in that region.
And such parallels, Sergei Markedonov argues, reflect the willingness of both central governments to believe their own propaganda, to rely on outwardly loyal local elites, and to ignore social developments below the surface that ultimately threaten Moscow’s position (http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=12434).
At one level, the Moscow analyst notes, “the Brezhnev period was the most stable in the history of the Caucasus.” There were no deportations or major shifts in borders, nor were there any “ethnic purges” or major “inter-ethnic clashes.” And feeling comfortable with that situation, the Soviet authorities devoted relatively little attention to the region.
The Soviet authorities accepted without question the assurances of loyalty on the part of local Communist Party and Soviet leaders that everything was under control, and they thus ignored the rise of what Markedonov calls the division of the region into “two Caucasuses.”
The first Caucasus, he notes, “greeted ‘dear Leonid Il’ich’ [Brezhnev]’, “celebrated ‘the voluntary inclusion’” of their peoples into Russia, and “fulfilled” at least on paper all the economic production goals set by the Soviet leadership.
But “the other Caucasus,” Markedonov continues, “was developing ‘early capitalist relations,’ was waiting for revenge, was forming nationalist groups, was terrorizing minority nationalities, and was secretly visiting religious circles and mosques.”
Most of the time, these activities remained below Moscow’s radar screen, and when clashes did break out as in Chechnya-Ingushetiya in 1965 and 1973, people in Moscow took on face value the assurances of the local leaders that these were the actions of a few marginals rather than a reflection of underlying problems.
Now, “completely in the traditions of Brezhnev’s USSR,” the Russian government under President Vladimir Putin is doing much the same thing: It is relying on elites it has selected and accepting their version of a pleasant and stable reality in exchange for proclamations of undying loyalty to the Kremlin.
Like their Soviet predecessors in “the notorious times of stagnation,” Moscow officials today think that “the first Caucasus” is the only one that matters, and thus, again like their forefathers, the current Russian leadership is ignoring the growth of problems in“the second North Caucasus.”
In this “other” Caucasus today, there are “the unresolved Osetin-Ingush conflict,” Adygei resistance to the “enlargement of regions,” “latent” conflicts between Daghestan and Chechnya, problems involving the selection of leaders, and “the growth of radical Islam as a political protest against regional and federal authorities.”
Dismissing all such “problems” now is perhaps even more a mistake than it was 35 years ago, Markedonov continues, because the challenges facing Moscow at present are even greater than they were under Brezhnev and at the end of the Soviet period for at least three reasons.
First, most political action then in contrast to political action now involved only the top elites. It was the tiny number of officials at the top who lead the “parade of sovereignties” at the time of the collapse of the USSR. Now, mass groups are involved even if the local regimes and Moscow refuse to see it.
Second, the actions of the North Caucasians at the end of the Soviet period were generally a form of “pay back on Soviet debts,” a response to what the regime had done. Now, Markedonov says, these actions have been generated “by the mistakes and miscalculations by those in power and their unwillingness to resolve existing problems.”
And third, unlike the situation at the end of Soviet times when the regime faced ethnic challenges against which Moscow could pursue a divide and rule strategy, Moscow now faces a serious “Islamic challenge,” one whose ideological basis it neither understands nor seems willing to do anything about concretely.
As a result, “if Russia wants to preserve its position in the Caucasus, it has no alternatives besides strengthening the state in the region.” But saying that begs a larger question, Markedonov says: “What does ‘strengthening the state’ mean for [the Russian state as a whole]?”
A genuine strengthening of the state, he concludes, does not mean the surrender of resources and power to local elites in exchange for “purely external declarations of loyalty.” Nor does it mean closer checking of passports, ethnic purges, and the use of force.
Instead, Markedonov says, it requires the creation of a state authority not only in the region but also n the Russian Federation as a whole whose officials “cannot be bought off” and one which “the residents of the Caucasus will be prepared to swear their loyalty to and serve”
Vienna, April 20 – The Russian government’s recent policies in the Northern Caucasus increasingly resembles the approach adopted by the Soviet regime during its period of stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev, according to one of Moscow’s leading experts on ethnic and religious politics in that region.
And such parallels, Sergei Markedonov argues, reflect the willingness of both central governments to believe their own propaganda, to rely on outwardly loyal local elites, and to ignore social developments below the surface that ultimately threaten Moscow’s position (http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=12434).
At one level, the Moscow analyst notes, “the Brezhnev period was the most stable in the history of the Caucasus.” There were no deportations or major shifts in borders, nor were there any “ethnic purges” or major “inter-ethnic clashes.” And feeling comfortable with that situation, the Soviet authorities devoted relatively little attention to the region.
The Soviet authorities accepted without question the assurances of loyalty on the part of local Communist Party and Soviet leaders that everything was under control, and they thus ignored the rise of what Markedonov calls the division of the region into “two Caucasuses.”
The first Caucasus, he notes, “greeted ‘dear Leonid Il’ich’ [Brezhnev]’, “celebrated ‘the voluntary inclusion’” of their peoples into Russia, and “fulfilled” at least on paper all the economic production goals set by the Soviet leadership.
But “the other Caucasus,” Markedonov continues, “was developing ‘early capitalist relations,’ was waiting for revenge, was forming nationalist groups, was terrorizing minority nationalities, and was secretly visiting religious circles and mosques.”
Most of the time, these activities remained below Moscow’s radar screen, and when clashes did break out as in Chechnya-Ingushetiya in 1965 and 1973, people in Moscow took on face value the assurances of the local leaders that these were the actions of a few marginals rather than a reflection of underlying problems.
Now, “completely in the traditions of Brezhnev’s USSR,” the Russian government under President Vladimir Putin is doing much the same thing: It is relying on elites it has selected and accepting their version of a pleasant and stable reality in exchange for proclamations of undying loyalty to the Kremlin.
Like their Soviet predecessors in “the notorious times of stagnation,” Moscow officials today think that “the first Caucasus” is the only one that matters, and thus, again like their forefathers, the current Russian leadership is ignoring the growth of problems in“the second North Caucasus.”
In this “other” Caucasus today, there are “the unresolved Osetin-Ingush conflict,” Adygei resistance to the “enlargement of regions,” “latent” conflicts between Daghestan and Chechnya, problems involving the selection of leaders, and “the growth of radical Islam as a political protest against regional and federal authorities.”
Dismissing all such “problems” now is perhaps even more a mistake than it was 35 years ago, Markedonov continues, because the challenges facing Moscow at present are even greater than they were under Brezhnev and at the end of the Soviet period for at least three reasons.
First, most political action then in contrast to political action now involved only the top elites. It was the tiny number of officials at the top who lead the “parade of sovereignties” at the time of the collapse of the USSR. Now, mass groups are involved even if the local regimes and Moscow refuse to see it.
Second, the actions of the North Caucasians at the end of the Soviet period were generally a form of “pay back on Soviet debts,” a response to what the regime had done. Now, Markedonov says, these actions have been generated “by the mistakes and miscalculations by those in power and their unwillingness to resolve existing problems.”
And third, unlike the situation at the end of Soviet times when the regime faced ethnic challenges against which Moscow could pursue a divide and rule strategy, Moscow now faces a serious “Islamic challenge,” one whose ideological basis it neither understands nor seems willing to do anything about concretely.
As a result, “if Russia wants to preserve its position in the Caucasus, it has no alternatives besides strengthening the state in the region.” But saying that begs a larger question, Markedonov says: “What does ‘strengthening the state’ mean for [the Russian state as a whole]?”
A genuine strengthening of the state, he concludes, does not mean the surrender of resources and power to local elites in exchange for “purely external declarations of loyalty.” Nor does it mean closer checking of passports, ethnic purges, and the use of force.
Instead, Markedonov says, it requires the creation of a state authority not only in the region but also n the Russian Federation as a whole whose officials “cannot be bought off” and one which “the residents of the Caucasus will be prepared to swear their loyalty to and serve”
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