Paul Goble
Vienna, April 3 – The rebirth of interest in religion in post-Soviet Russia may not transform that country in a positive direction as many religious leaders have hoped or threaten secular values as many intellectuals have feared, according to the findings of a massive new survey of religious life there.
That study, conducted by the Moscow Institute of Social Prognostication and involving more than 15,000 respondents, found that believers and unbelievers are not significantly different in terms of their social position or political and economic views (http://www.foma.ru/articles/679/?print_version=1).
But this finding, however disturbing it may be for some or encouraging for others, could be a statistical artifact, a reflection of the fact that relatively few Russians on either side of this religious divide currently take their faith or the lack or it nearly as seriously as many have thought.
On the one hand, the organizers of this survey grouped the roughly 15 percent of Russians who say they are atheists with another 15 percent who say they believe God may exist but that they personally do not see that as the basis for religious faith or practice (http://www.portal-credo.ru/site?/act=comment&id=1189).
And on the other, even though this survey found that 62 percent of the sample identified itself as Russian Orthodox, more than four out of five did so for cultural or political reasons rather than as a matter of faith: only 8.5 percent of the total group actually take part in the life of the Church.
Despite that possibility or even its likelihood, the study’s findings are likely to spark new debate on whether religion will “save” Russia or whether it will do no such thing. And consequently, it is worth recording here some of the data sets the Moscow institute gathered.
The survey found that the only statistically significant sociological difference was between men and women. Men formed 45.6 percent of the total sample, but they made up almost two-thirds of the non-believers – 66.5 percent. However, when it came to age or educational attainment, the differences were minimal within each group.
Other questions involved the attitudes of both groups toward a variety of social, economic and political questions. Both groups had roughly the same percentages of optimists and pessimists, both had similar attitudes toward big business, and both had equal proclivities to engage in entrepreneurial activity.
The two groups had almost identical views on whether Russia could return to the past, whether the Russian state would grow stronger or not in the immediate future, and whether freedom or equality is the more important value. Both believers and unbelievers rated freedom as more important to them than equality by a factor of almost four to one.
Asked who could lead Russia out of its current situation, the two groups diverged, with far more believers – nearly three out of four – saying that a strong state could do so while only one in two of the unbelivers had the same view. At the same time, far more unbelievers than unbelievers said the united efforts of the people could do the trick.
Asked about how the personal values they most admired, the two groups also diverged but only on a few things. Slightly more believers pointed to kindness and good-heartedness than did unbelievers, but the percentage valuing order, responsibility, patience, and a sense of humor were almost identical.
Tuesday, April 3, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Putin’s ‘Force-Based State’ Weakening Russia, Illarionov Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 3 – The state model President Vladimir Putin has adopted, one based on the unrestrained use of force, is destroying the institutions of modern statehood, undermining the possibilities for economic growth, and isolating Russia from virtually all of the rest of the world, according to a former Kremlin advisor.
In yesterday’s “Kommersant,” Andrei Illarionov, who served as an advisor to Putin and his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, makes a sweeping indictment of the kind of regime Russia now has and says its replacement is Russia’s “most important task” (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?DocID=755085&IssueID=36241).
To make his case, Illarionov draws on a variety of international rankings. He notes that in terms of the level of political rights and freedoms, Russia now stands 158th or 159th in the world, alongside Pakistan, Swaziland, and Togo. And in terms of freedom of the press, it occupied 147th place, alongside Iraq, Venezuela and Chad.
As for corruption, the outspoken Moscow analyst points out, today’s Russia stands in 123rd place out of 159 alongside Gambia, Afghanistan and Rwanda. In terms of the defense of property rights, it ranks 89th, right alongside Mozambique, Nigeria and Guatemala. And its judicial system ranks 170th out of 1999 countries.
Moreover, Illarionov notes, the “force model” of the state “legitimates force in society. Russia is today 7th in murders per 1,000 residents out of a survey of 112 countries – right between Ecuador and Guatemala. And in terms of their physical security, Russians find themselves ranked 175th out of 185 countries.
Many analysts both in Moscow and the West blame all this on the lawlessness and chaos of the 1990s, but such an interpretation is “a myth,” Illarionov says, noting that “the sharp decline in indicators of the quality of state institutions has been observed precisely” since those who seek to rely on force alone took over.
Corruption has increased both absolutely and relatively under the “force model,” a development Illarionov says is proved by both international and Russian statistics and one that is undermining both the bureaucratic effectiveness of the government apparatus and the stability of the country as a whole.
And he points out that all of this is having the most negative consequences on Russia’s standing in the world. Today, Moscow has “no allies,” he writes. The number of meetings with Western leaders has halved in the period since the Anna Politkovskaya and Aleksandr Litvinenko murders, and those with CIS leaders are down by two-thirds.
Even Russia’s economic growth so celebrated by the Kremlin and many in the West is less robust than many think. Russia’s GDP grew 6.8 percent annually in 2004 to 2006, more than in some European countries but less than Russia’s economic growth at the end of the Yeltsin era.
Compared to the CIS and Baltic countries, this relative decline is even greater. In 1999-2000, only two of these countries had higher growth rates than the Russian Federation, Illarionov continues, but now, 12 of the 14 do. And compared to China, today’s Russia is falling ever further behind.
This “catastrophe” -- and Illarinov pointedly uses precisely that word -- will have “serious consequences,” if not immediately in 2008 then eventually, something that those who believe Putin’s state based on force alone should reflect upon. And the longer things continue as they are, he suggests, the worse the impact of this system will be.
“The creators of this state,” Illarionov writes, “promised the rebirth of the Russian state, but the force model is destroying it. [They] promised security for citizens, but the force model is undermining that. [They] promised the strengthening of the sovereignty of Russia, but [their approach] is leading to the isolation of the country.”
Moreover, he continues, “the creators of this state promised an acceleration of economic growth, but the force model is guaranteeing its falling behind. [And they] promised the strengthening of the country, but [their approach is leading to] its weakening” across the board.
While the Kremlin and its backers at home and abroad will reject Illarionov’s arguments, some Russian analysts and many ordinary Russians appear to be accepting them, a trend that could point to trouble ahead for a regime that has promised not to have any. (See, among others, http://www.russ.ru/politics/docs/perestrojka_I_revolyuciya).
Vienna, April 3 – The state model President Vladimir Putin has adopted, one based on the unrestrained use of force, is destroying the institutions of modern statehood, undermining the possibilities for economic growth, and isolating Russia from virtually all of the rest of the world, according to a former Kremlin advisor.
In yesterday’s “Kommersant,” Andrei Illarionov, who served as an advisor to Putin and his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, makes a sweeping indictment of the kind of regime Russia now has and says its replacement is Russia’s “most important task” (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?DocID=755085&IssueID=36241).
To make his case, Illarionov draws on a variety of international rankings. He notes that in terms of the level of political rights and freedoms, Russia now stands 158th or 159th in the world, alongside Pakistan, Swaziland, and Togo. And in terms of freedom of the press, it occupied 147th place, alongside Iraq, Venezuela and Chad.
As for corruption, the outspoken Moscow analyst points out, today’s Russia stands in 123rd place out of 159 alongside Gambia, Afghanistan and Rwanda. In terms of the defense of property rights, it ranks 89th, right alongside Mozambique, Nigeria and Guatemala. And its judicial system ranks 170th out of 1999 countries.
Moreover, Illarionov notes, the “force model” of the state “legitimates force in society. Russia is today 7th in murders per 1,000 residents out of a survey of 112 countries – right between Ecuador and Guatemala. And in terms of their physical security, Russians find themselves ranked 175th out of 185 countries.
Many analysts both in Moscow and the West blame all this on the lawlessness and chaos of the 1990s, but such an interpretation is “a myth,” Illarionov says, noting that “the sharp decline in indicators of the quality of state institutions has been observed precisely” since those who seek to rely on force alone took over.
Corruption has increased both absolutely and relatively under the “force model,” a development Illarionov says is proved by both international and Russian statistics and one that is undermining both the bureaucratic effectiveness of the government apparatus and the stability of the country as a whole.
And he points out that all of this is having the most negative consequences on Russia’s standing in the world. Today, Moscow has “no allies,” he writes. The number of meetings with Western leaders has halved in the period since the Anna Politkovskaya and Aleksandr Litvinenko murders, and those with CIS leaders are down by two-thirds.
Even Russia’s economic growth so celebrated by the Kremlin and many in the West is less robust than many think. Russia’s GDP grew 6.8 percent annually in 2004 to 2006, more than in some European countries but less than Russia’s economic growth at the end of the Yeltsin era.
Compared to the CIS and Baltic countries, this relative decline is even greater. In 1999-2000, only two of these countries had higher growth rates than the Russian Federation, Illarionov continues, but now, 12 of the 14 do. And compared to China, today’s Russia is falling ever further behind.
This “catastrophe” -- and Illarinov pointedly uses precisely that word -- will have “serious consequences,” if not immediately in 2008 then eventually, something that those who believe Putin’s state based on force alone should reflect upon. And the longer things continue as they are, he suggests, the worse the impact of this system will be.
“The creators of this state,” Illarionov writes, “promised the rebirth of the Russian state, but the force model is destroying it. [They] promised security for citizens, but the force model is undermining that. [They] promised the strengthening of the sovereignty of Russia, but [their approach] is leading to the isolation of the country.”
Moreover, he continues, “the creators of this state promised an acceleration of economic growth, but the force model is guaranteeing its falling behind. [And they] promised the strengthening of the country, but [their approach is leading to] its weakening” across the board.
While the Kremlin and its backers at home and abroad will reject Illarionov’s arguments, some Russian analysts and many ordinary Russians appear to be accepting them, a trend that could point to trouble ahead for a regime that has promised not to have any. (See, among others, http://www.russ.ru/politics/docs/perestrojka_I_revolyuciya).
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