Paul Goble
Staunton, November 2 – The relative quiet in which most Daghestani municipal elections last month took place was less the result of improved work by election officials than by the absence of competition in many constituencies, an absence that United Russia officials and other incumbents worked hard to ensure, according to a Makhachkala observer.
Musa Musayev says in an article posted on a Moscow State University site today that Daghestanis “did not want to vote for the current bureaucrats” but had little choice in many places because officials had used their influence to dissuade people from running against them or even refused to register those who tried (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/9254/).
In those places where “real competition continued to exist,” he continues, “the voting passed with the traditional collection of violations of the law, including murders.” This time, Musayev says, the incumbent head of the village of Khadzhalmakhi Abudmuslim Nurmagormedov was killed and six others there wounded in an election clash.
Last year, competition in the elections in that village led the backers of one candidate to block a major road, forcing officials to delay a vote altogether. When it finally occurred, ther was another tragedy: People there found out about massive fraud, with more than 4,000 ballots disappearing and the closure of two of the precinct voting places on that election day itself.
But the most serious violence a year ago was in Derbent, where there were “mass disorders and the closing of many voting places.” To prevent that, Vladimir Churov, the head of the Russian Central Election Commission, came to Daghestan. This year, the vote in that southern Daghestani city was peaceful – because, Musayev says, “there was no competition.”
There were violations of election law almost everywhere there were multiple candidates for any position, with officials using “administrative” measures and open fraud including destroying ballots and ballot box stuffing to ensure that the “correct” candidate won, a trend that the Makhachkala observer says is quit dangerous.
Those steps may have bought peace now, he writes, but only at the price of highlighting the criminal behavior of many officials, something that along with “other de-stabilizing factors” in that republic have added to the potential for conflicts in what is now perhaps the most violent place in the Russian Federation.
Another Daghestani observer, Albert Esedov of the Nogay District of Daghestan concurs with Musayev’s observations, saying that official malfeasance in the electoral process is so widespread that the population doesn’t have any faith in the results and is continuing to challenge them with “massive and armed” protests (http://gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5052/109/).
In his view, only an engaged citizenry and the presence of journalists prevented officials in his area from committing even more violations. Indeed, he said, in Daghestan now, it is possible to “rephrase Comrade Stalin’s observation” and say that “it is not important who votes in what way, it is important WHO counts those votes.”
If citizen observers or journalists are present, officials naturally find it more difficult to falsify the results, Esedov says. But he makes that observation without the self-confident optimism that one might expect. Instead, the Daghestani journalist suggests, officials there have “still not learned” how to falsify things if someone is watching, but they may soon learn how to.
Such a level of cynicism means that the victories in which United Russia and its leadership put so much stock do not mean all that much or more precisely they do not mean what the members of that party hope for. Instead, the extreme manipulation of elections has deprived the outcomes of legitimacy.
And that in turn has cost the officials there and in Moscow their legitimacy in the eyes of Daghestanis, a development that makes it more rather than less likely that the residents of that republic will listen to militants who argue that they and not the current powers that be are the real representatives of the population.
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Attack on Federalism Pushing Northwest along ‘Baltic Path,’ Ingermanland Activist Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 2 – By its systematic attack on federalism within the Russian Federation and its effort to isolate European-oriented people in St. Petersburg and Northwestern Russia from their Baltic neighbors, Moscow is pushing that region onto “the Baltic path,” one that may ultimately lead to the same outcome, according to an Ingermanland activist.
In a 7300-word article on the Ingria.info portal today, Andrey Pugovkin argues that what is currently the Russian northwest has been “part of the cultural and political space of Northern Europe,” despite Moscow’s efforts to subordinate the region to itself and break those ties to the West (www.ingria.info/?biblio&news_action=show_news&news_id=5131).
Moscow’s conquest of European Novgorod and Staraya Ladoga, he points out, was for the residents of this highly literate and diverse population “an historic catastrophe,” the first of several Pugovkin argues the Muscovites with their links to the political system of the Mongol Horde have visited on them.
Prior to 1917, however, Petersburgers succeeded in creating “the type of ‘the Russian European,’ educated in the traditions of Orthodox culture but with an orientation toward the ethnical values and external attributes of the Western way of life.” And precisely because of that, many Russians from elsewhere had such a negative attitude toward that city.
The causes of this “irrational lack of acceptance of Petersburg by people with a paternalistic consciousness and a lumpen psychology” played and continue to play “a fatal role for the city” up to this day that is manifested in everything from vandalism of the city’s monuments to Moscow’s blocking of links between the city and Europe.
A major reason for the unique Europeanness of the city was that at the end of the imperial period, “not less than a fifth of the permanent residents of St. Petersburg consisted of religious and ethnic minorities” and by the presence of “approximately 200,000 foreign citizens,” almost all of whom contributed to a cosmopolitan and tolerant society.
Indeed, Pugovkin notes, except for the actions of small marginal groups and for those supported more or less openly by the representatives of the Moscow powers that be, St. Petersburg “did not know over the course of its entire history up to the 2000s any open inter-religious or inter-national conflicts.”
But that characteristic of the city along with so many others, he writes, was changed by “the events of 1917 and all that followed,” events that were “a catastrophe equivalent in history to that which Rome experienced during the barbarian invastions or Novgorod in the course of the Muscovite conquest.”
The destruction or expulsion of so many historical Petersburgers and their replacement by a lumpen class of people from elsewhere has meant, Pugovkin insists, that “the historical multi-national population of Petersburg and all Ingria can with full justification be considered a repressed ethno-cultural group.”
Despite that, he argues, as the Soviet system softened after the death of Stalin, Leningraders re-asserted themselves as a cultural center and, what is especially important, expanded their historical ties with intellectuals in neighboring nations including the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Finns.
“For residents of Soviet Leningrad,” he writes,, “Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in those times stood for Western Europe, a place in practice inaccessible because of ‘the iron curtain.’” And in 1964, an easing of visa arrangements allowed dramatically more short-term visits between the city and Finland.
In part because of those links and experiences, it was “in Leningrad more than anywhere else where already in the 1970s, the lack of prospects” for the Soviet system “became evident.” And consequently, “it is not surprising thatprecisely here, practically at the same time as in the Baltic region, there appeared the first challenges to the communist regime.
Moreover, Pugovkin continues, it was also precisely in these two places where the regime responded by “openly turning for help to the neo-nazis.”
“The consolidation of democratic forces of the Northern capital took place in close interconnection with the national-liberation movements of the Baltic republics,” with the latter often publishing things for the city that could not be published there and then sending them eastward.
When Soviet forces attacked the Lithuanians in January 1991, “tens of thousands of Leningraders” went into the street to show their solidarity with Lithuanian. And during the same period, “on the barricades in the center of Riga it was possible to see the Russian tri-color that had been raised by a delegation of the Leningrad Peoples Front.”
Representatives of the city allied themselves with the delegates of the peoples fronts of the Baltic republics at congresses of the peoples deputies of the USSR, and when asked in march 1991 if they favored the preservation of the USSR, the city’s voters by more than two to one said that they did not.
These experiences, he suggests, “created the conditions for the search for a regional identity,” one that would be a way out from “provincial complexes and Soviet traditions.” But Moscow was opposed to all steps in that direction, splitting the city and oblast apart and denying the two the possibility of forming a single free economic zone.
Thanks to the leadership of Anatoly Sobchak, the city continued during the 1990s many of the traditions it had recovered along with the Baltic peoples at the end of Soviet times, but “the change of priorities of Russian foreign and domestic policy in the 2000s turned out to be extraordinarily unfavorable for the entire North-West region of Russia.”
And that was true even though after 2000, a large number of Petersburgers took top jobs in Moscow. Having arrived in the Russian capital, they turned on the city, reducing its status through the formation of the North-West Federal District and cutting the resources its people have had for the improvement of their own lives.
At the same time, Moscow’s foreing policy shifts regarding the Baltic countries and other European neighbors had a negative impact on the city. The Russian government “renewed its short-sighted and harmful policy, in the first instance for the Russian-speaking population,” against the Baltic countries, preferring to talk about “russophobia” than to cooperate.
As a result of Russian policies, the Baltic countries “have guaranteed their military security by joining NATO and their economic well-being by becoming members of the European Union.” Instead of adapting, Moscow has re-erected a kind of “iron curtain” against them and transformed “’the window on Europe’ into a [oil] pipeline.”
Moreover, the central Russian powers that be have sought to reduce the ability of the federal subjects to conduct an independent foreign policy, treating that as “’separatism’ and ‘a threat to the integrity of the state,’” a counter-productive approach in a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation.
In the 1990s, federalism prevented a civil war in Russia, but in the last decade, Moscow has made the struggle against it “almost its main domestic political goal,” forgetting, Pugovkin points out, that “an excess of centralization [is] one of the main threats to the integrity of any federal state.”
And he concludes by warning that if Moscow continues on this “deadend” path, then “sooner or later” because of its historical “conditioning,” the people of Ingermanland and St. Petersburg will be driven to move along another road, “the Baltic path” which has consequences Moscow very much does not want to see.
Staunton, November 2 – By its systematic attack on federalism within the Russian Federation and its effort to isolate European-oriented people in St. Petersburg and Northwestern Russia from their Baltic neighbors, Moscow is pushing that region onto “the Baltic path,” one that may ultimately lead to the same outcome, according to an Ingermanland activist.
In a 7300-word article on the Ingria.info portal today, Andrey Pugovkin argues that what is currently the Russian northwest has been “part of the cultural and political space of Northern Europe,” despite Moscow’s efforts to subordinate the region to itself and break those ties to the West (www.ingria.info/?biblio&news_action=show_news&news_id=5131).
Moscow’s conquest of European Novgorod and Staraya Ladoga, he points out, was for the residents of this highly literate and diverse population “an historic catastrophe,” the first of several Pugovkin argues the Muscovites with their links to the political system of the Mongol Horde have visited on them.
Prior to 1917, however, Petersburgers succeeded in creating “the type of ‘the Russian European,’ educated in the traditions of Orthodox culture but with an orientation toward the ethnical values and external attributes of the Western way of life.” And precisely because of that, many Russians from elsewhere had such a negative attitude toward that city.
The causes of this “irrational lack of acceptance of Petersburg by people with a paternalistic consciousness and a lumpen psychology” played and continue to play “a fatal role for the city” up to this day that is manifested in everything from vandalism of the city’s monuments to Moscow’s blocking of links between the city and Europe.
A major reason for the unique Europeanness of the city was that at the end of the imperial period, “not less than a fifth of the permanent residents of St. Petersburg consisted of religious and ethnic minorities” and by the presence of “approximately 200,000 foreign citizens,” almost all of whom contributed to a cosmopolitan and tolerant society.
Indeed, Pugovkin notes, except for the actions of small marginal groups and for those supported more or less openly by the representatives of the Moscow powers that be, St. Petersburg “did not know over the course of its entire history up to the 2000s any open inter-religious or inter-national conflicts.”
But that characteristic of the city along with so many others, he writes, was changed by “the events of 1917 and all that followed,” events that were “a catastrophe equivalent in history to that which Rome experienced during the barbarian invastions or Novgorod in the course of the Muscovite conquest.”
The destruction or expulsion of so many historical Petersburgers and their replacement by a lumpen class of people from elsewhere has meant, Pugovkin insists, that “the historical multi-national population of Petersburg and all Ingria can with full justification be considered a repressed ethno-cultural group.”
Despite that, he argues, as the Soviet system softened after the death of Stalin, Leningraders re-asserted themselves as a cultural center and, what is especially important, expanded their historical ties with intellectuals in neighboring nations including the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Finns.
“For residents of Soviet Leningrad,” he writes,, “Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in those times stood for Western Europe, a place in practice inaccessible because of ‘the iron curtain.’” And in 1964, an easing of visa arrangements allowed dramatically more short-term visits between the city and Finland.
In part because of those links and experiences, it was “in Leningrad more than anywhere else where already in the 1970s, the lack of prospects” for the Soviet system “became evident.” And consequently, “it is not surprising thatprecisely here, practically at the same time as in the Baltic region, there appeared the first challenges to the communist regime.
Moreover, Pugovkin continues, it was also precisely in these two places where the regime responded by “openly turning for help to the neo-nazis.”
“The consolidation of democratic forces of the Northern capital took place in close interconnection with the national-liberation movements of the Baltic republics,” with the latter often publishing things for the city that could not be published there and then sending them eastward.
When Soviet forces attacked the Lithuanians in January 1991, “tens of thousands of Leningraders” went into the street to show their solidarity with Lithuanian. And during the same period, “on the barricades in the center of Riga it was possible to see the Russian tri-color that had been raised by a delegation of the Leningrad Peoples Front.”
Representatives of the city allied themselves with the delegates of the peoples fronts of the Baltic republics at congresses of the peoples deputies of the USSR, and when asked in march 1991 if they favored the preservation of the USSR, the city’s voters by more than two to one said that they did not.
These experiences, he suggests, “created the conditions for the search for a regional identity,” one that would be a way out from “provincial complexes and Soviet traditions.” But Moscow was opposed to all steps in that direction, splitting the city and oblast apart and denying the two the possibility of forming a single free economic zone.
Thanks to the leadership of Anatoly Sobchak, the city continued during the 1990s many of the traditions it had recovered along with the Baltic peoples at the end of Soviet times, but “the change of priorities of Russian foreign and domestic policy in the 2000s turned out to be extraordinarily unfavorable for the entire North-West region of Russia.”
And that was true even though after 2000, a large number of Petersburgers took top jobs in Moscow. Having arrived in the Russian capital, they turned on the city, reducing its status through the formation of the North-West Federal District and cutting the resources its people have had for the improvement of their own lives.
At the same time, Moscow’s foreing policy shifts regarding the Baltic countries and other European neighbors had a negative impact on the city. The Russian government “renewed its short-sighted and harmful policy, in the first instance for the Russian-speaking population,” against the Baltic countries, preferring to talk about “russophobia” than to cooperate.
As a result of Russian policies, the Baltic countries “have guaranteed their military security by joining NATO and their economic well-being by becoming members of the European Union.” Instead of adapting, Moscow has re-erected a kind of “iron curtain” against them and transformed “’the window on Europe’ into a [oil] pipeline.”
Moreover, the central Russian powers that be have sought to reduce the ability of the federal subjects to conduct an independent foreign policy, treating that as “’separatism’ and ‘a threat to the integrity of the state,’” a counter-productive approach in a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation.
In the 1990s, federalism prevented a civil war in Russia, but in the last decade, Moscow has made the struggle against it “almost its main domestic political goal,” forgetting, Pugovkin points out, that “an excess of centralization [is] one of the main threats to the integrity of any federal state.”
And he concludes by warning that if Moscow continues on this “deadend” path, then “sooner or later” because of its historical “conditioning,” the people of Ingermanland and St. Petersburg will be driven to move along another road, “the Baltic path” which has consequences Moscow very much does not want to see.
Window on Eurasia: Daghestanis Lead the North Caucasus Blogosphere, Survey Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 2 – Daghestanis are responsible for 185 of the 528 blogs being conducted either by people living in the North Caucasus or by North Caucasians living elsewhere, according to a survey conducted by an Ingushetia blogger who goes by the screen name timag82.
According to information posted on his blog (timag82.livejournal.com/36092.html and timag82.livejournal.com/35772.html) and summarized in an article today on Kavkaz-uzel.ru (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/176392/), the Daghestanis are followed by 151 Ossetians, 106 Ingushetians, 63 Chechens, 31 Circassians and six Balkars.
Of the total, some 358 are active, the Ingushetia blogger says, and the average age of bloggers across the region is “about 30.” A Daghestani blogger who works as a sports journalist, converciano, is “the absolute leader” among the bloggers. Another Daghestani, TV journalist Nariman Gadzhiyev, whose screen name is pcnariman, has the largest number of friends (1920).
But the leader by number of commentaries is a Circassian blogger, eva-vitli, who has 56,239. Among the most popular subjects of these bloggers is in descending order “the Caucasus, music, film, politics, literature, history, Islam, Ingusheetia, books, Chechnya, Daghestan, journalism, photography, Ossetia, psychology, football, the mountains,” and so on.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of timag82’s effort is the complete list of North Caucasus bloggers that he provides on his site, one that includes statistics of various kinds about each of the 528 blogs and that he indicates he plans to update on a regular basis as more bloggers emerge (timag82.narod.ru/caucasus/jj/).
Commenting on timag82’s effort, Nariman Gadzhiyev said that “Timur is a good man and he thought this up and carried it out on his own, [although] we helped hima little.” And the Daghestani blogger said that the numbers in his republic was undoubtedly a reflection of “the greater level of freedom in connection with the neighbors” and better Internet access.
Another reason for the Daghestani lead, Kavkaz-uzel.ru points out in its report, is that “in Daghestan, at the initiative of the republic ministry for youth affairs was earlier created a Blogger School,” something through which many of those active in the blogosphere from that republic have passed or taken as their model.
Meanwhile, there were two other intriguing reports on the Internet in the Russian Federation this week: a content analysis of President Dmitry Medvedev’s first 300 tweets (slon.ru/articles/486648/) and a discussion of the ways in which the Internet may require an updating of the list of basic human rights (forum-msk.org/material/society/4553244.html).
The Slon.ru study reports that Medvedev now has “more than 100,000 followers,” that foreign policy and catastrophic events are the most frequent subjects of his tweets, that the number of his tweets has fallen off since he began his micro-blog this summer, that he tweets mostly during the week and in the evenings, and that he hasn’t yet mentioned Putin.
The other article prepared by Igor Eidman, the author of a widely-noted 2007 book on the sociology of the internet revolution, argues that the rise of the Internet in all its forms not only requires a redefinition of basic human rights but also a rethinking of the nature of the political system and the state as such (forum-msk.org/material/society/4553244.html).
The current conceptions of rights and freedoms and of the state are based on ones that arose “at the end of the 18th century,” he argues, and given technological possibilities, they require fundamental revision. To that end, Eidman proposes that “the information society gives human beings a new fundamental right, the right to freely decide how to devote his time.”
The futurologist outlines six rights that flow from that, but his most interesting comments concern the way in which the Internet by detaching people from the restrictions of geography may lead to the transformation or even the end of the state as we know it at present into a more multi-layered and overlapping set of institutions.
He acknowledges that this won’t come about quickly or easily – there are too many opposing sets of interests – but Eidman argues that technology is likely to drive such a change in the more distant future just as he insists earlier technological revolutions promoted the rise of earlier political arrangements.
Staunton, November 2 – Daghestanis are responsible for 185 of the 528 blogs being conducted either by people living in the North Caucasus or by North Caucasians living elsewhere, according to a survey conducted by an Ingushetia blogger who goes by the screen name timag82.
According to information posted on his blog (timag82.livejournal.com/36092.html and timag82.livejournal.com/35772.html) and summarized in an article today on Kavkaz-uzel.ru (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/176392/), the Daghestanis are followed by 151 Ossetians, 106 Ingushetians, 63 Chechens, 31 Circassians and six Balkars.
Of the total, some 358 are active, the Ingushetia blogger says, and the average age of bloggers across the region is “about 30.” A Daghestani blogger who works as a sports journalist, converciano, is “the absolute leader” among the bloggers. Another Daghestani, TV journalist Nariman Gadzhiyev, whose screen name is pcnariman, has the largest number of friends (1920).
But the leader by number of commentaries is a Circassian blogger, eva-vitli, who has 56,239. Among the most popular subjects of these bloggers is in descending order “the Caucasus, music, film, politics, literature, history, Islam, Ingusheetia, books, Chechnya, Daghestan, journalism, photography, Ossetia, psychology, football, the mountains,” and so on.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of timag82’s effort is the complete list of North Caucasus bloggers that he provides on his site, one that includes statistics of various kinds about each of the 528 blogs and that he indicates he plans to update on a regular basis as more bloggers emerge (timag82.narod.ru/caucasus/jj/).
Commenting on timag82’s effort, Nariman Gadzhiyev said that “Timur is a good man and he thought this up and carried it out on his own, [although] we helped hima little.” And the Daghestani blogger said that the numbers in his republic was undoubtedly a reflection of “the greater level of freedom in connection with the neighbors” and better Internet access.
Another reason for the Daghestani lead, Kavkaz-uzel.ru points out in its report, is that “in Daghestan, at the initiative of the republic ministry for youth affairs was earlier created a Blogger School,” something through which many of those active in the blogosphere from that republic have passed or taken as their model.
Meanwhile, there were two other intriguing reports on the Internet in the Russian Federation this week: a content analysis of President Dmitry Medvedev’s first 300 tweets (slon.ru/articles/486648/) and a discussion of the ways in which the Internet may require an updating of the list of basic human rights (forum-msk.org/material/society/4553244.html).
The Slon.ru study reports that Medvedev now has “more than 100,000 followers,” that foreign policy and catastrophic events are the most frequent subjects of his tweets, that the number of his tweets has fallen off since he began his micro-blog this summer, that he tweets mostly during the week and in the evenings, and that he hasn’t yet mentioned Putin.
The other article prepared by Igor Eidman, the author of a widely-noted 2007 book on the sociology of the internet revolution, argues that the rise of the Internet in all its forms not only requires a redefinition of basic human rights but also a rethinking of the nature of the political system and the state as such (forum-msk.org/material/society/4553244.html).
The current conceptions of rights and freedoms and of the state are based on ones that arose “at the end of the 18th century,” he argues, and given technological possibilities, they require fundamental revision. To that end, Eidman proposes that “the information society gives human beings a new fundamental right, the right to freely decide how to devote his time.”
The futurologist outlines six rights that flow from that, but his most interesting comments concern the way in which the Internet by detaching people from the restrictions of geography may lead to the transformation or even the end of the state as we know it at present into a more multi-layered and overlapping set of institutions.
He acknowledges that this won’t come about quickly or easily – there are too many opposing sets of interests – but Eidman argues that technology is likely to drive such a change in the more distant future just as he insists earlier technological revolutions promoted the rise of earlier political arrangements.
Monday, November 1, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Growing Islamophobia in Russia has Three Sources, Muslim Experts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 1 – Few Muslims in the Russian Federation have any doubt that they face a rising tide of anti-Islamic extremism, but they and especially their intellectual leaders disagree as to its source, with some pointing to international trends, others to national ones and still a third to local causes.
In an essay posted online today, Islam.ru’s Daniyal Isayev asks three leading Islamic intellectuals in the Russian Federation for their explanations as to why hostility toward Russia’s Muslims is growing and whether there is any one institution or group of people responsible for the outrages against that community (www.islam.ru/pressclub/islamofobia/vzifodtries/).
There is no agreement on this point, Isayev notes, and he suggests that “the most interesting” variants of the answer are provided by Maksim Shevchenko, a Muslim commentator on Moscow’s First Chanel, Abudlla Rinat Mukhametov, the deputy chief editor of Islam.ru, and Aslambek Ezhayev, head of the Umma Publishing Company.
Shevchenko, as he has on other occasions, suggests that the rise of anti-Muslim attitudes and acitons is part of a general preparation for a major war in the Middle East, one that Israel plans to launch “in the first instance” against Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon. In support of this, Israel is trying to whip up opinion around the world against Muslims.
The Israelis and their allies, he continues, “want to explain to the world and in particular to Russia” that all Muslims are enemies, terrorists, and murderers. By “blackening the reputation” of Muslims and “demonizing them,” the Israelis and their allies are driving a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in Russia.
Mukhametov in contrast argues that the causes of growing Islamophobia in Russia are Russian. The editor has argued in other places that Moscow is pursuing a three-part strategy toward the Islamic community – adaption of its members to life, the dilution of Islamic culture,m and restraint on the growth of the umma in Russia.
At present, he argues, the last is the dominant approach, one that on a more or less constant basis, “certain siloviki and bureaucrats” think can be transformed into “a final solution of the Muslim question” and thus promote hostility between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Russian Federation.
That invariably leads to an exchange of attacks between these two communities, a trend that can be played up by those who want to exclude Islam from Russian life and have little concern either for tolerance or for the provisions of the Russian Constitution or the observance of Russian law.
But Ezhayev argues that one can best understand the sources of Islamophobia by focusing not on the international scene or even on the all-Russian one. Instead, he argues, one should focus on the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga and Siberia where some officials are convinced that Russia’s Muslims are under the influence of foreign extremist groups.
The “nightmare” scenario for such officials, he continues, is the idea that “an ever larger number of Muslims in the country are oriented not toward Talgat Tajuddin or Muhammedgali Husin but toward international Muslim scholars like Yusuf al-Qadawi, Abdullah ibn Jibrin, Said Nursi and others.”
Because these officials and especially the siloviki are responsible for security in their areas and because they are inclined to see a foreign hand behind all the greatest threats, they thus take actions against Muslims suspected of such links and that in turn feeds on xenophobic attitudes among the Russian population more generally.
Thus, Ezhayev implies, the professional responsibilities of these officials lead them to take individual actions which collectively feed into something larger rather than any one of these actions being a derivative of a more general policy, a reality that the Muslim publisher says the Islamic community must both recognize and make use of.
Isayev agrees, but he also thinks that international trends and all-Russian ones are playing a role and should be taken into consideration as the growing umma in the Russian Federation seeks to find its way toward a more tolerant relationship with the non-Muslim majority of that country.
Staunton, November 1 – Few Muslims in the Russian Federation have any doubt that they face a rising tide of anti-Islamic extremism, but they and especially their intellectual leaders disagree as to its source, with some pointing to international trends, others to national ones and still a third to local causes.
In an essay posted online today, Islam.ru’s Daniyal Isayev asks three leading Islamic intellectuals in the Russian Federation for their explanations as to why hostility toward Russia’s Muslims is growing and whether there is any one institution or group of people responsible for the outrages against that community (www.islam.ru/pressclub/islamofobia/vzifodtries/).
There is no agreement on this point, Isayev notes, and he suggests that “the most interesting” variants of the answer are provided by Maksim Shevchenko, a Muslim commentator on Moscow’s First Chanel, Abudlla Rinat Mukhametov, the deputy chief editor of Islam.ru, and Aslambek Ezhayev, head of the Umma Publishing Company.
Shevchenko, as he has on other occasions, suggests that the rise of anti-Muslim attitudes and acitons is part of a general preparation for a major war in the Middle East, one that Israel plans to launch “in the first instance” against Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon. In support of this, Israel is trying to whip up opinion around the world against Muslims.
The Israelis and their allies, he continues, “want to explain to the world and in particular to Russia” that all Muslims are enemies, terrorists, and murderers. By “blackening the reputation” of Muslims and “demonizing them,” the Israelis and their allies are driving a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in Russia.
Mukhametov in contrast argues that the causes of growing Islamophobia in Russia are Russian. The editor has argued in other places that Moscow is pursuing a three-part strategy toward the Islamic community – adaption of its members to life, the dilution of Islamic culture,m and restraint on the growth of the umma in Russia.
At present, he argues, the last is the dominant approach, one that on a more or less constant basis, “certain siloviki and bureaucrats” think can be transformed into “a final solution of the Muslim question” and thus promote hostility between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Russian Federation.
That invariably leads to an exchange of attacks between these two communities, a trend that can be played up by those who want to exclude Islam from Russian life and have little concern either for tolerance or for the provisions of the Russian Constitution or the observance of Russian law.
But Ezhayev argues that one can best understand the sources of Islamophobia by focusing not on the international scene or even on the all-Russian one. Instead, he argues, one should focus on the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga and Siberia where some officials are convinced that Russia’s Muslims are under the influence of foreign extremist groups.
The “nightmare” scenario for such officials, he continues, is the idea that “an ever larger number of Muslims in the country are oriented not toward Talgat Tajuddin or Muhammedgali Husin but toward international Muslim scholars like Yusuf al-Qadawi, Abdullah ibn Jibrin, Said Nursi and others.”
Because these officials and especially the siloviki are responsible for security in their areas and because they are inclined to see a foreign hand behind all the greatest threats, they thus take actions against Muslims suspected of such links and that in turn feeds on xenophobic attitudes among the Russian population more generally.
Thus, Ezhayev implies, the professional responsibilities of these officials lead them to take individual actions which collectively feed into something larger rather than any one of these actions being a derivative of a more general policy, a reality that the Muslim publisher says the Islamic community must both recognize and make use of.
Isayev agrees, but he also thinks that international trends and all-Russian ones are playing a role and should be taken into consideration as the growing umma in the Russian Federation seeks to find its way toward a more tolerant relationship with the non-Muslim majority of that country.
Window on Eurasia: Russians have More Reasons than Ever for Public Protests, Experts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 1 – The likelihood that Russians will engage in public protests in the coming months is increasing, experts in that country say, given the range of social and economic problems people there are experiencing, the intensification of many of these problems in particular places, and their sense that Moscow has failed to respond adequately or even at all.
In today’s Moscow “New Times,” a survey of expert opinion provides a veritable checklist of problems that appear likely to trigger protests in one place or another in the coming months and thus confront the Russian powers that be with a new set of problems in the run-up to the elections in 2011 and 2012 (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/29648).
Karin Kleman, the director of the Institute of Social Action, said that reasons for protest are mounting and now are “above the roof,” pointing to such problems as low pay, rising prices for consumer goods, and unchecked corruption. And Aleksandr Krasnoshtan, an organizer in Arkhangelsk, noted the growing fears among the elderly about their futures.
Added to that, the editors of the weekly said, are the fears of younger people that Moscow is about to increase their retirement age, a step that polls show 79 percent of Russians are “categorically against.” Many think the powers that be want to increase the minimum retirement age so that the regime won’t have to pay pensioners: they will die before reaching it!
Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin has proposed increasing the pension age from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 62 for men, arguing that at present Russia has “a low pension age.” But that Marie Antoinette-like comment has infuriated many, and Social and Health Mminsiter Tatyana Golikova was forced to deny that any plans for such a step were under discussion.
As in France and other Western countries, Russians face a problem with financing existing retirement plans, but as the demonstrations in Paris have shown, boosting the retirement age or even talking about it can push typically passive groups into the street. Consequently, many experts think that Moscow won’t do anything until after the 2012 elections.
But Russian workers have more immediate worries involving low wages and the non-payment even of those. The Association of Service Trade Union Workers, which unites some eight million people, plans to stage a strike action, given that Moscow has failed to deliver on its promises to raise salaries for its members.
Other Russian workers are even worse off. Their employers aren’t paying them. As of September 1st, Russian officials report, there was a backlog in unpaid wages of 3.35 billion rubles (100 million US dollars). These officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, hav suggested that this is not so bad, but others profoundly disagree.
While the situation is not so terrible compared to the 1990s or even 2007, it is much worse than it was only a few months ago, and wage arrears and the number of people who are suffering as a result has risen significantly since the start of the summer, the comparison that most people involved are likely to make.
If more workers protest with strike actions, few of the experts with whom “New Times” spoke will be surprised, but its journalists noted that “it is curious that protest attitudes are growing not only among workers but also among employers,” who are upset by rising costs and the absence of government compensation for these.
Another potential source of public protests are the company towns which have attracted attention when people have gone into the streets but have largely been ignored and typically neglected altogether after Moscow officials make promises that they have not been willing or able to follow through with.
Only one company town – Toliatti – has received as much as 80 percent of the money it was promised. Most have received far less and a large number have received nothing at all. Workers there either have to make do with part-time employment at low wages or when possible take their pensions. And as a result, conditions in many such cities are getting worse.
The Finance Minbsitry has decided to refrain from direct budgetary support of such places for the period 2011 to 2013, “New Times” reports, although it has kept aside 30 billion rubles (100 million US dollars) to pay out in the case of “extraordinary circumsatances” – a euphemism for when “people again block the roads” and thus an invitation to them to do so.
Finally, “New Times” considers a social problem that could have more immediate political consequences if those suffering from it decide to act. That involves the living conditions of military officers, both those still serving and those who have been forced to take their pensions as a result of the downsizing of the armed services.
Many in both groups have been promised housing, but what they have been given, Oleg Shvedkov, the head of the All-Russian Professional Union of Military Employees, says, is anything but satisfactory, a betrayal of regime promises, a source of anger, and quite possibly, the basis for public protests by this group as well.
The powers that be clearly expect that they will be able to prevent these groups from linking up or turning political, but the range and intensity of problems in Russian society is such that even scattered protests without a unifying leadership will present the regime with a serious problem especially in the run-up to the elections ahead.
Staunton, November 1 – The likelihood that Russians will engage in public protests in the coming months is increasing, experts in that country say, given the range of social and economic problems people there are experiencing, the intensification of many of these problems in particular places, and their sense that Moscow has failed to respond adequately or even at all.
In today’s Moscow “New Times,” a survey of expert opinion provides a veritable checklist of problems that appear likely to trigger protests in one place or another in the coming months and thus confront the Russian powers that be with a new set of problems in the run-up to the elections in 2011 and 2012 (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/29648).
Karin Kleman, the director of the Institute of Social Action, said that reasons for protest are mounting and now are “above the roof,” pointing to such problems as low pay, rising prices for consumer goods, and unchecked corruption. And Aleksandr Krasnoshtan, an organizer in Arkhangelsk, noted the growing fears among the elderly about their futures.
Added to that, the editors of the weekly said, are the fears of younger people that Moscow is about to increase their retirement age, a step that polls show 79 percent of Russians are “categorically against.” Many think the powers that be want to increase the minimum retirement age so that the regime won’t have to pay pensioners: they will die before reaching it!
Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin has proposed increasing the pension age from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 62 for men, arguing that at present Russia has “a low pension age.” But that Marie Antoinette-like comment has infuriated many, and Social and Health Mminsiter Tatyana Golikova was forced to deny that any plans for such a step were under discussion.
As in France and other Western countries, Russians face a problem with financing existing retirement plans, but as the demonstrations in Paris have shown, boosting the retirement age or even talking about it can push typically passive groups into the street. Consequently, many experts think that Moscow won’t do anything until after the 2012 elections.
But Russian workers have more immediate worries involving low wages and the non-payment even of those. The Association of Service Trade Union Workers, which unites some eight million people, plans to stage a strike action, given that Moscow has failed to deliver on its promises to raise salaries for its members.
Other Russian workers are even worse off. Their employers aren’t paying them. As of September 1st, Russian officials report, there was a backlog in unpaid wages of 3.35 billion rubles (100 million US dollars). These officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, hav suggested that this is not so bad, but others profoundly disagree.
While the situation is not so terrible compared to the 1990s or even 2007, it is much worse than it was only a few months ago, and wage arrears and the number of people who are suffering as a result has risen significantly since the start of the summer, the comparison that most people involved are likely to make.
If more workers protest with strike actions, few of the experts with whom “New Times” spoke will be surprised, but its journalists noted that “it is curious that protest attitudes are growing not only among workers but also among employers,” who are upset by rising costs and the absence of government compensation for these.
Another potential source of public protests are the company towns which have attracted attention when people have gone into the streets but have largely been ignored and typically neglected altogether after Moscow officials make promises that they have not been willing or able to follow through with.
Only one company town – Toliatti – has received as much as 80 percent of the money it was promised. Most have received far less and a large number have received nothing at all. Workers there either have to make do with part-time employment at low wages or when possible take their pensions. And as a result, conditions in many such cities are getting worse.
The Finance Minbsitry has decided to refrain from direct budgetary support of such places for the period 2011 to 2013, “New Times” reports, although it has kept aside 30 billion rubles (100 million US dollars) to pay out in the case of “extraordinary circumsatances” – a euphemism for when “people again block the roads” and thus an invitation to them to do so.
Finally, “New Times” considers a social problem that could have more immediate political consequences if those suffering from it decide to act. That involves the living conditions of military officers, both those still serving and those who have been forced to take their pensions as a result of the downsizing of the armed services.
Many in both groups have been promised housing, but what they have been given, Oleg Shvedkov, the head of the All-Russian Professional Union of Military Employees, says, is anything but satisfactory, a betrayal of regime promises, a source of anger, and quite possibly, the basis for public protests by this group as well.
The powers that be clearly expect that they will be able to prevent these groups from linking up or turning political, but the range and intensity of problems in Russian society is such that even scattered protests without a unifying leadership will present the regime with a serious problem especially in the run-up to the elections ahead.
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev’s Failure to Respond to Kadyrov a Serious Problem for the Kremlin and for Russia, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 1 – On the day Ramzan Kadyrov ceased to be president of Chechnya – as a result of his own initiative, he is now “head” of that republic – a Moscow commentator has asked what it means for President Dmitry Medvedev and for the Russian political system as a whole that the Kremlin has failed to respond to Kadyrov’s latest statements.
In “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Matvey Ganapolsky points to two comments from Grozny that one might have expected the Kremlin would have to respond to in some way. In the first, Kadyrov himself said he would like to see Vladimir Putin return to the Russian presidency for life and that with Putin’s support, he “can do everything” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10507).
And in the second more recent statement from the Chechen capital, Dukhuvakh Abdurakhmanov, speaker of that republic’s parliament, which is dominated by Kadyrov supporters, declared that “if United Russia needs to receive 115 to 120 percent of the vote, we can achieve that result.”
On the one hand, Ganapolsky notes, both Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov would undoubtedly explain their extravagant remarks as being nothing more than an expression of their enthusiasm for Putin. And on the other, the Moscow elite generally views Kadyrov’s remarks as being like those of Vladimir Zhirinovsky – “very loud but not dangerous.”
But given Constitutional requirements and Medvedev’s recent and “instantaneous” response to now former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s words and to the offensive comments of the Russian defense minister, the Kremlin’s silence after the remarks of the two Chechen leaders is deafening.”
One might have expected Medvedev to respond to Kadyrov’s suggestion quickly and sharply in order to meet the demands of his office and to demonstrate his own independence, even though everyone knows that Kadyrov is a special case because of his role in the North Caucasus and because he is “the most loyal Putin supporter” around.
But this, Ganapolsky continues, is “only part of the problem.” Clearly someone needs to rein in any regional leader who talks about aggressively taking out his “personal enemies,” words that might have been ignored were it not for the murders of journalists Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova, to which some have linked Kadyrov.
And it would seem to be even more important for the Russian president, as “guarantor” of the Russian Constitution to speak out given that there are currently court cases “where Mr. Kadyrov is defending his honorable name” against those who have suggested that he has done more than speak out against his enemies.
Accordingly, Ganapolsky says, “the declarations of Ramzan Kadyrov and the absence of a reaction to them on the part of President Medvedev are thus " no small matter. Above all,” to be sure, “for Medvedev himself” because of his special role in ensuring that the constitution and the laws are obeyed by all.
The president, the “Yezhednevny zhurnal” commentator says, “is an individual who swore on the text [of the Constitution]that … he in the first instance has one goal – with all his force and might to defend this [document]’ against those who would challenge its provisions or undermine its meaning.
Medvedev must “defend each of its letters,” a truth that Ganapolsky say is “so evident” that what the current president has done in the case of Kadyrov shows that he is not being true to his oath of office or to the people of Russia whose rights the Constitution includes guarantees against abuse.
At the same time, “one must remember” what political life in Russia is really like. “If Kadyrov permits himself such anti-constitutional declarations and is not restrained because of his friendship with Putin … then it turns out that to be a successful leader of a subject of the Federation means not to follow the Constitution but to be close to the [real] ruler.”
Ganapolsky’s argument is damning not only to Medvedev and to Putin and Kadyrov; it is damning of the entire Russian political system as it has emerged over the last two decades. And because it is so sweeping in its implications, it almost certainly will be dismissed as a voice crying in the wilderness.
But by writing it, Ganapolsky has posed a challenge to Medvedev which, if he fails to take it up and move against Kadyrov, will likely presage his political decline, and at the same time, by suggesting that what Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov have done should be cause for dismissal, the Moscow commentator is inviting the powers that be to consider their removal.
That alone makes this article immediately important because while there have been rumors of unhappiness in Moscow about Kadyrov before and while there has been some speculation that the Chechen leader should be removed, Ganapolsky has more sharply and clearly stated the consequences for all involved of not doing so -- and quickly.
Staunton, November 1 – On the day Ramzan Kadyrov ceased to be president of Chechnya – as a result of his own initiative, he is now “head” of that republic – a Moscow commentator has asked what it means for President Dmitry Medvedev and for the Russian political system as a whole that the Kremlin has failed to respond to Kadyrov’s latest statements.
In “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Matvey Ganapolsky points to two comments from Grozny that one might have expected the Kremlin would have to respond to in some way. In the first, Kadyrov himself said he would like to see Vladimir Putin return to the Russian presidency for life and that with Putin’s support, he “can do everything” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10507).
And in the second more recent statement from the Chechen capital, Dukhuvakh Abdurakhmanov, speaker of that republic’s parliament, which is dominated by Kadyrov supporters, declared that “if United Russia needs to receive 115 to 120 percent of the vote, we can achieve that result.”
On the one hand, Ganapolsky notes, both Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov would undoubtedly explain their extravagant remarks as being nothing more than an expression of their enthusiasm for Putin. And on the other, the Moscow elite generally views Kadyrov’s remarks as being like those of Vladimir Zhirinovsky – “very loud but not dangerous.”
But given Constitutional requirements and Medvedev’s recent and “instantaneous” response to now former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s words and to the offensive comments of the Russian defense minister, the Kremlin’s silence after the remarks of the two Chechen leaders is deafening.”
One might have expected Medvedev to respond to Kadyrov’s suggestion quickly and sharply in order to meet the demands of his office and to demonstrate his own independence, even though everyone knows that Kadyrov is a special case because of his role in the North Caucasus and because he is “the most loyal Putin supporter” around.
But this, Ganapolsky continues, is “only part of the problem.” Clearly someone needs to rein in any regional leader who talks about aggressively taking out his “personal enemies,” words that might have been ignored were it not for the murders of journalists Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova, to which some have linked Kadyrov.
And it would seem to be even more important for the Russian president, as “guarantor” of the Russian Constitution to speak out given that there are currently court cases “where Mr. Kadyrov is defending his honorable name” against those who have suggested that he has done more than speak out against his enemies.
Accordingly, Ganapolsky says, “the declarations of Ramzan Kadyrov and the absence of a reaction to them on the part of President Medvedev are thus " no small matter. Above all,” to be sure, “for Medvedev himself” because of his special role in ensuring that the constitution and the laws are obeyed by all.
The president, the “Yezhednevny zhurnal” commentator says, “is an individual who swore on the text [of the Constitution]that … he in the first instance has one goal – with all his force and might to defend this [document]’ against those who would challenge its provisions or undermine its meaning.
Medvedev must “defend each of its letters,” a truth that Ganapolsky say is “so evident” that what the current president has done in the case of Kadyrov shows that he is not being true to his oath of office or to the people of Russia whose rights the Constitution includes guarantees against abuse.
At the same time, “one must remember” what political life in Russia is really like. “If Kadyrov permits himself such anti-constitutional declarations and is not restrained because of his friendship with Putin … then it turns out that to be a successful leader of a subject of the Federation means not to follow the Constitution but to be close to the [real] ruler.”
Ganapolsky’s argument is damning not only to Medvedev and to Putin and Kadyrov; it is damning of the entire Russian political system as it has emerged over the last two decades. And because it is so sweeping in its implications, it almost certainly will be dismissed as a voice crying in the wilderness.
But by writing it, Ganapolsky has posed a challenge to Medvedev which, if he fails to take it up and move against Kadyrov, will likely presage his political decline, and at the same time, by suggesting that what Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov have done should be cause for dismissal, the Moscow commentator is inviting the powers that be to consider their removal.
That alone makes this article immediately important because while there have been rumors of unhappiness in Moscow about Kadyrov before and while there has been some speculation that the Chechen leader should be removed, Ganapolsky has more sharply and clearly stated the consequences for all involved of not doing so -- and quickly.
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Balkar Anger at Nalchik and Moscow Intensifies
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 31 – Representatives of seven Balkar villages are in the fourth month of a hunger strike at the base of the Kremlin wall in Moscow to call attention to the violation of the traditional land-use rights of their community by officials in the bi-national Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the North Caucasus.
Participants in this action have repeatedly said that they were driven to this “extreme measure” because no one in Nalchik or Moscow had paid attention to larger protest meetings in their republic, the result, they say, of corrupt relations between the Kabardinian-dominated government in Nalchik and officials in the Russian center (www.nr2.ru/moskow/306621.html).
The Balkar protest in Moscow has attracted some attention but only about their demands for the restoration of land transferred to the Kabardinians. But now as a result of the publication on Friday of a resolution adopted two weeks ago by “citizens of Russia and residents of Kabardino-Balkaria,” their broader complaints may get more coverage (skfonews.ru/article/109).
The resolution, adopted at a meeting convened by two Kabardinian-dominated organizations, reflected anger about what its signatories said was “the legal nihilism in society and the organs of power” and the “unceasing bacchanalia of criminality” at a time of economic collapse and rising unemployment since Arsen Kanokov became republic president in 2005.
“Despite the systemic and continuing lie that under Kanokov Kabardino-Balkaria is flourishing that has been distributed by the local clan elite in the Moscow corridors of power and related media,” the resolution said, “statistics, facts and reality say that the situation on the ground is exactly the reverse.”
According to official statistics, Kabardino-Balkaria ranks among the worse in employment, corruption and other negative indices. And it has been the scene of an explosive growth in the number of extremist crimes and terrorist actions, according to Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoruk.
“All this is taking place because the KBR procuracy avoids struggling with genuine extremism, preferring instead to identify ‘extremists’ among law-abiding members of the opposition, while the force structure illegally persecute believing young people,” the resolution continues.
Even more disturbing, there is evidence that the terrorists have links with the officials, the resolution says. Otherwise, how can one explain that the terrorists never attack those who are directly part of the ruling clan and its supporters in Moscow but only those within the KBR who do not have links with Kanokov and also that officials don’t pursue terrorists in many cases?
`. Moreover, many in the force structures simply kill innocent opponents of the current ethnocracy, the resolution says, thus leading to a situation in which the mothers of KBR residents beg the powers that be “not to shoot their children but to bring them to court.”
Given this behavior on the part of the officials, the resolution suggest, it should surprise no one that “dozens of young people are fleeing into the forests and the mountains in order to save their lives from the illegal actions of the siloviki.”
More generally, it says, “if Parliament and President of the KBR publish unconstitutional laws and do not fulfill the decisions of the Constitutional court of Russia, if the KBR procurator does not challenge then and itself commits criminal actions without fulfilling the decisions of the court, then what are citizens to do?”
This situation is giving rise to “a general legal nihilism among the population” because “in the KBR, all complaints by citizens to whomever they are addressed fall into the hands of those against whom the complains are lodged, and among the population,” ever more people assume that this simply works to support the existing powers that be.
As a result, “dissatisfaction in the population with the ruling elite both local, district and federal is intensifying.”
Underlying all of this, the resolution says, is “the propaganda of ‘Circassian supremacy’ [the Kabardinians are a subgroup of the Circassians] and dislike to Slavs and Turks.” And because of the threat this poses to stability in the North Caucasus and Russia’s territorial integrity, the resolution makes the following seven “proposals:”
First, it calls on President Dmitry Medvedev to examine what Kanokov has been doing and at the very least warn him that he risks “the loss of faith” at the center. Second, it asks Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to examine Kanokov’s use and misuse of federal funds. Third, it calls on the Russian procurator general to bring charges against the KBR procurator for his crimes.
Fourth, it asks the Russian Constitutional court to insist that KBR courts fulfill Russian laws and court decisions. Fifth, it requests that Presidential Plenipotentiary Aleksandr Khloponin consult with all groups in the KBR and not just those tied to Kanokov. Sixth, it calls on the powers that be in Moscow to provide support to the Balkar protesters in Moscow.
And seventh, the resolution calls for the reversal of the violations of federal law that have occurred concerning the rights of Balkar communities in mountainous areas to use pasture land, the proximate cause of this anger among the Turkic Balkars but far from the most serious aspects of their fury at the present time.
Staunton, October 31 – Representatives of seven Balkar villages are in the fourth month of a hunger strike at the base of the Kremlin wall in Moscow to call attention to the violation of the traditional land-use rights of their community by officials in the bi-national Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the North Caucasus.
Participants in this action have repeatedly said that they were driven to this “extreme measure” because no one in Nalchik or Moscow had paid attention to larger protest meetings in their republic, the result, they say, of corrupt relations between the Kabardinian-dominated government in Nalchik and officials in the Russian center (www.nr2.ru/moskow/306621.html).
The Balkar protest in Moscow has attracted some attention but only about their demands for the restoration of land transferred to the Kabardinians. But now as a result of the publication on Friday of a resolution adopted two weeks ago by “citizens of Russia and residents of Kabardino-Balkaria,” their broader complaints may get more coverage (skfonews.ru/article/109).
The resolution, adopted at a meeting convened by two Kabardinian-dominated organizations, reflected anger about what its signatories said was “the legal nihilism in society and the organs of power” and the “unceasing bacchanalia of criminality” at a time of economic collapse and rising unemployment since Arsen Kanokov became republic president in 2005.
“Despite the systemic and continuing lie that under Kanokov Kabardino-Balkaria is flourishing that has been distributed by the local clan elite in the Moscow corridors of power and related media,” the resolution said, “statistics, facts and reality say that the situation on the ground is exactly the reverse.”
According to official statistics, Kabardino-Balkaria ranks among the worse in employment, corruption and other negative indices. And it has been the scene of an explosive growth in the number of extremist crimes and terrorist actions, according to Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoruk.
“All this is taking place because the KBR procuracy avoids struggling with genuine extremism, preferring instead to identify ‘extremists’ among law-abiding members of the opposition, while the force structure illegally persecute believing young people,” the resolution continues.
Even more disturbing, there is evidence that the terrorists have links with the officials, the resolution says. Otherwise, how can one explain that the terrorists never attack those who are directly part of the ruling clan and its supporters in Moscow but only those within the KBR who do not have links with Kanokov and also that officials don’t pursue terrorists in many cases?
`. Moreover, many in the force structures simply kill innocent opponents of the current ethnocracy, the resolution says, thus leading to a situation in which the mothers of KBR residents beg the powers that be “not to shoot their children but to bring them to court.”
Given this behavior on the part of the officials, the resolution suggest, it should surprise no one that “dozens of young people are fleeing into the forests and the mountains in order to save their lives from the illegal actions of the siloviki.”
More generally, it says, “if Parliament and President of the KBR publish unconstitutional laws and do not fulfill the decisions of the Constitutional court of Russia, if the KBR procurator does not challenge then and itself commits criminal actions without fulfilling the decisions of the court, then what are citizens to do?”
This situation is giving rise to “a general legal nihilism among the population” because “in the KBR, all complaints by citizens to whomever they are addressed fall into the hands of those against whom the complains are lodged, and among the population,” ever more people assume that this simply works to support the existing powers that be.
As a result, “dissatisfaction in the population with the ruling elite both local, district and federal is intensifying.”
Underlying all of this, the resolution says, is “the propaganda of ‘Circassian supremacy’ [the Kabardinians are a subgroup of the Circassians] and dislike to Slavs and Turks.” And because of the threat this poses to stability in the North Caucasus and Russia’s territorial integrity, the resolution makes the following seven “proposals:”
First, it calls on President Dmitry Medvedev to examine what Kanokov has been doing and at the very least warn him that he risks “the loss of faith” at the center. Second, it asks Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to examine Kanokov’s use and misuse of federal funds. Third, it calls on the Russian procurator general to bring charges against the KBR procurator for his crimes.
Fourth, it asks the Russian Constitutional court to insist that KBR courts fulfill Russian laws and court decisions. Fifth, it requests that Presidential Plenipotentiary Aleksandr Khloponin consult with all groups in the KBR and not just those tied to Kanokov. Sixth, it calls on the powers that be in Moscow to provide support to the Balkar protesters in Moscow.
And seventh, the resolution calls for the reversal of the violations of federal law that have occurred concerning the rights of Balkar communities in mountainous areas to use pasture land, the proximate cause of this anger among the Turkic Balkars but far from the most serious aspects of their fury at the present time.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
