Paul Goble
Staunton, November 9 – The share of residents in the Russian Federation who did not take part either directly or indirectly in the just-completed national census more than doubled from the 2002 enumeration, rising from five percent to 11 percent, with only slightly more than half of all Russians assumed the new count as accurate, according to the results of a new poll.
The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), a survey organization widely thought to have close ties with the powers that be, interviewed 1600 people in 46 federal subjects October 30-31 concerning their experiences with the census that had concluded in most places the week before (wciom.ru/index.php?id=195&uid=13982).
According to the VTsIOM survey, 65 percent of those surveyed said they had been personally contacted by census takers, 11 percent fewer than said they had been interviewed during the course of the 2002 count. Twenty-two percent more had their census information provided by relatives, but the share which did not take part at all rose from five percent to 11 percent.
Elderly people were more likely to be interviewed than younger ones and residents of the Urals and Siberia more than those of other regions, VTsIOM found. Those whose data was supplied by relatives tended to be younger – especially in the 18 to 24-year-old cohort --and from the southern regions of the country.
Of those contacted, 92 percent told VTsIOM that they had been surveyed at their residences. Four percent said they had visited census offices over all, with that figure rising to 11 percent in Moscow and in St. Petersburg. And two percent of those questioned by VTsIOM said they had provided their census information over the telephone.
According to the VTsIOM sample, 58 percent of Russian residents said that they “do not doubt” that the census results will “reliably reflect the situation in the country,” but 29 percent took the opposition point of view with skeptics especially numerous in the two capitals (43 percent), and those who did not participate (68 percent).
Given the problems that surfaced after the 2002 count, which failed to meet international standards for a census by failing to contact personally at least 90 percent of the estimated sample, it is notable that the VTsIOM poll suggests that Russian census takers again failed to meet that standard.
Indeed, many people in the blogosphere have expressed skepticism about all these numbers, and the fact that suspicions are so high in Moscow and St. Petersburg and among those who declared to VTsIOM that they did not take part guarantees that as more results from this enumeration come out over the next two years, many of them will be disputed.
Given how important the census is for everything ranging from budget transfers to intra-Russia haj quotas, those disputes are likely to cast a shadow over this count just as dark as the one that still hangs over the 2002 census. And that in turn means that many in the Russian Federation will continue to believe that the last accurate census was the last, 1989, Soviet one.
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Window on Eurasia: ‘Every Second Russian is a Skinhead at Heart,’ Moscow Editor Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 9 – Russia has relatively few active skinheads (150) and neo-Nazi groups (150) for a country of its size, a Russian Internet editor says, but Moscow’s failure to address ethnic issues has created a situation in which polls suggest “every second Russian is a skinhead at heart,” thus providing implicit support for the nationalists of the radical right.
In a comment posted on the Osobaya bukhva site today, Viktor Tsvetkov notes that the Russian Federation is not the only country having problems with tolerance and multi-culturalism or the integration of ethnically and religious distinct immigrant groups into the broader society (www.specletter.com/politika/2010-11-09/kazhdyi-vtoroi-rossijanin-v-dushe-skinhed.html).
But German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent suggestion that multi-culturalism “isn’t working,” that Germans are attached to Christian values,” and that “those who do not accept them have no place here” had particular resonance in Russia because of the large number of Muslims both indigenous and immigrant there.
In Europe, “after World War II, nationalism was banned from big politics for a long time, but now,” Tsvetkov points out, “formerly taboo slogans are being taken up” again and without the shame or restraint of every times. Europeans still say they “love” or “tolerate” all people just as they did, but increasingly they are demanding that immigrants do all the adapting.
It would be strange if Russia did not face a similar challenge. “The roots of the conflict are very similar: the clash of various cultures and mutual lack of understanding on the background of economic problems.” And it would be equally strange if Russians did not react in many of the same ways Europeans are, the Osobaya bukhva editor says.
But there is an important difference. Russia has never been a mono-ethnic country, and many of the minorities that so many ethnic Russians are now angry about are indigenous nations rather than immigrants. Moreover, Russian attitudes appear to be leading the country into an absolute “dead end” given the failure of the powers that be to address it adequately.
Tsvetskov points to the ethnic clashes in the military unit near Perm and the shooting of a North Caucasian dancing in the middle of the night in Stavropol to show that officials clearly don’t know what to do. In the first case, they tried to suppress information about it, and in the second, they ignored the multiple factors at work.
This “short-sightedness and indifference” is obvious to everyone, the editor continued. “Doesn’t the Defense Ministry know that where people from the Caucasus republics assemble in a group, they will begin to live as their parents taught them and not as their father-commanders ordered?” And doesn’t the Stavropol militia recognize the way in which dancing in the middle of the night could affect people?
As Tsvetkov notes, Galina Kozhevnikova, the deputy head of the SOVA information-analytic center which tracks ethnic and religious affairs, points out that while the number of skinheads and radical groups is small, “more than half of Russians support neo-Nazi ideas” when it comes to dealing with minorities.
Thus, she continued, “this is a question not of the number of little groups but of the number of people who share neo-nazi views and support xenophobia as a whole because the neo-Nazis in the absence of such attitudes could not exist; they need to operate on the silent support of society” at large.”
Given that environment, Tsvetkov says, “can anyone be surprised by the appearance of demands of our citizens to create ‘an ethnic Russian republic’?” Or at the collection of signature in support of separating out Stavropol kray from the North Caucasus Federal District? “all this is based not on a heightened sense of national self-consciousness but on simple fear.”
Economists and demographers say that Russia needs more immigrants, but Tsvetkov says, there are no visible efforts by the government now to socialize the arrivals and help them fit in, a task especially difficult when Russians don’t want to consider them as people even though they want to hear them cite Pushkin from memory.
“The arguments of those who continue to support the idea of ‘Russia as a family of peoples’ are becoming ever fewer. Anger and lack of understanding, in contrast, are becoming ever greater and greater.” As a result, people are asking “what unites all of us besides state borders?”
And ever more often, Tsvetkov says, “one can hear the response: ‘Nothing.’”
Some Russians are trying to do something about this, but it is unclear whether they can succeed and reverse the current trend. Last week in Sochi, the Multi-National Russia Youth Forum came up with the idea that it is necessary to adopt and apply an “ethical code for multi-national Russia.”
Such a document, the editor continued, would declare Russian society to be “a single social community consisting of representatives of various ethnoses and start out from a recognition of the unqualified right of the individual to freedom of choice of his own ethnic and religious identities.”
Putting that in simpler terms, Tsvetkov says, “it is being suggested that we identify ourselves first of all as citizens of the Russian Federation and then as Russians (Tatars, Buryats and so on), Orthodox (Muslims, Buddhists, and so on)” – a proposal that he suggested represented “a noble undertaking.”
But there are good reasons to think such calls face an uphill battle. “Artificial constructs of citizenship by their significance do not compare with natural forms of identity including nationality and religion” – something that the collapse of the USSR highlighted for all in the post-Soviet region.
“Of course,” Tsvetkov continues, “it is possible to recall the Western model of the supremacy of law over all cultural distinctions and contradictions. However after the acknowledgement of Merkel and the French cleansings of the Roma, this experience too does not look so convincing.”
Keeping things together by force is always a possibility but that approach entails serious costs. Thus, “the method of convincing people remains.” But that is a hard task, especially if the powers that be prefer to ignore what is going on and “every other Russian” sympathizes with those who would oppress religious and ethnic minorities.
Tsetkov’s article is only one of the cries from the heart following the November 4 National Unity Day demonstrations conducted across the Russian Federation by ultra-nationalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis, some of whom carried Nazi slogans like “Arbeit Macht Frei” (blog.humanrightsfirst.org/2010/11/charged-week-in-russia-skinheads.html).
And while these protests too were relatively small given the size of the country, they are disturbing because they underscore the point Tsvetkov makes: The active extremists are not all that numerous, but the share of the population that sympathizes with at least some of their messages is much larger and seems certain to play a role in Russia’s future.
Staunton, November 9 – Russia has relatively few active skinheads (150) and neo-Nazi groups (150) for a country of its size, a Russian Internet editor says, but Moscow’s failure to address ethnic issues has created a situation in which polls suggest “every second Russian is a skinhead at heart,” thus providing implicit support for the nationalists of the radical right.
In a comment posted on the Osobaya bukhva site today, Viktor Tsvetkov notes that the Russian Federation is not the only country having problems with tolerance and multi-culturalism or the integration of ethnically and religious distinct immigrant groups into the broader society (www.specletter.com/politika/2010-11-09/kazhdyi-vtoroi-rossijanin-v-dushe-skinhed.html).
But German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent suggestion that multi-culturalism “isn’t working,” that Germans are attached to Christian values,” and that “those who do not accept them have no place here” had particular resonance in Russia because of the large number of Muslims both indigenous and immigrant there.
In Europe, “after World War II, nationalism was banned from big politics for a long time, but now,” Tsvetkov points out, “formerly taboo slogans are being taken up” again and without the shame or restraint of every times. Europeans still say they “love” or “tolerate” all people just as they did, but increasingly they are demanding that immigrants do all the adapting.
It would be strange if Russia did not face a similar challenge. “The roots of the conflict are very similar: the clash of various cultures and mutual lack of understanding on the background of economic problems.” And it would be equally strange if Russians did not react in many of the same ways Europeans are, the Osobaya bukhva editor says.
But there is an important difference. Russia has never been a mono-ethnic country, and many of the minorities that so many ethnic Russians are now angry about are indigenous nations rather than immigrants. Moreover, Russian attitudes appear to be leading the country into an absolute “dead end” given the failure of the powers that be to address it adequately.
Tsvetskov points to the ethnic clashes in the military unit near Perm and the shooting of a North Caucasian dancing in the middle of the night in Stavropol to show that officials clearly don’t know what to do. In the first case, they tried to suppress information about it, and in the second, they ignored the multiple factors at work.
This “short-sightedness and indifference” is obvious to everyone, the editor continued. “Doesn’t the Defense Ministry know that where people from the Caucasus republics assemble in a group, they will begin to live as their parents taught them and not as their father-commanders ordered?” And doesn’t the Stavropol militia recognize the way in which dancing in the middle of the night could affect people?
As Tsvetkov notes, Galina Kozhevnikova, the deputy head of the SOVA information-analytic center which tracks ethnic and religious affairs, points out that while the number of skinheads and radical groups is small, “more than half of Russians support neo-Nazi ideas” when it comes to dealing with minorities.
Thus, she continued, “this is a question not of the number of little groups but of the number of people who share neo-nazi views and support xenophobia as a whole because the neo-Nazis in the absence of such attitudes could not exist; they need to operate on the silent support of society” at large.”
Given that environment, Tsvetkov says, “can anyone be surprised by the appearance of demands of our citizens to create ‘an ethnic Russian republic’?” Or at the collection of signature in support of separating out Stavropol kray from the North Caucasus Federal District? “all this is based not on a heightened sense of national self-consciousness but on simple fear.”
Economists and demographers say that Russia needs more immigrants, but Tsvetkov says, there are no visible efforts by the government now to socialize the arrivals and help them fit in, a task especially difficult when Russians don’t want to consider them as people even though they want to hear them cite Pushkin from memory.
“The arguments of those who continue to support the idea of ‘Russia as a family of peoples’ are becoming ever fewer. Anger and lack of understanding, in contrast, are becoming ever greater and greater.” As a result, people are asking “what unites all of us besides state borders?”
And ever more often, Tsvetkov says, “one can hear the response: ‘Nothing.’”
Some Russians are trying to do something about this, but it is unclear whether they can succeed and reverse the current trend. Last week in Sochi, the Multi-National Russia Youth Forum came up with the idea that it is necessary to adopt and apply an “ethical code for multi-national Russia.”
Such a document, the editor continued, would declare Russian society to be “a single social community consisting of representatives of various ethnoses and start out from a recognition of the unqualified right of the individual to freedom of choice of his own ethnic and religious identities.”
Putting that in simpler terms, Tsvetkov says, “it is being suggested that we identify ourselves first of all as citizens of the Russian Federation and then as Russians (Tatars, Buryats and so on), Orthodox (Muslims, Buddhists, and so on)” – a proposal that he suggested represented “a noble undertaking.”
But there are good reasons to think such calls face an uphill battle. “Artificial constructs of citizenship by their significance do not compare with natural forms of identity including nationality and religion” – something that the collapse of the USSR highlighted for all in the post-Soviet region.
“Of course,” Tsvetkov continues, “it is possible to recall the Western model of the supremacy of law over all cultural distinctions and contradictions. However after the acknowledgement of Merkel and the French cleansings of the Roma, this experience too does not look so convincing.”
Keeping things together by force is always a possibility but that approach entails serious costs. Thus, “the method of convincing people remains.” But that is a hard task, especially if the powers that be prefer to ignore what is going on and “every other Russian” sympathizes with those who would oppress religious and ethnic minorities.
Tsetkov’s article is only one of the cries from the heart following the November 4 National Unity Day demonstrations conducted across the Russian Federation by ultra-nationalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis, some of whom carried Nazi slogans like “Arbeit Macht Frei” (blog.humanrightsfirst.org/2010/11/charged-week-in-russia-skinheads.html).
And while these protests too were relatively small given the size of the country, they are disturbing because they underscore the point Tsvetkov makes: The active extremists are not all that numerous, but the share of the population that sympathizes with at least some of their messages is much larger and seems certain to play a role in Russia’s future.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Moves against Tatarstan Sovereignty Opening the Way for Radical Islamists, Kazan Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 9 – Moscow’s decision to ban the use of the term president for the leaders of the non-Russian republics and its insistence that Tatarstan drop references to the sovereignty of that republic have not only created an identity crisis in that republic but led some of its leaders to suggest that Tatarstan should position itself as a Muslim republic.
And while even that step, Kazan political scientist Sergey Sergeyev says, almost certainly has been coordinated with some Russian leaders, it constitutes a serious threat because radical Islam in Russia typically grows in the shadow of “official Islam” and, “as is well known, it is impossible to escape from [such] a shadow” (www.regnum.ru/news/1344066.html).
Just before the November holidays, the Duma passed a law banning the use of the term president for republic leaders, and Moscow dispatched Valery Zorkin, the chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court to Kazan apparently to press for further changes in Tatarstan’s constitution.
In contrast to his earlier remarks and the expectations of many, Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of Tatarstan’s State Council, indicated that Kazan is now prepared to go along with Moscow, but at the same time, former republic president, Mintimir Shaimiyev, who now serves as advisor to the current republic head, talked about a bigger role for Islam in Tatar life.
These two themes came together in a comment by Gusman Iskhakov, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan. He suggested that the elimination of the institution of the presidency of Tatarstan was leading to “a crisis of Tatar identity” and noted that “now our culture and religion are flourishing” (www.islam.ru/rus/2010-11-03/#34572).
To sort this out, the Regnum.ru news agency turned to Sergeyev, who has often served as a commentator on Tatarstan affairs for that and other Moscow outlets in the past. The political scientist said that he was surprised Mukhametshin had surrendered so quickly, but he said Shaimiyev’s comments were utterly consistent with his past statements.
Only a few weeks ago, the head of the Tatarstan State Council had declared that “to do away with the presidency” was the personal right of the leaders of those republics who wanted to take that step but that this does not affect Tatarstan, which he said would find it “hard” to change its constitution.
What appears to have taken place, Sergeyev continued, is the kind of exchange that Moscow and Kazan have often engaged in: Moscow has agreed to allow the head of Tatarstan to retain his powers if the latter agrees to adopt the center’s requirement that he not label himself as president.
Moscow has reason to be grateful to Tatarstan for the smooth transition from Shaimiyev to Rustam Minnikhanov and for delivering the required percentage of votes for United Russia – although, Sergeyev continued, the 70 percent Kazan came up with doesn’t seem so impressive now that some North Caucasians are promising to deliver 120 percent in the future!
More significant, the Kazan political scientist said, are the words of Shaimiyev about Islam as “one of the vectors of Tatarstan politics” and Tatarstan as the center of the moderate Russian Islam which the center has suggested it is quite prepared to support, especially in contrast to the radical Islamism found elsewhere.
Sergeyev said that he was “practically certain” that Moscow had agreed in advance with Shaimiyev’s declaration, given that Kazan is now oriented “not to Saudi Arabia but to Singapore” and given that a Tatar Muslim will find it easier to talk with Muslim leaders than does “the Russian [Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov.”
That does not mean, however, that what Shaimiyev is talking about is without real dangers, Sergeyev said. On the one hand, this interest in religious identity “can be a sublimation of the activity of Tatar leaders because their possibilities in the political sphere are being limited.”
And on the other, there is a danger that this will open the way for “radical Islam which develops in Russia as a shadow of ‘official Islam’ and with which ‘official Islam’ struggles as with a competitor. But, as is well known,” Sergeyev continues, “it is impossible to escape from [one’s] shadow.”
*****
Many others are now discussing the impact of doing away with republic presidencies, and on Ryazan blogger, Vladimir Frolov, has pointed out an interesting aspect of the new Russian legislation: it bans the use of the word president but it doesn’t restrict how the republic leaders might style themselves otherwise (frolovchik.livejournal.com/84339.html).
As a result, he said, the Russian Federation may soon see an explosion in the number of titles regional leaders use. “In Ryzan, Smolensk, Tver and Vladimir oblasts,” he suggests, the leaders may call themselves “grand dukes.” In Rostov, Krasnodar, Orenburg, Chita, and Amur oblasts and Primorsky kray, perhaps “atamans.”
Meanwhile, the leaders of Tatarstan and Kalmykia might call themselves “khans,” and the heads of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daghestan could identify as “emirs,” and the leader of Yakutia-Sakha as “a toyon.” Few of these are likely but the possibilities are as Frolov suggests almost endless as the latest unintended consequence of Russian legislation.
Staunton, November 9 – Moscow’s decision to ban the use of the term president for the leaders of the non-Russian republics and its insistence that Tatarstan drop references to the sovereignty of that republic have not only created an identity crisis in that republic but led some of its leaders to suggest that Tatarstan should position itself as a Muslim republic.
And while even that step, Kazan political scientist Sergey Sergeyev says, almost certainly has been coordinated with some Russian leaders, it constitutes a serious threat because radical Islam in Russia typically grows in the shadow of “official Islam” and, “as is well known, it is impossible to escape from [such] a shadow” (www.regnum.ru/news/1344066.html).
Just before the November holidays, the Duma passed a law banning the use of the term president for republic leaders, and Moscow dispatched Valery Zorkin, the chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court to Kazan apparently to press for further changes in Tatarstan’s constitution.
In contrast to his earlier remarks and the expectations of many, Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of Tatarstan’s State Council, indicated that Kazan is now prepared to go along with Moscow, but at the same time, former republic president, Mintimir Shaimiyev, who now serves as advisor to the current republic head, talked about a bigger role for Islam in Tatar life.
These two themes came together in a comment by Gusman Iskhakov, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan. He suggested that the elimination of the institution of the presidency of Tatarstan was leading to “a crisis of Tatar identity” and noted that “now our culture and religion are flourishing” (www.islam.ru/rus/2010-11-03/#34572).
To sort this out, the Regnum.ru news agency turned to Sergeyev, who has often served as a commentator on Tatarstan affairs for that and other Moscow outlets in the past. The political scientist said that he was surprised Mukhametshin had surrendered so quickly, but he said Shaimiyev’s comments were utterly consistent with his past statements.
Only a few weeks ago, the head of the Tatarstan State Council had declared that “to do away with the presidency” was the personal right of the leaders of those republics who wanted to take that step but that this does not affect Tatarstan, which he said would find it “hard” to change its constitution.
What appears to have taken place, Sergeyev continued, is the kind of exchange that Moscow and Kazan have often engaged in: Moscow has agreed to allow the head of Tatarstan to retain his powers if the latter agrees to adopt the center’s requirement that he not label himself as president.
Moscow has reason to be grateful to Tatarstan for the smooth transition from Shaimiyev to Rustam Minnikhanov and for delivering the required percentage of votes for United Russia – although, Sergeyev continued, the 70 percent Kazan came up with doesn’t seem so impressive now that some North Caucasians are promising to deliver 120 percent in the future!
More significant, the Kazan political scientist said, are the words of Shaimiyev about Islam as “one of the vectors of Tatarstan politics” and Tatarstan as the center of the moderate Russian Islam which the center has suggested it is quite prepared to support, especially in contrast to the radical Islamism found elsewhere.
Sergeyev said that he was “practically certain” that Moscow had agreed in advance with Shaimiyev’s declaration, given that Kazan is now oriented “not to Saudi Arabia but to Singapore” and given that a Tatar Muslim will find it easier to talk with Muslim leaders than does “the Russian [Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov.”
That does not mean, however, that what Shaimiyev is talking about is without real dangers, Sergeyev said. On the one hand, this interest in religious identity “can be a sublimation of the activity of Tatar leaders because their possibilities in the political sphere are being limited.”
And on the other, there is a danger that this will open the way for “radical Islam which develops in Russia as a shadow of ‘official Islam’ and with which ‘official Islam’ struggles as with a competitor. But, as is well known,” Sergeyev continues, “it is impossible to escape from [one’s] shadow.”
*****
Many others are now discussing the impact of doing away with republic presidencies, and on Ryazan blogger, Vladimir Frolov, has pointed out an interesting aspect of the new Russian legislation: it bans the use of the word president but it doesn’t restrict how the republic leaders might style themselves otherwise (frolovchik.livejournal.com/84339.html).
As a result, he said, the Russian Federation may soon see an explosion in the number of titles regional leaders use. “In Ryzan, Smolensk, Tver and Vladimir oblasts,” he suggests, the leaders may call themselves “grand dukes.” In Rostov, Krasnodar, Orenburg, Chita, and Amur oblasts and Primorsky kray, perhaps “atamans.”
Meanwhile, the leaders of Tatarstan and Kalmykia might call themselves “khans,” and the heads of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daghestan could identify as “emirs,” and the leader of Yakutia-Sakha as “a toyon.” Few of these are likely but the possibilities are as Frolov suggests almost endless as the latest unintended consequence of Russian legislation.
Monday, November 8, 2010
Window on Eurasia: In Russia Today, It is ‘Superman vs. the Computer Geek,” Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – Medvedev and Putin have often been described as playing the familiar roles of good cop-bad cop, but a better image, one that says more about where Russia is and where it may be going is to see the context between Putin as Medvedev as between “superman and the computer geek,” according to a Russian nationalist commentator.
In a comment for Ruskline.ru today, Sergey Lebedev, a Moscow political scientist who writes frequently on ethnic issues, says that the attraction of the good cop-bad cop model is understandable given that Putin is preserved as “the severe chekist” while Medvedev is shown as a young guy “in jeans” (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/11/08/supermen_protiv_kompyuterwika/).
Russians, Lebedev argues, “love strong and severe rulers, severe but just, ‘father-commanders,’” thus giving Putin the advantage. But at the same time, “the image of ‘the first boy in the village,’ also elicits sympathy but popular consciousness requires the image of a tsar – if not in the literal sense, then at a minimum as a wise and strict ruler.”
Consequently, however much Medvedev may please the younger generation, Putin in this regard, has chosen a more correct image. The premier shows that he is physically strong, always goes about in food form and thus indicates that his approaching 60 does not have any importance.”
Putin clearly “wants to show that there will not be any new ‘Brezhnevism’ with us;” that instead, there will be “people who play sports and deal with technology but who are at the same time wise and severe father commanders.” And regardless of what “the liberal media” say about “the bloody KGB,” Russians still relate to “’the siloviki’ with traditional respect.”
Medvedev who is younger comes from a different world. He presents himself as “the image of the ‘post-modern’ ruler of the 21st century.” But over time, he is taking on a more “severe and dignified” form. “An egghead computer guy will enjoy popularity among other eggheads who will always be in opposition to any power and any political regime.”
But Lebedev insists, “’chekists-supermen’ will always impress the broad masses.”
Those who want to understand this should remember what happened in the Name of Russia project. Then people indicated that they preferred rulers who were “just but severe,” with Ivan the Terrible and Joseph Stalin taking the lead despite all the blood they had shed because they had won the respect of the population.
“Medvedev and Putin,” Lebedev concludes, “have formed two images which together can win all the votes of the electors, both the majority and the minority in Russia.” That is why they have formed the tandem because “people who don’t like ‘the chekist’ Putin can vote for the ‘computer geek’ Medvedev.”
Meanwhile, “those who consider that Medvedev is too young and does not have any special achievements,” in contrast, vote for ‘the chekist’ Putin.” Although Lebedev doesn’t say so, it is clear that he believes that in a clash between the two, the chekist rather than the computer geek would win the support of the population, whatever Russians may be telling pollsters now.
Staunton, November 8 – Medvedev and Putin have often been described as playing the familiar roles of good cop-bad cop, but a better image, one that says more about where Russia is and where it may be going is to see the context between Putin as Medvedev as between “superman and the computer geek,” according to a Russian nationalist commentator.
In a comment for Ruskline.ru today, Sergey Lebedev, a Moscow political scientist who writes frequently on ethnic issues, says that the attraction of the good cop-bad cop model is understandable given that Putin is preserved as “the severe chekist” while Medvedev is shown as a young guy “in jeans” (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/11/08/supermen_protiv_kompyuterwika/).
Russians, Lebedev argues, “love strong and severe rulers, severe but just, ‘father-commanders,’” thus giving Putin the advantage. But at the same time, “the image of ‘the first boy in the village,’ also elicits sympathy but popular consciousness requires the image of a tsar – if not in the literal sense, then at a minimum as a wise and strict ruler.”
Consequently, however much Medvedev may please the younger generation, Putin in this regard, has chosen a more correct image. The premier shows that he is physically strong, always goes about in food form and thus indicates that his approaching 60 does not have any importance.”
Putin clearly “wants to show that there will not be any new ‘Brezhnevism’ with us;” that instead, there will be “people who play sports and deal with technology but who are at the same time wise and severe father commanders.” And regardless of what “the liberal media” say about “the bloody KGB,” Russians still relate to “’the siloviki’ with traditional respect.”
Medvedev who is younger comes from a different world. He presents himself as “the image of the ‘post-modern’ ruler of the 21st century.” But over time, he is taking on a more “severe and dignified” form. “An egghead computer guy will enjoy popularity among other eggheads who will always be in opposition to any power and any political regime.”
But Lebedev insists, “’chekists-supermen’ will always impress the broad masses.”
Those who want to understand this should remember what happened in the Name of Russia project. Then people indicated that they preferred rulers who were “just but severe,” with Ivan the Terrible and Joseph Stalin taking the lead despite all the blood they had shed because they had won the respect of the population.
“Medvedev and Putin,” Lebedev concludes, “have formed two images which together can win all the votes of the electors, both the majority and the minority in Russia.” That is why they have formed the tandem because “people who don’t like ‘the chekist’ Putin can vote for the ‘computer geek’ Medvedev.”
Meanwhile, “those who consider that Medvedev is too young and does not have any special achievements,” in contrast, vote for ‘the chekist’ Putin.” Although Lebedev doesn’t say so, it is clear that he believes that in a clash between the two, the chekist rather than the computer geek would win the support of the population, whatever Russians may be telling pollsters now.
Window on Eurasia: Internet Helping to Define Identity of Russia’s Muslims, New Study Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – The Internet has played a disproportionate role in the rise of Islam within the Russian Federation, a role that reflects the inability so far of Russia’s Muslims to break into the traditional print or national electronic media and one that has both positive and negative consequences for the umma, according to a new book.
Aynur Sibgatullin, the author of the widely-respected study on the role of the Internet in the development of the Tatar national movement, has now published a virtual guidebook to the Muslim segment of the Russian-language Internet, “The Islamic Internet” (in Russian; Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod: Medina Publishers, 2010).
In a review of that volume on the Islamrf.ru portal today, Larisa Usmanova says that while “not one has to be convinced that the Internet is an effective instrument in the education and instruction of the rising generation,” few have fully understood the role it plays in the formation of national and religious identities (www.islamrf.ru/news/library/rezenzii/14098/).
Sibgatullin’s book makes a significant contribution to that understanding, she continues, but in the first instance, it deserves attention because it is “the first handbook or guide to the Russian-language ‘Islamic Internet’ and the first substantial investigation of this Russian-language segment of the global information network.”
The author’s first book, “The Tatar Internet,” traced the role and significance of the Internet “in the national consolidation of one of the most numerous national minorities of the Russian Federation,” a minority in which Islam is “traditionally considered the religious component of the identity of the Tatar nation.”
His new book, Usmanova says, extends that research and broadens it out, simultaneously providing insights and dispelling myths about the role of the Internet. Perhaps Sibgatullin’s most immediately striking finding is that the Russian-language Islamic Internet is not as large as many people assume.
At the present time, he found, there are only about 400 “developed Internet resources devoted to Islam, among which are information portals and personal blogs, as well as sites prepared by mosques, Internet magazines, and social networks,” with the three most visited being www.islam.ru, www.islamnews.ru, and www.muslim.ru.
According to Sibgatullin, there are two main reasons why the Internet has played such an important role in the lives of Russia’s Muslims. On the one hand, the Russian government’s national and religious policies have restricted the amount of information about Islam in central news outlets of various kinds.
And on the other, the author suggests, the Internet has proved attractive as a result of “the growing interest in Islam precisely among young people who as a whole prefer the Internet to other information sources.” Other faiths, like Orthodoxy for example, generally appeal to an older and less Internet savvy cohort.
The Russian-language Islamic Internet is only about a decade old. In 2000, there were a tiny number of Muslim resources with the leading one then and now being the news and analysis portal, Islam.ru. Only in the last few years has the number of sites increased dramatically, and many of those have proved to be stillborn.
Among the characteristics of the Islamic Internet in Russia, Sibgatullin says, are that it is “not purely commercial” which often means it is not well financed and that it is both involved in missionary work and intended for practicing Muslims rather than anyone else, often slighting their need for studying the faith.
Most Islamic sites are primitive and poorly developed with few photographs and little interactivity, the author says. They also often feature “an unattractive language and style of presentation,” and they are currently far behind the sites of the Russian Orthodox Internet and foreign Islamic sites as well in this regard.
According to Usmanova, the book’s author devotes particular attention to “a special phenomenon of the world wide web – the formation in the Islamic Internet of a special virtual community with the name ‘Cyber-Muslims.’” Such people get more from the Internet than just information; they gain an identity by surfing the web.
“This phenomenon,” Usmanova points out, “has already been noted in national segments of the web, in particular in the Russian language the term ‘Cyber-Russian’ has appeared to designate those users who clearly express their national identity by means of the possibilities that the Internet offers.”
Such virtual groups should attract more investigators because these communities really are different, Usmanova notes, and she provides an intriguing example in the case of the Muslim net. “In virtual groups, communication between men and women is conducted on an absolutely equal basis, which is not entirely typical for traditional, ‘non-virtual’ Islam.”
Staunton, November 8 – The Internet has played a disproportionate role in the rise of Islam within the Russian Federation, a role that reflects the inability so far of Russia’s Muslims to break into the traditional print or national electronic media and one that has both positive and negative consequences for the umma, according to a new book.
Aynur Sibgatullin, the author of the widely-respected study on the role of the Internet in the development of the Tatar national movement, has now published a virtual guidebook to the Muslim segment of the Russian-language Internet, “The Islamic Internet” (in Russian; Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod: Medina Publishers, 2010).
In a review of that volume on the Islamrf.ru portal today, Larisa Usmanova says that while “not one has to be convinced that the Internet is an effective instrument in the education and instruction of the rising generation,” few have fully understood the role it plays in the formation of national and religious identities (www.islamrf.ru/news/library/rezenzii/14098/).
Sibgatullin’s book makes a significant contribution to that understanding, she continues, but in the first instance, it deserves attention because it is “the first handbook or guide to the Russian-language ‘Islamic Internet’ and the first substantial investigation of this Russian-language segment of the global information network.”
The author’s first book, “The Tatar Internet,” traced the role and significance of the Internet “in the national consolidation of one of the most numerous national minorities of the Russian Federation,” a minority in which Islam is “traditionally considered the religious component of the identity of the Tatar nation.”
His new book, Usmanova says, extends that research and broadens it out, simultaneously providing insights and dispelling myths about the role of the Internet. Perhaps Sibgatullin’s most immediately striking finding is that the Russian-language Islamic Internet is not as large as many people assume.
At the present time, he found, there are only about 400 “developed Internet resources devoted to Islam, among which are information portals and personal blogs, as well as sites prepared by mosques, Internet magazines, and social networks,” with the three most visited being www.islam.ru, www.islamnews.ru, and www.muslim.ru.
According to Sibgatullin, there are two main reasons why the Internet has played such an important role in the lives of Russia’s Muslims. On the one hand, the Russian government’s national and religious policies have restricted the amount of information about Islam in central news outlets of various kinds.
And on the other, the author suggests, the Internet has proved attractive as a result of “the growing interest in Islam precisely among young people who as a whole prefer the Internet to other information sources.” Other faiths, like Orthodoxy for example, generally appeal to an older and less Internet savvy cohort.
The Russian-language Islamic Internet is only about a decade old. In 2000, there were a tiny number of Muslim resources with the leading one then and now being the news and analysis portal, Islam.ru. Only in the last few years has the number of sites increased dramatically, and many of those have proved to be stillborn.
Among the characteristics of the Islamic Internet in Russia, Sibgatullin says, are that it is “not purely commercial” which often means it is not well financed and that it is both involved in missionary work and intended for practicing Muslims rather than anyone else, often slighting their need for studying the faith.
Most Islamic sites are primitive and poorly developed with few photographs and little interactivity, the author says. They also often feature “an unattractive language and style of presentation,” and they are currently far behind the sites of the Russian Orthodox Internet and foreign Islamic sites as well in this regard.
According to Usmanova, the book’s author devotes particular attention to “a special phenomenon of the world wide web – the formation in the Islamic Internet of a special virtual community with the name ‘Cyber-Muslims.’” Such people get more from the Internet than just information; they gain an identity by surfing the web.
“This phenomenon,” Usmanova points out, “has already been noted in national segments of the web, in particular in the Russian language the term ‘Cyber-Russian’ has appeared to designate those users who clearly express their national identity by means of the possibilities that the Internet offers.”
Such virtual groups should attract more investigators because these communities really are different, Usmanova notes, and she provides an intriguing example in the case of the Muslim net. “In virtual groups, communication between men and women is conducted on an absolutely equal basis, which is not entirely typical for traditional, ‘non-virtual’ Islam.”
Window on Eurasia: Protestant Congregations Now Vastly Outnumber Orthodox Ones in Russian Far East
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – Protestant congregations now outnumber Russian Orthodox ones in Russia’s Far East, a development that both reflects and reinforces the distinctive regional identity and anti-Moscow sentiments of many of the people in that enormous region, according to religious specialists.
Today, the Trans-Baikal news agency reported that “the most ‘Protestant’ regions of the Far East are Primorsky and Khabarovsk krays.” In the former, there are 178 Protestant communities compared to 89 parishes of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church (zabinfo.ru/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=71103&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 ).
Among the leading denominations there are Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Evangelicals, and Seventh Day Adventists, the news service says, but there are “dozens of others” as well. Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists also lag far behind in numbers: there are six mosques, seven synagogues, and four pagodas.
The situation in Khabarovsk kray is “very similar: of the 163 religious organizations, 96 are Protestant,” twice as many as the Orthodox. Moreover, this Protestant advantage is growing: Not only are ever more Protestant groups organizing and building churches, but the Orthodox
Church, lacking funds and followers, has been shutting down parishes.
Moreover, this report suggests, although its authors do not make this point, that it is no longer the case that Protestant congregations are significantly smaller than Orthodox ones, at least in terms of attendance, activity, and contributions, something that the Moscow Patriarchate has stressed in the past.
This pattern of the rise of Protestantism and the decline of Orthodoxy holds for other parts of Siberia as well. In Krasnoyarsk, there are now 111 Protestant groups, in Irkutsk, 97, and in Sverdlovsk, 94. “The most widespread,” Zabinfo.ru continues, are charismatic churches such as the Pentecostals.
Pastor Konstantin Bendas, administrator of the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians, says that “this phenomenon has a long history. Orthodoxy came to these territories quite late. In Siberia and the Far East, representatives of confessions not tolerated in the Russian Empire were exiled.”
Moreover, he continued, “many fled from oppression – the Molokane, the Dukhobors, the Mennonites, the Stundists and so on. In Soviet times, those religious leaders who were able to escape execution were exiled to the Far East. And in this way, the elite of Russian Protestants was concentrated precisely there.”
In a comment on this report, the editors of Religiopolis.org suggest that this trend, which they acknowledge has deep historical roots, also reflects certain contemporary realities, including the ethnic diversity of the region, immigration and outmigration, and a tradition of independent action (www.religiopolis.org/news/1373-dalnij-vostok-rossii-otkazalsja-ot-pravoslavija.html).
“The social openness” of Protestantism and its commitment to public action, Religiopolis.org argues, means that its various denominations are more attractive to the people of Siberia and the Russian Far East than is the more inward-focused Russian Orthodox Church at least at the present time.
Zabinfo.ru asked the Moscow Patriarchate for comment, but its representatives found it “difficult” to do so. Vladimir Vigilyansky, the head of the Patriarchate’s press service, said that he “does not comment on inter-relationships with ‘sectarians and Protestants,’” a remark that says far more than he may perhaps have intended.
But the rise of Protestantism in Siberia and the Russian Far East threatens not just the Moscow Patriarchate and its pretensions to speak for all ethnic Russians who it says are Orthodox by birth. It also represents a challenge to Moscow’s political control of the region, given that Siberian regionalism and Protestant religion can and do reinforce one another.
Indeed, one of the major arguments of the Siberian nationalist movement is that Siberia, never knew serfdom and has a Protestant work ethic closer to that of the United States than to that found in European Russia. The rise of Protestant communities across the region will only reinforce that, especially if the Moscow Patriarchate remains so hostile to this development.
Staunton, November 8 – Protestant congregations now outnumber Russian Orthodox ones in Russia’s Far East, a development that both reflects and reinforces the distinctive regional identity and anti-Moscow sentiments of many of the people in that enormous region, according to religious specialists.
Today, the Trans-Baikal news agency reported that “the most ‘Protestant’ regions of the Far East are Primorsky and Khabarovsk krays.” In the former, there are 178 Protestant communities compared to 89 parishes of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church (zabinfo.ru/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=71103&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 ).
Among the leading denominations there are Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Evangelicals, and Seventh Day Adventists, the news service says, but there are “dozens of others” as well. Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists also lag far behind in numbers: there are six mosques, seven synagogues, and four pagodas.
The situation in Khabarovsk kray is “very similar: of the 163 religious organizations, 96 are Protestant,” twice as many as the Orthodox. Moreover, this Protestant advantage is growing: Not only are ever more Protestant groups organizing and building churches, but the Orthodox
Church, lacking funds and followers, has been shutting down parishes.
Moreover, this report suggests, although its authors do not make this point, that it is no longer the case that Protestant congregations are significantly smaller than Orthodox ones, at least in terms of attendance, activity, and contributions, something that the Moscow Patriarchate has stressed in the past.
This pattern of the rise of Protestantism and the decline of Orthodoxy holds for other parts of Siberia as well. In Krasnoyarsk, there are now 111 Protestant groups, in Irkutsk, 97, and in Sverdlovsk, 94. “The most widespread,” Zabinfo.ru continues, are charismatic churches such as the Pentecostals.
Pastor Konstantin Bendas, administrator of the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians, says that “this phenomenon has a long history. Orthodoxy came to these territories quite late. In Siberia and the Far East, representatives of confessions not tolerated in the Russian Empire were exiled.”
Moreover, he continued, “many fled from oppression – the Molokane, the Dukhobors, the Mennonites, the Stundists and so on. In Soviet times, those religious leaders who were able to escape execution were exiled to the Far East. And in this way, the elite of Russian Protestants was concentrated precisely there.”
In a comment on this report, the editors of Religiopolis.org suggest that this trend, which they acknowledge has deep historical roots, also reflects certain contemporary realities, including the ethnic diversity of the region, immigration and outmigration, and a tradition of independent action (www.religiopolis.org/news/1373-dalnij-vostok-rossii-otkazalsja-ot-pravoslavija.html).
“The social openness” of Protestantism and its commitment to public action, Religiopolis.org argues, means that its various denominations are more attractive to the people of Siberia and the Russian Far East than is the more inward-focused Russian Orthodox Church at least at the present time.
Zabinfo.ru asked the Moscow Patriarchate for comment, but its representatives found it “difficult” to do so. Vladimir Vigilyansky, the head of the Patriarchate’s press service, said that he “does not comment on inter-relationships with ‘sectarians and Protestants,’” a remark that says far more than he may perhaps have intended.
But the rise of Protestantism in Siberia and the Russian Far East threatens not just the Moscow Patriarchate and its pretensions to speak for all ethnic Russians who it says are Orthodox by birth. It also represents a challenge to Moscow’s political control of the region, given that Siberian regionalism and Protestant religion can and do reinforce one another.
Indeed, one of the major arguments of the Siberian nationalist movement is that Siberia, never knew serfdom and has a Protestant work ethic closer to that of the United States than to that found in European Russia. The rise of Protestant communities across the region will only reinforce that, especially if the Moscow Patriarchate remains so hostile to this development.
Sunday, November 7, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Religion More Important than Nationality for Moscow’s Muslims, Imam Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 7 – The imam of Moscow’s Memorial Mosque says that those attending his religious center are increasingly diverse in ethnic terms but that particularly in the case of indigenous Muslims, religious identity is far more important than nationality, something that largely eliminates any ethnic tensions among them.
That is a summation of the many observations Shamil Alyautdinov made during an extended and highly unusual interview he gave to S.V. Ryzhkova, an expert at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Center of Ethnic Sociology (www.umma.ru/interviews/5036-intervyu-sh-alyautdinova-dlya-czentra-etnicheskoj-socziologii-ran).
According to the imam, “for the indigenous Muslim population of Russia, the religious factor is much more a rallying identity than it was,” while nationality in contrast “over the last 15 years has experienced a declining influence.” Those new arrivals identify with nationality and Islam “at approximately the same level.”
At the present time, Alyautdinov said, “parishioners at the Memorial Mosque on Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow [include] Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingush, Koreans, Avars, Dargins, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Jews, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and others” as well.
During his 13 years at the mosque, however, the imam said that he “never divided people into the categories of Russian and non-Russian. For me,” he continued, “there are Muscovites and guests of the capital, citizens of Russia and those who have come from abroad.” And he has maintained that approach despite the influx of people from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The imam said that “despite this ethnic diversity, the probability of tense relations in the Muslim milieu of Moscow is extremely low, in contrast to the situation of the city more generall where under the influence of the mass media, the probability of conflicts on an inter-ethnic basis is somewhat higher.”
But because Muslims are also members of different ethnic groups, he continued, there is the possibility that there could be ethnic clashes among them, something that can be avoided if the Muslims from abroad are integrated into the umma of Russian believers rather than treated, as the Russian media often do as “not ours.”
One of the reasons why the Moscow umma can be so multi-ethnic, the imam said, is that “95 percent of the services in the capital’s mosques are [now] conducted in Russia, the language which the majority speak and understand.” That is a major change from Soviet times when services were held “only in Tatar.”
Given the positive integrative role that such mosques can play, Alyautdinov said, it is important that more be build, “whither people can come and listen to sermons in Russian.” In that way, the arrivals, both Russian Federation citizens from the North Caucasus and Muslims from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, will feel more at home.
Asked about the presence of Shiite Azerbaijanis in Moscow, the imam responded that “not all Azerbaijanis follow the Shiite tradition.” Moreover, he said, “the difference between Sunnis and Shiites is not large. In [his] mosque, there are Shiite Muslims” and “they feel themselves quite comfortable and fulfill the rituals together with us.”
Unfortunately, Alyautdinov said, the positive message of the mosque is often overwhelmed by the anti-Muslim and anti-non-Russian approach of the Moscow media, which appear to believe that if these groups are criticized enough, “they will russify themselves and accept Christianity, a utopian view and an extremely short-sighted policy.”
At the same time, the imam acknowledged that some of the arrivals who come from abroad do keep to themselves “in order in the first instance to preserve their culture, language, and customs.” But it is important to remember that most of them “do not intend to remain in Moscow for long.”
“There is not particular necessity to enlighten non-Muslims about Islam,” he said. But “there is a great need at the state level to declare more often that Russia is not an Orthodox but a multi-confessional state and that Russia is not for the ethnic Russians but for all the peoples who have been living hundreds and thousands of years in its current borders.”
Staunton, November 7 – The imam of Moscow’s Memorial Mosque says that those attending his religious center are increasingly diverse in ethnic terms but that particularly in the case of indigenous Muslims, religious identity is far more important than nationality, something that largely eliminates any ethnic tensions among them.
That is a summation of the many observations Shamil Alyautdinov made during an extended and highly unusual interview he gave to S.V. Ryzhkova, an expert at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Center of Ethnic Sociology (www.umma.ru/interviews/5036-intervyu-sh-alyautdinova-dlya-czentra-etnicheskoj-socziologii-ran).
According to the imam, “for the indigenous Muslim population of Russia, the religious factor is much more a rallying identity than it was,” while nationality in contrast “over the last 15 years has experienced a declining influence.” Those new arrivals identify with nationality and Islam “at approximately the same level.”
At the present time, Alyautdinov said, “parishioners at the Memorial Mosque on Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow [include] Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingush, Koreans, Avars, Dargins, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Jews, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and others” as well.
During his 13 years at the mosque, however, the imam said that he “never divided people into the categories of Russian and non-Russian. For me,” he continued, “there are Muscovites and guests of the capital, citizens of Russia and those who have come from abroad.” And he has maintained that approach despite the influx of people from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The imam said that “despite this ethnic diversity, the probability of tense relations in the Muslim milieu of Moscow is extremely low, in contrast to the situation of the city more generall where under the influence of the mass media, the probability of conflicts on an inter-ethnic basis is somewhat higher.”
But because Muslims are also members of different ethnic groups, he continued, there is the possibility that there could be ethnic clashes among them, something that can be avoided if the Muslims from abroad are integrated into the umma of Russian believers rather than treated, as the Russian media often do as “not ours.”
One of the reasons why the Moscow umma can be so multi-ethnic, the imam said, is that “95 percent of the services in the capital’s mosques are [now] conducted in Russia, the language which the majority speak and understand.” That is a major change from Soviet times when services were held “only in Tatar.”
Given the positive integrative role that such mosques can play, Alyautdinov said, it is important that more be build, “whither people can come and listen to sermons in Russian.” In that way, the arrivals, both Russian Federation citizens from the North Caucasus and Muslims from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, will feel more at home.
Asked about the presence of Shiite Azerbaijanis in Moscow, the imam responded that “not all Azerbaijanis follow the Shiite tradition.” Moreover, he said, “the difference between Sunnis and Shiites is not large. In [his] mosque, there are Shiite Muslims” and “they feel themselves quite comfortable and fulfill the rituals together with us.”
Unfortunately, Alyautdinov said, the positive message of the mosque is often overwhelmed by the anti-Muslim and anti-non-Russian approach of the Moscow media, which appear to believe that if these groups are criticized enough, “they will russify themselves and accept Christianity, a utopian view and an extremely short-sighted policy.”
At the same time, the imam acknowledged that some of the arrivals who come from abroad do keep to themselves “in order in the first instance to preserve their culture, language, and customs.” But it is important to remember that most of them “do not intend to remain in Moscow for long.”
“There is not particular necessity to enlighten non-Muslims about Islam,” he said. But “there is a great need at the state level to declare more often that Russia is not an Orthodox but a multi-confessional state and that Russia is not for the ethnic Russians but for all the peoples who have been living hundreds and thousands of years in its current borders.”
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