Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – As many as 40 percent of all immigrant workers in the Russian Federation would like to regularize their status and become full members of the community there, an expert on migration says, but neither the Russian state nor most members of Russian society are prepared to take the steps needed to meet them half way.
In part, this reflects a reaction to demagogic commentaries which have dramatically overstated the size of the problem Russia now faces, Vladimir Mukomel, a sociologist who is part of the Strategy 2020 expert group, but in part, it represents an unwillingness to pursue what he calls “Rossianization” rather than “Russificaiton” (svpressa.ru/society/article/43689/).
In an interview with “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist Kirill Zubkov, Mukomel comments first of all on some of the figures which have prompted Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov and other politicians to call for parliamentary hearings on the influx of people they suggest “do not have Russian memory” and “for whom the Russian land is something alien.”
According to Mukomel, “migration is not a problem with which one must struggle but it also is not a panacea for all problems.” It may solve some problems but only at the cost of creating others. And consequently, any discussion of how to address migration must consider both costs and benefits.
By 2030, he points out, Russia is “threatened by something worse than depopulation.” It is threatened by a decline of more than 12 million people of working age, even as the total decline of the population will be only 2.8 million. That means workers increasingly will have to support more non-workers, mostly the elderly, than in the past.
It is thus not clear, Mukomel says, “on whose account Russian pensions will live, given that the percent that they will form in the population is growing while the percentage of workers is falling.” And that will be even more true in the future, when after 2018, the current relative stabilization of Russia’s population ends and a new and more rapid decline begins.
Putting things in the simplest terms, the sociologist continues, “Russia needs new workers immediately, and Russia needs new citizens over time if Russia wants to have a future for itself.”
Many suggest that the solution is to be found in the mass influx of immigrants, but “migration is not a panacea.” And what is necessary is finding a way that allows for “the adaptation of migrants to Russian society – at least in the case of those migrants who want to settle in Russia and become equal citizens of the country.”
The total number of them, like the total number of migrants in the Russian Federation, is often exaggerated, Mukomel insists. There are about 160,000 who seek permanent residence, while something on the order of four million come for seasonal or temporary work and then return home.
The figures politicians toss about are far too large unless one counts all those now in the Russian Federation who were born elsewhere. “For the post-Soviet space, sucha method of accounting is unacceptable. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of citizens of Russia were born and for a long time lived in the former Soviet republics.
“If one follows the logic” of those who invoke the larger figure, Mukomel says, then one has to include in it such people as “Minister of Internal Affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev, who was born on the territory of what is now independent Kazakhstan. Moreover, the younger daughter of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Ekaterina, who was born in Dresden, also is an immigrant.”
While exact statistics are not available, the expert says, sociologists believe that “on average from 25 to 40 percent of the labor migrants who have come to Russia for work are prepared to be integrated” into Russian society.” In fact, many of them already have done so, although they are not in a position to regularize themselves legally.
The reasons for that, he suggests, lie in “the most complete lack of preparedness of [Russian] state structures” to do so as well as the unfortunate reality that “Russian society itself is not ready for the integration of immigrants,” despite the fact that most come from former Soviet areas and speak Russian.
As a result, Mukomel continues, “words about ‘the lack among those who come of Russian memory’ are also untrue: across the entire post-Soviet space, the Russian language is taught up to now and enjoys, for example in Tajikistan, serious demand” because “everyone understands” that one needs Russian if one is to work in Russia.
In other words, his interviewer says, “one is speaking about a certain variant of Russification?” To which Mukomel replies: “I would prefer the term ‘Rossification.’ In the final analysis, the entire history of Russia is the history of Russification, the integration into Rusian society of immigrant masses.”
“Karamzin, Chaadayev, Dal, even Pushkin,” Mukomel oints out, “are all descendents of migrants,” something that “should not be forgotten.” And as far as suggestions that new arrivals supposedly “will not defend the motherland,” one should remember such figures as Barklay de Tolli, Bagration, Totleben and tens of thousands of others” who nobly fought for it.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Once Proud River Fleet Near Collapse
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – Russia’s river fleet on which Moscow in the past has relied to move bulk cargo given the shortage of reliable highways and rail lines is near a state of collapse, threatening the country’s economy and, because of the ecological problems its aging ships present, ability to export many things to European markets.
The Russian Federation has more than 100,000 kilometers of internal waterways deep enough for barge and other shipping traffic, but, Vladimir Rechmensky writes in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli,” the use of this network over the last 20 years has only fallen” and now involves less than two percent of all bulk transport (www.argumenti.ru/society/n290/108373).
According to the calculations of the Volga State Academy of Water Transport, shipping bulk cargo by water is 30 to 40 percent cheaper than moving the same amount by railway or highway, but because the amount now being carried is so small a percentage, Rechmensky says, “globally thinking manager-bureaucrats are not turning their attention” to the rivers.
Russia’s river fleet has always faced problems, experts say, because “in the best case,” the rivers are open for traffic only five months a year, meaning that they must make a profit for the entire year based on less than half a year’s operation. In addition, fuel costs have risen dramatically, and the lack of dredging has reduced the size of the available water network.
Because so little new money is going into this sector, Rechmensky continues, most of the ships are not equipped with contemporary geo-positioning systems. Instead of using GLONASS and GPS, as most other shippers now do, Russian captains are forced to navigate using maps which are updated only “once every three years,” a situation that can lead to accidents.
According to academic experts, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, “at present, the state of the water arteries of the country is at the level it was at in the 1940s and 1950s. [They] and those working in this sector look with tears in their eyes at the step by step destruction of a system that was at one time capable of work.”
Except for yachts and high-end tourist vessels, the Russian river transport system is attracting ever less interest and support, and as a result, “the aging of port and hydro-technical arrangements and the river fleet itself is exceeding the rate of its rebuilding,” with many ships now beyond their projected lifespan and most “older than 30 years.”
With enough funding, these aging ships could be kept operational for several more decades, Rechmensky says, giving as an example a ship in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet which was launched in 1913. But if that is the case for domestic shipping, it is not sufficient when those barges try to carry goods to European ports.
Older ships and barges, Rechmensky points out, “do not correspond to the demands of ecological security” that European countries make and consequently they are not welcome in European ports, limiting the ability of Russia to export bulk cargoes in the most cost-efficient way.
To bring Russia’s river fleet up to international standards, the country would have to replace more than 80 percent of its vessels, some 8000 in all. Given current investment patterns, that is unlikely to happen, and as a result, Russia’s river fleet is “slowly but truly degrading” to the detriment of the country.
Staunton, May 27 – Russia’s river fleet on which Moscow in the past has relied to move bulk cargo given the shortage of reliable highways and rail lines is near a state of collapse, threatening the country’s economy and, because of the ecological problems its aging ships present, ability to export many things to European markets.
The Russian Federation has more than 100,000 kilometers of internal waterways deep enough for barge and other shipping traffic, but, Vladimir Rechmensky writes in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli,” the use of this network over the last 20 years has only fallen” and now involves less than two percent of all bulk transport (www.argumenti.ru/society/n290/108373).
According to the calculations of the Volga State Academy of Water Transport, shipping bulk cargo by water is 30 to 40 percent cheaper than moving the same amount by railway or highway, but because the amount now being carried is so small a percentage, Rechmensky says, “globally thinking manager-bureaucrats are not turning their attention” to the rivers.
Russia’s river fleet has always faced problems, experts say, because “in the best case,” the rivers are open for traffic only five months a year, meaning that they must make a profit for the entire year based on less than half a year’s operation. In addition, fuel costs have risen dramatically, and the lack of dredging has reduced the size of the available water network.
Because so little new money is going into this sector, Rechmensky continues, most of the ships are not equipped with contemporary geo-positioning systems. Instead of using GLONASS and GPS, as most other shippers now do, Russian captains are forced to navigate using maps which are updated only “once every three years,” a situation that can lead to accidents.
According to academic experts, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, “at present, the state of the water arteries of the country is at the level it was at in the 1940s and 1950s. [They] and those working in this sector look with tears in their eyes at the step by step destruction of a system that was at one time capable of work.”
Except for yachts and high-end tourist vessels, the Russian river transport system is attracting ever less interest and support, and as a result, “the aging of port and hydro-technical arrangements and the river fleet itself is exceeding the rate of its rebuilding,” with many ships now beyond their projected lifespan and most “older than 30 years.”
With enough funding, these aging ships could be kept operational for several more decades, Rechmensky says, giving as an example a ship in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet which was launched in 1913. But if that is the case for domestic shipping, it is not sufficient when those barges try to carry goods to European ports.
Older ships and barges, Rechmensky points out, “do not correspond to the demands of ecological security” that European countries make and consequently they are not welcome in European ports, limiting the ability of Russia to export bulk cargoes in the most cost-efficient way.
To bring Russia’s river fleet up to international standards, the country would have to replace more than 80 percent of its vessels, some 8000 in all. Given current investment patterns, that is unlikely to happen, and as a result, Russia’s river fleet is “slowly but truly degrading” to the detriment of the country.
Window on Eurasia: Rise of Siberian Nationality a ‘Positive’ Development, Presidential Plenipotentiary Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – Viktor Tolokonsky, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Siberian Federal District, says that the increasing number of residents of that region who identify as Siberians rather than Russians is “a positive and valuable phenomenon” because it is an indicator of a definite kind of patriotism.”
At the same time, he insisted, “this does not mean that Siberian wants any special status or autonomization” or that it is “a sign of separatism,” adding that he “considers himself a Siberian,” although he did not say, Siberian news outlets pointed out, whether he had identified himself in that way in the recent census (news.vtomske.ru/news/33877.html).
Tolokonsky’s remarks in Tomsk represent a second and far more significant expression of support for “Siberian” as a nationality by a senior Russian official. Earlier, Aleksandr Surinov, the head of Rosstat, the state statistics agency, said that the 2010 census could show “a new nationality – Siberian” (sibir.rian.ru/society/20110525/82087475.html).
There are at least three reasons why Tolokonsky may have made this remark, any of which appears likely to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Russia east of the Urals. First of all, he may simply have wanted to try to put himself among the leaders of an increasingly numerous group in order to draw on its power to put pressure on Moscow.
The rising tide of Siberian anger about Moscow’s exploitation of the region and especially its failure to send enough money back to it is currently epitomized by a campaign Siberian regionalists have launched to demand more funds for building roads in the region at least relative to the amount being spent in European Russia.
Second, the presidential plenipotentiary may have made this comment as part of pre-election maneuvering, seeking to ensure that those who identify as Siberians do not, as they appear to be doing, conclude that they are no friends in the power vertical and thus decide to vote for opponents of United Russia in the upcoming elections.
Or third, Tolokonsky may have made his statement about Siberian nationality to try to weaken it by suggesting that Siberianness is limited to the Siberian Federal District rather than to all of Russia east of the Urals and that the Russian government can embrace it as part of what some might call “repressive tolerance.”
If the first of these reasons points to the way in which a political figure might use such an identification to advance his own political agenda, the second and third could in fact serve Moscow’s interests by defusing somewhat the oppositional nature of Siberian identity or even splitting the movement.
But however that may be, Tolokonsky’s remark underscores the fact that Siberian identity is not nearly as marginal a phenomenon as many in Moscow have assumed and calls attention to two realities that many analysts there pointed to when Vladimir Putin first created the federal districts.
On the one hand, these commentators noted at the time, the presidential plenipotentiaries represented a serious potential problem. If they were not given enough power to rein in those below them, they would simply represent yet another bureaucratic layer rather than a serious step toward increased bureaucratic efficiency.
And on the other, they pointed out, dividing Russia into fewer than ten federal units in place of the more than 80 that had existed up to that point could trigger the disintegration of the country. As several commentators pointed out, no country with more than 15 units had ever come apart while an increasing number with fewer have done so.
It seems unlikely that those calculations were on Tolokonsky’s mind when he made these comments, but it is almost certain that they will be on the minds both of Siberians thinking about their future and of Muscovites concerned about the evolution of the Russian Federation over the next decade.
Staunton, May 27 – Viktor Tolokonsky, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Siberian Federal District, says that the increasing number of residents of that region who identify as Siberians rather than Russians is “a positive and valuable phenomenon” because it is an indicator of a definite kind of patriotism.”
At the same time, he insisted, “this does not mean that Siberian wants any special status or autonomization” or that it is “a sign of separatism,” adding that he “considers himself a Siberian,” although he did not say, Siberian news outlets pointed out, whether he had identified himself in that way in the recent census (news.vtomske.ru/news/33877.html).
Tolokonsky’s remarks in Tomsk represent a second and far more significant expression of support for “Siberian” as a nationality by a senior Russian official. Earlier, Aleksandr Surinov, the head of Rosstat, the state statistics agency, said that the 2010 census could show “a new nationality – Siberian” (sibir.rian.ru/society/20110525/82087475.html).
There are at least three reasons why Tolokonsky may have made this remark, any of which appears likely to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Russia east of the Urals. First of all, he may simply have wanted to try to put himself among the leaders of an increasingly numerous group in order to draw on its power to put pressure on Moscow.
The rising tide of Siberian anger about Moscow’s exploitation of the region and especially its failure to send enough money back to it is currently epitomized by a campaign Siberian regionalists have launched to demand more funds for building roads in the region at least relative to the amount being spent in European Russia.
Second, the presidential plenipotentiary may have made this comment as part of pre-election maneuvering, seeking to ensure that those who identify as Siberians do not, as they appear to be doing, conclude that they are no friends in the power vertical and thus decide to vote for opponents of United Russia in the upcoming elections.
Or third, Tolokonsky may have made his statement about Siberian nationality to try to weaken it by suggesting that Siberianness is limited to the Siberian Federal District rather than to all of Russia east of the Urals and that the Russian government can embrace it as part of what some might call “repressive tolerance.”
If the first of these reasons points to the way in which a political figure might use such an identification to advance his own political agenda, the second and third could in fact serve Moscow’s interests by defusing somewhat the oppositional nature of Siberian identity or even splitting the movement.
But however that may be, Tolokonsky’s remark underscores the fact that Siberian identity is not nearly as marginal a phenomenon as many in Moscow have assumed and calls attention to two realities that many analysts there pointed to when Vladimir Putin first created the federal districts.
On the one hand, these commentators noted at the time, the presidential plenipotentiaries represented a serious potential problem. If they were not given enough power to rein in those below them, they would simply represent yet another bureaucratic layer rather than a serious step toward increased bureaucratic efficiency.
And on the other, they pointed out, dividing Russia into fewer than ten federal units in place of the more than 80 that had existed up to that point could trigger the disintegration of the country. As several commentators pointed out, no country with more than 15 units had ever come apart while an increasing number with fewer have done so.
It seems unlikely that those calculations were on Tolokonsky’s mind when he made these comments, but it is almost certain that they will be on the minds both of Siberians thinking about their future and of Muscovites concerned about the evolution of the Russian Federation over the next decade.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Silantyev Says ‘Hundreds of Thousands’ of Muslims in North Caucasus are Extremists
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state, says that there are currently “hundreds of thousands of Wahhabis and their sympathizers” among the Muslim communities of the republics in the North Caucasus.
Given Silantyev’s track record, one that has often infuriated Muslims who see him as an enemy of their faith and leaders, this figure and the others he offers should not be viewed as definitive. Indeed, as the Russian specialist acknowledges, there is no way to know such things with real precision.
But there are three reasons why his words in this regard are nonetheless important. First, they suggest that many in Moscow are very worried about the growth of Islamic extremism which Silantyev and they often lump together under the term “Wahhabis,” even though the followers of that trend do not call themselves that.
Second, his remarks and the coverage they are receiving suggest that the Wahhabis as Russians understand them may be becoming more active despite all the claims to the contrary that Russian officials and pro-Moscow political and social figures in the North Caucasus have claimed over the last year.
And third, Silantyev’s words suggest that some in Moscow, including leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, are pressing for a new crackdown against Muslim groups not only in the North Caucasus but more generally, an effort that would be likely to provoke a sharp reaction from Muslims and could serve to unify them even more than they are now.
Silantyev told Interfax that Wahhabis form “about five percent” of all Muslims in the Russian Federation, with their share rising to 10 to 15 percent in the North Caucasus. “When there will be more than 40 percent,” he continued, “one can calculated that they have already won” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40864).
In the North Caucasus, he continued, Daghestan has the largest number of Wahhabis with some 30,000 people being followers of that trend. In Ingushetia, Silantyev suggested, there are “approximately 10,000. Among “the most problematic republics” is Kabardino-Balkaria, and there are also “a large percentage of radicals” among the Muslims in Stavropol kray.
In Chechnya, the specialist said, Ramzan Kadyrov has done a lot to improve the situation, “but [despite his efforts] the problem remains.” As for supporters and sympathizers, he continued, their numbers are in “the hundreds of thousands,” a large share of the total population in that troubled region.
Asked about the level of Wahhabist penetration of mullahs and imams in the Russian Federation, Silantyev said that “there is no separate statistic on this,” but in the words of Interfax, he “expressed the opinion that it is ‘much less than half,’” leaving it to his listeners to determine just how much less.
“At the same time,” Silantyev continued, “there is an opinion that among the religious leaders, the percent of radicalization is higher than among ordinary Muslims ‘because Wahhabis in the first instance work with spiritual leaders and there is thus a high percentage of imams who sympathize with them.’”
But it is impossible to know just how many of these are showing sympathy or open support for the Wahhabis are actual converts because many of them “being subject to pressure from the side of the bandits,” speak in favor of the Wahhabis “out of a feeling of fear for their own lives,” something the Russian authorities should try to remedy.
Staunton, May 25 – Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state, says that there are currently “hundreds of thousands of Wahhabis and their sympathizers” among the Muslim communities of the republics in the North Caucasus.
Given Silantyev’s track record, one that has often infuriated Muslims who see him as an enemy of their faith and leaders, this figure and the others he offers should not be viewed as definitive. Indeed, as the Russian specialist acknowledges, there is no way to know such things with real precision.
But there are three reasons why his words in this regard are nonetheless important. First, they suggest that many in Moscow are very worried about the growth of Islamic extremism which Silantyev and they often lump together under the term “Wahhabis,” even though the followers of that trend do not call themselves that.
Second, his remarks and the coverage they are receiving suggest that the Wahhabis as Russians understand them may be becoming more active despite all the claims to the contrary that Russian officials and pro-Moscow political and social figures in the North Caucasus have claimed over the last year.
And third, Silantyev’s words suggest that some in Moscow, including leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, are pressing for a new crackdown against Muslim groups not only in the North Caucasus but more generally, an effort that would be likely to provoke a sharp reaction from Muslims and could serve to unify them even more than they are now.
Silantyev told Interfax that Wahhabis form “about five percent” of all Muslims in the Russian Federation, with their share rising to 10 to 15 percent in the North Caucasus. “When there will be more than 40 percent,” he continued, “one can calculated that they have already won” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40864).
In the North Caucasus, he continued, Daghestan has the largest number of Wahhabis with some 30,000 people being followers of that trend. In Ingushetia, Silantyev suggested, there are “approximately 10,000. Among “the most problematic republics” is Kabardino-Balkaria, and there are also “a large percentage of radicals” among the Muslims in Stavropol kray.
In Chechnya, the specialist said, Ramzan Kadyrov has done a lot to improve the situation, “but [despite his efforts] the problem remains.” As for supporters and sympathizers, he continued, their numbers are in “the hundreds of thousands,” a large share of the total population in that troubled region.
Asked about the level of Wahhabist penetration of mullahs and imams in the Russian Federation, Silantyev said that “there is no separate statistic on this,” but in the words of Interfax, he “expressed the opinion that it is ‘much less than half,’” leaving it to his listeners to determine just how much less.
“At the same time,” Silantyev continued, “there is an opinion that among the religious leaders, the percent of radicalization is higher than among ordinary Muslims ‘because Wahhabis in the first instance work with spiritual leaders and there is thus a high percentage of imams who sympathize with them.’”
But it is impossible to know just how many of these are showing sympathy or open support for the Wahhabis are actual converts because many of them “being subject to pressure from the side of the bandits,” speak in favor of the Wahhabis “out of a feeling of fear for their own lives,” something the Russian authorities should try to remedy.
Window on Eurasia: Kyiv Urged to Declare 1944 Deportation of Crimean Tatars an Act of Genocide
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – The Georgian parliament’s decision last week to declare the Russian repression of the Circassians 150 years ago a genocide, a decision that has infuriated Moscow, could have a far broader impact than even its critics have suggested. Indeed, it could lead other groups victimized in the past to seek similar declarations from governments in the region now.
That possibility is suggested by the proposal of the Ukrainian Peoples Party this week that the Ukrainian government declare the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin in 1944 “an act of genocide and a crime against humanity,” something for which international law specifies that there is no statute of limitations (http://www.qha.com.ua/haber2.php?id=6511).
Oleg Fomushkin, the head of the Crimean section of that party, said that “at the moment [of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944], “51 percent of Crimean Tatar men had ben mobilized and were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army and [an additional] 11 percent fought in partisan units.”
As a result, the Ukrainian Peoples Party continued, Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the first instance involved “older people, women and children” rather than those who might as Moscow then charged have collaborated with the invading German forces against the Soviet Union.
“In this way, the actions of the Communist powers, in terms of the UN Convention ‘On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Punishment for It’ falls under the definition of genocide since for the Crimean Tatars were intentionally created conditions which were calculated to lead to the full or partial destruction” of that people.
According to researchers, during “only the first years” of exile in Central Asia, Siberia and the Urals, “almost half” of the Crimean nation was lost” to premature deaths. Moreover, that exile continued for almost all until the end of 1989 and continues for more than 150,000 to this day, making genocide charges in this case especially explosive.
Moreover, for almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were “deprived of the rights of ethnic self-identification” by the Soviet authorities who refused to allow them to call themselves Crimean Tatars and who prohibited the use of the Crimean Tatar language in schools and kindergartens as part of an effort to destroy any future for that nation.
Over the last week, Russian media outlets have been full of attacks on the Georgian decision. (See, among others, www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/05/25/mifologija-genocida-cherkesskij-vopros-i-plany-saakashvili.html, novopol.ru/-saakashvili-razyigral-cherkesskuyu-kartu--text101859.html, www.win.ru/school/7268.phtml and www.politcom.ru/12010.html).
But almost all of them have focused only on the impact of Tbilisi’s decision on the North Caucasus rather than discussing the ways in which the Georgian Parliament’s declaration that the Russian Empire committed a genocide against the Circassians has broader implications for the Russian Federation and indeed for Eurasia as a whole.
An exception to this is an article by a pro-Russian journalist in Ukraine who in an article posted online today explicitly considers the ways in which the Circassian decision may have an impact on the Crimean Tatars and through the Crimean Tatars on other groups inside the borders of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states.
In an essay posted on the Materik.ru portal, Vladislav Gulyevich, a commentator for Kyiv’s “Chas Pik” weekly, argues that “Crimea and the project of Greater Circassia are steps along the path to the conquest of the entire Caucasus region” by the Western powers with Russian influence there being excluded (www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=12688).
The success of such an enterprise, he argues, would hurt “not only Russia but also Turkey which would find itself in the position of ‘a loser who had not fought.’” And that, Gulyevich argues, makes the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky “about the unity of Slavs and Turks“ especially important and a possible barrier to the further unraveling of Russia and its neighbors.
Gasprinsky’s name and works may not be widely known in many quarters, but that appears likely to change in the coming weeks, given his ideas on this point which Gulyevich outlines with approval and given a conference this week in Moscow on the great Crimean Tatar thinker on his 160th birthday (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusanons/16178/).
That conference as well as Gasprinsky’s ideas are likely to make the issue of the Soviet genocide of the Crimean Tatars not only the focus of political debates in Kyiv and Moscow but also lead other peoples, themselves victimized by Russian imperialism, to seek recognition from other governments of what was done to them.
Staunton, May 25 – The Georgian parliament’s decision last week to declare the Russian repression of the Circassians 150 years ago a genocide, a decision that has infuriated Moscow, could have a far broader impact than even its critics have suggested. Indeed, it could lead other groups victimized in the past to seek similar declarations from governments in the region now.
That possibility is suggested by the proposal of the Ukrainian Peoples Party this week that the Ukrainian government declare the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin in 1944 “an act of genocide and a crime against humanity,” something for which international law specifies that there is no statute of limitations (http://www.qha.com.ua/haber2.php?id=6511).
Oleg Fomushkin, the head of the Crimean section of that party, said that “at the moment [of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944], “51 percent of Crimean Tatar men had ben mobilized and were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army and [an additional] 11 percent fought in partisan units.”
As a result, the Ukrainian Peoples Party continued, Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the first instance involved “older people, women and children” rather than those who might as Moscow then charged have collaborated with the invading German forces against the Soviet Union.
“In this way, the actions of the Communist powers, in terms of the UN Convention ‘On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Punishment for It’ falls under the definition of genocide since for the Crimean Tatars were intentionally created conditions which were calculated to lead to the full or partial destruction” of that people.
According to researchers, during “only the first years” of exile in Central Asia, Siberia and the Urals, “almost half” of the Crimean nation was lost” to premature deaths. Moreover, that exile continued for almost all until the end of 1989 and continues for more than 150,000 to this day, making genocide charges in this case especially explosive.
Moreover, for almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were “deprived of the rights of ethnic self-identification” by the Soviet authorities who refused to allow them to call themselves Crimean Tatars and who prohibited the use of the Crimean Tatar language in schools and kindergartens as part of an effort to destroy any future for that nation.
Over the last week, Russian media outlets have been full of attacks on the Georgian decision. (See, among others, www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/05/25/mifologija-genocida-cherkesskij-vopros-i-plany-saakashvili.html, novopol.ru/-saakashvili-razyigral-cherkesskuyu-kartu--text101859.html, www.win.ru/school/7268.phtml and www.politcom.ru/12010.html).
But almost all of them have focused only on the impact of Tbilisi’s decision on the North Caucasus rather than discussing the ways in which the Georgian Parliament’s declaration that the Russian Empire committed a genocide against the Circassians has broader implications for the Russian Federation and indeed for Eurasia as a whole.
An exception to this is an article by a pro-Russian journalist in Ukraine who in an article posted online today explicitly considers the ways in which the Circassian decision may have an impact on the Crimean Tatars and through the Crimean Tatars on other groups inside the borders of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states.
In an essay posted on the Materik.ru portal, Vladislav Gulyevich, a commentator for Kyiv’s “Chas Pik” weekly, argues that “Crimea and the project of Greater Circassia are steps along the path to the conquest of the entire Caucasus region” by the Western powers with Russian influence there being excluded (www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=12688).
The success of such an enterprise, he argues, would hurt “not only Russia but also Turkey which would find itself in the position of ‘a loser who had not fought.’” And that, Gulyevich argues, makes the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky “about the unity of Slavs and Turks“ especially important and a possible barrier to the further unraveling of Russia and its neighbors.
Gasprinsky’s name and works may not be widely known in many quarters, but that appears likely to change in the coming weeks, given his ideas on this point which Gulyevich outlines with approval and given a conference this week in Moscow on the great Crimean Tatar thinker on his 160th birthday (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusanons/16178/).
That conference as well as Gasprinsky’s ideas are likely to make the issue of the Soviet genocide of the Crimean Tatars not only the focus of political debates in Kyiv and Moscow but also lead other peoples, themselves victimized by Russian imperialism, to seek recognition from other governments of what was done to them.
Window on Eurasia: Historical Analogies Matter in Russia Because Lessons Aren’t Learned, Crimes Aren’t Punished and Mistakes Aren’t Overcome, Pavlova Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Unlike in Western countries which have law-based states, historical analogies are particularly important and suggestive in Russia because there “the lessons of the past are not learned, crimes by the state are not punished, and mistakes are not overcome,” according to Grani.ru commentator Irina Pavlova.
That reality, she argues in her latest commentary, makes especially worrisome “the essential similarity” between what is going on in the Russian political system now and what took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1937, the year that opened the way to what is often called “the great terror” (grani.ru/opinion/m.188681.html).
In advance of the December 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Pavlova notes, Andrey Zhdanov, then a candidate member to the Politburo, said it was necessary to achieve “the furthest most strengthening of the political activity of the masses and the inclusion of new strata of the toilers in the work of the administration of the state,” adding that the Bolshevik Party must “guarantee its leading role in the front of ‘social organizations and the society of the toilers.”
Two weeks ago, in advance of the Duma elections scheduled for December 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the establishment of an All-Russian Peoples Front and said in Volgograd [formerly Stalingrad] that “namely the United Russia Party must lead the preparation of the masses for the elections.”
Several days later, Putin said that “we are creating the All-Russian Peoples Front in order that there will be a demand for all constructive ideas” from various parts of society and that there will be “an additional chance for the immediate direct participation [of the masses] in the development of the most important government decisions.”
In 1937, Pavlova continues, “only ‘social organizations and societies of toilers’ could nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and the chief jurist of the USSR at that time, Andrey Vyzhinsky, said that these groups are those which put “as their task the active participation in socialist construction of the USSR and also the support of the strengthening of the defense of the country.”
Those qualities at the time deprived groups like religious parishes “which were permitted to exist only for ‘the satisfaction of their religious requirements,” of a similar right to nominate candidates.
At present, Pavlova says, citizens “inclined toward opposition” are similarly excluded. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, said that opposition figures like Eduard Limonov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov could not join the new peoples front because “as far as I am aware, these persons do not share either the strategic or tactical goals of United Russia.”
“In 1937,” Pavlova continues, “mass popular enthusiasm was observed.” That enthusiasm was then directed against Stalin’s opponents. Indeed, it was at the same party plenum that a decision was approved to “transfer the cases of Bukharin and Ryzhkov to the NKVD” and to go after regional leaders who displayed “a cult of personality.”
During the 1937 election campaign, there was much talk about “wreckers” and “enemies of the people.” Now, the “main” subject, according to President Dmitry Medvedev is “the struggle with corruption,” a struggle that is supposed to involve, just like its predecessor, “the most varied forces” and be directed at those viewed as the opponents of the Kremlin.
Pavlova points out that as a result, “in 1937, the mass election campaign became a cover for the conduct of a government policy of repression.” Today, there are differences, but the current situation “ever more recalls one before a storm” that must “somehow or other” break out as part of a resolution.
Obviously historical analogies do not explain everything, Pavlova says, but she asks a series of pointed questions on the basis of her comparison: “Will the struggle with corruption turn out to be a new edition of the cadres reform of 1937?” Will the current leadership which is riddled with thieves be replaced by “young ‘nashists,’ ready to struggle for modernization?”
And even more seriously, “will ‘a cadres reform’ of the 2011 model develop in such a way, if it does take place, that it will lead to a broad struggle with ‘extremists,’ ‘extra-systemic liberals’ and other citizens” the regime’s leaders view as “disloyal.” The danger is real enough, she suggests, to justify real alarm.
Staunton, May 25 – Unlike in Western countries which have law-based states, historical analogies are particularly important and suggestive in Russia because there “the lessons of the past are not learned, crimes by the state are not punished, and mistakes are not overcome,” according to Grani.ru commentator Irina Pavlova.
That reality, she argues in her latest commentary, makes especially worrisome “the essential similarity” between what is going on in the Russian political system now and what took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1937, the year that opened the way to what is often called “the great terror” (grani.ru/opinion/m.188681.html).
In advance of the December 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Pavlova notes, Andrey Zhdanov, then a candidate member to the Politburo, said it was necessary to achieve “the furthest most strengthening of the political activity of the masses and the inclusion of new strata of the toilers in the work of the administration of the state,” adding that the Bolshevik Party must “guarantee its leading role in the front of ‘social organizations and the society of the toilers.”
Two weeks ago, in advance of the Duma elections scheduled for December 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the establishment of an All-Russian Peoples Front and said in Volgograd [formerly Stalingrad] that “namely the United Russia Party must lead the preparation of the masses for the elections.”
Several days later, Putin said that “we are creating the All-Russian Peoples Front in order that there will be a demand for all constructive ideas” from various parts of society and that there will be “an additional chance for the immediate direct participation [of the masses] in the development of the most important government decisions.”
In 1937, Pavlova continues, “only ‘social organizations and societies of toilers’ could nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and the chief jurist of the USSR at that time, Andrey Vyzhinsky, said that these groups are those which put “as their task the active participation in socialist construction of the USSR and also the support of the strengthening of the defense of the country.”
Those qualities at the time deprived groups like religious parishes “which were permitted to exist only for ‘the satisfaction of their religious requirements,” of a similar right to nominate candidates.
At present, Pavlova says, citizens “inclined toward opposition” are similarly excluded. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, said that opposition figures like Eduard Limonov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov could not join the new peoples front because “as far as I am aware, these persons do not share either the strategic or tactical goals of United Russia.”
“In 1937,” Pavlova continues, “mass popular enthusiasm was observed.” That enthusiasm was then directed against Stalin’s opponents. Indeed, it was at the same party plenum that a decision was approved to “transfer the cases of Bukharin and Ryzhkov to the NKVD” and to go after regional leaders who displayed “a cult of personality.”
During the 1937 election campaign, there was much talk about “wreckers” and “enemies of the people.” Now, the “main” subject, according to President Dmitry Medvedev is “the struggle with corruption,” a struggle that is supposed to involve, just like its predecessor, “the most varied forces” and be directed at those viewed as the opponents of the Kremlin.
Pavlova points out that as a result, “in 1937, the mass election campaign became a cover for the conduct of a government policy of repression.” Today, there are differences, but the current situation “ever more recalls one before a storm” that must “somehow or other” break out as part of a resolution.
Obviously historical analogies do not explain everything, Pavlova says, but she asks a series of pointed questions on the basis of her comparison: “Will the struggle with corruption turn out to be a new edition of the cadres reform of 1937?” Will the current leadership which is riddled with thieves be replaced by “young ‘nashists,’ ready to struggle for modernization?”
And even more seriously, “will ‘a cadres reform’ of the 2011 model develop in such a way, if it does take place, that it will lead to a broad struggle with ‘extremists,’ ‘extra-systemic liberals’ and other citizens” the regime’s leaders view as “disloyal.” The danger is real enough, she suggests, to justify real alarm.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Despite Promises, Russian Draftees are Fighting and Dying in the North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 24 – Despite repeated promises by senior Moscow officials and the explicit provisions of several laws, Russian draftees are being sent to fight and die in the hotspots of the North Caucasus, a situation a major Moscow paper is calling attention to and one likely to spark both more resistance to the draft and more questions about Russia’s policies in that region.
The deaths of several draftees in Ingushetia have prompted “Moskovsky komsomolets” to declare in a headline that “The Russian Army is Outside the Law” because the defense ministry has declared that such personnel “must not be involved in counter-terrorist operations” (www.mk.ru/politics/article/2011/05/19/590609-rossiyskaya-armiya-vne-zakona.html).
Indeed, the widely published ministerial decree specifies that draftees are not even to be positioned “in the zone” of such counter-terrorist operations. Apparently, the paper continued, “the command of the military unit does not know anything about this order. Or how else can one explain the fact” that this set of deaths of draftees is not the first?
A source in the military procuracy told the paper that “such violations are taking place everywhere,” even though commanders know the order and investigators have addressed many of these situations, a process that is complicated because commanders often do what they can to hide the facts of these and other violations of the military code.
The major reason commanders want to use draftees is that such personnel cost less and are far more numerous than professional soldiers, but another experts say is that the latter are far more prepared to speak up for their rights than are the draftees. If the pay of the professionals is late, for example, they raise such a fuss that commanders hurry to address the problem.
Because the command is unwilling to investigate these violations, activists have appealed to the Counter-Terrorist Committee and also to the Federation Council, but they have either been ignored or “given to understand that about the Russian Army today one can speak only as about the dead – either something good or nothing at all.”
However, the numerous cases of the violation of the defense minstry’s own orders and of the rights of draftees almost certainly will increase calls for a shift to a professional military, something Russia would find hard to pay for unless it significantly reduced the size of its armed forces, or an increase in the amount of draft resistance.
And in the current environment, these two trends appear to be coming together. In St. Petersburg over the weekend, for example, some 150 people staged a demonstration under the banner “Say No to the Draft” during which speakers called for the creation of a purely professional military (ingria.info/lenta/347-2011-05-22-08-50-40).
This meeting is likely to lead to others, all the more so because it was organized by groups with sections elsewhere and by political parties, including Yabloko, which are likely to be interested in using this issue to attract attention and support in the run up to the 2011 and 2012 elections.
Staunton, May 24 – Despite repeated promises by senior Moscow officials and the explicit provisions of several laws, Russian draftees are being sent to fight and die in the hotspots of the North Caucasus, a situation a major Moscow paper is calling attention to and one likely to spark both more resistance to the draft and more questions about Russia’s policies in that region.
The deaths of several draftees in Ingushetia have prompted “Moskovsky komsomolets” to declare in a headline that “The Russian Army is Outside the Law” because the defense ministry has declared that such personnel “must not be involved in counter-terrorist operations” (www.mk.ru/politics/article/2011/05/19/590609-rossiyskaya-armiya-vne-zakona.html).
Indeed, the widely published ministerial decree specifies that draftees are not even to be positioned “in the zone” of such counter-terrorist operations. Apparently, the paper continued, “the command of the military unit does not know anything about this order. Or how else can one explain the fact” that this set of deaths of draftees is not the first?
A source in the military procuracy told the paper that “such violations are taking place everywhere,” even though commanders know the order and investigators have addressed many of these situations, a process that is complicated because commanders often do what they can to hide the facts of these and other violations of the military code.
The major reason commanders want to use draftees is that such personnel cost less and are far more numerous than professional soldiers, but another experts say is that the latter are far more prepared to speak up for their rights than are the draftees. If the pay of the professionals is late, for example, they raise such a fuss that commanders hurry to address the problem.
Because the command is unwilling to investigate these violations, activists have appealed to the Counter-Terrorist Committee and also to the Federation Council, but they have either been ignored or “given to understand that about the Russian Army today one can speak only as about the dead – either something good or nothing at all.”
However, the numerous cases of the violation of the defense minstry’s own orders and of the rights of draftees almost certainly will increase calls for a shift to a professional military, something Russia would find hard to pay for unless it significantly reduced the size of its armed forces, or an increase in the amount of draft resistance.
And in the current environment, these two trends appear to be coming together. In St. Petersburg over the weekend, for example, some 150 people staged a demonstration under the banner “Say No to the Draft” during which speakers called for the creation of a purely professional military (ingria.info/lenta/347-2011-05-22-08-50-40).
This meeting is likely to lead to others, all the more so because it was organized by groups with sections elsewhere and by political parties, including Yabloko, which are likely to be interested in using this issue to attract attention and support in the run up to the 2011 and 2012 elections.
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