Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – Viktor Tolokonsky, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Siberian Federal District, says that the increasing number of residents of that region who identify as Siberians rather than Russians is “a positive and valuable phenomenon” because it is an indicator of a definite kind of patriotism.”
At the same time, he insisted, “this does not mean that Siberian wants any special status or autonomization” or that it is “a sign of separatism,” adding that he “considers himself a Siberian,” although he did not say, Siberian news outlets pointed out, whether he had identified himself in that way in the recent census (news.vtomske.ru/news/33877.html).
Tolokonsky’s remarks in Tomsk represent a second and far more significant expression of support for “Siberian” as a nationality by a senior Russian official. Earlier, Aleksandr Surinov, the head of Rosstat, the state statistics agency, said that the 2010 census could show “a new nationality – Siberian” (sibir.rian.ru/society/20110525/82087475.html).
There are at least three reasons why Tolokonsky may have made this remark, any of which appears likely to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Russia east of the Urals. First of all, he may simply have wanted to try to put himself among the leaders of an increasingly numerous group in order to draw on its power to put pressure on Moscow.
The rising tide of Siberian anger about Moscow’s exploitation of the region and especially its failure to send enough money back to it is currently epitomized by a campaign Siberian regionalists have launched to demand more funds for building roads in the region at least relative to the amount being spent in European Russia.
Second, the presidential plenipotentiary may have made this comment as part of pre-election maneuvering, seeking to ensure that those who identify as Siberians do not, as they appear to be doing, conclude that they are no friends in the power vertical and thus decide to vote for opponents of United Russia in the upcoming elections.
Or third, Tolokonsky may have made his statement about Siberian nationality to try to weaken it by suggesting that Siberianness is limited to the Siberian Federal District rather than to all of Russia east of the Urals and that the Russian government can embrace it as part of what some might call “repressive tolerance.”
If the first of these reasons points to the way in which a political figure might use such an identification to advance his own political agenda, the second and third could in fact serve Moscow’s interests by defusing somewhat the oppositional nature of Siberian identity or even splitting the movement.
But however that may be, Tolokonsky’s remark underscores the fact that Siberian identity is not nearly as marginal a phenomenon as many in Moscow have assumed and calls attention to two realities that many analysts there pointed to when Vladimir Putin first created the federal districts.
On the one hand, these commentators noted at the time, the presidential plenipotentiaries represented a serious potential problem. If they were not given enough power to rein in those below them, they would simply represent yet another bureaucratic layer rather than a serious step toward increased bureaucratic efficiency.
And on the other, they pointed out, dividing Russia into fewer than ten federal units in place of the more than 80 that had existed up to that point could trigger the disintegration of the country. As several commentators pointed out, no country with more than 15 units had ever come apart while an increasing number with fewer have done so.
It seems unlikely that those calculations were on Tolokonsky’s mind when he made these comments, but it is almost certain that they will be on the minds both of Siberians thinking about their future and of Muscovites concerned about the evolution of the Russian Federation over the next decade.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Silantyev Says ‘Hundreds of Thousands’ of Muslims in North Caucasus are Extremists
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state, says that there are currently “hundreds of thousands of Wahhabis and their sympathizers” among the Muslim communities of the republics in the North Caucasus.
Given Silantyev’s track record, one that has often infuriated Muslims who see him as an enemy of their faith and leaders, this figure and the others he offers should not be viewed as definitive. Indeed, as the Russian specialist acknowledges, there is no way to know such things with real precision.
But there are three reasons why his words in this regard are nonetheless important. First, they suggest that many in Moscow are very worried about the growth of Islamic extremism which Silantyev and they often lump together under the term “Wahhabis,” even though the followers of that trend do not call themselves that.
Second, his remarks and the coverage they are receiving suggest that the Wahhabis as Russians understand them may be becoming more active despite all the claims to the contrary that Russian officials and pro-Moscow political and social figures in the North Caucasus have claimed over the last year.
And third, Silantyev’s words suggest that some in Moscow, including leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, are pressing for a new crackdown against Muslim groups not only in the North Caucasus but more generally, an effort that would be likely to provoke a sharp reaction from Muslims and could serve to unify them even more than they are now.
Silantyev told Interfax that Wahhabis form “about five percent” of all Muslims in the Russian Federation, with their share rising to 10 to 15 percent in the North Caucasus. “When there will be more than 40 percent,” he continued, “one can calculated that they have already won” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40864).
In the North Caucasus, he continued, Daghestan has the largest number of Wahhabis with some 30,000 people being followers of that trend. In Ingushetia, Silantyev suggested, there are “approximately 10,000. Among “the most problematic republics” is Kabardino-Balkaria, and there are also “a large percentage of radicals” among the Muslims in Stavropol kray.
In Chechnya, the specialist said, Ramzan Kadyrov has done a lot to improve the situation, “but [despite his efforts] the problem remains.” As for supporters and sympathizers, he continued, their numbers are in “the hundreds of thousands,” a large share of the total population in that troubled region.
Asked about the level of Wahhabist penetration of mullahs and imams in the Russian Federation, Silantyev said that “there is no separate statistic on this,” but in the words of Interfax, he “expressed the opinion that it is ‘much less than half,’” leaving it to his listeners to determine just how much less.
“At the same time,” Silantyev continued, “there is an opinion that among the religious leaders, the percent of radicalization is higher than among ordinary Muslims ‘because Wahhabis in the first instance work with spiritual leaders and there is thus a high percentage of imams who sympathize with them.’”
But it is impossible to know just how many of these are showing sympathy or open support for the Wahhabis are actual converts because many of them “being subject to pressure from the side of the bandits,” speak in favor of the Wahhabis “out of a feeling of fear for their own lives,” something the Russian authorities should try to remedy.
Staunton, May 25 – Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state, says that there are currently “hundreds of thousands of Wahhabis and their sympathizers” among the Muslim communities of the republics in the North Caucasus.
Given Silantyev’s track record, one that has often infuriated Muslims who see him as an enemy of their faith and leaders, this figure and the others he offers should not be viewed as definitive. Indeed, as the Russian specialist acknowledges, there is no way to know such things with real precision.
But there are three reasons why his words in this regard are nonetheless important. First, they suggest that many in Moscow are very worried about the growth of Islamic extremism which Silantyev and they often lump together under the term “Wahhabis,” even though the followers of that trend do not call themselves that.
Second, his remarks and the coverage they are receiving suggest that the Wahhabis as Russians understand them may be becoming more active despite all the claims to the contrary that Russian officials and pro-Moscow political and social figures in the North Caucasus have claimed over the last year.
And third, Silantyev’s words suggest that some in Moscow, including leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, are pressing for a new crackdown against Muslim groups not only in the North Caucasus but more generally, an effort that would be likely to provoke a sharp reaction from Muslims and could serve to unify them even more than they are now.
Silantyev told Interfax that Wahhabis form “about five percent” of all Muslims in the Russian Federation, with their share rising to 10 to 15 percent in the North Caucasus. “When there will be more than 40 percent,” he continued, “one can calculated that they have already won” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40864).
In the North Caucasus, he continued, Daghestan has the largest number of Wahhabis with some 30,000 people being followers of that trend. In Ingushetia, Silantyev suggested, there are “approximately 10,000. Among “the most problematic republics” is Kabardino-Balkaria, and there are also “a large percentage of radicals” among the Muslims in Stavropol kray.
In Chechnya, the specialist said, Ramzan Kadyrov has done a lot to improve the situation, “but [despite his efforts] the problem remains.” As for supporters and sympathizers, he continued, their numbers are in “the hundreds of thousands,” a large share of the total population in that troubled region.
Asked about the level of Wahhabist penetration of mullahs and imams in the Russian Federation, Silantyev said that “there is no separate statistic on this,” but in the words of Interfax, he “expressed the opinion that it is ‘much less than half,’” leaving it to his listeners to determine just how much less.
“At the same time,” Silantyev continued, “there is an opinion that among the religious leaders, the percent of radicalization is higher than among ordinary Muslims ‘because Wahhabis in the first instance work with spiritual leaders and there is thus a high percentage of imams who sympathize with them.’”
But it is impossible to know just how many of these are showing sympathy or open support for the Wahhabis are actual converts because many of them “being subject to pressure from the side of the bandits,” speak in favor of the Wahhabis “out of a feeling of fear for their own lives,” something the Russian authorities should try to remedy.
Window on Eurasia: Kyiv Urged to Declare 1944 Deportation of Crimean Tatars an Act of Genocide
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – The Georgian parliament’s decision last week to declare the Russian repression of the Circassians 150 years ago a genocide, a decision that has infuriated Moscow, could have a far broader impact than even its critics have suggested. Indeed, it could lead other groups victimized in the past to seek similar declarations from governments in the region now.
That possibility is suggested by the proposal of the Ukrainian Peoples Party this week that the Ukrainian government declare the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin in 1944 “an act of genocide and a crime against humanity,” something for which international law specifies that there is no statute of limitations (http://www.qha.com.ua/haber2.php?id=6511).
Oleg Fomushkin, the head of the Crimean section of that party, said that “at the moment [of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944], “51 percent of Crimean Tatar men had ben mobilized and were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army and [an additional] 11 percent fought in partisan units.”
As a result, the Ukrainian Peoples Party continued, Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the first instance involved “older people, women and children” rather than those who might as Moscow then charged have collaborated with the invading German forces against the Soviet Union.
“In this way, the actions of the Communist powers, in terms of the UN Convention ‘On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Punishment for It’ falls under the definition of genocide since for the Crimean Tatars were intentionally created conditions which were calculated to lead to the full or partial destruction” of that people.
According to researchers, during “only the first years” of exile in Central Asia, Siberia and the Urals, “almost half” of the Crimean nation was lost” to premature deaths. Moreover, that exile continued for almost all until the end of 1989 and continues for more than 150,000 to this day, making genocide charges in this case especially explosive.
Moreover, for almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were “deprived of the rights of ethnic self-identification” by the Soviet authorities who refused to allow them to call themselves Crimean Tatars and who prohibited the use of the Crimean Tatar language in schools and kindergartens as part of an effort to destroy any future for that nation.
Over the last week, Russian media outlets have been full of attacks on the Georgian decision. (See, among others, www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/05/25/mifologija-genocida-cherkesskij-vopros-i-plany-saakashvili.html, novopol.ru/-saakashvili-razyigral-cherkesskuyu-kartu--text101859.html, www.win.ru/school/7268.phtml and www.politcom.ru/12010.html).
But almost all of them have focused only on the impact of Tbilisi’s decision on the North Caucasus rather than discussing the ways in which the Georgian Parliament’s declaration that the Russian Empire committed a genocide against the Circassians has broader implications for the Russian Federation and indeed for Eurasia as a whole.
An exception to this is an article by a pro-Russian journalist in Ukraine who in an article posted online today explicitly considers the ways in which the Circassian decision may have an impact on the Crimean Tatars and through the Crimean Tatars on other groups inside the borders of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states.
In an essay posted on the Materik.ru portal, Vladislav Gulyevich, a commentator for Kyiv’s “Chas Pik” weekly, argues that “Crimea and the project of Greater Circassia are steps along the path to the conquest of the entire Caucasus region” by the Western powers with Russian influence there being excluded (www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=12688).
The success of such an enterprise, he argues, would hurt “not only Russia but also Turkey which would find itself in the position of ‘a loser who had not fought.’” And that, Gulyevich argues, makes the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky “about the unity of Slavs and Turks“ especially important and a possible barrier to the further unraveling of Russia and its neighbors.
Gasprinsky’s name and works may not be widely known in many quarters, but that appears likely to change in the coming weeks, given his ideas on this point which Gulyevich outlines with approval and given a conference this week in Moscow on the great Crimean Tatar thinker on his 160th birthday (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusanons/16178/).
That conference as well as Gasprinsky’s ideas are likely to make the issue of the Soviet genocide of the Crimean Tatars not only the focus of political debates in Kyiv and Moscow but also lead other peoples, themselves victimized by Russian imperialism, to seek recognition from other governments of what was done to them.
Staunton, May 25 – The Georgian parliament’s decision last week to declare the Russian repression of the Circassians 150 years ago a genocide, a decision that has infuriated Moscow, could have a far broader impact than even its critics have suggested. Indeed, it could lead other groups victimized in the past to seek similar declarations from governments in the region now.
That possibility is suggested by the proposal of the Ukrainian Peoples Party this week that the Ukrainian government declare the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin in 1944 “an act of genocide and a crime against humanity,” something for which international law specifies that there is no statute of limitations (http://www.qha.com.ua/haber2.php?id=6511).
Oleg Fomushkin, the head of the Crimean section of that party, said that “at the moment [of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944], “51 percent of Crimean Tatar men had ben mobilized and were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army and [an additional] 11 percent fought in partisan units.”
As a result, the Ukrainian Peoples Party continued, Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the first instance involved “older people, women and children” rather than those who might as Moscow then charged have collaborated with the invading German forces against the Soviet Union.
“In this way, the actions of the Communist powers, in terms of the UN Convention ‘On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Punishment for It’ falls under the definition of genocide since for the Crimean Tatars were intentionally created conditions which were calculated to lead to the full or partial destruction” of that people.
According to researchers, during “only the first years” of exile in Central Asia, Siberia and the Urals, “almost half” of the Crimean nation was lost” to premature deaths. Moreover, that exile continued for almost all until the end of 1989 and continues for more than 150,000 to this day, making genocide charges in this case especially explosive.
Moreover, for almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were “deprived of the rights of ethnic self-identification” by the Soviet authorities who refused to allow them to call themselves Crimean Tatars and who prohibited the use of the Crimean Tatar language in schools and kindergartens as part of an effort to destroy any future for that nation.
Over the last week, Russian media outlets have been full of attacks on the Georgian decision. (See, among others, www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/05/25/mifologija-genocida-cherkesskij-vopros-i-plany-saakashvili.html, novopol.ru/-saakashvili-razyigral-cherkesskuyu-kartu--text101859.html, www.win.ru/school/7268.phtml and www.politcom.ru/12010.html).
But almost all of them have focused only on the impact of Tbilisi’s decision on the North Caucasus rather than discussing the ways in which the Georgian Parliament’s declaration that the Russian Empire committed a genocide against the Circassians has broader implications for the Russian Federation and indeed for Eurasia as a whole.
An exception to this is an article by a pro-Russian journalist in Ukraine who in an article posted online today explicitly considers the ways in which the Circassian decision may have an impact on the Crimean Tatars and through the Crimean Tatars on other groups inside the borders of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states.
In an essay posted on the Materik.ru portal, Vladislav Gulyevich, a commentator for Kyiv’s “Chas Pik” weekly, argues that “Crimea and the project of Greater Circassia are steps along the path to the conquest of the entire Caucasus region” by the Western powers with Russian influence there being excluded (www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=12688).
The success of such an enterprise, he argues, would hurt “not only Russia but also Turkey which would find itself in the position of ‘a loser who had not fought.’” And that, Gulyevich argues, makes the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky “about the unity of Slavs and Turks“ especially important and a possible barrier to the further unraveling of Russia and its neighbors.
Gasprinsky’s name and works may not be widely known in many quarters, but that appears likely to change in the coming weeks, given his ideas on this point which Gulyevich outlines with approval and given a conference this week in Moscow on the great Crimean Tatar thinker on his 160th birthday (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusanons/16178/).
That conference as well as Gasprinsky’s ideas are likely to make the issue of the Soviet genocide of the Crimean Tatars not only the focus of political debates in Kyiv and Moscow but also lead other peoples, themselves victimized by Russian imperialism, to seek recognition from other governments of what was done to them.
Window on Eurasia: Historical Analogies Matter in Russia Because Lessons Aren’t Learned, Crimes Aren’t Punished and Mistakes Aren’t Overcome, Pavlova Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Unlike in Western countries which have law-based states, historical analogies are particularly important and suggestive in Russia because there “the lessons of the past are not learned, crimes by the state are not punished, and mistakes are not overcome,” according to Grani.ru commentator Irina Pavlova.
That reality, she argues in her latest commentary, makes especially worrisome “the essential similarity” between what is going on in the Russian political system now and what took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1937, the year that opened the way to what is often called “the great terror” (grani.ru/opinion/m.188681.html).
In advance of the December 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Pavlova notes, Andrey Zhdanov, then a candidate member to the Politburo, said it was necessary to achieve “the furthest most strengthening of the political activity of the masses and the inclusion of new strata of the toilers in the work of the administration of the state,” adding that the Bolshevik Party must “guarantee its leading role in the front of ‘social organizations and the society of the toilers.”
Two weeks ago, in advance of the Duma elections scheduled for December 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the establishment of an All-Russian Peoples Front and said in Volgograd [formerly Stalingrad] that “namely the United Russia Party must lead the preparation of the masses for the elections.”
Several days later, Putin said that “we are creating the All-Russian Peoples Front in order that there will be a demand for all constructive ideas” from various parts of society and that there will be “an additional chance for the immediate direct participation [of the masses] in the development of the most important government decisions.”
In 1937, Pavlova continues, “only ‘social organizations and societies of toilers’ could nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and the chief jurist of the USSR at that time, Andrey Vyzhinsky, said that these groups are those which put “as their task the active participation in socialist construction of the USSR and also the support of the strengthening of the defense of the country.”
Those qualities at the time deprived groups like religious parishes “which were permitted to exist only for ‘the satisfaction of their religious requirements,” of a similar right to nominate candidates.
At present, Pavlova says, citizens “inclined toward opposition” are similarly excluded. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, said that opposition figures like Eduard Limonov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov could not join the new peoples front because “as far as I am aware, these persons do not share either the strategic or tactical goals of United Russia.”
“In 1937,” Pavlova continues, “mass popular enthusiasm was observed.” That enthusiasm was then directed against Stalin’s opponents. Indeed, it was at the same party plenum that a decision was approved to “transfer the cases of Bukharin and Ryzhkov to the NKVD” and to go after regional leaders who displayed “a cult of personality.”
During the 1937 election campaign, there was much talk about “wreckers” and “enemies of the people.” Now, the “main” subject, according to President Dmitry Medvedev is “the struggle with corruption,” a struggle that is supposed to involve, just like its predecessor, “the most varied forces” and be directed at those viewed as the opponents of the Kremlin.
Pavlova points out that as a result, “in 1937, the mass election campaign became a cover for the conduct of a government policy of repression.” Today, there are differences, but the current situation “ever more recalls one before a storm” that must “somehow or other” break out as part of a resolution.
Obviously historical analogies do not explain everything, Pavlova says, but she asks a series of pointed questions on the basis of her comparison: “Will the struggle with corruption turn out to be a new edition of the cadres reform of 1937?” Will the current leadership which is riddled with thieves be replaced by “young ‘nashists,’ ready to struggle for modernization?”
And even more seriously, “will ‘a cadres reform’ of the 2011 model develop in such a way, if it does take place, that it will lead to a broad struggle with ‘extremists,’ ‘extra-systemic liberals’ and other citizens” the regime’s leaders view as “disloyal.” The danger is real enough, she suggests, to justify real alarm.
Staunton, May 25 – Unlike in Western countries which have law-based states, historical analogies are particularly important and suggestive in Russia because there “the lessons of the past are not learned, crimes by the state are not punished, and mistakes are not overcome,” according to Grani.ru commentator Irina Pavlova.
That reality, she argues in her latest commentary, makes especially worrisome “the essential similarity” between what is going on in the Russian political system now and what took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1937, the year that opened the way to what is often called “the great terror” (grani.ru/opinion/m.188681.html).
In advance of the December 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Pavlova notes, Andrey Zhdanov, then a candidate member to the Politburo, said it was necessary to achieve “the furthest most strengthening of the political activity of the masses and the inclusion of new strata of the toilers in the work of the administration of the state,” adding that the Bolshevik Party must “guarantee its leading role in the front of ‘social organizations and the society of the toilers.”
Two weeks ago, in advance of the Duma elections scheduled for December 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the establishment of an All-Russian Peoples Front and said in Volgograd [formerly Stalingrad] that “namely the United Russia Party must lead the preparation of the masses for the elections.”
Several days later, Putin said that “we are creating the All-Russian Peoples Front in order that there will be a demand for all constructive ideas” from various parts of society and that there will be “an additional chance for the immediate direct participation [of the masses] in the development of the most important government decisions.”
In 1937, Pavlova continues, “only ‘social organizations and societies of toilers’ could nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and the chief jurist of the USSR at that time, Andrey Vyzhinsky, said that these groups are those which put “as their task the active participation in socialist construction of the USSR and also the support of the strengthening of the defense of the country.”
Those qualities at the time deprived groups like religious parishes “which were permitted to exist only for ‘the satisfaction of their religious requirements,” of a similar right to nominate candidates.
At present, Pavlova says, citizens “inclined toward opposition” are similarly excluded. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, said that opposition figures like Eduard Limonov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov could not join the new peoples front because “as far as I am aware, these persons do not share either the strategic or tactical goals of United Russia.”
“In 1937,” Pavlova continues, “mass popular enthusiasm was observed.” That enthusiasm was then directed against Stalin’s opponents. Indeed, it was at the same party plenum that a decision was approved to “transfer the cases of Bukharin and Ryzhkov to the NKVD” and to go after regional leaders who displayed “a cult of personality.”
During the 1937 election campaign, there was much talk about “wreckers” and “enemies of the people.” Now, the “main” subject, according to President Dmitry Medvedev is “the struggle with corruption,” a struggle that is supposed to involve, just like its predecessor, “the most varied forces” and be directed at those viewed as the opponents of the Kremlin.
Pavlova points out that as a result, “in 1937, the mass election campaign became a cover for the conduct of a government policy of repression.” Today, there are differences, but the current situation “ever more recalls one before a storm” that must “somehow or other” break out as part of a resolution.
Obviously historical analogies do not explain everything, Pavlova says, but she asks a series of pointed questions on the basis of her comparison: “Will the struggle with corruption turn out to be a new edition of the cadres reform of 1937?” Will the current leadership which is riddled with thieves be replaced by “young ‘nashists,’ ready to struggle for modernization?”
And even more seriously, “will ‘a cadres reform’ of the 2011 model develop in such a way, if it does take place, that it will lead to a broad struggle with ‘extremists,’ ‘extra-systemic liberals’ and other citizens” the regime’s leaders view as “disloyal.” The danger is real enough, she suggests, to justify real alarm.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Despite Promises, Russian Draftees are Fighting and Dying in the North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 24 – Despite repeated promises by senior Moscow officials and the explicit provisions of several laws, Russian draftees are being sent to fight and die in the hotspots of the North Caucasus, a situation a major Moscow paper is calling attention to and one likely to spark both more resistance to the draft and more questions about Russia’s policies in that region.
The deaths of several draftees in Ingushetia have prompted “Moskovsky komsomolets” to declare in a headline that “The Russian Army is Outside the Law” because the defense ministry has declared that such personnel “must not be involved in counter-terrorist operations” (www.mk.ru/politics/article/2011/05/19/590609-rossiyskaya-armiya-vne-zakona.html).
Indeed, the widely published ministerial decree specifies that draftees are not even to be positioned “in the zone” of such counter-terrorist operations. Apparently, the paper continued, “the command of the military unit does not know anything about this order. Or how else can one explain the fact” that this set of deaths of draftees is not the first?
A source in the military procuracy told the paper that “such violations are taking place everywhere,” even though commanders know the order and investigators have addressed many of these situations, a process that is complicated because commanders often do what they can to hide the facts of these and other violations of the military code.
The major reason commanders want to use draftees is that such personnel cost less and are far more numerous than professional soldiers, but another experts say is that the latter are far more prepared to speak up for their rights than are the draftees. If the pay of the professionals is late, for example, they raise such a fuss that commanders hurry to address the problem.
Because the command is unwilling to investigate these violations, activists have appealed to the Counter-Terrorist Committee and also to the Federation Council, but they have either been ignored or “given to understand that about the Russian Army today one can speak only as about the dead – either something good or nothing at all.”
However, the numerous cases of the violation of the defense minstry’s own orders and of the rights of draftees almost certainly will increase calls for a shift to a professional military, something Russia would find hard to pay for unless it significantly reduced the size of its armed forces, or an increase in the amount of draft resistance.
And in the current environment, these two trends appear to be coming together. In St. Petersburg over the weekend, for example, some 150 people staged a demonstration under the banner “Say No to the Draft” during which speakers called for the creation of a purely professional military (ingria.info/lenta/347-2011-05-22-08-50-40).
This meeting is likely to lead to others, all the more so because it was organized by groups with sections elsewhere and by political parties, including Yabloko, which are likely to be interested in using this issue to attract attention and support in the run up to the 2011 and 2012 elections.
Staunton, May 24 – Despite repeated promises by senior Moscow officials and the explicit provisions of several laws, Russian draftees are being sent to fight and die in the hotspots of the North Caucasus, a situation a major Moscow paper is calling attention to and one likely to spark both more resistance to the draft and more questions about Russia’s policies in that region.
The deaths of several draftees in Ingushetia have prompted “Moskovsky komsomolets” to declare in a headline that “The Russian Army is Outside the Law” because the defense ministry has declared that such personnel “must not be involved in counter-terrorist operations” (www.mk.ru/politics/article/2011/05/19/590609-rossiyskaya-armiya-vne-zakona.html).
Indeed, the widely published ministerial decree specifies that draftees are not even to be positioned “in the zone” of such counter-terrorist operations. Apparently, the paper continued, “the command of the military unit does not know anything about this order. Or how else can one explain the fact” that this set of deaths of draftees is not the first?
A source in the military procuracy told the paper that “such violations are taking place everywhere,” even though commanders know the order and investigators have addressed many of these situations, a process that is complicated because commanders often do what they can to hide the facts of these and other violations of the military code.
The major reason commanders want to use draftees is that such personnel cost less and are far more numerous than professional soldiers, but another experts say is that the latter are far more prepared to speak up for their rights than are the draftees. If the pay of the professionals is late, for example, they raise such a fuss that commanders hurry to address the problem.
Because the command is unwilling to investigate these violations, activists have appealed to the Counter-Terrorist Committee and also to the Federation Council, but they have either been ignored or “given to understand that about the Russian Army today one can speak only as about the dead – either something good or nothing at all.”
However, the numerous cases of the violation of the defense minstry’s own orders and of the rights of draftees almost certainly will increase calls for a shift to a professional military, something Russia would find hard to pay for unless it significantly reduced the size of its armed forces, or an increase in the amount of draft resistance.
And in the current environment, these two trends appear to be coming together. In St. Petersburg over the weekend, for example, some 150 people staged a demonstration under the banner “Say No to the Draft” during which speakers called for the creation of a purely professional military (ingria.info/lenta/347-2011-05-22-08-50-40).
This meeting is likely to lead to others, all the more so because it was organized by groups with sections elsewhere and by political parties, including Yabloko, which are likely to be interested in using this issue to attract attention and support in the run up to the 2011 and 2012 elections.
Window on Eurasia: Middle Class ‘Fleeing’ Russia, Moscow Experts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 24 – Members of the middle class, including both entrepreneurs and intellectuals on whom the future of democratic development in the Russian Federation depends, are now fleeting that country in ever-increasing numbers, a trend that both testifies to Russia’s current problems and casts a shadow over its future.
In the current issue of the Moscow weekly “New Times,” Natalya Alyarinskaya and Dmitry Dokuchayev report that according to Russian officials, 1.25 million Russians, “chiefly businessmen and representatives of the middle class,” have left the country over the last three years (http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/39135).
Their departure, the two journalists say, is “almost as large as the first which took place after the October coup in 1917 when about two million people left” Russia. And the devote the remainder of their article to exploring the answers as to “why these people are leaving Russia and whether it is possible to stop this exodus?”
The findings of a recent poll by the Levada Center showing that 50 percent of Russians “dream of leaving the country,” including “two thirds [of those] under 35,” and that “63 percent of those questioned would like their children to study and work abroad” rather than in their homeland.
But those findings, which express interest and desire rather than action, have now been made even more a matter of concern by other data. Vladimir Gruzdyev, a Duma deputy of the ruling United Russia Party said that in 2010, “the number of individual entrepreneurs dropped from 4.61 to 4.11 million,” with most of the half million not only leaving business but Russia.
Igor Nikolayev, the head of strategic prognostications for FBK suggests that this statistic “should be increased by a factor of two if not three.” The reason? “Many people keep their citizenship and apartment in Russia, and although their entire family has been living in the West for a long time, they do not fall within the emigration statistics.”
And Vladislav Inozemtsev, the director of the Center for Research on Post-Industrial Society, says the situation may be even worse than those figures show. According to his research, “45 percent of [university] graduates do not exclude the possibility of leaving and almost half of them firmly intend to seek” work abroad.
According to Moscow experts, the two journalists say, there are now about four million Russians living in the European Union and the United States, distributing themselves according to ease of entry, cost of living and the existence of a Russian community with which they can find support at least at first.
No one knows for certain just how many more of Russia’s middle class are really waiting to join them, “sitting on their suitcases,” to use the Russian expression. But the number has certainly gone up in the last few years because, in the words of one expert, opportunities have declined while “administrative pressure has increased.”
According to Moscow political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin, “the main cause” pushing members of the Russian middle class to think about emigration is “the lack of a future,” the sense that for Russians now, unlike a decade ago, there is no light at the end of the tunnel but only more darkness.
Moreover, the members of this class increasingly feel the envy of those below them in the social pyramid and pressure from the political elite above. And they fear that the current situation may get even worse after the 2011 and 2012 elections which could set in train a new set of challenges they would rather avoid by moving out of Russia.
Most analysts fear the impact of these departures, especially since in many ways it is the best and the brightest who are leaving. Approximately 15 percent of all Russians have higher education, but among those leaving, “more than 40 percent do,” thus undermining the ability of the Russian economy to modernize or even keep up.
A few experts, like Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a specialist on elites at the Russian Academy of Sciences, suggest that no one should be upset by these trends because they show that Russia is becoming part of the global society and that Russians are “step by step becoming people of the world.”
But others take a gloomier view. Oreshkin says that “the sense of total corruption does not leave [these people].” Consequently, to improve matters and retain more of the Russian middle class, the country must “in the first instance destroy the power vertical, cleanse itself from corruption and conduct honest elections.”
However, he continues, even if Russia manages to do this, “a minimum of about five years will be required for people [now] abroad to believe that the situation for business in Russia has changed for the better” and decide that they should be working at home rather than living abroad.
Staunton, May 24 – Members of the middle class, including both entrepreneurs and intellectuals on whom the future of democratic development in the Russian Federation depends, are now fleeting that country in ever-increasing numbers, a trend that both testifies to Russia’s current problems and casts a shadow over its future.
In the current issue of the Moscow weekly “New Times,” Natalya Alyarinskaya and Dmitry Dokuchayev report that according to Russian officials, 1.25 million Russians, “chiefly businessmen and representatives of the middle class,” have left the country over the last three years (http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/39135).
Their departure, the two journalists say, is “almost as large as the first which took place after the October coup in 1917 when about two million people left” Russia. And the devote the remainder of their article to exploring the answers as to “why these people are leaving Russia and whether it is possible to stop this exodus?”
The findings of a recent poll by the Levada Center showing that 50 percent of Russians “dream of leaving the country,” including “two thirds [of those] under 35,” and that “63 percent of those questioned would like their children to study and work abroad” rather than in their homeland.
But those findings, which express interest and desire rather than action, have now been made even more a matter of concern by other data. Vladimir Gruzdyev, a Duma deputy of the ruling United Russia Party said that in 2010, “the number of individual entrepreneurs dropped from 4.61 to 4.11 million,” with most of the half million not only leaving business but Russia.
Igor Nikolayev, the head of strategic prognostications for FBK suggests that this statistic “should be increased by a factor of two if not three.” The reason? “Many people keep their citizenship and apartment in Russia, and although their entire family has been living in the West for a long time, they do not fall within the emigration statistics.”
And Vladislav Inozemtsev, the director of the Center for Research on Post-Industrial Society, says the situation may be even worse than those figures show. According to his research, “45 percent of [university] graduates do not exclude the possibility of leaving and almost half of them firmly intend to seek” work abroad.
According to Moscow experts, the two journalists say, there are now about four million Russians living in the European Union and the United States, distributing themselves according to ease of entry, cost of living and the existence of a Russian community with which they can find support at least at first.
No one knows for certain just how many more of Russia’s middle class are really waiting to join them, “sitting on their suitcases,” to use the Russian expression. But the number has certainly gone up in the last few years because, in the words of one expert, opportunities have declined while “administrative pressure has increased.”
According to Moscow political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin, “the main cause” pushing members of the Russian middle class to think about emigration is “the lack of a future,” the sense that for Russians now, unlike a decade ago, there is no light at the end of the tunnel but only more darkness.
Moreover, the members of this class increasingly feel the envy of those below them in the social pyramid and pressure from the political elite above. And they fear that the current situation may get even worse after the 2011 and 2012 elections which could set in train a new set of challenges they would rather avoid by moving out of Russia.
Most analysts fear the impact of these departures, especially since in many ways it is the best and the brightest who are leaving. Approximately 15 percent of all Russians have higher education, but among those leaving, “more than 40 percent do,” thus undermining the ability of the Russian economy to modernize or even keep up.
A few experts, like Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a specialist on elites at the Russian Academy of Sciences, suggest that no one should be upset by these trends because they show that Russia is becoming part of the global society and that Russians are “step by step becoming people of the world.”
But others take a gloomier view. Oreshkin says that “the sense of total corruption does not leave [these people].” Consequently, to improve matters and retain more of the Russian middle class, the country must “in the first instance destroy the power vertical, cleanse itself from corruption and conduct honest elections.”
However, he continues, even if Russia manages to do this, “a minimum of about five years will be required for people [now] abroad to believe that the situation for business in Russia has changed for the better” and decide that they should be working at home rather than living abroad.
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Northern Peoples Use UN to Press Moscow on Ethnic Rights
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 23 – Representatives of the numerically small and often widely dispersed peoples of Russia’s Arctic north have used a United Nations forum to press the Russian government to respect their collective rights, but President Dmitry Medvedev has indicated that he believes the regions in which they live rather than Moscow should bear the costs of doing so.
Last week, during the sessions in New York of the United Nations Forum on the Issues of Indigenous Peoples, representatives of the Russian Federation’s numerically small peoples of the North issued a series of demands to Moscow ranging from help in countering the effects of global warming to recognizing their right to self-determination.
Valentina Sovkina, the speaker of the Saami Parliament of the Kola Peninsula, issued the most sweeping demand. She called on Moscow to observe the right of all indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation to self-determination, something she pointed out the Russian government is committed to by treaty (finugor.ru/node/17742).
Vasily Nemechkin, a member of the governing board of the Youth Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples (MAFUN), made a more limited demand. He called on the Russian powers that be to establish a special ombudsman to ensure the rights of native peoples, including his own (mariuver.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/mafun-ombudsmen/).
And Tatyana Achirgina, the president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference of Chukotka, called on Rusdsia to reaffirm its treaty support for the rights of indigenous people by approving the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and living up to its provisions (www.raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novosti/1974-arkticheskij-kokus-deklaraciju-oon-.html).
UN officials and especially representatives of UNESCO expressed their support for the Northern peoples and indicated that they are ready to address their problems, especially those arising from global warming and increased economic activity in the Arctic region (www.raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novosti/1973-junesko-usilit-rabotu-s-korennymi-narodami.html).
Over the last several decades, Russia’s Northern peoples have sought to advance their cause in Moscow by building alliances with other indigenous peoples in the Arctic through such institutions as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and they are now using such links to enlist the UN as well.
The strategy has worked at least up to a point: Russia’s Northern Peoples currently receive disproportionate subsidies from Moscow compared to the all-Russian per capita average. But leaders of these communities argue that environmental challenges, the activities of business groups, and their traditional cultures require greater support.
They received some encouragement last week from a comment by President Dmitry Medvedev at his press conference. He said that he now understands the problems of the Northern peoples, but he suggested that these problems should be addressed not by the central government but by regional officials (www.raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novosti/1971-prezident-rossii-znaet-o-problemah-severnyh-narodov.html).
From the point of view of the Northern peoples, Medvedev’s suggestion that regional officials rather than Moscow should focus on these issues and bear the cost of resolving them will not be welcome. And as a result, some of their leaders are likely to try to advance their interests in international forums like the UN, potentially adding to Moscow’s problems there.
Staunton, May 23 – Representatives of the numerically small and often widely dispersed peoples of Russia’s Arctic north have used a United Nations forum to press the Russian government to respect their collective rights, but President Dmitry Medvedev has indicated that he believes the regions in which they live rather than Moscow should bear the costs of doing so.
Last week, during the sessions in New York of the United Nations Forum on the Issues of Indigenous Peoples, representatives of the Russian Federation’s numerically small peoples of the North issued a series of demands to Moscow ranging from help in countering the effects of global warming to recognizing their right to self-determination.
Valentina Sovkina, the speaker of the Saami Parliament of the Kola Peninsula, issued the most sweeping demand. She called on Moscow to observe the right of all indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation to self-determination, something she pointed out the Russian government is committed to by treaty (finugor.ru/node/17742).
Vasily Nemechkin, a member of the governing board of the Youth Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples (MAFUN), made a more limited demand. He called on the Russian powers that be to establish a special ombudsman to ensure the rights of native peoples, including his own (mariuver.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/mafun-ombudsmen/).
And Tatyana Achirgina, the president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference of Chukotka, called on Rusdsia to reaffirm its treaty support for the rights of indigenous people by approving the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and living up to its provisions (www.raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novosti/1974-arkticheskij-kokus-deklaraciju-oon-.html).
UN officials and especially representatives of UNESCO expressed their support for the Northern peoples and indicated that they are ready to address their problems, especially those arising from global warming and increased economic activity in the Arctic region (www.raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novosti/1973-junesko-usilit-rabotu-s-korennymi-narodami.html).
Over the last several decades, Russia’s Northern peoples have sought to advance their cause in Moscow by building alliances with other indigenous peoples in the Arctic through such institutions as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and they are now using such links to enlist the UN as well.
The strategy has worked at least up to a point: Russia’s Northern Peoples currently receive disproportionate subsidies from Moscow compared to the all-Russian per capita average. But leaders of these communities argue that environmental challenges, the activities of business groups, and their traditional cultures require greater support.
They received some encouragement last week from a comment by President Dmitry Medvedev at his press conference. He said that he now understands the problems of the Northern peoples, but he suggested that these problems should be addressed not by the central government but by regional officials (www.raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novosti/1971-prezident-rossii-znaet-o-problemah-severnyh-narodov.html).
From the point of view of the Northern peoples, Medvedev’s suggestion that regional officials rather than Moscow should focus on these issues and bear the cost of resolving them will not be welcome. And as a result, some of their leaders are likely to try to advance their interests in international forums like the UN, potentially adding to Moscow’s problems there.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
