Paul Goble
Staunton, May 21 – South Korea, which lost out to Russia in the competition to hold the Winter Olympics in 2014, is continuing to build facilities for such a competition, apparently in hopes that the Sochi Games will be cancelled either because of construction problems or security concerns, according to Moscow’s “Izvestiya.”
“Izvestiya” correspondents Andrey Reut and Aleksey Severov report that “Korea is continuing to build Olympic sites despite having lost to Russia the right to hold the 2014 Olympiad.” More than half of the South Korean sites are ready, and “the remaining ones are being build at record rates” (www.izvestia.ru/investigation/article3155383/).
Having visited the sites, the Russian journalists say they want to answer the question: “What are [the South Koreans] counting on?” But in fact, the article may be designed to send a message to the international community: Any problems now in the run-up to the Sochi Games are the result of Georgian actions rather than Russian problems.
“Officially,” the Russian journalists say, officials and Olympic activists in Seoul are competing for the 2018 games, in which there are officially three candidates – Germany, France and South Korea. That would be the third attempt to bring the Olympics to South, given that “the previous two have failed.”
Despite that, “the Koreans are all the same actively engaged in construction,” the “Izvestiya” journalists say, “more actively than in Sochi,” and consequently regardless of the results of the voting in the International Olympic Committee, “practically all the Olympic venues” in South Korea are “already prepared.”
“The main intrigue” here, the journalists say, involves the question: “Why spend billions of dollars on games which Korea has not yet won the right to hold?” According to the article, “Olympic officials are not answering this question, but indirectly they confirm: they [still] have hopes for 2014.”
Speaking with what “Izvestiya” characterized as “ironic Eastern diplomacy,” Yang Chung Pak, the secretary general of the Korean Olympic Committee, refused to answer the direct question whether his group was preparing for 2014. “Let us hope,” he said, “that Sochi will hold one of the best Winter Olympics” in that year.
Could it in fact happen, the journalists ask, that the 2014 games could be taken away from Russia and handed over to Korea? There are only “two possible causes,” they say. The first would be a failure of Russia to build all the venues on time, and the second basis “for the hopes of the Koreans” would be “instability in the region.”
The two “Izvestiya” journalists say that “representatives of the Russian special services” tell them that “in Sochi have appeared groups of potential diversionists from Georgia who have tried to settle in as local residents” or to take the guise of “builders” of Olympic sites. And the services add that “it is possible there even exists a program” in Georgia to block the games.
“Georgian politicians have more than once spoken about this,” “Izvestiya” says, beginning in the fall of 2008, after the Russian-Georgian war, when Tbilisi proposed shifting the games to South Korea or to Austria. The motivations for this, the paper continues, were political rather than ecological, despite Georgian claims to the contrary.
Moreover, the Moscow paper continues, there even exists in Georgia “a special commission” which is preparing “a boycott plan,” as the head of that country’s parliamentary committee for diaspora affairs, Nugzar Tsiklauri, has said. “But all this is only words,” the Russian journalists say.
The Olympics have never been taken away from one city and given to another, Russian Olympic Committee officials say, and the Olympic Charter does not allow for it. But apparently, the South Koreans still have “hope for a miracle” in this regard. And because they have the money, they are more than ready to prepare for one.
Saturday, May 21, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Recognition of Circassian Genocide Part of Broader Georgian Campaign in North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 21 – The Georgian parliament’s adoption yesterday of a resolution declaring the mass killings of Circassians 150 years ago to have been a genocide is part of a broad Tbilisi campaign to extend its influence in the North Caucasus by undermining Russian control there.
That conclusion is suggested both by the debate preceding the adoption of the resolution and by two other recent developments, one in Georgia involving the expansion of broadcasts into the North Caucasus from Georgia and a second in that region itself where demonstrators invoked Georgian support to pressure local officials.
Yesterday, the Georgian parliament passed a government-backed resolution saying that the “pre-planned” mass killing of Circassians in the 1860s constituted “a genocide” and that those forced to leave their homeland and their descendents should be recognized as “refugees” (www.circassianworld.com/new/headlines/1571-georgia-recognizes-circassian-genocide.html).
Backers of the resolution said that this declaration is “not directed against the Russian people” because “the Russian people should not be permanently living under the burden imposed on them by their leaders in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century and the twenty-first century.”
But many Russians and at least some Georgians are likely to view it otherwise, in part because another deputy from the ruling party, Givi Targamadze, said that the Georgian parliament should also take up “the situation surrounding other peoples” in the North Caucasus, a step he said would “lead us to a powerful and significant Caucasian unity.”
Deputies of the Christian Democratic Movement abstained from voting, arguing that the vote was taken too hastily, but only one parliamentarian spoke against the resolution. Jondi Bagaturia said that while “it is impossible not to show solidarity towards the Circassian people,” Georgians should consider whether that “will not look unfair” to the Armenians.
That is because Armenians have frequently asked Georgia to declare the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire a genocide, something Georgian officials and parliamentarians have refused to do, most recently a month ago.
Another deputy, Nuzgar Tsiklauri, chairman of the diaspora and Caucasian issues committee in the parliament, countered that it was “inappropriate” to link the two issues. Tbilisi could address these questions with “Georgia’s two friendly nations,” Armenia and Turkey, “with “a positive dialogue,’ and “meddling in this process would be ‘unjustified.’”
The second development indicating that this decision was very political and directed against Russian interests in the North Caucasus was the launch earlier this year of a Russian-language television channel in Georgia targeted at that region, PIK television, which can be viewed on the Internet ( pik.tv/ru).
Yesterday and today, that channel gave prominent coverage to yesterday’s decision of the Georgian parliament to declare the 1864 killings of the Circassians a genocide and headlined its story, “Georgia has become the first to recognize the genocide of the Circassian people” (pik.tv/ru/news/story/gruziia-stala-pervoy-kto-priznal-genocid-cherkesskogo-naroda).
But a third development this week, although it has attracted far less international attention, may prove to be equally consequential. In Daghestan, members of the Dido nationality on Tuesday organized a demonstration in Makhachkala demanding that their nationality be given official status and their own ethno-territorial unit (www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4908).
The meeting, which attracted some 80 people and adopted a resolution sent to both the Daghestan and Russian Federation governments, took place under a banner declaring in Russian “Daghestan Refuses; Georgia Helps,” a message that, if taken up by other groups in that republic and beyond, could further complicate Moscow’s tasks in the region.
Staunton, May 21 – The Georgian parliament’s adoption yesterday of a resolution declaring the mass killings of Circassians 150 years ago to have been a genocide is part of a broad Tbilisi campaign to extend its influence in the North Caucasus by undermining Russian control there.
That conclusion is suggested both by the debate preceding the adoption of the resolution and by two other recent developments, one in Georgia involving the expansion of broadcasts into the North Caucasus from Georgia and a second in that region itself where demonstrators invoked Georgian support to pressure local officials.
Yesterday, the Georgian parliament passed a government-backed resolution saying that the “pre-planned” mass killing of Circassians in the 1860s constituted “a genocide” and that those forced to leave their homeland and their descendents should be recognized as “refugees” (www.circassianworld.com/new/headlines/1571-georgia-recognizes-circassian-genocide.html).
Backers of the resolution said that this declaration is “not directed against the Russian people” because “the Russian people should not be permanently living under the burden imposed on them by their leaders in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century and the twenty-first century.”
But many Russians and at least some Georgians are likely to view it otherwise, in part because another deputy from the ruling party, Givi Targamadze, said that the Georgian parliament should also take up “the situation surrounding other peoples” in the North Caucasus, a step he said would “lead us to a powerful and significant Caucasian unity.”
Deputies of the Christian Democratic Movement abstained from voting, arguing that the vote was taken too hastily, but only one parliamentarian spoke against the resolution. Jondi Bagaturia said that while “it is impossible not to show solidarity towards the Circassian people,” Georgians should consider whether that “will not look unfair” to the Armenians.
That is because Armenians have frequently asked Georgia to declare the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire a genocide, something Georgian officials and parliamentarians have refused to do, most recently a month ago.
Another deputy, Nuzgar Tsiklauri, chairman of the diaspora and Caucasian issues committee in the parliament, countered that it was “inappropriate” to link the two issues. Tbilisi could address these questions with “Georgia’s two friendly nations,” Armenia and Turkey, “with “a positive dialogue,’ and “meddling in this process would be ‘unjustified.’”
The second development indicating that this decision was very political and directed against Russian interests in the North Caucasus was the launch earlier this year of a Russian-language television channel in Georgia targeted at that region, PIK television, which can be viewed on the Internet ( pik.tv/ru).
Yesterday and today, that channel gave prominent coverage to yesterday’s decision of the Georgian parliament to declare the 1864 killings of the Circassians a genocide and headlined its story, “Georgia has become the first to recognize the genocide of the Circassian people” (pik.tv/ru/news/story/gruziia-stala-pervoy-kto-priznal-genocid-cherkesskogo-naroda).
But a third development this week, although it has attracted far less international attention, may prove to be equally consequential. In Daghestan, members of the Dido nationality on Tuesday organized a demonstration in Makhachkala demanding that their nationality be given official status and their own ethno-territorial unit (www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4908).
The meeting, which attracted some 80 people and adopted a resolution sent to both the Daghestan and Russian Federation governments, took place under a banner declaring in Russian “Daghestan Refuses; Georgia Helps,” a message that, if taken up by other groups in that republic and beyond, could further complicate Moscow’s tasks in the region.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Fight against Extremism Lacks Clear Definitions, SOVA Head Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 21 – Russia’s struggle against extremism “does not have clearly defined tasks” because the government “cannot clearly formulate them,” and as a result, various officials, operating on the basis of “their own interests” rather than on the basis of law act in ways that contradict one another, according to the head of the SOVA analytic center.
Not only does that shortcoming undermine the rule of law and the protection of the rights of citizens, but it means that some genuinely extremist materials escape any ban at all while many entirely innocent publications are deemed extremist, thereby sending a chill through the entire society.
In an interview published this week in “Epoch Times,” Aleksandr Verkhovsky says that “in any country, there are legal limitations of rights” when they come into conflict with other rights or goals, but in Russia, such limitations go far beyond that because the state has failed to define the basis for such limitations (www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/47852/54/).
Verkhovsky says that in his work, he encounters what are clearly legally justified limitations on religious texts that are clearly “directed” at inspiring hatred toward others. “Here I understand why they are banning them,” he continues. But “often, I do not understand” because there is no apparent basis for taking this step.
According to the SOVA leader, this is at least partially explained by what he believes is the fact that officials “themselves do not know what they want to achieve” by their acitons. In order for there to be understanding, there is a need for one side to be able to explain its acitons to another.” But in the case of Russia’s struggle with extremism, that isn’t possible.
“The state cannot formulate [these tasks] clearly,” either because it lacks the ability to do so or because it wants to retain maximum flexibility. And consequently, “many various groups of bureaucrats” act independently and often in contradiction with one another because they are “guided by their own interests and ideas” rather than by the legal definitions.
Some officials engaged in these activities undoubtedly are sincere in their stated belief that this or that religious group is “socially dangerous and must be uprooted.” But others appear to be doing so to attract attention, justify budgets or out of personal vindictiveness,m all things that undermine the rule of law.
“The main repressive mechanism” in this struggle is the banning of the distribution of materials “recognized as extremist,” Verkhovsky says. And on the basis of judicial decisions, the justice ministry maintains a list of publications that have been declared extremist. “But one must not use this list” because of a whole range of problems.
There are many mistakes in this list, the result of multiple decisions which sometimes find a particular work extremist and at other times declare it not to be and of the failure of the justice ministry to update the list in an appropriate and timely fashion. And consequently “it is clear that this cannot work in principle.”
And there is another problem, Verkhovsky notes. “In the law it is written how this list is to be added to but nothing is said about the basis on which materials can be removed from the list … [Thus,] this situation is not legal because in this case there are no norms” as any legal arrangement requires.
In the opinion of the SOVA chief, there should be “either an amendment to the law or a directive of the Justice Ministry regulating this procedure or an explanation by the Supreme Court.” But none of these things has yet happened, although he adds that “a resolution of the plenum of the Supreme Court” is working on these issues.
That effort, he adds, allows “the weak hope that some kind of wise explanations will be adopted and that they will have obligatory force.”
Another serious problem in this area, Verkhovsky points out, is the use of the charge of extremism by officials without the sanction of a court. That isn’t supposed to happen under the law, but by drawing analogies with materials that have been banned, officials often broaden the scope of anti-extremist actions.
And still a third problem involves the use of expertise in deciding whether this or that item is extremist. Ten years ago, expertise was not widely employed; now, it is involved in almost every case, and Verkhovsky says, it is being misused, with experts expressing their view on whether something is extremist, a conclusion only judges are entitled to make.
The situation of experts on religious or other groups is like that of a specialist on ballistics, Verkhovsky says. The expert can be asked about how a bullet flew or from what gun it came, “but it is impermissible to ask him who killed Sidorov or whether he was killed because of hatred. If such a question is given to an expert, this is a crude procedural violation.”
Staunton, May 21 – Russia’s struggle against extremism “does not have clearly defined tasks” because the government “cannot clearly formulate them,” and as a result, various officials, operating on the basis of “their own interests” rather than on the basis of law act in ways that contradict one another, according to the head of the SOVA analytic center.
Not only does that shortcoming undermine the rule of law and the protection of the rights of citizens, but it means that some genuinely extremist materials escape any ban at all while many entirely innocent publications are deemed extremist, thereby sending a chill through the entire society.
In an interview published this week in “Epoch Times,” Aleksandr Verkhovsky says that “in any country, there are legal limitations of rights” when they come into conflict with other rights or goals, but in Russia, such limitations go far beyond that because the state has failed to define the basis for such limitations (www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/47852/54/).
Verkhovsky says that in his work, he encounters what are clearly legally justified limitations on religious texts that are clearly “directed” at inspiring hatred toward others. “Here I understand why they are banning them,” he continues. But “often, I do not understand” because there is no apparent basis for taking this step.
According to the SOVA leader, this is at least partially explained by what he believes is the fact that officials “themselves do not know what they want to achieve” by their acitons. In order for there to be understanding, there is a need for one side to be able to explain its acitons to another.” But in the case of Russia’s struggle with extremism, that isn’t possible.
“The state cannot formulate [these tasks] clearly,” either because it lacks the ability to do so or because it wants to retain maximum flexibility. And consequently, “many various groups of bureaucrats” act independently and often in contradiction with one another because they are “guided by their own interests and ideas” rather than by the legal definitions.
Some officials engaged in these activities undoubtedly are sincere in their stated belief that this or that religious group is “socially dangerous and must be uprooted.” But others appear to be doing so to attract attention, justify budgets or out of personal vindictiveness,m all things that undermine the rule of law.
“The main repressive mechanism” in this struggle is the banning of the distribution of materials “recognized as extremist,” Verkhovsky says. And on the basis of judicial decisions, the justice ministry maintains a list of publications that have been declared extremist. “But one must not use this list” because of a whole range of problems.
There are many mistakes in this list, the result of multiple decisions which sometimes find a particular work extremist and at other times declare it not to be and of the failure of the justice ministry to update the list in an appropriate and timely fashion. And consequently “it is clear that this cannot work in principle.”
And there is another problem, Verkhovsky notes. “In the law it is written how this list is to be added to but nothing is said about the basis on which materials can be removed from the list … [Thus,] this situation is not legal because in this case there are no norms” as any legal arrangement requires.
In the opinion of the SOVA chief, there should be “either an amendment to the law or a directive of the Justice Ministry regulating this procedure or an explanation by the Supreme Court.” But none of these things has yet happened, although he adds that “a resolution of the plenum of the Supreme Court” is working on these issues.
That effort, he adds, allows “the weak hope that some kind of wise explanations will be adopted and that they will have obligatory force.”
Another serious problem in this area, Verkhovsky points out, is the use of the charge of extremism by officials without the sanction of a court. That isn’t supposed to happen under the law, but by drawing analogies with materials that have been banned, officials often broaden the scope of anti-extremist actions.
And still a third problem involves the use of expertise in deciding whether this or that item is extremist. Ten years ago, expertise was not widely employed; now, it is involved in almost every case, and Verkhovsky says, it is being misused, with experts expressing their view on whether something is extremist, a conclusion only judges are entitled to make.
The situation of experts on religious or other groups is like that of a specialist on ballistics, Verkhovsky says. The expert can be asked about how a bullet flew or from what gun it came, “but it is impermissible to ask him who killed Sidorov or whether he was killed because of hatred. If such a question is given to an expert, this is a crude procedural violation.”
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Abkhazia Again ‘Struggling for Independence’ -- But Now Perhaps ‘From Russia,’ Moscow Observer Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 19 – In the nearly two years since Russia recognized Abkhazia as an independent country, relations between Moscow and Sukhum have deteriorated with many in the former unhappy that they have to pay such a high price for geopolitics and many in the latter suspicious that Russia is a threat to Abkhaz independence, according to a Moscow observer.
In yesterday’s “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” Vladimir Vorsobin, that paper’s political observer, explained why “after recognition, ever more problems are appearing” in the Russian-Abkhazian relationship on such questions as resorts, religious administrations, property ownership and even the border between the two (msk.kp.ru/daily/25687/891281/).
To the extent that and as long as Abkhazian leaders viewed Tbilisi and Washington as the main problems, relations between Abkhazia and Russia were “simplified,” with people in both of their capitals subordinating any disputes to the broader and more important geopolitical problems of relations with Georgia and the United States.
But “in recent months,” this dynamic has changed. Tbilisi and Washington are less often viewed as credible opponents, and people in both Sukhum and Moscow are focusing on their own differences, differences made all the more troubling, Vorsobin says, because of the amount of money Russia is spending and the natural suspiciousness of the Abkhazians about outsiders.
The Abkhazians have become outraged by Russian cutbacks in support for sanitaria, and the Russians in turn have been upset by what they see as shady practices and even illegal actions by the Abkhazians – and by the efforts of the Russian embassy in Sukhum to excuse the Abkhazians rather than defend Russian citizens.
Other issues have added to the tensions. The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has been reluctant to see the Orthodox in Abkhazia become an independent church lest that undermine Moscow’s claims in Ukraine and elsewhere but at the same time has acted in ways that seem intended to put the Abkhazian Orthodox under its domain.
Some Orthodox clergy in Abkhazia openly declare, the Moscow journalist says, that “the future of the Abkhazian church must be constructed not only on the basis of ties with the Russian church but also with other Orthodox churches, including the Greek and Serbian. There must be multi-polarity in the foreign policy of the Abkhazian church.”
Just last Sunday, the Abkhazian Orthodox split, with part agreeing to be subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church and part rejecting that approach, such splitting the Orthodox “front” and exacerbating tensions between Russians and Abkhazians. (For details on this, see www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1875).
Other areas where tensions are high concern property that the Russians claim but that the Abkhazians have seized, and what may surprise many even more over the border between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation. Vorsobin offers a map showing a portion of the northwest part of Abkhazia that Moscow wants transferred to it.
The Russian side makes two arguments. On the one hand, some of the villages in that region are overwhelmingly ethnic Russian. And on the other, this part of Abkhazia is very near the places where Moscow hopes to stage the 2014 Olympics. Having the territory under direct Russian control would make that task easier.
But from the Abkhazian perspective, Russia’s interest in part of Abkhazia’s territory is seen as the effort of another outside power to seize Abkhazian lands. Indeed, the Moscow observer says, “hot heads” in Sukhum now accuse Moscow of evil intentions and “suggest that Moscow repent for expelling a half million Abkhazians to Turkey in the 19th century.”
Out of geopolitical calculations, the Russian embassy in Sukhum has tried to keep all this out of the press, obviously without success, and Russian government officials have rejected Duma complaints about how much money Moscow is spending on the ungrateful Abkhazians. “The main thing,” Russian officials say, “is geopolitics,” not money.
That is “useful advice,” Vorsobin says, but it is clear from his article that he does not expect many on either side of this deepening divide to take it for much longer.
Staunton, May 19 – In the nearly two years since Russia recognized Abkhazia as an independent country, relations between Moscow and Sukhum have deteriorated with many in the former unhappy that they have to pay such a high price for geopolitics and many in the latter suspicious that Russia is a threat to Abkhaz independence, according to a Moscow observer.
In yesterday’s “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” Vladimir Vorsobin, that paper’s political observer, explained why “after recognition, ever more problems are appearing” in the Russian-Abkhazian relationship on such questions as resorts, religious administrations, property ownership and even the border between the two (msk.kp.ru/daily/25687/891281/).
To the extent that and as long as Abkhazian leaders viewed Tbilisi and Washington as the main problems, relations between Abkhazia and Russia were “simplified,” with people in both of their capitals subordinating any disputes to the broader and more important geopolitical problems of relations with Georgia and the United States.
But “in recent months,” this dynamic has changed. Tbilisi and Washington are less often viewed as credible opponents, and people in both Sukhum and Moscow are focusing on their own differences, differences made all the more troubling, Vorsobin says, because of the amount of money Russia is spending and the natural suspiciousness of the Abkhazians about outsiders.
The Abkhazians have become outraged by Russian cutbacks in support for sanitaria, and the Russians in turn have been upset by what they see as shady practices and even illegal actions by the Abkhazians – and by the efforts of the Russian embassy in Sukhum to excuse the Abkhazians rather than defend Russian citizens.
Other issues have added to the tensions. The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has been reluctant to see the Orthodox in Abkhazia become an independent church lest that undermine Moscow’s claims in Ukraine and elsewhere but at the same time has acted in ways that seem intended to put the Abkhazian Orthodox under its domain.
Some Orthodox clergy in Abkhazia openly declare, the Moscow journalist says, that “the future of the Abkhazian church must be constructed not only on the basis of ties with the Russian church but also with other Orthodox churches, including the Greek and Serbian. There must be multi-polarity in the foreign policy of the Abkhazian church.”
Just last Sunday, the Abkhazian Orthodox split, with part agreeing to be subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church and part rejecting that approach, such splitting the Orthodox “front” and exacerbating tensions between Russians and Abkhazians. (For details on this, see www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1875).
Other areas where tensions are high concern property that the Russians claim but that the Abkhazians have seized, and what may surprise many even more over the border between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation. Vorsobin offers a map showing a portion of the northwest part of Abkhazia that Moscow wants transferred to it.
The Russian side makes two arguments. On the one hand, some of the villages in that region are overwhelmingly ethnic Russian. And on the other, this part of Abkhazia is very near the places where Moscow hopes to stage the 2014 Olympics. Having the territory under direct Russian control would make that task easier.
But from the Abkhazian perspective, Russia’s interest in part of Abkhazia’s territory is seen as the effort of another outside power to seize Abkhazian lands. Indeed, the Moscow observer says, “hot heads” in Sukhum now accuse Moscow of evil intentions and “suggest that Moscow repent for expelling a half million Abkhazians to Turkey in the 19th century.”
Out of geopolitical calculations, the Russian embassy in Sukhum has tried to keep all this out of the press, obviously without success, and Russian government officials have rejected Duma complaints about how much money Moscow is spending on the ungrateful Abkhazians. “The main thing,” Russian officials say, “is geopolitics,” not money.
That is “useful advice,” Vorsobin says, but it is clear from his article that he does not expect many on either side of this deepening divide to take it for much longer.
Window on Eurasia: Muscovites Want Their Children to Study in Schools without Migrants
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 19 – Now that “up to 60 percent” of the pupils in the primary schools of the Russian capital are children of migrants who do not speak Russian well, an increasing number of Muscovite parents are doing whatever they can to ensure that their children go to those schools which have few or no migrant children, according to a Moscow newspaper.
Educational officials in Moscow prefer that parents send their children to the schools that are closest to their homes, but the parents of many believe that their children will have a less successful academic experience if they are surrounded by other pupils for whom Russian is not a native language (www.kp.ru/daily/25688.4/892109/).
As one father put it, an article in “Komsomolskaya Pravda” today reports, he would rather have his child be in a school nearby so that he and his family would not have to get up so early. But that school is “”full of these … How can the teacher teach if half of the pupils do not speak Russian!””
Such attitudes undoubtedly reflect both xenophobia of some parents and worries about the well-being their children, but the situation has already reached the point, the paper says, that Muscovites now speak about “’white’” and “’black’” classes because in many schools on the outskirts of Moscow half or more of the pupils are “children of migrant workers.”
The low Russian language competence of many of the migrant children puts a serious burden on classroom teachers, the paper continues. Those who complain about the difficulties of keeping the interest of native Russian speakers while developing Russian language skills among others are told by their directors: “’You’re a teacher; teach!’”
Such problems in the classroom are creating “a serious problem for many school directors” in the Russian capital, “Komsomolskaya Pravda” says. Some believe that the best thing is to segregate those with poor or non-existent Russian language schools while others are convinced that the best way for such pupils to learn is to be thrown in with Russian pupils.
And many of these directors are upset because, the paper notes, “in essence, the only social institution which adapts [migrants in Moscow] if not the adults then at least their children for life in the Russian capital is the school,” an institution that is already asked with ever fewer resources to carry out other tasks as well.
There is a network of special classes where Russia is taught as a foreign language. In Moscow at the present time, there are 211 such groups, but they cannot hope to serve the hundreds of thousands of migrant children. And there are only ten schools entirely devoted to this task in Moscow in which are enrolled all of 417 children.
There are many reasons for this shortage besides the obvious financial difficulties. Many parents “often don’t want their child to lose a year,” as they assume those in such schools do. Others don’t want to take the trouble involved in getting their children into such schools. And still a third group resists because its members are unsure of how long they’ll stay in Moscow.
Some Moscow teachers report that in springtime, they suddenly lose “half of their pupils” if these are from Central Asia because the children are sent home to work in the fields of their relatives. And others say that female Muslim pupils are often pulled out of class because their parents don’t believe they need much education at all.
Most teachers involved with such children, however, are committed to providing them with the instruction they have a right to as residents of the Russian Federation. But unfortunately, they sometimes face a problem: “There is no legal foundation” for insisting that a foreign child study Russian. Indeed, the paper says, “no one has the right to do that.”
Many observers are likely to view all this simply as evidence of nationalism among the pupils, but the reality is more complicated. According to the Moscow journalist, “teachers, directors, and the children themselves assured [him] that there is much less nationalism in the capital’s schools than there is outside their doors.”
Staunton, May 19 – Now that “up to 60 percent” of the pupils in the primary schools of the Russian capital are children of migrants who do not speak Russian well, an increasing number of Muscovite parents are doing whatever they can to ensure that their children go to those schools which have few or no migrant children, according to a Moscow newspaper.
Educational officials in Moscow prefer that parents send their children to the schools that are closest to their homes, but the parents of many believe that their children will have a less successful academic experience if they are surrounded by other pupils for whom Russian is not a native language (www.kp.ru/daily/25688.4/892109/).
As one father put it, an article in “Komsomolskaya Pravda” today reports, he would rather have his child be in a school nearby so that he and his family would not have to get up so early. But that school is “”full of these … How can the teacher teach if half of the pupils do not speak Russian!””
Such attitudes undoubtedly reflect both xenophobia of some parents and worries about the well-being their children, but the situation has already reached the point, the paper says, that Muscovites now speak about “’white’” and “’black’” classes because in many schools on the outskirts of Moscow half or more of the pupils are “children of migrant workers.”
The low Russian language competence of many of the migrant children puts a serious burden on classroom teachers, the paper continues. Those who complain about the difficulties of keeping the interest of native Russian speakers while developing Russian language skills among others are told by their directors: “’You’re a teacher; teach!’”
Such problems in the classroom are creating “a serious problem for many school directors” in the Russian capital, “Komsomolskaya Pravda” says. Some believe that the best thing is to segregate those with poor or non-existent Russian language schools while others are convinced that the best way for such pupils to learn is to be thrown in with Russian pupils.
And many of these directors are upset because, the paper notes, “in essence, the only social institution which adapts [migrants in Moscow] if not the adults then at least their children for life in the Russian capital is the school,” an institution that is already asked with ever fewer resources to carry out other tasks as well.
There is a network of special classes where Russia is taught as a foreign language. In Moscow at the present time, there are 211 such groups, but they cannot hope to serve the hundreds of thousands of migrant children. And there are only ten schools entirely devoted to this task in Moscow in which are enrolled all of 417 children.
There are many reasons for this shortage besides the obvious financial difficulties. Many parents “often don’t want their child to lose a year,” as they assume those in such schools do. Others don’t want to take the trouble involved in getting their children into such schools. And still a third group resists because its members are unsure of how long they’ll stay in Moscow.
Some Moscow teachers report that in springtime, they suddenly lose “half of their pupils” if these are from Central Asia because the children are sent home to work in the fields of their relatives. And others say that female Muslim pupils are often pulled out of class because their parents don’t believe they need much education at all.
Most teachers involved with such children, however, are committed to providing them with the instruction they have a right to as residents of the Russian Federation. But unfortunately, they sometimes face a problem: “There is no legal foundation” for insisting that a foreign child study Russian. Indeed, the paper says, “no one has the right to do that.”
Many observers are likely to view all this simply as evidence of nationalism among the pupils, but the reality is more complicated. According to the Moscow journalist, “teachers, directors, and the children themselves assured [him] that there is much less nationalism in the capital’s schools than there is outside their doors.”
Window on Eurasia: More than Half of Bashkortostan’s Imams above Pension Age, Survey Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 19 – More than half of the imams and muezzins of the mosques of Bashkortostan are beyond the normal age for pensioners, according to a recent survey, and 20 percent of all Muslim religious leaders in that republic lack any religious training, a situation common in Middle Volga and one that points to challenges for both Muslims and Moscow.
Not only do these numbers suggest the approach of a radical generational change in the leadership of the Muslim community there, but they open the way to the introduction of even more graduates of Islamic training centers abroad, a development that could unsettle the parishes there as well as increase tensions between the Middle Volga Muslims and Moscow.
These are among the many issues currently roiling the Islamic community in the Middle Volga that Ruslan khazrat Sayakhov, the deputy head of the Bashkortostan Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) responsible for educational issues and external relations, discusses in an interview posted on the Islamrf.ru portal today (www.islamrf.ru/news/umma/faces/16102/).
The problems of the umma in Bashkortostan and the need for new leading cadres, Sayakhov says, were shown by a re-attestation survey of the imams and muezzins of the republic’s MSD. “More than 50 percent of the spiritual workers are people who have long ago passed pension age,” with some imams being over 80 years of age.
Such people, of course, “are extremely respected and wise,” but often cannot keep up with “contemporary people,” he continues. Moreover, “on the order of 20 percent of all these workers do not have even a primary religious education.” Not surprisingly, parishes “ever more often are asking for the sending of young specialists” to take their places.
Unfortunately, there are two few such people who can be sent. Russia’s own Muslim educational system is still being built, Sayakhov says, and consequently, many people are looking at younger people who have received training in Muslim universities and medrassahs abroad.
Despite the fears of some, those who have received such training often benefit from it, the deputy MSD chief who himself studied for eight years in the Arab world adds. They of necessity learn Arabic far better than those who do not go abroad. They are exposed to different approaches and experiences. And they bring this back to others.
Clearly, he continues, it is important to work carefully with those who have studied abroad. They need to be screened and clear goals need to be set, and they must operate under the guidance of more senior Muslim leaders who have greater experience with traditional Islam in the Middle Volga.
Those who say that the Muslim universities in Egypt and elsewhere are “preparing radicals” and that “their graduates fight with arms in their hands against federal forces in the North Caucasus” are making assertions that are “not completely based” in reality, the Bashkortostan MSD deputy head says.
Each student whether in the Russian Federation or abroad “chooses for himself” what he wants. “No one can impose on [him] an alien ideology,” Sayakhov says. On the basis of his own experience with and knowledge of Islamic educational institutions “in Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabai,” he adds, “an individual can find in each of them” that which corresponds to his search.
When one talks about “the contemporary problems of Islamic education,” he goes on, the question needs to be ask “whom do we want to see ‘at the other end’? What knowledge and personal qualities must an individual have who has decided to devote himself to work in the religious sphere?”
There is much to be learned from the jaded traditions of a century ago, Sayakhov says, and he expresses the hope that “in the next few years, that colossal work which is being conducted in this area will allow the discovery” of the best possible combination of a knowledge of Islam, the Arab world, and the Tatar-Bashkir past.
Staunton, May 19 – More than half of the imams and muezzins of the mosques of Bashkortostan are beyond the normal age for pensioners, according to a recent survey, and 20 percent of all Muslim religious leaders in that republic lack any religious training, a situation common in Middle Volga and one that points to challenges for both Muslims and Moscow.
Not only do these numbers suggest the approach of a radical generational change in the leadership of the Muslim community there, but they open the way to the introduction of even more graduates of Islamic training centers abroad, a development that could unsettle the parishes there as well as increase tensions between the Middle Volga Muslims and Moscow.
These are among the many issues currently roiling the Islamic community in the Middle Volga that Ruslan khazrat Sayakhov, the deputy head of the Bashkortostan Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) responsible for educational issues and external relations, discusses in an interview posted on the Islamrf.ru portal today (www.islamrf.ru/news/umma/faces/16102/).
The problems of the umma in Bashkortostan and the need for new leading cadres, Sayakhov says, were shown by a re-attestation survey of the imams and muezzins of the republic’s MSD. “More than 50 percent of the spiritual workers are people who have long ago passed pension age,” with some imams being over 80 years of age.
Such people, of course, “are extremely respected and wise,” but often cannot keep up with “contemporary people,” he continues. Moreover, “on the order of 20 percent of all these workers do not have even a primary religious education.” Not surprisingly, parishes “ever more often are asking for the sending of young specialists” to take their places.
Unfortunately, there are two few such people who can be sent. Russia’s own Muslim educational system is still being built, Sayakhov says, and consequently, many people are looking at younger people who have received training in Muslim universities and medrassahs abroad.
Despite the fears of some, those who have received such training often benefit from it, the deputy MSD chief who himself studied for eight years in the Arab world adds. They of necessity learn Arabic far better than those who do not go abroad. They are exposed to different approaches and experiences. And they bring this back to others.
Clearly, he continues, it is important to work carefully with those who have studied abroad. They need to be screened and clear goals need to be set, and they must operate under the guidance of more senior Muslim leaders who have greater experience with traditional Islam in the Middle Volga.
Those who say that the Muslim universities in Egypt and elsewhere are “preparing radicals” and that “their graduates fight with arms in their hands against federal forces in the North Caucasus” are making assertions that are “not completely based” in reality, the Bashkortostan MSD deputy head says.
Each student whether in the Russian Federation or abroad “chooses for himself” what he wants. “No one can impose on [him] an alien ideology,” Sayakhov says. On the basis of his own experience with and knowledge of Islamic educational institutions “in Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabai,” he adds, “an individual can find in each of them” that which corresponds to his search.
When one talks about “the contemporary problems of Islamic education,” he goes on, the question needs to be ask “whom do we want to see ‘at the other end’? What knowledge and personal qualities must an individual have who has decided to devote himself to work in the religious sphere?”
There is much to be learned from the jaded traditions of a century ago, Sayakhov says, and he expresses the hope that “in the next few years, that colossal work which is being conducted in this area will allow the discovery” of the best possible combination of a knowledge of Islam, the Arab world, and the Tatar-Bashkir past.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Nationalists, Leftists and Chechens Debate Future of North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 18 – Yesterday, at a roundtable organized by the Moscow Institute of Innovative Development, Russian nationalists, members of leftist groups, and representatives of the Chechen Republic joined in a lively debate about what each group sees as the future relationship of the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation.
The participants were unusually blunt. Dmitry Bakharev, the head of the Slavic Force Movement, opened the debate by arguing that “over the course of centuries, [his] ancestors had assembled these lands with their blood, worked and defended them,” pointedly asking “and what contribution to the general development of Russia has been made by the Chechen people?”
Arguing that the Russians, not the Soviets had defeated Hitler, Bakharev enquired “how can [we] build relations if we know about the disappearance of several dozen Russians in Grozny, about the bestial murders of Russian soldiers in Chechnya? [and] ifin Moscow, there is a street named for a man who called for killing as many Russians as possible.
Zelimkhan Musayev, the Chechen minister for foreign ties, nationality policy, press and information, disputed Bakharev’s argument. He argued that the Soviet Union won in World War II “only thanks to the trust among peoples.” Moreover, he pointed out, “the Caucasus war did not last a century; it lasted only 25 years” (www.nr2.ru/moskow/331976.html).
Moreover, the Chechen minister continued, “Russian General Yermolov “who pacified the Caucasus destroyed Chechen settlements completely” because that struggle “was not a war of Russians and Chechens; it was a war of two civilizations. But most strikingly, Musayev defended Chechen actions since 1991.
The Chechens Have “nothing to be ashamed of,” he said. “Akhmad Kadyrov with arms in his hands defended his people, and the war itself was a ‘bestial provocation’ of the Yeltsin-Dudayev corrupt regime.” Moreover, it often happened that “Chechen women covered Russian soldiers with their bodies, thus saving the soldiers from shooting.”
What his opponent is doing, Musayev suggested, is seeking to “justify his own excesses by searching for the bad in his opponent. We are prepared for positive dialogue. The problem is that unfortunately, the Russian Federation does not have a national ideology.” Instead, what is on offer is extreme nationalism and chauvinism.
Another Chechen, Professor Yavus Akhmadov turned on the nationalists and said that “You as people who did not pass through the war certainly do not understand one thing. You think that it can’t get worse than it is and that it is necessary to take power and so on. We also thought that way when we supported the first revolt against Dudayev’s regime.”
“I assure you,” Akhmadov said, if you act in the same way, “it will get worse.”
According to Akhmadov, most Chechens “identify themselves as citizens of Russia. But they are supporters of a state of a ‘feudal-imperial type,’ a strong power, a strong president, and a strong Russia.”
Vladimir Lakeyev, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the KPRF and a representative of leftist groups, Novy region reported, “tried” to bridge the gap by arguing that what matters is not nationality but the structure of the state. “To a complete degree, friendship of the peoples will work only under socialism,” he added.
Aleksandr Batov, the coordinator of leftist ROT-Front, argued that “in Chechnya there is only the appearance of peace” and that “in other national regions there is the basis for the renewal of a war,” with new outbreaks of “separatism and nationalism because conflicts like Chechnya were “profitable for [leaders on] both sides” although deadly for the people.
“Nationalism, the establishment of an [ethnic] Russian state, and the separation of the Caucasus are a path to nowhere,” Batov argued. That is because there are in reality only two nationalities: “the nationality of honest people who toil honestly and the nationality of thieves,k bandits and the like who now rule in our country.”
Another nationalist speaker, however, took a different view. Aleksandr Belov who had led the now-banned Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) said that he “personally did not feel any antipathy toward Chechens” and that “none of the Russian nationalists consider the Chechens as anything but fully valued people.”
But Belov said, “objective reality is such that Russian society experiences a definite fear of the Chechens and the majority of Russians do not associate Chechenya with Russia.” Given that and the absence of assimilation, ‘how should the Russian and Chechen peoples exist together?” The answer is that the divide between them is too great to bridge.
Rustam Tapayev, the president of the Union of Chechen Youth, called on the Russian nationalists to provide evidence that they were seeking a resolution. “Otherwise, in his words, all will conceive them as an organization which ‘exists while there is a conflict … Bothers can argue but they need to find common aspects and not disagreements.
Vladimir Tor, the representative of the Russian Social Movement (ROD), dissented from the idea that one could call “brothers” all those at the table But he suggested that did not mean that there could not be a discussion. However, he insisted that the Chechens must explain why they deserve many times the subsidies from Moscow that Russians get.
He said that was the most important question that had to be answered, although he suggested that two others – the bad behavior of Chechens in Russian cities and “the genocide of ethnic Russian in the Caucasus” – require resolution as well. And he reminded the group that “genocide is a crime which does not have a statute of limitations.”
That prompted a response from Akhmadov. He suggested that “not a single kopeck or ruble has Chechnya received at the expense of the Russian or Khanty-Mansiisk land. Everyone knows the expression of our president [Ramzan Kadyrov]: “Give us the possibility to pumpt oil and we won’t need money from the federal budget.”
After a sharp exchange on these and other issues, Viktor Militaryev, the coordinator of ROD, said there were two additional problems which had to be discussed: “the monopolization of small and mid-sized business by the peoples of the Caucaus” and “the protection of ‘their own’ by national diasporas.”
But Denis Zommer, a leader of the Union of Communist Youth, summed up the meeting with what may be a common view: “It is wrong to dance the lezginka at the tomb of the unknown soldier, but it is also wrong to drink beer there.” With that, the groups appear to have agreed to meet again, next time in Grozny.
Staunton, May 18 – Yesterday, at a roundtable organized by the Moscow Institute of Innovative Development, Russian nationalists, members of leftist groups, and representatives of the Chechen Republic joined in a lively debate about what each group sees as the future relationship of the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation.
The participants were unusually blunt. Dmitry Bakharev, the head of the Slavic Force Movement, opened the debate by arguing that “over the course of centuries, [his] ancestors had assembled these lands with their blood, worked and defended them,” pointedly asking “and what contribution to the general development of Russia has been made by the Chechen people?”
Arguing that the Russians, not the Soviets had defeated Hitler, Bakharev enquired “how can [we] build relations if we know about the disappearance of several dozen Russians in Grozny, about the bestial murders of Russian soldiers in Chechnya? [and] ifin Moscow, there is a street named for a man who called for killing as many Russians as possible.
Zelimkhan Musayev, the Chechen minister for foreign ties, nationality policy, press and information, disputed Bakharev’s argument. He argued that the Soviet Union won in World War II “only thanks to the trust among peoples.” Moreover, he pointed out, “the Caucasus war did not last a century; it lasted only 25 years” (www.nr2.ru/moskow/331976.html).
Moreover, the Chechen minister continued, “Russian General Yermolov “who pacified the Caucasus destroyed Chechen settlements completely” because that struggle “was not a war of Russians and Chechens; it was a war of two civilizations. But most strikingly, Musayev defended Chechen actions since 1991.
The Chechens Have “nothing to be ashamed of,” he said. “Akhmad Kadyrov with arms in his hands defended his people, and the war itself was a ‘bestial provocation’ of the Yeltsin-Dudayev corrupt regime.” Moreover, it often happened that “Chechen women covered Russian soldiers with their bodies, thus saving the soldiers from shooting.”
What his opponent is doing, Musayev suggested, is seeking to “justify his own excesses by searching for the bad in his opponent. We are prepared for positive dialogue. The problem is that unfortunately, the Russian Federation does not have a national ideology.” Instead, what is on offer is extreme nationalism and chauvinism.
Another Chechen, Professor Yavus Akhmadov turned on the nationalists and said that “You as people who did not pass through the war certainly do not understand one thing. You think that it can’t get worse than it is and that it is necessary to take power and so on. We also thought that way when we supported the first revolt against Dudayev’s regime.”
“I assure you,” Akhmadov said, if you act in the same way, “it will get worse.”
According to Akhmadov, most Chechens “identify themselves as citizens of Russia. But they are supporters of a state of a ‘feudal-imperial type,’ a strong power, a strong president, and a strong Russia.”
Vladimir Lakeyev, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the KPRF and a representative of leftist groups, Novy region reported, “tried” to bridge the gap by arguing that what matters is not nationality but the structure of the state. “To a complete degree, friendship of the peoples will work only under socialism,” he added.
Aleksandr Batov, the coordinator of leftist ROT-Front, argued that “in Chechnya there is only the appearance of peace” and that “in other national regions there is the basis for the renewal of a war,” with new outbreaks of “separatism and nationalism because conflicts like Chechnya were “profitable for [leaders on] both sides” although deadly for the people.
“Nationalism, the establishment of an [ethnic] Russian state, and the separation of the Caucasus are a path to nowhere,” Batov argued. That is because there are in reality only two nationalities: “the nationality of honest people who toil honestly and the nationality of thieves,k bandits and the like who now rule in our country.”
Another nationalist speaker, however, took a different view. Aleksandr Belov who had led the now-banned Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) said that he “personally did not feel any antipathy toward Chechens” and that “none of the Russian nationalists consider the Chechens as anything but fully valued people.”
But Belov said, “objective reality is such that Russian society experiences a definite fear of the Chechens and the majority of Russians do not associate Chechenya with Russia.” Given that and the absence of assimilation, ‘how should the Russian and Chechen peoples exist together?” The answer is that the divide between them is too great to bridge.
Rustam Tapayev, the president of the Union of Chechen Youth, called on the Russian nationalists to provide evidence that they were seeking a resolution. “Otherwise, in his words, all will conceive them as an organization which ‘exists while there is a conflict … Bothers can argue but they need to find common aspects and not disagreements.
Vladimir Tor, the representative of the Russian Social Movement (ROD), dissented from the idea that one could call “brothers” all those at the table But he suggested that did not mean that there could not be a discussion. However, he insisted that the Chechens must explain why they deserve many times the subsidies from Moscow that Russians get.
He said that was the most important question that had to be answered, although he suggested that two others – the bad behavior of Chechens in Russian cities and “the genocide of ethnic Russian in the Caucasus” – require resolution as well. And he reminded the group that “genocide is a crime which does not have a statute of limitations.”
That prompted a response from Akhmadov. He suggested that “not a single kopeck or ruble has Chechnya received at the expense of the Russian or Khanty-Mansiisk land. Everyone knows the expression of our president [Ramzan Kadyrov]: “Give us the possibility to pumpt oil and we won’t need money from the federal budget.”
After a sharp exchange on these and other issues, Viktor Militaryev, the coordinator of ROD, said there were two additional problems which had to be discussed: “the monopolization of small and mid-sized business by the peoples of the Caucaus” and “the protection of ‘their own’ by national diasporas.”
But Denis Zommer, a leader of the Union of Communist Youth, summed up the meeting with what may be a common view: “It is wrong to dance the lezginka at the tomb of the unknown soldier, but it is also wrong to drink beer there.” With that, the groups appear to have agreed to meet again, next time in Grozny.
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