Paul Goble
Staunton, May 19 – Now that “up to 60 percent” of the pupils in the primary schools of the Russian capital are children of migrants who do not speak Russian well, an increasing number of Muscovite parents are doing whatever they can to ensure that their children go to those schools which have few or no migrant children, according to a Moscow newspaper.
Educational officials in Moscow prefer that parents send their children to the schools that are closest to their homes, but the parents of many believe that their children will have a less successful academic experience if they are surrounded by other pupils for whom Russian is not a native language (www.kp.ru/daily/25688.4/892109/).
As one father put it, an article in “Komsomolskaya Pravda” today reports, he would rather have his child be in a school nearby so that he and his family would not have to get up so early. But that school is “”full of these … How can the teacher teach if half of the pupils do not speak Russian!””
Such attitudes undoubtedly reflect both xenophobia of some parents and worries about the well-being their children, but the situation has already reached the point, the paper says, that Muscovites now speak about “’white’” and “’black’” classes because in many schools on the outskirts of Moscow half or more of the pupils are “children of migrant workers.”
The low Russian language competence of many of the migrant children puts a serious burden on classroom teachers, the paper continues. Those who complain about the difficulties of keeping the interest of native Russian speakers while developing Russian language skills among others are told by their directors: “’You’re a teacher; teach!’”
Such problems in the classroom are creating “a serious problem for many school directors” in the Russian capital, “Komsomolskaya Pravda” says. Some believe that the best thing is to segregate those with poor or non-existent Russian language schools while others are convinced that the best way for such pupils to learn is to be thrown in with Russian pupils.
And many of these directors are upset because, the paper notes, “in essence, the only social institution which adapts [migrants in Moscow] if not the adults then at least their children for life in the Russian capital is the school,” an institution that is already asked with ever fewer resources to carry out other tasks as well.
There is a network of special classes where Russia is taught as a foreign language. In Moscow at the present time, there are 211 such groups, but they cannot hope to serve the hundreds of thousands of migrant children. And there are only ten schools entirely devoted to this task in Moscow in which are enrolled all of 417 children.
There are many reasons for this shortage besides the obvious financial difficulties. Many parents “often don’t want their child to lose a year,” as they assume those in such schools do. Others don’t want to take the trouble involved in getting their children into such schools. And still a third group resists because its members are unsure of how long they’ll stay in Moscow.
Some Moscow teachers report that in springtime, they suddenly lose “half of their pupils” if these are from Central Asia because the children are sent home to work in the fields of their relatives. And others say that female Muslim pupils are often pulled out of class because their parents don’t believe they need much education at all.
Most teachers involved with such children, however, are committed to providing them with the instruction they have a right to as residents of the Russian Federation. But unfortunately, they sometimes face a problem: “There is no legal foundation” for insisting that a foreign child study Russian. Indeed, the paper says, “no one has the right to do that.”
Many observers are likely to view all this simply as evidence of nationalism among the pupils, but the reality is more complicated. According to the Moscow journalist, “teachers, directors, and the children themselves assured [him] that there is much less nationalism in the capital’s schools than there is outside their doors.”
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Window on Eurasia: More than Half of Bashkortostan’s Imams above Pension Age, Survey Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 19 – More than half of the imams and muezzins of the mosques of Bashkortostan are beyond the normal age for pensioners, according to a recent survey, and 20 percent of all Muslim religious leaders in that republic lack any religious training, a situation common in Middle Volga and one that points to challenges for both Muslims and Moscow.
Not only do these numbers suggest the approach of a radical generational change in the leadership of the Muslim community there, but they open the way to the introduction of even more graduates of Islamic training centers abroad, a development that could unsettle the parishes there as well as increase tensions between the Middle Volga Muslims and Moscow.
These are among the many issues currently roiling the Islamic community in the Middle Volga that Ruslan khazrat Sayakhov, the deputy head of the Bashkortostan Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) responsible for educational issues and external relations, discusses in an interview posted on the Islamrf.ru portal today (www.islamrf.ru/news/umma/faces/16102/).
The problems of the umma in Bashkortostan and the need for new leading cadres, Sayakhov says, were shown by a re-attestation survey of the imams and muezzins of the republic’s MSD. “More than 50 percent of the spiritual workers are people who have long ago passed pension age,” with some imams being over 80 years of age.
Such people, of course, “are extremely respected and wise,” but often cannot keep up with “contemporary people,” he continues. Moreover, “on the order of 20 percent of all these workers do not have even a primary religious education.” Not surprisingly, parishes “ever more often are asking for the sending of young specialists” to take their places.
Unfortunately, there are two few such people who can be sent. Russia’s own Muslim educational system is still being built, Sayakhov says, and consequently, many people are looking at younger people who have received training in Muslim universities and medrassahs abroad.
Despite the fears of some, those who have received such training often benefit from it, the deputy MSD chief who himself studied for eight years in the Arab world adds. They of necessity learn Arabic far better than those who do not go abroad. They are exposed to different approaches and experiences. And they bring this back to others.
Clearly, he continues, it is important to work carefully with those who have studied abroad. They need to be screened and clear goals need to be set, and they must operate under the guidance of more senior Muslim leaders who have greater experience with traditional Islam in the Middle Volga.
Those who say that the Muslim universities in Egypt and elsewhere are “preparing radicals” and that “their graduates fight with arms in their hands against federal forces in the North Caucasus” are making assertions that are “not completely based” in reality, the Bashkortostan MSD deputy head says.
Each student whether in the Russian Federation or abroad “chooses for himself” what he wants. “No one can impose on [him] an alien ideology,” Sayakhov says. On the basis of his own experience with and knowledge of Islamic educational institutions “in Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabai,” he adds, “an individual can find in each of them” that which corresponds to his search.
When one talks about “the contemporary problems of Islamic education,” he goes on, the question needs to be ask “whom do we want to see ‘at the other end’? What knowledge and personal qualities must an individual have who has decided to devote himself to work in the religious sphere?”
There is much to be learned from the jaded traditions of a century ago, Sayakhov says, and he expresses the hope that “in the next few years, that colossal work which is being conducted in this area will allow the discovery” of the best possible combination of a knowledge of Islam, the Arab world, and the Tatar-Bashkir past.
Staunton, May 19 – More than half of the imams and muezzins of the mosques of Bashkortostan are beyond the normal age for pensioners, according to a recent survey, and 20 percent of all Muslim religious leaders in that republic lack any religious training, a situation common in Middle Volga and one that points to challenges for both Muslims and Moscow.
Not only do these numbers suggest the approach of a radical generational change in the leadership of the Muslim community there, but they open the way to the introduction of even more graduates of Islamic training centers abroad, a development that could unsettle the parishes there as well as increase tensions between the Middle Volga Muslims and Moscow.
These are among the many issues currently roiling the Islamic community in the Middle Volga that Ruslan khazrat Sayakhov, the deputy head of the Bashkortostan Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) responsible for educational issues and external relations, discusses in an interview posted on the Islamrf.ru portal today (www.islamrf.ru/news/umma/faces/16102/).
The problems of the umma in Bashkortostan and the need for new leading cadres, Sayakhov says, were shown by a re-attestation survey of the imams and muezzins of the republic’s MSD. “More than 50 percent of the spiritual workers are people who have long ago passed pension age,” with some imams being over 80 years of age.
Such people, of course, “are extremely respected and wise,” but often cannot keep up with “contemporary people,” he continues. Moreover, “on the order of 20 percent of all these workers do not have even a primary religious education.” Not surprisingly, parishes “ever more often are asking for the sending of young specialists” to take their places.
Unfortunately, there are two few such people who can be sent. Russia’s own Muslim educational system is still being built, Sayakhov says, and consequently, many people are looking at younger people who have received training in Muslim universities and medrassahs abroad.
Despite the fears of some, those who have received such training often benefit from it, the deputy MSD chief who himself studied for eight years in the Arab world adds. They of necessity learn Arabic far better than those who do not go abroad. They are exposed to different approaches and experiences. And they bring this back to others.
Clearly, he continues, it is important to work carefully with those who have studied abroad. They need to be screened and clear goals need to be set, and they must operate under the guidance of more senior Muslim leaders who have greater experience with traditional Islam in the Middle Volga.
Those who say that the Muslim universities in Egypt and elsewhere are “preparing radicals” and that “their graduates fight with arms in their hands against federal forces in the North Caucasus” are making assertions that are “not completely based” in reality, the Bashkortostan MSD deputy head says.
Each student whether in the Russian Federation or abroad “chooses for himself” what he wants. “No one can impose on [him] an alien ideology,” Sayakhov says. On the basis of his own experience with and knowledge of Islamic educational institutions “in Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabai,” he adds, “an individual can find in each of them” that which corresponds to his search.
When one talks about “the contemporary problems of Islamic education,” he goes on, the question needs to be ask “whom do we want to see ‘at the other end’? What knowledge and personal qualities must an individual have who has decided to devote himself to work in the religious sphere?”
There is much to be learned from the jaded traditions of a century ago, Sayakhov says, and he expresses the hope that “in the next few years, that colossal work which is being conducted in this area will allow the discovery” of the best possible combination of a knowledge of Islam, the Arab world, and the Tatar-Bashkir past.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Nationalists, Leftists and Chechens Debate Future of North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 18 – Yesterday, at a roundtable organized by the Moscow Institute of Innovative Development, Russian nationalists, members of leftist groups, and representatives of the Chechen Republic joined in a lively debate about what each group sees as the future relationship of the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation.
The participants were unusually blunt. Dmitry Bakharev, the head of the Slavic Force Movement, opened the debate by arguing that “over the course of centuries, [his] ancestors had assembled these lands with their blood, worked and defended them,” pointedly asking “and what contribution to the general development of Russia has been made by the Chechen people?”
Arguing that the Russians, not the Soviets had defeated Hitler, Bakharev enquired “how can [we] build relations if we know about the disappearance of several dozen Russians in Grozny, about the bestial murders of Russian soldiers in Chechnya? [and] ifin Moscow, there is a street named for a man who called for killing as many Russians as possible.
Zelimkhan Musayev, the Chechen minister for foreign ties, nationality policy, press and information, disputed Bakharev’s argument. He argued that the Soviet Union won in World War II “only thanks to the trust among peoples.” Moreover, he pointed out, “the Caucasus war did not last a century; it lasted only 25 years” (www.nr2.ru/moskow/331976.html).
Moreover, the Chechen minister continued, “Russian General Yermolov “who pacified the Caucasus destroyed Chechen settlements completely” because that struggle “was not a war of Russians and Chechens; it was a war of two civilizations. But most strikingly, Musayev defended Chechen actions since 1991.
The Chechens Have “nothing to be ashamed of,” he said. “Akhmad Kadyrov with arms in his hands defended his people, and the war itself was a ‘bestial provocation’ of the Yeltsin-Dudayev corrupt regime.” Moreover, it often happened that “Chechen women covered Russian soldiers with their bodies, thus saving the soldiers from shooting.”
What his opponent is doing, Musayev suggested, is seeking to “justify his own excesses by searching for the bad in his opponent. We are prepared for positive dialogue. The problem is that unfortunately, the Russian Federation does not have a national ideology.” Instead, what is on offer is extreme nationalism and chauvinism.
Another Chechen, Professor Yavus Akhmadov turned on the nationalists and said that “You as people who did not pass through the war certainly do not understand one thing. You think that it can’t get worse than it is and that it is necessary to take power and so on. We also thought that way when we supported the first revolt against Dudayev’s regime.”
“I assure you,” Akhmadov said, if you act in the same way, “it will get worse.”
According to Akhmadov, most Chechens “identify themselves as citizens of Russia. But they are supporters of a state of a ‘feudal-imperial type,’ a strong power, a strong president, and a strong Russia.”
Vladimir Lakeyev, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the KPRF and a representative of leftist groups, Novy region reported, “tried” to bridge the gap by arguing that what matters is not nationality but the structure of the state. “To a complete degree, friendship of the peoples will work only under socialism,” he added.
Aleksandr Batov, the coordinator of leftist ROT-Front, argued that “in Chechnya there is only the appearance of peace” and that “in other national regions there is the basis for the renewal of a war,” with new outbreaks of “separatism and nationalism because conflicts like Chechnya were “profitable for [leaders on] both sides” although deadly for the people.
“Nationalism, the establishment of an [ethnic] Russian state, and the separation of the Caucasus are a path to nowhere,” Batov argued. That is because there are in reality only two nationalities: “the nationality of honest people who toil honestly and the nationality of thieves,k bandits and the like who now rule in our country.”
Another nationalist speaker, however, took a different view. Aleksandr Belov who had led the now-banned Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) said that he “personally did not feel any antipathy toward Chechens” and that “none of the Russian nationalists consider the Chechens as anything but fully valued people.”
But Belov said, “objective reality is such that Russian society experiences a definite fear of the Chechens and the majority of Russians do not associate Chechenya with Russia.” Given that and the absence of assimilation, ‘how should the Russian and Chechen peoples exist together?” The answer is that the divide between them is too great to bridge.
Rustam Tapayev, the president of the Union of Chechen Youth, called on the Russian nationalists to provide evidence that they were seeking a resolution. “Otherwise, in his words, all will conceive them as an organization which ‘exists while there is a conflict … Bothers can argue but they need to find common aspects and not disagreements.
Vladimir Tor, the representative of the Russian Social Movement (ROD), dissented from the idea that one could call “brothers” all those at the table But he suggested that did not mean that there could not be a discussion. However, he insisted that the Chechens must explain why they deserve many times the subsidies from Moscow that Russians get.
He said that was the most important question that had to be answered, although he suggested that two others – the bad behavior of Chechens in Russian cities and “the genocide of ethnic Russian in the Caucasus” – require resolution as well. And he reminded the group that “genocide is a crime which does not have a statute of limitations.”
That prompted a response from Akhmadov. He suggested that “not a single kopeck or ruble has Chechnya received at the expense of the Russian or Khanty-Mansiisk land. Everyone knows the expression of our president [Ramzan Kadyrov]: “Give us the possibility to pumpt oil and we won’t need money from the federal budget.”
After a sharp exchange on these and other issues, Viktor Militaryev, the coordinator of ROD, said there were two additional problems which had to be discussed: “the monopolization of small and mid-sized business by the peoples of the Caucaus” and “the protection of ‘their own’ by national diasporas.”
But Denis Zommer, a leader of the Union of Communist Youth, summed up the meeting with what may be a common view: “It is wrong to dance the lezginka at the tomb of the unknown soldier, but it is also wrong to drink beer there.” With that, the groups appear to have agreed to meet again, next time in Grozny.
Staunton, May 18 – Yesterday, at a roundtable organized by the Moscow Institute of Innovative Development, Russian nationalists, members of leftist groups, and representatives of the Chechen Republic joined in a lively debate about what each group sees as the future relationship of the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation.
The participants were unusually blunt. Dmitry Bakharev, the head of the Slavic Force Movement, opened the debate by arguing that “over the course of centuries, [his] ancestors had assembled these lands with their blood, worked and defended them,” pointedly asking “and what contribution to the general development of Russia has been made by the Chechen people?”
Arguing that the Russians, not the Soviets had defeated Hitler, Bakharev enquired “how can [we] build relations if we know about the disappearance of several dozen Russians in Grozny, about the bestial murders of Russian soldiers in Chechnya? [and] ifin Moscow, there is a street named for a man who called for killing as many Russians as possible.
Zelimkhan Musayev, the Chechen minister for foreign ties, nationality policy, press and information, disputed Bakharev’s argument. He argued that the Soviet Union won in World War II “only thanks to the trust among peoples.” Moreover, he pointed out, “the Caucasus war did not last a century; it lasted only 25 years” (www.nr2.ru/moskow/331976.html).
Moreover, the Chechen minister continued, “Russian General Yermolov “who pacified the Caucasus destroyed Chechen settlements completely” because that struggle “was not a war of Russians and Chechens; it was a war of two civilizations. But most strikingly, Musayev defended Chechen actions since 1991.
The Chechens Have “nothing to be ashamed of,” he said. “Akhmad Kadyrov with arms in his hands defended his people, and the war itself was a ‘bestial provocation’ of the Yeltsin-Dudayev corrupt regime.” Moreover, it often happened that “Chechen women covered Russian soldiers with their bodies, thus saving the soldiers from shooting.”
What his opponent is doing, Musayev suggested, is seeking to “justify his own excesses by searching for the bad in his opponent. We are prepared for positive dialogue. The problem is that unfortunately, the Russian Federation does not have a national ideology.” Instead, what is on offer is extreme nationalism and chauvinism.
Another Chechen, Professor Yavus Akhmadov turned on the nationalists and said that “You as people who did not pass through the war certainly do not understand one thing. You think that it can’t get worse than it is and that it is necessary to take power and so on. We also thought that way when we supported the first revolt against Dudayev’s regime.”
“I assure you,” Akhmadov said, if you act in the same way, “it will get worse.”
According to Akhmadov, most Chechens “identify themselves as citizens of Russia. But they are supporters of a state of a ‘feudal-imperial type,’ a strong power, a strong president, and a strong Russia.”
Vladimir Lakeyev, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the KPRF and a representative of leftist groups, Novy region reported, “tried” to bridge the gap by arguing that what matters is not nationality but the structure of the state. “To a complete degree, friendship of the peoples will work only under socialism,” he added.
Aleksandr Batov, the coordinator of leftist ROT-Front, argued that “in Chechnya there is only the appearance of peace” and that “in other national regions there is the basis for the renewal of a war,” with new outbreaks of “separatism and nationalism because conflicts like Chechnya were “profitable for [leaders on] both sides” although deadly for the people.
“Nationalism, the establishment of an [ethnic] Russian state, and the separation of the Caucasus are a path to nowhere,” Batov argued. That is because there are in reality only two nationalities: “the nationality of honest people who toil honestly and the nationality of thieves,k bandits and the like who now rule in our country.”
Another nationalist speaker, however, took a different view. Aleksandr Belov who had led the now-banned Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) said that he “personally did not feel any antipathy toward Chechens” and that “none of the Russian nationalists consider the Chechens as anything but fully valued people.”
But Belov said, “objective reality is such that Russian society experiences a definite fear of the Chechens and the majority of Russians do not associate Chechenya with Russia.” Given that and the absence of assimilation, ‘how should the Russian and Chechen peoples exist together?” The answer is that the divide between them is too great to bridge.
Rustam Tapayev, the president of the Union of Chechen Youth, called on the Russian nationalists to provide evidence that they were seeking a resolution. “Otherwise, in his words, all will conceive them as an organization which ‘exists while there is a conflict … Bothers can argue but they need to find common aspects and not disagreements.
Vladimir Tor, the representative of the Russian Social Movement (ROD), dissented from the idea that one could call “brothers” all those at the table But he suggested that did not mean that there could not be a discussion. However, he insisted that the Chechens must explain why they deserve many times the subsidies from Moscow that Russians get.
He said that was the most important question that had to be answered, although he suggested that two others – the bad behavior of Chechens in Russian cities and “the genocide of ethnic Russian in the Caucasus” – require resolution as well. And he reminded the group that “genocide is a crime which does not have a statute of limitations.”
That prompted a response from Akhmadov. He suggested that “not a single kopeck or ruble has Chechnya received at the expense of the Russian or Khanty-Mansiisk land. Everyone knows the expression of our president [Ramzan Kadyrov]: “Give us the possibility to pumpt oil and we won’t need money from the federal budget.”
After a sharp exchange on these and other issues, Viktor Militaryev, the coordinator of ROD, said there were two additional problems which had to be discussed: “the monopolization of small and mid-sized business by the peoples of the Caucaus” and “the protection of ‘their own’ by national diasporas.”
But Denis Zommer, a leader of the Union of Communist Youth, summed up the meeting with what may be a common view: “It is wrong to dance the lezginka at the tomb of the unknown soldier, but it is also wrong to drink beer there.” With that, the groups appear to have agreed to meet again, next time in Grozny.
Window on Eurasia: Caucasus Muslim Leader Denounces Georgia’s Creation of an Independent Muslim Body
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 18 – Allashukyur Pashazade, sheikh ul-Islam and head of the Baku-based Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus (AMC), has sharply criticized the creation of an independent Administration of Muslims of Georgia (AMG), as the latest example of the nationalist course set by President Mikhail Saakashvili.
The sheikh said that the decision of “official Tbilisi” was “incorrect,” adding that in his view, “behind the establishment of this organization stands the idea of ‘Greater Armenia” and saying that he deeply regretted that “part of the ethnic Azerbaijani officials” in Georgia support the new body (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1405007.html).
However that may be, the efforts of Georgians to have their own Muslim organization are but the latest example of numerous problems involved in squaring religious and national borders in the post-Soviet states, ones that bedevil the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Abkhazia but that is nowhere more complicated than in the south Caucasus.
The AMC was established in Soviet times as one of four Muslims Spiritual Directorates (MSDs), but unlike the other three, the Baku institution had a double task. On the one hand, it was responsible for Shiite communities throughout the USSR. And on the other, it had administrative responsibility for Muslim parishes in the Caucasus as a whole.
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pashazade, who has been in office since 1980, has sought to continue to exercise the powers involved in each of these responsibilities, although he has been under pressure to yield on both counts and has in fact given way to other newer Muslim bodies.
The sheikh ul-Islam has insisted that he, the only Shiite leader of a supra-national MSD, is still responsible for all Shiite communities across the former Soviet space, although his position has been challenged by others, including most recently Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR).
And while he has de facto yielded to the new MSDs in the post-Soviet North Caucasus, Pashazade has sought to maintain the powers implied in the name of the institution he heads, especially with regard to neighboring Georgia, where the majority of Muslims are ethnic Azerbaijanis, although many of them are Sunni rather than Shiia.
The Baku sheikh noted on Monday that he has exercised his authority in Georgia through a special division of the AMC, which was “created in 1996 at the request of [former Georgian] President Shevardnadze” and which continues to function under the direction of Ali Aliyev, a citizens of Georgia.
That makes the creation of the Georgian body a particular threat to his dignity and influence. Details about the AMG are still sketchy, particularly with regard to how many of the Muslim parishes in Georgia, ethnic Azerbaijani or otherwise, recognize its authority. But some details are offered in the just released issue of “NG-Religii.”
In an essay entitled, “The Shiites and Sunnis Divide Georgia,” Lidiya Orlova reports that the AMG was created last week, with Sunni Mufti Dzhamal Bagshadze becoming its leader with the avowed purposes of “achieving independence from the AMC” and “uniting under its control the Muslim communities of Georgia” (religion.ng.ru/events/2011-05-18/3_gruzia.html).
Ali Aliyev, the AMC representative in Georgia, insisted that the announcement of the new group would have little effect and that in his words, “the mosques in Georgia will continue their activity and continue to be subordinate to the AMC.” That is especially true because there is no legal basis for the new national AMG.
According to Aliyev, “the creators of such a structure must be representatives of the religion and spiritual persons. [But in this case] there is not one spiritual person; they are civil people, and certain [of those involved in fact] work in government structures.” And he added that in the AMG leadership as of now, “there is not a single [ethnic] Azerbaijani.”
“At the same time,” Orlova continues, “Aliyev is not inclined to see a political subtext to the appearance of the new spiritual administration” because Tbilisi in general and President Saakashvili in particular “constantly declare their friendship with Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people.”
But if Aliyev does not view this action as political, Araz Alizade, the vice president of the Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan is sure that it is. He told Regnum that “behind the creation of the AMG stands the Georgian government” which is trying in every possible way “to separate Azerbaijanis living in Georgia from Azerbaijan.”
Staunton, May 18 – Allashukyur Pashazade, sheikh ul-Islam and head of the Baku-based Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus (AMC), has sharply criticized the creation of an independent Administration of Muslims of Georgia (AMG), as the latest example of the nationalist course set by President Mikhail Saakashvili.
The sheikh said that the decision of “official Tbilisi” was “incorrect,” adding that in his view, “behind the establishment of this organization stands the idea of ‘Greater Armenia” and saying that he deeply regretted that “part of the ethnic Azerbaijani officials” in Georgia support the new body (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1405007.html).
However that may be, the efforts of Georgians to have their own Muslim organization are but the latest example of numerous problems involved in squaring religious and national borders in the post-Soviet states, ones that bedevil the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Abkhazia but that is nowhere more complicated than in the south Caucasus.
The AMC was established in Soviet times as one of four Muslims Spiritual Directorates (MSDs), but unlike the other three, the Baku institution had a double task. On the one hand, it was responsible for Shiite communities throughout the USSR. And on the other, it had administrative responsibility for Muslim parishes in the Caucasus as a whole.
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pashazade, who has been in office since 1980, has sought to continue to exercise the powers involved in each of these responsibilities, although he has been under pressure to yield on both counts and has in fact given way to other newer Muslim bodies.
The sheikh ul-Islam has insisted that he, the only Shiite leader of a supra-national MSD, is still responsible for all Shiite communities across the former Soviet space, although his position has been challenged by others, including most recently Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR).
And while he has de facto yielded to the new MSDs in the post-Soviet North Caucasus, Pashazade has sought to maintain the powers implied in the name of the institution he heads, especially with regard to neighboring Georgia, where the majority of Muslims are ethnic Azerbaijanis, although many of them are Sunni rather than Shiia.
The Baku sheikh noted on Monday that he has exercised his authority in Georgia through a special division of the AMC, which was “created in 1996 at the request of [former Georgian] President Shevardnadze” and which continues to function under the direction of Ali Aliyev, a citizens of Georgia.
That makes the creation of the Georgian body a particular threat to his dignity and influence. Details about the AMG are still sketchy, particularly with regard to how many of the Muslim parishes in Georgia, ethnic Azerbaijani or otherwise, recognize its authority. But some details are offered in the just released issue of “NG-Religii.”
In an essay entitled, “The Shiites and Sunnis Divide Georgia,” Lidiya Orlova reports that the AMG was created last week, with Sunni Mufti Dzhamal Bagshadze becoming its leader with the avowed purposes of “achieving independence from the AMC” and “uniting under its control the Muslim communities of Georgia” (religion.ng.ru/events/2011-05-18/3_gruzia.html).
Ali Aliyev, the AMC representative in Georgia, insisted that the announcement of the new group would have little effect and that in his words, “the mosques in Georgia will continue their activity and continue to be subordinate to the AMC.” That is especially true because there is no legal basis for the new national AMG.
According to Aliyev, “the creators of such a structure must be representatives of the religion and spiritual persons. [But in this case] there is not one spiritual person; they are civil people, and certain [of those involved in fact] work in government structures.” And he added that in the AMG leadership as of now, “there is not a single [ethnic] Azerbaijani.”
“At the same time,” Orlova continues, “Aliyev is not inclined to see a political subtext to the appearance of the new spiritual administration” because Tbilisi in general and President Saakashvili in particular “constantly declare their friendship with Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people.”
But if Aliyev does not view this action as political, Araz Alizade, the vice president of the Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan is sure that it is. He told Regnum that “behind the creation of the AMG stands the Georgian government” which is trying in every possible way “to separate Azerbaijanis living in Georgia from Azerbaijan.”
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Regime Opponents, Under Pressure in Russia’s Regions, Flee to Capitals
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 17 – Less constrained than their counterparts in Moscow, police officials in Russia’s regions are currently putting so much pressure on those they identify as “extremists” that many of these people in many cases feel compelled to move to Moscow and St. Petersburg where they hope there is “still a chance to be heard.”
On the one hand, this situation means that the state of repression in the Russian Federation is much worse than it may appear to those who judge it on the basis of the situation in Moscow and St. Petersburg. And on the other, it suggests that the amount of opposition to the regime in the capitals may overstate the level of such opposition in the country as a whole.
Those are just some of the disturbing conclusions suggested by commentator Aleksander Litoy in an article the current issue of Moscow’s “New Times” weekly, an article that compares how interior ministry officers treat people in Moscow and the provinces and examines how opposition figures have adapted to this difference (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/38797).
Litoy notes that the E Centers have existed in the interior ministry since the end of 2008, when they replaced the subdivisions for the struggle with organized crime and when the majority of the staff of the latter passed into the former. But already then, after anti-extremist legislation was passed, “rights activists expressed concern” that these units would be used against dissent.
That is exactly what has happened. Litoy says. And as a result, “the “clients” of the centers” had only one option left to defend themselves if they were operating in the regions: “they could flee to the capitals where there are still media prepared to speak out on behalf of the repressed and where organizations defending rights are still active.”
Those who were in the regions had no such defense, and the operatives of the E section of the local interior ministry offices acted against them without much ceremony. Anna Polikova, the editor of the extremizma.net site, says that this reflects the anti-organized crime background of the officers involved.
Most of these officers, she suggests, view their new “charges” as no different than the organized criminal groups they had earlier been deployed against. Consequently, they “are not able to work any differently” toward political dissidents than they did toward real criminal groups.
Indeed, Polikova points out, “the regional ‘E-men’ consider the ideal situation to be when on their territory there are in general no political organizations or initiatives other than the official ones.” And consequently, given their past, they seek to suppress any independent action, viewing it through the prism of official definitions of “extremism.”
As a result, outside of the capitals, Litoy says, “the possibilities of those who struggle with extremism have only increased despite the continuing criticism by the media and human rights activists.” And that has led many political activists there either to cease their activities or, quite often, to flee to Moscow or St. Petersburg where their chances are greater.
Appended to Litovoy’s article are quotations from the late Galina Kozhevnikova or SOVA, Mikhail Maglov of Solidarity, who himself came to Moscow from Omsk, and Olga Ivanova of the Left Front who moved from Krasnodar to Moscow, all of whom support Litoy’s basic conclusions.
Staunton, May 17 – Less constrained than their counterparts in Moscow, police officials in Russia’s regions are currently putting so much pressure on those they identify as “extremists” that many of these people in many cases feel compelled to move to Moscow and St. Petersburg where they hope there is “still a chance to be heard.”
On the one hand, this situation means that the state of repression in the Russian Federation is much worse than it may appear to those who judge it on the basis of the situation in Moscow and St. Petersburg. And on the other, it suggests that the amount of opposition to the regime in the capitals may overstate the level of such opposition in the country as a whole.
Those are just some of the disturbing conclusions suggested by commentator Aleksander Litoy in an article the current issue of Moscow’s “New Times” weekly, an article that compares how interior ministry officers treat people in Moscow and the provinces and examines how opposition figures have adapted to this difference (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/38797).
Litoy notes that the E Centers have existed in the interior ministry since the end of 2008, when they replaced the subdivisions for the struggle with organized crime and when the majority of the staff of the latter passed into the former. But already then, after anti-extremist legislation was passed, “rights activists expressed concern” that these units would be used against dissent.
That is exactly what has happened. Litoy says. And as a result, “the “clients” of the centers” had only one option left to defend themselves if they were operating in the regions: “they could flee to the capitals where there are still media prepared to speak out on behalf of the repressed and where organizations defending rights are still active.”
Those who were in the regions had no such defense, and the operatives of the E section of the local interior ministry offices acted against them without much ceremony. Anna Polikova, the editor of the extremizma.net site, says that this reflects the anti-organized crime background of the officers involved.
Most of these officers, she suggests, view their new “charges” as no different than the organized criminal groups they had earlier been deployed against. Consequently, they “are not able to work any differently” toward political dissidents than they did toward real criminal groups.
Indeed, Polikova points out, “the regional ‘E-men’ consider the ideal situation to be when on their territory there are in general no political organizations or initiatives other than the official ones.” And consequently, given their past, they seek to suppress any independent action, viewing it through the prism of official definitions of “extremism.”
As a result, outside of the capitals, Litoy says, “the possibilities of those who struggle with extremism have only increased despite the continuing criticism by the media and human rights activists.” And that has led many political activists there either to cease their activities or, quite often, to flee to Moscow or St. Petersburg where their chances are greater.
Appended to Litovoy’s article are quotations from the late Galina Kozhevnikova or SOVA, Mikhail Maglov of Solidarity, who himself came to Moscow from Omsk, and Olga Ivanova of the Left Front who moved from Krasnodar to Moscow, all of whom support Litoy’s basic conclusions.
Window on Eurasia: For the Price of the Sochi Games, Russia Could Provide Kindergartens for All Preschoolers, Activists Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 17 – For what Moscow plans to spend on the 2014 Sochi Olympics, activists say, the central government could open and support the operations of kindergartens for all preschoolers in Russia, the latest indication of the way in which in straightened economic times, Russians are registering their objections to government policies.
And because all Russians are paying the price for these games just as they are paying for the continuing war in the North Caucasus, such objections are likely to increase the number of opponents to these policies, even if as seems likely the powers that be in Moscow will do everything they can to ignore or downplay them.
But even if Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are able to continue to pursue such policies, anger about spending on one set of projects, especially if it is shown to be taking money out of the mouths of children and others who need it, will have an impact on the rhetoric of Russian politics especially during the upcoming parliamentary campaign.
The Accessible Pre-School Education for Russian Children Movement has pointed out that Russia is spending 1.5 trillion rubles (50 billion US dollars) to prepare for the Sochi Games, an amount that the group say would provide kindergartens for three million Russian children, many of whom must now do without (globalsib.com/10501/).
The movement adds that Moscow plans to spend “not less” than that on the World Soccer Championship in 2018, yet another high profile publicity event that will do little or nothing to help ordinary Russians. And it offers other examples where money Moscow is currently spending could be put to better use.
To attract attention to this cause, the movement is organizing a three-day hunger strike for next weekend, the seventh such effort over the past several years but the one that already has attracted more support from more regions and cities than any of the earlier ones which Moscow studiously ignored (rdddo.ru/golodovka).
A major reason why the movement appears to be gaining support is that tough economic times and Moscow’s decision to solve its budgetary problems largely by cutting services to the poorer elements of the society is infuriating an increasing number of people and leading them to question the gigantist Soviet-style projects Vladimir Putin in particular appears to favor.
Last week, Anton Razmakhnin of “Svobodnaya pressa” reported that because of budgetary problems, “in this year, the majority of rural hospitals are closing,” a forced measure he points out that Moscow had not taken “since the times of the German occupation” during World War II (svpressa.ru/society/article/42957/).
Cutbacks in schools and hospitals, of course, will do more than anger many Russians. They will worsen the country’s demographic situation because many will decide not to have children if they cannot be sure there will be pre-school facilities to take them and because many others will suffer and die because they cannot gain access to medical treatment.
Staunton, May 17 – For what Moscow plans to spend on the 2014 Sochi Olympics, activists say, the central government could open and support the operations of kindergartens for all preschoolers in Russia, the latest indication of the way in which in straightened economic times, Russians are registering their objections to government policies.
And because all Russians are paying the price for these games just as they are paying for the continuing war in the North Caucasus, such objections are likely to increase the number of opponents to these policies, even if as seems likely the powers that be in Moscow will do everything they can to ignore or downplay them.
But even if Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are able to continue to pursue such policies, anger about spending on one set of projects, especially if it is shown to be taking money out of the mouths of children and others who need it, will have an impact on the rhetoric of Russian politics especially during the upcoming parliamentary campaign.
The Accessible Pre-School Education for Russian Children Movement has pointed out that Russia is spending 1.5 trillion rubles (50 billion US dollars) to prepare for the Sochi Games, an amount that the group say would provide kindergartens for three million Russian children, many of whom must now do without (globalsib.com/10501/).
The movement adds that Moscow plans to spend “not less” than that on the World Soccer Championship in 2018, yet another high profile publicity event that will do little or nothing to help ordinary Russians. And it offers other examples where money Moscow is currently spending could be put to better use.
To attract attention to this cause, the movement is organizing a three-day hunger strike for next weekend, the seventh such effort over the past several years but the one that already has attracted more support from more regions and cities than any of the earlier ones which Moscow studiously ignored (rdddo.ru/golodovka).
A major reason why the movement appears to be gaining support is that tough economic times and Moscow’s decision to solve its budgetary problems largely by cutting services to the poorer elements of the society is infuriating an increasing number of people and leading them to question the gigantist Soviet-style projects Vladimir Putin in particular appears to favor.
Last week, Anton Razmakhnin of “Svobodnaya pressa” reported that because of budgetary problems, “in this year, the majority of rural hospitals are closing,” a forced measure he points out that Moscow had not taken “since the times of the German occupation” during World War II (svpressa.ru/society/article/42957/).
Cutbacks in schools and hospitals, of course, will do more than anger many Russians. They will worsen the country’s demographic situation because many will decide not to have children if they cannot be sure there will be pre-school facilities to take them and because many others will suffer and die because they cannot gain access to medical treatment.
Window on Eurasia: Russians Worried Siberians Could Follow the Path of Ukrainians
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 17 – Siberians may follow the path of the Ukrainians and seek independent statehood, some Moscow commentators believe, but whether they do is still an open question, the answer to which depends as much as on the Russians themselves as on those who are now identifying themselves as “Sibiryaki.”
In the latest broadcast of the “Nationality Question” program of “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” the two hosts, Elena Khanga and Dmitry Steshin note that according to some in Siberia, as many as a third of the residents of that region now identify as Siberians and see their future as separate from or even independent of Russia’s (www.kp.ru/daily/25686/890769/).
The two then discuss with their guest, Egor Kholmogorov, the editor of the “Russky obozrevatel” internet journal, whether the growth in Siberian identity represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and who is to blame for the apparent increase in such an identity over the last few years.
As Khanga points out, “a segment of the Siberians assert that they are distinctive people and, by distinguishing themselves from other nations, can resolve many social, ecological and other problems. And they themselves can define the future of their region and over time cease to be [only] a source of raw materials for Russia.”
Steshin adds that “Siberia always was set apart from the rest of Russia,” at least at the level of “social consciousness.” Because of the way the region was settled, a unique “Siberian mentality” has emerged -- to which Khanga adds that almost 14 percent of the population of the country could identify as Siberians, “an enormous figure.”
Kholmogorov concedes that there is such a possibility, but he says that he “hope that the greater part of them will never write down this nationality or even find out about such an idea,” lest having taken this first step in nation building they take others much as some of the nations of the former Soviet Union did.
To Khanga’s objection that “nationality is not citizenship” and that if people identify in one way rather than another, there is no harm in that, the “Russky obozrevatel” editor replies that everyone must understand that “in today’s world, there is no other territory” which outsiders view with such greedy aspirations.
He then recalls the statement of one former US secretary of state that “Siberia is too large a country to belong to a single state,” a clear indication in his mind of what the West intends and of the West’s role in promoting this particular national “identity” as a first step to taking Siberia away from Russia.
Steshin then suggests another approach to the problem of Siberian identity. In his view, Russians themselves are to blame both by forcing Siberians to pay excessive prices for tickets to travel to European Russia and by depriving them of the assistance they need both in normal times and during natural disasters like the forest fires of last year.
He adds that the appearance of a Siberian language is “a very serious provocation which touches the depths of the sub-consciousness,” although appended to the article is a comment by the language’s developer that he came up with the idea of such a language as a lark and has been surprised by the interest in it.
According to Kholmogorov, Ukrainian was once invented in much the same way by Mihailo Hurushevsky, and consequently, the Russian commentator argues, the appearance of such a language, however artificial, has the potential to create real problems for the state down the road.
That is especially likely in the Siberian case, Kholmogorov suggests, because Russian identity is no longer highly values and the asymmetric nature of Russian Federalism means that non-Russians have many benefits and powers that ethnic Russians do not, even in places where they are the overwhelming majority.
Consequently, he concludes, what some may now dismiss as a bad joke may prove to be something more and more disturbing if Russians do not wake up to the danger that such an identity represents for their country and for their nation, one that could cost their country even more than did the departure of Ukraine.
Staunton, May 17 – Siberians may follow the path of the Ukrainians and seek independent statehood, some Moscow commentators believe, but whether they do is still an open question, the answer to which depends as much as on the Russians themselves as on those who are now identifying themselves as “Sibiryaki.”
In the latest broadcast of the “Nationality Question” program of “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” the two hosts, Elena Khanga and Dmitry Steshin note that according to some in Siberia, as many as a third of the residents of that region now identify as Siberians and see their future as separate from or even independent of Russia’s (www.kp.ru/daily/25686/890769/).
The two then discuss with their guest, Egor Kholmogorov, the editor of the “Russky obozrevatel” internet journal, whether the growth in Siberian identity represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and who is to blame for the apparent increase in such an identity over the last few years.
As Khanga points out, “a segment of the Siberians assert that they are distinctive people and, by distinguishing themselves from other nations, can resolve many social, ecological and other problems. And they themselves can define the future of their region and over time cease to be [only] a source of raw materials for Russia.”
Steshin adds that “Siberia always was set apart from the rest of Russia,” at least at the level of “social consciousness.” Because of the way the region was settled, a unique “Siberian mentality” has emerged -- to which Khanga adds that almost 14 percent of the population of the country could identify as Siberians, “an enormous figure.”
Kholmogorov concedes that there is such a possibility, but he says that he “hope that the greater part of them will never write down this nationality or even find out about such an idea,” lest having taken this first step in nation building they take others much as some of the nations of the former Soviet Union did.
To Khanga’s objection that “nationality is not citizenship” and that if people identify in one way rather than another, there is no harm in that, the “Russky obozrevatel” editor replies that everyone must understand that “in today’s world, there is no other territory” which outsiders view with such greedy aspirations.
He then recalls the statement of one former US secretary of state that “Siberia is too large a country to belong to a single state,” a clear indication in his mind of what the West intends and of the West’s role in promoting this particular national “identity” as a first step to taking Siberia away from Russia.
Steshin then suggests another approach to the problem of Siberian identity. In his view, Russians themselves are to blame both by forcing Siberians to pay excessive prices for tickets to travel to European Russia and by depriving them of the assistance they need both in normal times and during natural disasters like the forest fires of last year.
He adds that the appearance of a Siberian language is “a very serious provocation which touches the depths of the sub-consciousness,” although appended to the article is a comment by the language’s developer that he came up with the idea of such a language as a lark and has been surprised by the interest in it.
According to Kholmogorov, Ukrainian was once invented in much the same way by Mihailo Hurushevsky, and consequently, the Russian commentator argues, the appearance of such a language, however artificial, has the potential to create real problems for the state down the road.
That is especially likely in the Siberian case, Kholmogorov suggests, because Russian identity is no longer highly values and the asymmetric nature of Russian Federalism means that non-Russians have many benefits and powers that ethnic Russians do not, even in places where they are the overwhelming majority.
Consequently, he concludes, what some may now dismiss as a bad joke may prove to be something more and more disturbing if Russians do not wake up to the danger that such an identity represents for their country and for their nation, one that could cost their country even more than did the departure of Ukraine.
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