Paul Goble
Staunton, May 17 – Less constrained than their counterparts in Moscow, police officials in Russia’s regions are currently putting so much pressure on those they identify as “extremists” that many of these people in many cases feel compelled to move to Moscow and St. Petersburg where they hope there is “still a chance to be heard.”
On the one hand, this situation means that the state of repression in the Russian Federation is much worse than it may appear to those who judge it on the basis of the situation in Moscow and St. Petersburg. And on the other, it suggests that the amount of opposition to the regime in the capitals may overstate the level of such opposition in the country as a whole.
Those are just some of the disturbing conclusions suggested by commentator Aleksander Litoy in an article the current issue of Moscow’s “New Times” weekly, an article that compares how interior ministry officers treat people in Moscow and the provinces and examines how opposition figures have adapted to this difference (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/38797).
Litoy notes that the E Centers have existed in the interior ministry since the end of 2008, when they replaced the subdivisions for the struggle with organized crime and when the majority of the staff of the latter passed into the former. But already then, after anti-extremist legislation was passed, “rights activists expressed concern” that these units would be used against dissent.
That is exactly what has happened. Litoy says. And as a result, “the “clients” of the centers” had only one option left to defend themselves if they were operating in the regions: “they could flee to the capitals where there are still media prepared to speak out on behalf of the repressed and where organizations defending rights are still active.”
Those who were in the regions had no such defense, and the operatives of the E section of the local interior ministry offices acted against them without much ceremony. Anna Polikova, the editor of the extremizma.net site, says that this reflects the anti-organized crime background of the officers involved.
Most of these officers, she suggests, view their new “charges” as no different than the organized criminal groups they had earlier been deployed against. Consequently, they “are not able to work any differently” toward political dissidents than they did toward real criminal groups.
Indeed, Polikova points out, “the regional ‘E-men’ consider the ideal situation to be when on their territory there are in general no political organizations or initiatives other than the official ones.” And consequently, given their past, they seek to suppress any independent action, viewing it through the prism of official definitions of “extremism.”
As a result, outside of the capitals, Litoy says, “the possibilities of those who struggle with extremism have only increased despite the continuing criticism by the media and human rights activists.” And that has led many political activists there either to cease their activities or, quite often, to flee to Moscow or St. Petersburg where their chances are greater.
Appended to Litovoy’s article are quotations from the late Galina Kozhevnikova or SOVA, Mikhail Maglov of Solidarity, who himself came to Moscow from Omsk, and Olga Ivanova of the Left Front who moved from Krasnodar to Moscow, all of whom support Litoy’s basic conclusions.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Window on Eurasia: For the Price of the Sochi Games, Russia Could Provide Kindergartens for All Preschoolers, Activists Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 17 – For what Moscow plans to spend on the 2014 Sochi Olympics, activists say, the central government could open and support the operations of kindergartens for all preschoolers in Russia, the latest indication of the way in which in straightened economic times, Russians are registering their objections to government policies.
And because all Russians are paying the price for these games just as they are paying for the continuing war in the North Caucasus, such objections are likely to increase the number of opponents to these policies, even if as seems likely the powers that be in Moscow will do everything they can to ignore or downplay them.
But even if Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are able to continue to pursue such policies, anger about spending on one set of projects, especially if it is shown to be taking money out of the mouths of children and others who need it, will have an impact on the rhetoric of Russian politics especially during the upcoming parliamentary campaign.
The Accessible Pre-School Education for Russian Children Movement has pointed out that Russia is spending 1.5 trillion rubles (50 billion US dollars) to prepare for the Sochi Games, an amount that the group say would provide kindergartens for three million Russian children, many of whom must now do without (globalsib.com/10501/).
The movement adds that Moscow plans to spend “not less” than that on the World Soccer Championship in 2018, yet another high profile publicity event that will do little or nothing to help ordinary Russians. And it offers other examples where money Moscow is currently spending could be put to better use.
To attract attention to this cause, the movement is organizing a three-day hunger strike for next weekend, the seventh such effort over the past several years but the one that already has attracted more support from more regions and cities than any of the earlier ones which Moscow studiously ignored (rdddo.ru/golodovka).
A major reason why the movement appears to be gaining support is that tough economic times and Moscow’s decision to solve its budgetary problems largely by cutting services to the poorer elements of the society is infuriating an increasing number of people and leading them to question the gigantist Soviet-style projects Vladimir Putin in particular appears to favor.
Last week, Anton Razmakhnin of “Svobodnaya pressa” reported that because of budgetary problems, “in this year, the majority of rural hospitals are closing,” a forced measure he points out that Moscow had not taken “since the times of the German occupation” during World War II (svpressa.ru/society/article/42957/).
Cutbacks in schools and hospitals, of course, will do more than anger many Russians. They will worsen the country’s demographic situation because many will decide not to have children if they cannot be sure there will be pre-school facilities to take them and because many others will suffer and die because they cannot gain access to medical treatment.
Staunton, May 17 – For what Moscow plans to spend on the 2014 Sochi Olympics, activists say, the central government could open and support the operations of kindergartens for all preschoolers in Russia, the latest indication of the way in which in straightened economic times, Russians are registering their objections to government policies.
And because all Russians are paying the price for these games just as they are paying for the continuing war in the North Caucasus, such objections are likely to increase the number of opponents to these policies, even if as seems likely the powers that be in Moscow will do everything they can to ignore or downplay them.
But even if Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are able to continue to pursue such policies, anger about spending on one set of projects, especially if it is shown to be taking money out of the mouths of children and others who need it, will have an impact on the rhetoric of Russian politics especially during the upcoming parliamentary campaign.
The Accessible Pre-School Education for Russian Children Movement has pointed out that Russia is spending 1.5 trillion rubles (50 billion US dollars) to prepare for the Sochi Games, an amount that the group say would provide kindergartens for three million Russian children, many of whom must now do without (globalsib.com/10501/).
The movement adds that Moscow plans to spend “not less” than that on the World Soccer Championship in 2018, yet another high profile publicity event that will do little or nothing to help ordinary Russians. And it offers other examples where money Moscow is currently spending could be put to better use.
To attract attention to this cause, the movement is organizing a three-day hunger strike for next weekend, the seventh such effort over the past several years but the one that already has attracted more support from more regions and cities than any of the earlier ones which Moscow studiously ignored (rdddo.ru/golodovka).
A major reason why the movement appears to be gaining support is that tough economic times and Moscow’s decision to solve its budgetary problems largely by cutting services to the poorer elements of the society is infuriating an increasing number of people and leading them to question the gigantist Soviet-style projects Vladimir Putin in particular appears to favor.
Last week, Anton Razmakhnin of “Svobodnaya pressa” reported that because of budgetary problems, “in this year, the majority of rural hospitals are closing,” a forced measure he points out that Moscow had not taken “since the times of the German occupation” during World War II (svpressa.ru/society/article/42957/).
Cutbacks in schools and hospitals, of course, will do more than anger many Russians. They will worsen the country’s demographic situation because many will decide not to have children if they cannot be sure there will be pre-school facilities to take them and because many others will suffer and die because they cannot gain access to medical treatment.
Window on Eurasia: Russians Worried Siberians Could Follow the Path of Ukrainians
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 17 – Siberians may follow the path of the Ukrainians and seek independent statehood, some Moscow commentators believe, but whether they do is still an open question, the answer to which depends as much as on the Russians themselves as on those who are now identifying themselves as “Sibiryaki.”
In the latest broadcast of the “Nationality Question” program of “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” the two hosts, Elena Khanga and Dmitry Steshin note that according to some in Siberia, as many as a third of the residents of that region now identify as Siberians and see their future as separate from or even independent of Russia’s (www.kp.ru/daily/25686/890769/).
The two then discuss with their guest, Egor Kholmogorov, the editor of the “Russky obozrevatel” internet journal, whether the growth in Siberian identity represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and who is to blame for the apparent increase in such an identity over the last few years.
As Khanga points out, “a segment of the Siberians assert that they are distinctive people and, by distinguishing themselves from other nations, can resolve many social, ecological and other problems. And they themselves can define the future of their region and over time cease to be [only] a source of raw materials for Russia.”
Steshin adds that “Siberia always was set apart from the rest of Russia,” at least at the level of “social consciousness.” Because of the way the region was settled, a unique “Siberian mentality” has emerged -- to which Khanga adds that almost 14 percent of the population of the country could identify as Siberians, “an enormous figure.”
Kholmogorov concedes that there is such a possibility, but he says that he “hope that the greater part of them will never write down this nationality or even find out about such an idea,” lest having taken this first step in nation building they take others much as some of the nations of the former Soviet Union did.
To Khanga’s objection that “nationality is not citizenship” and that if people identify in one way rather than another, there is no harm in that, the “Russky obozrevatel” editor replies that everyone must understand that “in today’s world, there is no other territory” which outsiders view with such greedy aspirations.
He then recalls the statement of one former US secretary of state that “Siberia is too large a country to belong to a single state,” a clear indication in his mind of what the West intends and of the West’s role in promoting this particular national “identity” as a first step to taking Siberia away from Russia.
Steshin then suggests another approach to the problem of Siberian identity. In his view, Russians themselves are to blame both by forcing Siberians to pay excessive prices for tickets to travel to European Russia and by depriving them of the assistance they need both in normal times and during natural disasters like the forest fires of last year.
He adds that the appearance of a Siberian language is “a very serious provocation which touches the depths of the sub-consciousness,” although appended to the article is a comment by the language’s developer that he came up with the idea of such a language as a lark and has been surprised by the interest in it.
According to Kholmogorov, Ukrainian was once invented in much the same way by Mihailo Hurushevsky, and consequently, the Russian commentator argues, the appearance of such a language, however artificial, has the potential to create real problems for the state down the road.
That is especially likely in the Siberian case, Kholmogorov suggests, because Russian identity is no longer highly values and the asymmetric nature of Russian Federalism means that non-Russians have many benefits and powers that ethnic Russians do not, even in places where they are the overwhelming majority.
Consequently, he concludes, what some may now dismiss as a bad joke may prove to be something more and more disturbing if Russians do not wake up to the danger that such an identity represents for their country and for their nation, one that could cost their country even more than did the departure of Ukraine.
Staunton, May 17 – Siberians may follow the path of the Ukrainians and seek independent statehood, some Moscow commentators believe, but whether they do is still an open question, the answer to which depends as much as on the Russians themselves as on those who are now identifying themselves as “Sibiryaki.”
In the latest broadcast of the “Nationality Question” program of “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” the two hosts, Elena Khanga and Dmitry Steshin note that according to some in Siberia, as many as a third of the residents of that region now identify as Siberians and see their future as separate from or even independent of Russia’s (www.kp.ru/daily/25686/890769/).
The two then discuss with their guest, Egor Kholmogorov, the editor of the “Russky obozrevatel” internet journal, whether the growth in Siberian identity represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and who is to blame for the apparent increase in such an identity over the last few years.
As Khanga points out, “a segment of the Siberians assert that they are distinctive people and, by distinguishing themselves from other nations, can resolve many social, ecological and other problems. And they themselves can define the future of their region and over time cease to be [only] a source of raw materials for Russia.”
Steshin adds that “Siberia always was set apart from the rest of Russia,” at least at the level of “social consciousness.” Because of the way the region was settled, a unique “Siberian mentality” has emerged -- to which Khanga adds that almost 14 percent of the population of the country could identify as Siberians, “an enormous figure.”
Kholmogorov concedes that there is such a possibility, but he says that he “hope that the greater part of them will never write down this nationality or even find out about such an idea,” lest having taken this first step in nation building they take others much as some of the nations of the former Soviet Union did.
To Khanga’s objection that “nationality is not citizenship” and that if people identify in one way rather than another, there is no harm in that, the “Russky obozrevatel” editor replies that everyone must understand that “in today’s world, there is no other territory” which outsiders view with such greedy aspirations.
He then recalls the statement of one former US secretary of state that “Siberia is too large a country to belong to a single state,” a clear indication in his mind of what the West intends and of the West’s role in promoting this particular national “identity” as a first step to taking Siberia away from Russia.
Steshin then suggests another approach to the problem of Siberian identity. In his view, Russians themselves are to blame both by forcing Siberians to pay excessive prices for tickets to travel to European Russia and by depriving them of the assistance they need both in normal times and during natural disasters like the forest fires of last year.
He adds that the appearance of a Siberian language is “a very serious provocation which touches the depths of the sub-consciousness,” although appended to the article is a comment by the language’s developer that he came up with the idea of such a language as a lark and has been surprised by the interest in it.
According to Kholmogorov, Ukrainian was once invented in much the same way by Mihailo Hurushevsky, and consequently, the Russian commentator argues, the appearance of such a language, however artificial, has the potential to create real problems for the state down the road.
That is especially likely in the Siberian case, Kholmogorov suggests, because Russian identity is no longer highly values and the asymmetric nature of Russian Federalism means that non-Russians have many benefits and powers that ethnic Russians do not, even in places where they are the overwhelming majority.
Consequently, he concludes, what some may now dismiss as a bad joke may prove to be something more and more disturbing if Russians do not wake up to the danger that such an identity represents for their country and for their nation, one that could cost their country even more than did the departure of Ukraine.
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Virtually All Daghestani Media Outlets Now Have Online Versions
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 10 – People throughout Russia and around the world can now follow developments in Daghestan as reported in traditional print and broadcast media online in that North Caucasus republic since virtually all media outlets there maintain frequently updated web sites, according to the Internet columnist for the republic’s “Nastoyashcheye vremya.”
In an article featuring a photograph of four older Daghestani women looking at a laptop computer, Bagdat Tumalayev who writes frequently on Internet issues in the North Caucasus provides a comprehensive listing of the traditional media outlets that have their own websites (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/6002/109/).
As is the case elsewhere, such sites may be the salvation of some traditional media outlets by attracting more readers, listeners or viewers, of they may represent the death knell for others by causing people to stop reading, listening or viewing them. But the extent of such online media in the regions means Moscow will likely find it ever more difficult to control the flow of news.
Below the list of the sites Tumalayev offers.
Daghestani newspapers online:
Gazeta-nv.ru “Nastoyashcheye vremya” weekly
Ndelo.ru “Novoye delo” weekly
Dagpravda.ru “Dagestanskaya Pravda” daily
respublic.net “Respublika” weekly
chernovik.net “Chernovik” weekly
mi-dag.ru “Makhachkalionskiye izvestiya” daily
assalam.ru Newspaper of Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Daghestan
dagstadion.narod.ru “Stadium” sports newspaper
dagorlenok.ru “Orlenok Dagstana” youth newspaper
tryjenik.3dn.ru “Selsky truzhennik,” a regional paper
proji.ru “Prodzhi” features journal
dmdag.ru “Delovoy mir Dagestana”
Башня05.рф “Bashnya,” a youth newspaper with its own Facebook page
garage05.ru “Garage,” an automobile magazine
stpartner05.ru “Stroipartner,” a construction industry paper with a guide to firms in Daghestan
Television Sites:
gtrkdagestan.ru Daghestan state television
rutvstar.ru RuTV channel
tvchirkey.ru Daghestani Islamic television channel
tvdrk.ru Makhachkala advertising channel
mtv-stolica.ru MTV youth channel
Radio Sites:
radio-stolica.ru Stolitsa Radio site– сайт модного дагестанского радио «Столица».
mediaholding-stolica.ru Radio aggregator site
dagfm.ru Volna media group site
99fm.ru Kristall radio site
News Service Sites:
Riadagestan.ru RIA Dagestan news service
dagnews.com Independent analytic service
Staunton, May 10 – People throughout Russia and around the world can now follow developments in Daghestan as reported in traditional print and broadcast media online in that North Caucasus republic since virtually all media outlets there maintain frequently updated web sites, according to the Internet columnist for the republic’s “Nastoyashcheye vremya.”
In an article featuring a photograph of four older Daghestani women looking at a laptop computer, Bagdat Tumalayev who writes frequently on Internet issues in the North Caucasus provides a comprehensive listing of the traditional media outlets that have their own websites (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/6002/109/).
As is the case elsewhere, such sites may be the salvation of some traditional media outlets by attracting more readers, listeners or viewers, of they may represent the death knell for others by causing people to stop reading, listening or viewing them. But the extent of such online media in the regions means Moscow will likely find it ever more difficult to control the flow of news.
Below the list of the sites Tumalayev offers.
Daghestani newspapers online:
Gazeta-nv.ru “Nastoyashcheye vremya” weekly
Ndelo.ru “Novoye delo” weekly
Dagpravda.ru “Dagestanskaya Pravda” daily
respublic.net “Respublika” weekly
chernovik.net “Chernovik” weekly
mi-dag.ru “Makhachkalionskiye izvestiya” daily
assalam.ru Newspaper of Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Daghestan
dagstadion.narod.ru “Stadium” sports newspaper
dagorlenok.ru “Orlenok Dagstana” youth newspaper
tryjenik.3dn.ru “Selsky truzhennik,” a regional paper
proji.ru “Prodzhi” features journal
dmdag.ru “Delovoy mir Dagestana”
Башня05.рф “Bashnya,” a youth newspaper with its own Facebook page
garage05.ru “Garage,” an automobile magazine
stpartner05.ru “Stroipartner,” a construction industry paper with a guide to firms in Daghestan
Television Sites:
gtrkdagestan.ru Daghestan state television
rutvstar.ru RuTV channel
tvchirkey.ru Daghestani Islamic television channel
tvdrk.ru Makhachkala advertising channel
mtv-stolica.ru MTV youth channel
Radio Sites:
radio-stolica.ru Stolitsa Radio site– сайт модного дагестанского радио «Столица».
mediaholding-stolica.ru Radio aggregator site
dagfm.ru Volna media group site
99fm.ru Kristall radio site
News Service Sites:
Riadagestan.ru RIA Dagestan news service
dagnews.com Independent analytic service
Window on Eurasia: ‘No Confirmed Evidence’ of Al Qaeda Role in Caucasus Resistance Exists, Daghestani Journalist Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 10 – There is “no confirmed evidence” that Al Qaeda has played a role in the militant movement in the North Caucasus, and Moscow’s claims to the contrary are yet another effort by the Russian government to avoid facing the real basis for the anti-Moscow movement in the region, a Makhachkala journalist says.
In an article the current issue of “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” Ruslan Gereyev says that “representatives of Al Qaeda of course were in the North Caucasus” at various times “but they did not play a major role,” and “the general movement” there did “not depend on them, a sharp contrast to the situation in Bosnia or Somalia (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5988/109/).
Gereyev acknowledges that Al Qaeda operatives have visited the North Caucasus and that the organization has provided some funding for militants there, but “the Arabs have never achieved control of the administration of the resistance movement in the North Caucasus.” Instead, Gereyev says, “local Islamists have used” the Arabs rather than the other way around.
“Many who act in the North Caucasus,” he continues, “do not have direct ties to Al Qaeda,” and it is even more the case that “Al Qaeda itself has never had great influence in the North Caucasus,” despite all the claims that have been made by the Russian special forces to the contrary.
The Russian security services have tried to link the North Caucasus militants ot the Arabs by ascribing membership in Al Qaeda to Khattab and all Arabs who have appeared in the region, but the numbers of such people have been relatively small. And they do not snow that bin Laden ever realized control over what is taking place” in the region.
Under contemporary conditions, “there is no need” for Arabs to turn to Al Qaeda as the only possible source for support. “People coming from North Africa, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have for a long time already their own channels of financing. They do not need Al Qaeda in order to carry out a jihad, including in the North Caucasus.”
As Gereyev notes, “experts have more than once declared that the information of the [Russian] sp[ecial services about the activities of Al Qaeda in the North Caucasus is not shown, although according to the data of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, the terrorist network of Al Qaeda continuously finances the leaders of the armed Caucasus Emirate.”
But as the Daghestani journalist points out, “up to now, the causes which are giving birth to terrorism, including social, political, economic, and inter-ethnic conflicts,” especially in the North Caucasus, have not been eliminated by Russian government policies. Instead, Moscow hopes to win the sympathy of the West by suggesting Al Qaeda is behind Russia’s problems.
As a result, despite “the liquidation of bin Laden,” the level of terrorism throughout the world, including in the North Caucasus, will not change. Instead, his death at the hand of the Americans is likely to open “a Pandora’s box” of problems. Indeed, the Taliban of Afghanistan have already declared that they will take revenge.
Staunton, May 10 – There is “no confirmed evidence” that Al Qaeda has played a role in the militant movement in the North Caucasus, and Moscow’s claims to the contrary are yet another effort by the Russian government to avoid facing the real basis for the anti-Moscow movement in the region, a Makhachkala journalist says.
In an article the current issue of “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” Ruslan Gereyev says that “representatives of Al Qaeda of course were in the North Caucasus” at various times “but they did not play a major role,” and “the general movement” there did “not depend on them, a sharp contrast to the situation in Bosnia or Somalia (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5988/109/).
Gereyev acknowledges that Al Qaeda operatives have visited the North Caucasus and that the organization has provided some funding for militants there, but “the Arabs have never achieved control of the administration of the resistance movement in the North Caucasus.” Instead, Gereyev says, “local Islamists have used” the Arabs rather than the other way around.
“Many who act in the North Caucasus,” he continues, “do not have direct ties to Al Qaeda,” and it is even more the case that “Al Qaeda itself has never had great influence in the North Caucasus,” despite all the claims that have been made by the Russian special forces to the contrary.
The Russian security services have tried to link the North Caucasus militants ot the Arabs by ascribing membership in Al Qaeda to Khattab and all Arabs who have appeared in the region, but the numbers of such people have been relatively small. And they do not snow that bin Laden ever realized control over what is taking place” in the region.
Under contemporary conditions, “there is no need” for Arabs to turn to Al Qaeda as the only possible source for support. “People coming from North Africa, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have for a long time already their own channels of financing. They do not need Al Qaeda in order to carry out a jihad, including in the North Caucasus.”
As Gereyev notes, “experts have more than once declared that the information of the [Russian] sp[ecial services about the activities of Al Qaeda in the North Caucasus is not shown, although according to the data of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, the terrorist network of Al Qaeda continuously finances the leaders of the armed Caucasus Emirate.”
But as the Daghestani journalist points out, “up to now, the causes which are giving birth to terrorism, including social, political, economic, and inter-ethnic conflicts,” especially in the North Caucasus, have not been eliminated by Russian government policies. Instead, Moscow hopes to win the sympathy of the West by suggesting Al Qaeda is behind Russia’s problems.
As a result, despite “the liquidation of bin Laden,” the level of terrorism throughout the world, including in the North Caucasus, will not change. Instead, his death at the hand of the Americans is likely to open “a Pandora’s box” of problems. Indeed, the Taliban of Afghanistan have already declared that they will take revenge.
Window on Eurasia: Russians Caught Between Post-Imperial and Russian Identities, Orthodox Editor Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 10 – Russians today find themselves between a very real post-imperial identity and an ethnic Russian one, a situation in which they find it difficult if not impossible to define themselves or to consider their country or their nation in a positive way, according to the editor of the leading Russian Orthodox journal.
In an article posted on polit.ru based on a presentation he made to the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in April, Sergey Chapnin, the editor of the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate,” argues that these difficulties show that Russians routinely use the wrong terms to describe the reality surrounding them (www.polit.ru/country/2011/05/05/culture.html).
On the one hand, the editor says, Russians very much want to describe the world in which they live as Russian. But on the other, they continue to live in a post-Soviet one, a world that is “not a ‘frozen’ post-Soviet one, but rather an actively developing one,” even 20 years after the collapse of the USSR.
The values of post-Soviet culture, he continues, are “extremely contradictory and do not form a single picture.” Instead, they are so contradictory that “we have lost the ability to speak about ourselves, our ancestors and one another in a positive fashion and to create convincing and attractive models.”
As a result, “neither in high culture, nor in its mass variant is there any positive model of contemporary Russia. We do not like ourselves and we do not respect one another. An integral model of the present is lacking. The image of the past is mythologized … [and] there is no clear model of our future.”
As a result, “at the center of the new national mythology is only one event – the Great Victory in the Great Fatherland War,” a victory “conceived as the single ‘holy’ event of our history of the 20th century” and one whose celebration is “constructed as a religious action in which participate or at least sympathize the majority of Russians.”
And from this, Chapnin says, a kind of “civic religion with its own rules and rituals. The theme of victory is so ‘holy’ that to speak about it is possible only in the framework” established by “mass post-Soviet consciousness,” a situation that distorts both history and the consciousness of it.
“At the basis of this civic religion lie pagan values, meanings and symbols which were only partially modernized by communist propaganda,” including the eternal flame before which all bow but whose meaning within the traditions of Christianity is contradictory or even profoundly negative.
The cult of the Great Fatherland War entails a number of “extremely dangerous aspects,” the Orthodox editor says, including “the preservation and cultivation of ‘the image of the enemy,’” “the total heroization of war,” a sense of loss since victory, and “a primitive (pagan) understanding of patriotism.”
But perhaps the most serious of these is “the justification by virtue of the victory of all that happened in Russia in the10th century and above all with the totalitarian regime and Stalin personally.” And not surprisingly, in recent years, this “post-Soviet civic religion” has come into conflict with Russian culture as “inspired by the evangelical ideal.”
Because the Russian Orthodox Church is “a big Church,” it does not, indeed cannot provide “a common position” on all issues which are not directly part of Church doctrine. Instead, there have emerged what Chapnin calls three “church subcultures,” each with its own views on the Soviet past.
The first of these is “prepared to incorporate elements of Soviet culture” on the basis of a claim that “Soviet culture was more Christian by its content than is contemporary mass culture.” This is the largest of the three and includes almost all those who joined the priesthood in the last decade or so.
This group strives toward “social and cultural self-isolation,” shows “extreme lack of faith to any forms of ‘Western’ values,” and thus opposes ecumenism, changes in the Church itself, and any steps by the state which appear to threaten the Church including electronic numbering systems.
In reality, Chapnin argues, one can say that “this is Orthodoxy without tradition,” and “its representatives continue to struggle with the church problems of the past Soviet epoch – ecumenism and agents of the KGB within the Church,” even though “today these are already not real problems but phantoms.”
The second Church subculture is the successor to the Church underground of Soviet period, when the Church was persecuted. “This group,” Chapnin says, “consciously and consistently accepts nothing that is Soviet,” but it does so “peacefully and non-aggressively” because it recognizes that overcoming the past will take a long time.
Representatives of the second group also “well understand the universal character of Eastern-Slavic culture, but they know, love and value those forms of the cultural tradition” which exist within Russian Orthodoxy. A small group, it is will become smaller because its supporters are those who became priests in Soviet times or who were part of the Orthodox Church Abroad.
Finally, the third subculture combines a claim of links to the catacomb church but “on the other hand completely accepts the Soviet cultural matrix. In essence, this group has preserved the stylistics of Soviet propaganda and only replaced a number of terms and definitions, dropping ‘Soviet Union’ in favor of ‘Holy Rus,’ and ‘communist’ for ‘Orthodox.’”
Each of these groups supports a different version of Russian nationalism and Russian national culture and is in turn supported by them. And consequently, because the Church does not speak as one on these questions, it is not in a position to lead Russians along a single path to overcome the divisions in society which now exist.
Staunton, May 10 – Russians today find themselves between a very real post-imperial identity and an ethnic Russian one, a situation in which they find it difficult if not impossible to define themselves or to consider their country or their nation in a positive way, according to the editor of the leading Russian Orthodox journal.
In an article posted on polit.ru based on a presentation he made to the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in April, Sergey Chapnin, the editor of the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate,” argues that these difficulties show that Russians routinely use the wrong terms to describe the reality surrounding them (www.polit.ru/country/2011/05/05/culture.html).
On the one hand, the editor says, Russians very much want to describe the world in which they live as Russian. But on the other, they continue to live in a post-Soviet one, a world that is “not a ‘frozen’ post-Soviet one, but rather an actively developing one,” even 20 years after the collapse of the USSR.
The values of post-Soviet culture, he continues, are “extremely contradictory and do not form a single picture.” Instead, they are so contradictory that “we have lost the ability to speak about ourselves, our ancestors and one another in a positive fashion and to create convincing and attractive models.”
As a result, “neither in high culture, nor in its mass variant is there any positive model of contemporary Russia. We do not like ourselves and we do not respect one another. An integral model of the present is lacking. The image of the past is mythologized … [and] there is no clear model of our future.”
As a result, “at the center of the new national mythology is only one event – the Great Victory in the Great Fatherland War,” a victory “conceived as the single ‘holy’ event of our history of the 20th century” and one whose celebration is “constructed as a religious action in which participate or at least sympathize the majority of Russians.”
And from this, Chapnin says, a kind of “civic religion with its own rules and rituals. The theme of victory is so ‘holy’ that to speak about it is possible only in the framework” established by “mass post-Soviet consciousness,” a situation that distorts both history and the consciousness of it.
“At the basis of this civic religion lie pagan values, meanings and symbols which were only partially modernized by communist propaganda,” including the eternal flame before which all bow but whose meaning within the traditions of Christianity is contradictory or even profoundly negative.
The cult of the Great Fatherland War entails a number of “extremely dangerous aspects,” the Orthodox editor says, including “the preservation and cultivation of ‘the image of the enemy,’” “the total heroization of war,” a sense of loss since victory, and “a primitive (pagan) understanding of patriotism.”
But perhaps the most serious of these is “the justification by virtue of the victory of all that happened in Russia in the10th century and above all with the totalitarian regime and Stalin personally.” And not surprisingly, in recent years, this “post-Soviet civic religion” has come into conflict with Russian culture as “inspired by the evangelical ideal.”
Because the Russian Orthodox Church is “a big Church,” it does not, indeed cannot provide “a common position” on all issues which are not directly part of Church doctrine. Instead, there have emerged what Chapnin calls three “church subcultures,” each with its own views on the Soviet past.
The first of these is “prepared to incorporate elements of Soviet culture” on the basis of a claim that “Soviet culture was more Christian by its content than is contemporary mass culture.” This is the largest of the three and includes almost all those who joined the priesthood in the last decade or so.
This group strives toward “social and cultural self-isolation,” shows “extreme lack of faith to any forms of ‘Western’ values,” and thus opposes ecumenism, changes in the Church itself, and any steps by the state which appear to threaten the Church including electronic numbering systems.
In reality, Chapnin argues, one can say that “this is Orthodoxy without tradition,” and “its representatives continue to struggle with the church problems of the past Soviet epoch – ecumenism and agents of the KGB within the Church,” even though “today these are already not real problems but phantoms.”
The second Church subculture is the successor to the Church underground of Soviet period, when the Church was persecuted. “This group,” Chapnin says, “consciously and consistently accepts nothing that is Soviet,” but it does so “peacefully and non-aggressively” because it recognizes that overcoming the past will take a long time.
Representatives of the second group also “well understand the universal character of Eastern-Slavic culture, but they know, love and value those forms of the cultural tradition” which exist within Russian Orthodoxy. A small group, it is will become smaller because its supporters are those who became priests in Soviet times or who were part of the Orthodox Church Abroad.
Finally, the third subculture combines a claim of links to the catacomb church but “on the other hand completely accepts the Soviet cultural matrix. In essence, this group has preserved the stylistics of Soviet propaganda and only replaced a number of terms and definitions, dropping ‘Soviet Union’ in favor of ‘Holy Rus,’ and ‘communist’ for ‘Orthodox.’”
Each of these groups supports a different version of Russian nationalism and Russian national culture and is in turn supported by them. And consequently, because the Church does not speak as one on these questions, it is not in a position to lead Russians along a single path to overcome the divisions in society which now exist.
Monday, May 9, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian First Lady Seen Actively Promoting Orthodox Church
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 9 – Svetlana Medvedeva, Russia’s first lady, currently plays an active role in promoting the spread of the values of the Russian Orthodox Church not only in Russian society at large but in the Russian elite in particular, according to members of the Orthodox clergy who have known her for nearly 20 years.
In the current issue of “Sovershenno sekretno,” Aleksey Chelnokov surveys their opinions about what he calls “the phenomenon of the First Lady,” a woman whose role in the life of the Russian Federation is far larger than any of her immediate predecessors and far more important than most suspect (www.sovsekretno.ru/magazines/article/2786).
While much of his article is devoted to the Russian first lady’s childhood, first encounters with her husband, and his role in “glamorous” events like fashion shows and the promotion of particular Russian artists, Chelnokov devotes particular attention to her role in the Church not only in the 1990s but more recently.
It is said, Chelnokov notes, that Svetlana Medvedeva entered the church thanks to her “religious older sister already in the 1990s” when “fate, more precisely God, put her in touch with the pastor” of a church across the Moscow River from the Kremlin, Father Vladimir Volgin, a remarkable figure in his own right.
Not only is he the pastor of four different congregations but he is the son of the actress Yekaterina Vasilyeva and has been responsible for bringing into the church “Irina Abramovich, the mother of five children of the oligarch Roman Abramovich” and for making a pilgrimage with Svetlana Medvedeva.
The First Lady, he told “Sovershenno-Seketrno,” is “an individual of high morality and strong, I would even say, strategic mind,” adding that he was sure that her “experience of contact with holy things” has had an impact on her work in the program for the spiritual and moral training of young people.
Father Volgin said that he accompanied Russian First Family to Mount Athos in Greece and that “sometimes” he is invited to visit the couple “at the government dacha of the Administration of the Affairs of the President.” When that first happened, officials often looked at him askance, but now that has changed.
And he added that some of the senior officials he had met there now visit Mount Athos or other Orthodox pilgrimage sits “several times a year,” another indication of a change of attitude at the top. Father Volgin added that the Medvedevs are not shy about expressing their faith to those whom they know.
Another Orthodox priest with whom Chelnokov spoke was Father Kiprian who heads the Church’s Institute for Expertise on Educational Programs and Governmetn-Confession Relations. Born in 1953 into a family of atheists, he nonetheless became a monk in 1994 and since 1997, a member of the Academic Committee of the Russian Orthodox Church.
He has worked closely with Svetlana Medvedeva since 2007 when she was given the Church’s Olga Order and became a member of the advisory committee of the Spiritual-Moral culture Program for the Rising Generation of Russia, that was created at the behest of then-Patriarch Aleksii II.
At present, Kiprian, who serves as the secretary of this Church project said, “Svetlana vladimirovna is involved in the formation of a new membership” for that council and in the development of a program for its activities over the next decade. “The conception has not changed, but the extent of its activity has been significantly increased,” he added.
Under her influence, the group is promoting the Orthodox holiday of Sts. Peter and Fevronia as a counter to “the challenges of the Catholic Saint Valentine.” And the First Lady is involved in various projects including supporting religious communities and a home for mentally handicapped children.
And in a final comment, Father Kiprian made a remark about Vladimir Putin that may say even more about relations between the Medvedev’s and the prime minister than he intended. He called that Putin had suggested after the Manezh clashes that “Orthodoxy in many ways is even closer to Islam than let us say to the Catholics.”
“Perhaps,” Father Kiprian said laughing, “it is closer to Vladimir Vladimirovich personally. Islam is an Old Testament branch, a single religion which aspires to exclusiveness, by calling all others unbelievers.” Insisting on its similarities with Orthodoxy, the Orthodox churchman said, “is conditioned by some personal preferences” of Putin himself.”
Staunton, May 9 – Svetlana Medvedeva, Russia’s first lady, currently plays an active role in promoting the spread of the values of the Russian Orthodox Church not only in Russian society at large but in the Russian elite in particular, according to members of the Orthodox clergy who have known her for nearly 20 years.
In the current issue of “Sovershenno sekretno,” Aleksey Chelnokov surveys their opinions about what he calls “the phenomenon of the First Lady,” a woman whose role in the life of the Russian Federation is far larger than any of her immediate predecessors and far more important than most suspect (www.sovsekretno.ru/magazines/article/2786).
While much of his article is devoted to the Russian first lady’s childhood, first encounters with her husband, and his role in “glamorous” events like fashion shows and the promotion of particular Russian artists, Chelnokov devotes particular attention to her role in the Church not only in the 1990s but more recently.
It is said, Chelnokov notes, that Svetlana Medvedeva entered the church thanks to her “religious older sister already in the 1990s” when “fate, more precisely God, put her in touch with the pastor” of a church across the Moscow River from the Kremlin, Father Vladimir Volgin, a remarkable figure in his own right.
Not only is he the pastor of four different congregations but he is the son of the actress Yekaterina Vasilyeva and has been responsible for bringing into the church “Irina Abramovich, the mother of five children of the oligarch Roman Abramovich” and for making a pilgrimage with Svetlana Medvedeva.
The First Lady, he told “Sovershenno-Seketrno,” is “an individual of high morality and strong, I would even say, strategic mind,” adding that he was sure that her “experience of contact with holy things” has had an impact on her work in the program for the spiritual and moral training of young people.
Father Volgin said that he accompanied Russian First Family to Mount Athos in Greece and that “sometimes” he is invited to visit the couple “at the government dacha of the Administration of the Affairs of the President.” When that first happened, officials often looked at him askance, but now that has changed.
And he added that some of the senior officials he had met there now visit Mount Athos or other Orthodox pilgrimage sits “several times a year,” another indication of a change of attitude at the top. Father Volgin added that the Medvedevs are not shy about expressing their faith to those whom they know.
Another Orthodox priest with whom Chelnokov spoke was Father Kiprian who heads the Church’s Institute for Expertise on Educational Programs and Governmetn-Confession Relations. Born in 1953 into a family of atheists, he nonetheless became a monk in 1994 and since 1997, a member of the Academic Committee of the Russian Orthodox Church.
He has worked closely with Svetlana Medvedeva since 2007 when she was given the Church’s Olga Order and became a member of the advisory committee of the Spiritual-Moral culture Program for the Rising Generation of Russia, that was created at the behest of then-Patriarch Aleksii II.
At present, Kiprian, who serves as the secretary of this Church project said, “Svetlana vladimirovna is involved in the formation of a new membership” for that council and in the development of a program for its activities over the next decade. “The conception has not changed, but the extent of its activity has been significantly increased,” he added.
Under her influence, the group is promoting the Orthodox holiday of Sts. Peter and Fevronia as a counter to “the challenges of the Catholic Saint Valentine.” And the First Lady is involved in various projects including supporting religious communities and a home for mentally handicapped children.
And in a final comment, Father Kiprian made a remark about Vladimir Putin that may say even more about relations between the Medvedev’s and the prime minister than he intended. He called that Putin had suggested after the Manezh clashes that “Orthodoxy in many ways is even closer to Islam than let us say to the Catholics.”
“Perhaps,” Father Kiprian said laughing, “it is closer to Vladimir Vladimirovich personally. Islam is an Old Testament branch, a single religion which aspires to exclusiveness, by calling all others unbelievers.” Insisting on its similarities with Orthodoxy, the Orthodox churchman said, “is conditioned by some personal preferences” of Putin himself.”
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