Paul Goble
Staunton, May 3 – Representatives of the 12,000 Shapsugs, a subdivision of the Circassian nation, last week called for the formation of an autonomous district within Krasnodar kray, an event that takes on importance because the Shapsugs are the Circassians who had been living where the 2014 Sochi Olympics are scheduled to take place.
Indeed, speeches at this meeting suggest that Circassian groups, many of whom are outraged that Moscow would organize the Olympics on the site of the genocide of their people in 1864, are beginning to use their objections and the attention these have garnered to make demands on the Russian government to improve their situation.
On Saturday, a congress of the Circassian organization Adyge Khase took place in the village of Lazarevskoye in Sochi to discuss the provisions of the law protecting numerically small peoples like the Shapsugs and the possible impact of the conduct of the Olympics there on them (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184658/).
Some 230 delegates from Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Krasnodar and Armavit as well as guests from the International Circassian Association heard speakers call for the establishment of a Shapsug Autonomous District within Krasnodar Kray as a means of protecting that small community.
Most speakers stressed that the Russian law “on guarantees of the rights of numerically small peoples” is not being implemented and consequently the problems it was intended to address are only growing worse. Murdin Teshev, honorary president of Adyge Khase, said that officials in Krasnodar “are deaf to our requests and hopes.”
Several speakers said that because of this, the only hope for the Shapsugs, now living in the Tuaps and Lazarev districts of Sochi is the establishment of an autonomy within Krasnodar kray, an idea that was first put forward in the 1990s but has acquired new importance given the Sochi Olympics.
Adam Bogus, the deputy president of Adyge Khase in Adygeya said that “there is only one approach to the resolution of the problems – the restoration of this district, the restoration of corresponding structures and a budget on a state basis.” If this step is not taken, many of the auls where the Shapsugs now live will soon disappear as “there is no work.”
Another speaker said that things had reached the point that individuals have to ask for land to build a house or operate a farm. And still a third said that “in the auls, drunkenness rules, and narcotics have appeared. Many 30 to 40 year old men and women do not have families and children,” a pattern unprecedented in Shapsug history and a demographic disaster.
According to the delegates, “young people are fleeing from the auls, and pupils are deprived of the chance to study their native language. ‘For the past years, the number of school hours has been reduced several times, and today on the Black Sea coast, only about 20 percent of the Shapsug children are studying their native language,’” one said.
In addition, the Shapsugs asked for assistance in overcoming the problems of housing and infrastructure in their auls, the construction of roads and water mains. Some cultural facilities are operating but generally only on the basis of private contributions such as those which support the local newspaper, “Shapsugia.”
In a related development, the congress discussed the prospect of the 2014 Olympiad in Sochi. According to Kavkaz-Uzel, opinions were divided. Kanshobi Azhakhov, the president of the International Circassian Association, said that “for one people [the expulsion of the Circassians in 1864] was a tragic event; for all others, [the Olympiad is] a holiday.”
“The majority of Shapsugs, whom I represent,” he said, “support the Olympic games. “But this majority can shift to the side of the minority if existing problems are not resolved.” Among the steps Moscow must take to avoid that, he said, is to ensure that the law on numerically small peoples is observed and May 21 is declared a day of mourning.”
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Bin Laden’s Death Won’t Affect North Caucasus Militants, Russian Analysts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 3 – Although Russian analysts divide on whether the death of Osama bin Laden will lead to a new spike in terrorist acts around the world, those who have expressed an opinion so far are nearly unanimous that the passing of the Al Qaeda leader will have little or no impact on the fighting in the North Caucasus.
That conclusion, almost certainly correct because of the relatively small involvement of Al Qaeda in that region, will nonetheless have an impact on Moscow’s ability to continue to present its actions there as part of a worldwide anti-terrorist campaign and thus raise more questions about the nature of the militants the Russian government is confronting.
Yesterday, the Regnum news agency, an outlet that has been among the most vocal in seeking to link the North Caucasus militants to Al Qaeda, featured an article entitled “Will the End of bin Laden be Noticed in the Caucasus?” which surveyed what it described as bin Laden’s involvement there (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1400597.html).
“Judging from everything,” Regnum begins its story, “bin Laden tried to demonstrate his active role in the Caucasus.” It gives the example of the statement by an Arab “military instructor,” Abu Daud, in 2000 during the second post-Soviet Chechen war that bin Laden “had sent 400” of his people to fight Russian forces.
After the conclusion of that war, the news agency continues, there have been scattered reports of Arab militants killed or captured in the North Caucasus. In March 2010, for instance, Abu Khaled, “who was considered close to the leader of the terrorist ‘Caucasus Emirate’ Doku Umarov was killed after having spent 13 years in Chechnya, Russian officials said.
And Chechen leaders have routinely talked about the existence of two “Arab instructors” named Mohannad [sic] and Yasir who supposedly help prepare suicide bombers. Meanwhile in Daghestan, in November 2006, “an Arab militant” named Abu Khavs, who the Russian interior ministry said was an Al Qaeda emissary, was liquidated.
But Regnum concedes, “at the same time, to speak about any dependence of the North Caucasus band formation underground on international terrorist structures including Al Qaeda today is not appropriate. Experts evfer more frequently conclude that the militants in the North Caucasus operate on a ‘self-financing’ basis, collecting ‘tribute’ from local business.”
Moreover, at a Makhachkala roundtable on this subject last week, Zaid Abdulagatov, a sociologist at the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Daghestani Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Science, said that a poll showed that “the majority of young people” join the militants in search of employment.
According to Regnum, however, another link between Al Qaeda and the North Caucasus involves people from the North Caucasus who “fought in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban.” The exact number of such people, the news agency says, is “unknown,” but at least two of them were at one time in the US prison in Guantanamo.
And implying that there may be more, Regnum concludes with the observation that “information about leaders of North Caucasus extremists directly making contact with the leaders of the terrorist community of Afghanistan and Pakistan have not been published” in the open media.
A decade ago, such contacts may have been probable, but “in recent years, such subjects have ever less actively been discussed by experts and journalists,” a likely indication that the numbers of those involved, if any, have fallen off or completely disappeared.
The lack of such ties gives even more credibility to those who point to the domestic sources of violence in the Caucasus. In an interview published in the current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyasheye vrema,” Federation Council member and former general Aslambek Aslakhanov provides a list of these (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5973/109/).
Among the causes the general points to are “the extremist statements of Vladimir Zhirinovsky relative to the Caucasus, the Nazi pogrom on Manezh Square, the corrupt nature of Caucasus and Moscow bureaucrats, and the throwing of youth [in the region] to the arbitrariness of fate.”
Staunton, May 3 – Although Russian analysts divide on whether the death of Osama bin Laden will lead to a new spike in terrorist acts around the world, those who have expressed an opinion so far are nearly unanimous that the passing of the Al Qaeda leader will have little or no impact on the fighting in the North Caucasus.
That conclusion, almost certainly correct because of the relatively small involvement of Al Qaeda in that region, will nonetheless have an impact on Moscow’s ability to continue to present its actions there as part of a worldwide anti-terrorist campaign and thus raise more questions about the nature of the militants the Russian government is confronting.
Yesterday, the Regnum news agency, an outlet that has been among the most vocal in seeking to link the North Caucasus militants to Al Qaeda, featured an article entitled “Will the End of bin Laden be Noticed in the Caucasus?” which surveyed what it described as bin Laden’s involvement there (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1400597.html).
“Judging from everything,” Regnum begins its story, “bin Laden tried to demonstrate his active role in the Caucasus.” It gives the example of the statement by an Arab “military instructor,” Abu Daud, in 2000 during the second post-Soviet Chechen war that bin Laden “had sent 400” of his people to fight Russian forces.
After the conclusion of that war, the news agency continues, there have been scattered reports of Arab militants killed or captured in the North Caucasus. In March 2010, for instance, Abu Khaled, “who was considered close to the leader of the terrorist ‘Caucasus Emirate’ Doku Umarov was killed after having spent 13 years in Chechnya, Russian officials said.
And Chechen leaders have routinely talked about the existence of two “Arab instructors” named Mohannad [sic] and Yasir who supposedly help prepare suicide bombers. Meanwhile in Daghestan, in November 2006, “an Arab militant” named Abu Khavs, who the Russian interior ministry said was an Al Qaeda emissary, was liquidated.
But Regnum concedes, “at the same time, to speak about any dependence of the North Caucasus band formation underground on international terrorist structures including Al Qaeda today is not appropriate. Experts evfer more frequently conclude that the militants in the North Caucasus operate on a ‘self-financing’ basis, collecting ‘tribute’ from local business.”
Moreover, at a Makhachkala roundtable on this subject last week, Zaid Abdulagatov, a sociologist at the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Daghestani Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Science, said that a poll showed that “the majority of young people” join the militants in search of employment.
According to Regnum, however, another link between Al Qaeda and the North Caucasus involves people from the North Caucasus who “fought in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban.” The exact number of such people, the news agency says, is “unknown,” but at least two of them were at one time in the US prison in Guantanamo.
And implying that there may be more, Regnum concludes with the observation that “information about leaders of North Caucasus extremists directly making contact with the leaders of the terrorist community of Afghanistan and Pakistan have not been published” in the open media.
A decade ago, such contacts may have been probable, but “in recent years, such subjects have ever less actively been discussed by experts and journalists,” a likely indication that the numbers of those involved, if any, have fallen off or completely disappeared.
The lack of such ties gives even more credibility to those who point to the domestic sources of violence in the Caucasus. In an interview published in the current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyasheye vrema,” Federation Council member and former general Aslambek Aslakhanov provides a list of these (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5973/109/).
Among the causes the general points to are “the extremist statements of Vladimir Zhirinovsky relative to the Caucasus, the Nazi pogrom on Manezh Square, the corrupt nature of Caucasus and Moscow bureaucrats, and the throwing of youth [in the region] to the arbitrariness of fate.”
Friday, April 29, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Different Parts of Russia Will Modernize Differently, Emil Pain Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 29 – Russia’s regions and republics are so different in terms of their current social and political development that their modernization is certain to be different as well, possibly in ways that will mean that the development of some will interfere with the development of others, according to a leading Russian specialist on ethnicity.
At a roundtable in the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Emil Pain argues that if Russia does modernize, there will be “different modernizations for different parts of [Russia],” a point he makes by comparing the situation between Chechnya and the ethnic Russian regions of the country (www.nr2.ru/moskow/329988.html).
Chechen society, Pain says, retains many elements of both blood feud and communal organization. Thus, wearing knives is not just “a ritual” matter. Rather they “fulfill a real function in life,” potentially saving the life of the wearer or his family in cases of “force majeure.”
Russian society, in contrast, he suggests, long ago saw such “traditional-patriarchal institutions” disappear or be destroyed. As a result, “Russian society is the most de-traditionalized and the most split.” That opens the way for progress but only if traditional institutions are replaced by modern ones. Otherwise, degradation sets in.
Unfortunately, “in all post-communist countries” and “in Russia least of all,” the appearance of the kind of informal organizations on which modernity depends “is several times lower than on average in Europe,” an apparent reaction to the enforced collectivism of the past from which people are fleeing.
It is often held, Pain says, that “a low level of traditionalism in society is compensated by a high willingness to pursue innovations.” But for that to be true, there have to be people who want such innovations and who can work together to pursue them. In Russia, however, there are few such people.
Instead, “Russian initiative is anarchic and often immoral,” Pain continues, a pattern that is reflected by the fact that while the number of people going to church has increased over the past 20 years, the number of those who “in fact observe the commandments, respect the laws of God and so on has not changed” over that period.
And it is also reflected in polls that show that “in Russia, there is the lowest level of horizontal trust among 27 countries” in which that has been sampled. “This is practically a catastrophe,” Pain says. Without trust, people will not work together for the future, and pursuing any long-term goals is “utopian.”
In Chechnya, on the other hand, “modernization has the classical problems” with traditional norms “blocking the formation of new ones.” But “both varieties of society, both patriarchal and de-traditionalized create their own obstacles for modernization,” albeit different ones and thus modernization will be of a plural nature.
That in itself creates problems, Pain the ethno-sociologist says, because there is a very great probability that these various modernizations will interfere and contradict one another,” possibly putting all of them and the country itself at risk.
In other comments, Pain notes that “the mythology about the great power nature of the Russian people is very widely disseminated.” But he notes, “there also exists another form of this, imitation. Supreme power imitates democracy. Regioonal power imitates that it takes orders from the center but in fact does what it wants.”
“The population imitates love for the powers, but in fact it seeks to avoid being controlled by any power.” This leads to “complete alienation,” Pain says, and that means that “the problem of national consolidation is the central problem for all, not only for modernization but [indeed] for survival.”
“Certain parts of the Russian Federation, such as Chechnya,” Pain goes on to say, “have created a regime of the Saudi type,” and have for a long time not been part of the common Russian legal space. But they follow this imitation principle, according to the principle “’We did not voluntarily become part of Russia and voluntarily we will not leave it.”
What that means, Pain concluded, is that “there is a problem of the country and there is the problem of community. The community has already fallen apart. The country is still holding on.”
Other speakers at the roundtable expressed similar if even more dire concerns. Lev Gudkov of the Levada Center said that “one of the main problems of Russia is that its central institutions of power … have remained practically unchanged” from the distant past and that the main issue for Russia is overcoming the “deficit of legitimacy” of the powers that be.
But instead, the powers announce “plans and projects for the future which … they will never realize. The modern is something which has nothing in common with the present, and there is no real modernization here.” If Medvedev wanted “changes,” Gudkov said, “he would begin modernization with the independence of the courts, the separation of powers,” and so on.
As far as the Caucasus is concerned, the pollster continued, it “de facto has its own courts, its own legal system, and its own system of social relations.’ And while 90 percent of Russians won’t yield the Kuriles to Japan, “60 percent [of Russians are ready to separate [the North Caucasus] from the Russian Federation one way or another.”
And finally a third speaker, economist Sergey Magaril gave an even bleaker picture of the future. Russia, he said, is like the Titanic moving toward the iceberg, a situation in which he suggested he was not certain “we have the time to maneuver” to avoid a complete and total disaster.
For Russians he said, modernization is simply “an effort to escape from stagnation.” But there are “few chances” for that. “In front of our eyes, in Russia is being reproduced the same police state on an illegal basis as it was in the USSR and before that in tsarist Russia,” a kind of regime “incapable of guaranteeing national development and inevitably leading to oblivion.”
Indeed, Magaril said, “this is only a question of time.” But Russia is not using what time it has. Instead, the economist concluded, it is reproducing “the Gogolian type of Akaky Akakiyevich … a social isolate who can give rise only to an atomized society. Are there any mechanisms for the modernization of such consciousness?”
Staunton, April 29 – Russia’s regions and republics are so different in terms of their current social and political development that their modernization is certain to be different as well, possibly in ways that will mean that the development of some will interfere with the development of others, according to a leading Russian specialist on ethnicity.
At a roundtable in the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Emil Pain argues that if Russia does modernize, there will be “different modernizations for different parts of [Russia],” a point he makes by comparing the situation between Chechnya and the ethnic Russian regions of the country (www.nr2.ru/moskow/329988.html).
Chechen society, Pain says, retains many elements of both blood feud and communal organization. Thus, wearing knives is not just “a ritual” matter. Rather they “fulfill a real function in life,” potentially saving the life of the wearer or his family in cases of “force majeure.”
Russian society, in contrast, he suggests, long ago saw such “traditional-patriarchal institutions” disappear or be destroyed. As a result, “Russian society is the most de-traditionalized and the most split.” That opens the way for progress but only if traditional institutions are replaced by modern ones. Otherwise, degradation sets in.
Unfortunately, “in all post-communist countries” and “in Russia least of all,” the appearance of the kind of informal organizations on which modernity depends “is several times lower than on average in Europe,” an apparent reaction to the enforced collectivism of the past from which people are fleeing.
It is often held, Pain says, that “a low level of traditionalism in society is compensated by a high willingness to pursue innovations.” But for that to be true, there have to be people who want such innovations and who can work together to pursue them. In Russia, however, there are few such people.
Instead, “Russian initiative is anarchic and often immoral,” Pain continues, a pattern that is reflected by the fact that while the number of people going to church has increased over the past 20 years, the number of those who “in fact observe the commandments, respect the laws of God and so on has not changed” over that period.
And it is also reflected in polls that show that “in Russia, there is the lowest level of horizontal trust among 27 countries” in which that has been sampled. “This is practically a catastrophe,” Pain says. Without trust, people will not work together for the future, and pursuing any long-term goals is “utopian.”
In Chechnya, on the other hand, “modernization has the classical problems” with traditional norms “blocking the formation of new ones.” But “both varieties of society, both patriarchal and de-traditionalized create their own obstacles for modernization,” albeit different ones and thus modernization will be of a plural nature.
That in itself creates problems, Pain the ethno-sociologist says, because there is a very great probability that these various modernizations will interfere and contradict one another,” possibly putting all of them and the country itself at risk.
In other comments, Pain notes that “the mythology about the great power nature of the Russian people is very widely disseminated.” But he notes, “there also exists another form of this, imitation. Supreme power imitates democracy. Regioonal power imitates that it takes orders from the center but in fact does what it wants.”
“The population imitates love for the powers, but in fact it seeks to avoid being controlled by any power.” This leads to “complete alienation,” Pain says, and that means that “the problem of national consolidation is the central problem for all, not only for modernization but [indeed] for survival.”
“Certain parts of the Russian Federation, such as Chechnya,” Pain goes on to say, “have created a regime of the Saudi type,” and have for a long time not been part of the common Russian legal space. But they follow this imitation principle, according to the principle “’We did not voluntarily become part of Russia and voluntarily we will not leave it.”
What that means, Pain concluded, is that “there is a problem of the country and there is the problem of community. The community has already fallen apart. The country is still holding on.”
Other speakers at the roundtable expressed similar if even more dire concerns. Lev Gudkov of the Levada Center said that “one of the main problems of Russia is that its central institutions of power … have remained practically unchanged” from the distant past and that the main issue for Russia is overcoming the “deficit of legitimacy” of the powers that be.
But instead, the powers announce “plans and projects for the future which … they will never realize. The modern is something which has nothing in common with the present, and there is no real modernization here.” If Medvedev wanted “changes,” Gudkov said, “he would begin modernization with the independence of the courts, the separation of powers,” and so on.
As far as the Caucasus is concerned, the pollster continued, it “de facto has its own courts, its own legal system, and its own system of social relations.’ And while 90 percent of Russians won’t yield the Kuriles to Japan, “60 percent [of Russians are ready to separate [the North Caucasus] from the Russian Federation one way or another.”
And finally a third speaker, economist Sergey Magaril gave an even bleaker picture of the future. Russia, he said, is like the Titanic moving toward the iceberg, a situation in which he suggested he was not certain “we have the time to maneuver” to avoid a complete and total disaster.
For Russians he said, modernization is simply “an effort to escape from stagnation.” But there are “few chances” for that. “In front of our eyes, in Russia is being reproduced the same police state on an illegal basis as it was in the USSR and before that in tsarist Russia,” a kind of regime “incapable of guaranteeing national development and inevitably leading to oblivion.”
Indeed, Magaril said, “this is only a question of time.” But Russia is not using what time it has. Instead, the economist concluded, it is reproducing “the Gogolian type of Akaky Akakiyevich … a social isolate who can give rise only to an atomized society. Are there any mechanisms for the modernization of such consciousness?”
Window on Eurasia: Little Possibility of Social Explosions in Russia, Sociologist Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 29 – At the present time, Lev Gudkov, the head of the independent Levada Center polling agency says, there is “neither the possibility nor the potential” in the Russian Federation for the kind of social and political explosions which continue to occur throughout the Arab world.
In an article on the “Osobaya bukhva” portal yesterday, Gudkov says that “the Russian middle class, despite concerns about losing everything is loyal to the regime” and generally lacks any capacity for solidarity and action,, preferring “as before” to place its hopes in the state (www.specletter.com/obcshestvo/2011-04-28/print/osnovnaja-massa-naselenija-rossii-ochen-konservativna-depressivna-i-bedna.html).
And “the main mass of the population,” the sociologist continues, is not likely to rise in protest either because its members are “very conservative” and “depressed” -- even if they are also “poor” because like the middle class they fear losing what they have more than they hope to achieve something more.
According to the pollster, “about 80 percent of [the Russian] population considers that one should not trust people around them and that one must be very careful [even] in talking” about problems. Consequently, “they believe and are concerned only about those closest to them” rather than identifying with a larger group or class.
All this makes the situation in Russia very different from that in the Arab world, Gudkov argues. “There, the breakthrough has been achieved on the basis of the appearance, at least in Egypt, of educated people, [whom one could] conditionally call the middle class [and who] did not find a place for themselves or see a future for themselves under the ruling dictatorship.”
As a result, and precisely because of “modernization processes,” groups were formed which felt themselves without prospects and who thus decided to act to advance their own collective interests against those of the state. But the situation in Russia is “different,” and thus, Gudkov says, he “does not see” many chances for “mass uprisings and social explosions.”
And this is the case, he continues, even though there is “chronic dissatisfaction” among many groups. That is because while they are unhappy about this or that situation, most Russians are far more willing to put their trust in the state to solve their problems than they are to trust others in society and work together to improve conditions on their own.
Many in fact, “do not even imagine how a better life might be possible,” Gudkov says. “They understand Soviet life and Soviet forms of organization.” The ongoing degradation of social infrastructure angers them but what they want is for the state to solve their problems. As a result, their dissatisfaction “is not destructive for the regime.” Rather the reverse.
In principle, the pollster continues, what is called the middle class could be a source of change, “if it really understood the growing threat to its existence” – “instability, the absencxe of new institutions, independent courts, media freedom .. and access to political activity,” “all that Russians “today are deprived of.”
“But the risks [involved in seeking those things] are too great in the consciousness of this narrow stratum, [and] therefore opportunism arises,” an opportunism limited both by fear of losing one’s position and the possibility of leaving rather than changing the situation inside Russia itself.
Gudkov then focuses on what he calls “one really interesting problem” – the passivity of university students. On the one hand, he says, many of these people are getting many of the things they want; and on the other, many are opportunists, something that “paralyzes political solidarity and the political activity of this group.”
Were a protest to arise among them, the Levada Center leader says, it would “however strange this might seem take the form of conservative-nationalis[m].” Many students, “especially those from the provinces,” are filled with “nationalistic resentments” and envy” for “rich America and the Russian oligarchs.”
Moreover, he says, many of them suffer from “a complex of incompleteness caused by the collapse of the USSR, a sense of national incompleteness,” most strongly expressed outside of the capitals because people there have fewer prospects, their instructors are from soviet times, “and there are very few new people and new ideas.”
The Russian state is inclined to “support and provoke such attitudes through a system of propaganda and instruction,” offering “an eclectic mix of old prejudices, Orthodoxy, imitation fundamentalism, and ideological boilerplate of Soviet times” rather than promoting new ideas and new directions.
An instructive finding of polls in this regard, Gudkov says, is that 78 percent of the population of the Russian Federation considers themselves to be Orthodox, but only two to five percent go to church regularly and only about 27 percent believe in God, in salvation, and in eternal life.
Staunton, April 29 – At the present time, Lev Gudkov, the head of the independent Levada Center polling agency says, there is “neither the possibility nor the potential” in the Russian Federation for the kind of social and political explosions which continue to occur throughout the Arab world.
In an article on the “Osobaya bukhva” portal yesterday, Gudkov says that “the Russian middle class, despite concerns about losing everything is loyal to the regime” and generally lacks any capacity for solidarity and action,, preferring “as before” to place its hopes in the state (www.specletter.com/obcshestvo/2011-04-28/print/osnovnaja-massa-naselenija-rossii-ochen-konservativna-depressivna-i-bedna.html).
And “the main mass of the population,” the sociologist continues, is not likely to rise in protest either because its members are “very conservative” and “depressed” -- even if they are also “poor” because like the middle class they fear losing what they have more than they hope to achieve something more.
According to the pollster, “about 80 percent of [the Russian] population considers that one should not trust people around them and that one must be very careful [even] in talking” about problems. Consequently, “they believe and are concerned only about those closest to them” rather than identifying with a larger group or class.
All this makes the situation in Russia very different from that in the Arab world, Gudkov argues. “There, the breakthrough has been achieved on the basis of the appearance, at least in Egypt, of educated people, [whom one could] conditionally call the middle class [and who] did not find a place for themselves or see a future for themselves under the ruling dictatorship.”
As a result, and precisely because of “modernization processes,” groups were formed which felt themselves without prospects and who thus decided to act to advance their own collective interests against those of the state. But the situation in Russia is “different,” and thus, Gudkov says, he “does not see” many chances for “mass uprisings and social explosions.”
And this is the case, he continues, even though there is “chronic dissatisfaction” among many groups. That is because while they are unhappy about this or that situation, most Russians are far more willing to put their trust in the state to solve their problems than they are to trust others in society and work together to improve conditions on their own.
Many in fact, “do not even imagine how a better life might be possible,” Gudkov says. “They understand Soviet life and Soviet forms of organization.” The ongoing degradation of social infrastructure angers them but what they want is for the state to solve their problems. As a result, their dissatisfaction “is not destructive for the regime.” Rather the reverse.
In principle, the pollster continues, what is called the middle class could be a source of change, “if it really understood the growing threat to its existence” – “instability, the absencxe of new institutions, independent courts, media freedom .. and access to political activity,” “all that Russians “today are deprived of.”
“But the risks [involved in seeking those things] are too great in the consciousness of this narrow stratum, [and] therefore opportunism arises,” an opportunism limited both by fear of losing one’s position and the possibility of leaving rather than changing the situation inside Russia itself.
Gudkov then focuses on what he calls “one really interesting problem” – the passivity of university students. On the one hand, he says, many of these people are getting many of the things they want; and on the other, many are opportunists, something that “paralyzes political solidarity and the political activity of this group.”
Were a protest to arise among them, the Levada Center leader says, it would “however strange this might seem take the form of conservative-nationalis[m].” Many students, “especially those from the provinces,” are filled with “nationalistic resentments” and envy” for “rich America and the Russian oligarchs.”
Moreover, he says, many of them suffer from “a complex of incompleteness caused by the collapse of the USSR, a sense of national incompleteness,” most strongly expressed outside of the capitals because people there have fewer prospects, their instructors are from soviet times, “and there are very few new people and new ideas.”
The Russian state is inclined to “support and provoke such attitudes through a system of propaganda and instruction,” offering “an eclectic mix of old prejudices, Orthodoxy, imitation fundamentalism, and ideological boilerplate of Soviet times” rather than promoting new ideas and new directions.
An instructive finding of polls in this regard, Gudkov says, is that 78 percent of the population of the Russian Federation considers themselves to be Orthodox, but only two to five percent go to church regularly and only about 27 percent believe in God, in salvation, and in eternal life.
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russians No Longer View Orthodox Church as Separate from the State, Lunkin Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – Most Russians do not consider the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as separate and distinct from the Russian state, a perception that reinforces indifference to matters of faith and that has led many to ignore or disparage the first signs of a genuine religious revival, according to a leading specialist on religious life in Russia.
Roman Lunkin, the director of the Institute of Religion and Law and a leading scholar at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says this is part of a larger problem: “Religion and chiefly Orthodoxy are conceived in the mass consciousness of Russian society in an irrational and contradictory way” (www.politjournal.ru/index.php?action=News&tek=9555).
“For the majority of [Russians], it is customary to view Orthodox leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution as a constituent part of the official chronicles on federal television channels and in the press,” Lunkinn says, but when the Church uses these ties to push its agenda, many Russians become angry.
That is because, Lunkin says, Russians are “accustomed to consider themselves as Orthodox and with satisfaction listen to speeches by the Patriarch and the bishops that ‘we are all baptized into Orthodoxy,” but they do not want the Church to try to extend its influence, viewing that as a form of “dangerous clericalization.’”
For most of the post-Soviet period, Orthodox leaders have supported this contradictory view, but “independently from the declared basis of the consteitutional system and the declarations of Orthodox hierarchs that the Church does not want to again become a government church, Orthodoxy has always ceased to be viewed as separate from the state.”
Since 1991, Russian officials and commentators have routinely declared that Orthodoxy is “the preserver of the richness and values of Russian culture and spirituality,” thus replacing the term “people” in the oft-repeated Soviet slogan that “’art belongs to the people’” and thus putting the Church in a complicated position.
Evidence of this is provided in the way in which the media oppose state-supported Orthodoxy and unacceptable “sects,” and the willingness of the Russian people to accept that division, a willingness that shows that “neither in society nor in the media is there an understanding of what faith is, how one can believe and what is religious practice.”
Even more important, all this is evidence of a lack of interest in the faith itself and in the fundamental aspects of the Orthodox religion and a willingness of many Russians to view Orthodoxy iin conjunction with “a semi-pagan culture’ with “astrological-occult” aspects including “superstitions, fortunetelling, diets, and in general about how religion must help.”
This “folklorization of Orthodoxy” is not the result of any “ill intention” or popular inattention. Rather, “under conditions of the existence of the polar opposites” of Official Orthodoxy and sects, “genuine faith does not interest anyone;” and consequently, “what develops is precisely folklore.”
The situation has somewhat improved in recent years, Lunkin says, and he points to the influence of Patriarch Kirill as being a positive one in this regard, an especially interesting comment given that Lunkin has often been criticized by Orthodox hierarchs for his critical attitude toward the Patriarchate.
Evidence of this improvement, of a greater concern with faith rather than form, Lunkin suggests, is to be found in a place many Orthodox hierarchs may not like: in the dissent of the Izhevsk “free thinkers, three priests who declared about their refusal to recall Patriarch Kirill in their prayers and who accused the Church leadership of tight connections with the powers.”
Nonetheless, it is still true, Lunkin says, that “the number of practicing believers as before remains extraordinarily few, and besides this, religious life consists not of Orthodoxy and ‘the sects” but of the most various movements and confessions,” often far beyond Orthodoxy or even Christianity.
“The number of believers who are becoming part of the Russian Orthodox Church in a genuine way is slowly growing, especially to the extent that the Church is becoming more open, more willing to talk about its problems and involved in social projects and the development of parishes.”
Staunton, April 28 – Most Russians do not consider the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as separate and distinct from the Russian state, a perception that reinforces indifference to matters of faith and that has led many to ignore or disparage the first signs of a genuine religious revival, according to a leading specialist on religious life in Russia.
Roman Lunkin, the director of the Institute of Religion and Law and a leading scholar at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says this is part of a larger problem: “Religion and chiefly Orthodoxy are conceived in the mass consciousness of Russian society in an irrational and contradictory way” (www.politjournal.ru/index.php?action=News&tek=9555).
“For the majority of [Russians], it is customary to view Orthodox leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution as a constituent part of the official chronicles on federal television channels and in the press,” Lunkinn says, but when the Church uses these ties to push its agenda, many Russians become angry.
That is because, Lunkin says, Russians are “accustomed to consider themselves as Orthodox and with satisfaction listen to speeches by the Patriarch and the bishops that ‘we are all baptized into Orthodoxy,” but they do not want the Church to try to extend its influence, viewing that as a form of “dangerous clericalization.’”
For most of the post-Soviet period, Orthodox leaders have supported this contradictory view, but “independently from the declared basis of the consteitutional system and the declarations of Orthodox hierarchs that the Church does not want to again become a government church, Orthodoxy has always ceased to be viewed as separate from the state.”
Since 1991, Russian officials and commentators have routinely declared that Orthodoxy is “the preserver of the richness and values of Russian culture and spirituality,” thus replacing the term “people” in the oft-repeated Soviet slogan that “’art belongs to the people’” and thus putting the Church in a complicated position.
Evidence of this is provided in the way in which the media oppose state-supported Orthodoxy and unacceptable “sects,” and the willingness of the Russian people to accept that division, a willingness that shows that “neither in society nor in the media is there an understanding of what faith is, how one can believe and what is religious practice.”
Even more important, all this is evidence of a lack of interest in the faith itself and in the fundamental aspects of the Orthodox religion and a willingness of many Russians to view Orthodoxy iin conjunction with “a semi-pagan culture’ with “astrological-occult” aspects including “superstitions, fortunetelling, diets, and in general about how religion must help.”
This “folklorization of Orthodoxy” is not the result of any “ill intention” or popular inattention. Rather, “under conditions of the existence of the polar opposites” of Official Orthodoxy and sects, “genuine faith does not interest anyone;” and consequently, “what develops is precisely folklore.”
The situation has somewhat improved in recent years, Lunkin says, and he points to the influence of Patriarch Kirill as being a positive one in this regard, an especially interesting comment given that Lunkin has often been criticized by Orthodox hierarchs for his critical attitude toward the Patriarchate.
Evidence of this improvement, of a greater concern with faith rather than form, Lunkin suggests, is to be found in a place many Orthodox hierarchs may not like: in the dissent of the Izhevsk “free thinkers, three priests who declared about their refusal to recall Patriarch Kirill in their prayers and who accused the Church leadership of tight connections with the powers.”
Nonetheless, it is still true, Lunkin says, that “the number of practicing believers as before remains extraordinarily few, and besides this, religious life consists not of Orthodoxy and ‘the sects” but of the most various movements and confessions,” often far beyond Orthodoxy or even Christianity.
“The number of believers who are becoming part of the Russian Orthodox Church in a genuine way is slowly growing, especially to the extent that the Church is becoming more open, more willing to talk about its problems and involved in social projects and the development of parishes.”
Window on Eurasia: Central Asian Countries May Leave CIS in the Coming Decade, Moscow Analysts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – The Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States will survive this decade at least, but it will likely have fewer members, with the countries of Central Asia the most likely to exit because they “will make a different geopolitical choice,” according to a leading Moscow specialist on the post-Soviet region.
During a video conference between scholars and officials in Moscow, Tbilisi, Almaaty, Bishkek, and Chisinau, Aleksey Vlasov, director of the Center for Post-Soviet Research at Moscow State University, said that “the nucleus” of the CIS will survive but some of its outlying members will likely leave (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10364/).
Vlasov mentioned three “factors” which he said would prevent the complete unraveling of the CIS: “the absence of visas, Russian as a common language of communication, and the still existing trade and economic preferences in relations among the [Commonwealth member] states.”
“If the three components disappear,” he continued, “the CIS as such will not exist. In this case, the CIS will be transformed into a club of interests, the presidents will meet twice a year, some questions will be discussed, but not more than that. While these exist, it is necessary to add to them certain motives so that the system will not weaken but be strengthened.”
Another participant in the video conference, Sergey Mikheyev, the director general of the Moscow Center of Political Conjuncture, agreed. He said that in his view, the CIS “in one form or another will be preserved over the course of the next decade because there exist definite preconditions for this.”
There are actually many reasons for “integration within the framework of the CIS,” Mikheyev said. “The question is in how deep this integration can be. As far as the membership is concerned, then it certainly can be changed, but this to a significant degree depends on external factors because around the perimeter of the CIS, destructive processes are taking place.”
As far as the countries of Central Asia are concerned, the Moscow analyst said, “the question could be put in a still worse form.” That is because those countries are “not simply reorienting themselves” but because outside forces are promoting this “in a quite dangerous key.”
The remarks of Vlasov and Mikheyev represent a remarkably open acknowledgement by those close to the powers that be in Moscow that the CIS is hardly the vibrant organization Russian leaders often seek to present it as. But more than that, their words point back to the way in which the CIS itself was in fact organized.
The CIS was not created at Belovezhe as many now think. Instead, the actions of the presidents of the three Slavic republics prompted the leaders of the Central Asian Muslim states to meet and consider forming their own organization. Fearful of what that might mean, Russian leaders then organized a meeting in Kazakhstan to link the two groups into the CIS.
The comments of Vlasov and Mikheyev this week suggest that 20 years on, the organization has not been able to overcome that original division effectively and that it, rather than the withdrawal of Georgia or the assumption of associate status by Turkmenistan, is likely to be the defining vector in that organization’s future existence.
Staunton, April 28 – The Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States will survive this decade at least, but it will likely have fewer members, with the countries of Central Asia the most likely to exit because they “will make a different geopolitical choice,” according to a leading Moscow specialist on the post-Soviet region.
During a video conference between scholars and officials in Moscow, Tbilisi, Almaaty, Bishkek, and Chisinau, Aleksey Vlasov, director of the Center for Post-Soviet Research at Moscow State University, said that “the nucleus” of the CIS will survive but some of its outlying members will likely leave (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10364/).
Vlasov mentioned three “factors” which he said would prevent the complete unraveling of the CIS: “the absence of visas, Russian as a common language of communication, and the still existing trade and economic preferences in relations among the [Commonwealth member] states.”
“If the three components disappear,” he continued, “the CIS as such will not exist. In this case, the CIS will be transformed into a club of interests, the presidents will meet twice a year, some questions will be discussed, but not more than that. While these exist, it is necessary to add to them certain motives so that the system will not weaken but be strengthened.”
Another participant in the video conference, Sergey Mikheyev, the director general of the Moscow Center of Political Conjuncture, agreed. He said that in his view, the CIS “in one form or another will be preserved over the course of the next decade because there exist definite preconditions for this.”
There are actually many reasons for “integration within the framework of the CIS,” Mikheyev said. “The question is in how deep this integration can be. As far as the membership is concerned, then it certainly can be changed, but this to a significant degree depends on external factors because around the perimeter of the CIS, destructive processes are taking place.”
As far as the countries of Central Asia are concerned, the Moscow analyst said, “the question could be put in a still worse form.” That is because those countries are “not simply reorienting themselves” but because outside forces are promoting this “in a quite dangerous key.”
The remarks of Vlasov and Mikheyev represent a remarkably open acknowledgement by those close to the powers that be in Moscow that the CIS is hardly the vibrant organization Russian leaders often seek to present it as. But more than that, their words point back to the way in which the CIS itself was in fact organized.
The CIS was not created at Belovezhe as many now think. Instead, the actions of the presidents of the three Slavic republics prompted the leaders of the Central Asian Muslim states to meet and consider forming their own organization. Fearful of what that might mean, Russian leaders then organized a meeting in Kazakhstan to link the two groups into the CIS.
The comments of Vlasov and Mikheyev this week suggest that 20 years on, the organization has not been able to overcome that original division effectively and that it, rather than the withdrawal of Georgia or the assumption of associate status by Turkmenistan, is likely to be the defining vector in that organization’s future existence.
Window on Eurasia: Regional Paper Considers Impact of Russia’s Possible Disintegration on Samara Oblast
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – Many analysts in Moscow and the West have talked in general terms about what they see as the probable disintegration of the Russian Federation into a number of independent states, but a Samara paper this week has taken the next step and discussed what independence would mean for that oblast.
And while this article’s prognostications are no more certain of coming true than those who discuss this possibility in more general terms, they are interesting and important for what they say about how ordinary people are thinking about such outcomes and what their views say about their current expectations and fears.
In an essay in the Tol’yatti paper “Ponedel’nik,” Aleksandr Gremin says that he is not calling for the disintegration of Russia – that is a criminal offense – but only seeking “to analyze what awaits Samara oblast if in the country for one reason or another begins a parade of sovereignties” (rus.ruvr.ru/2011/04/26/49421674.html).
As he points out, “predictions of Russia’s disintegration into regional principalities, khalifates, republics and confederations” are nothing new. They have been a staple of articles from “serious institutes” in the Russian capital and abroad, with most disturbing prognoses eing “the separation of Siberia from European Russia and a split along the Volga-Urals line.”
If the UN is correct, Gremin continues, by 2030, the population of Russia will “fall to 118 million” and “this means that in Siberia and in the Far East the population will be less than would be needed to keep their territories within Russia.” The North Caucasus will likely have already left, “in a Kosovo scenario,” as soon as “the river of money from Moscow runs out.”
Indeed, given the international community’s interest in the natural resources of the Russian lands, the Kosovo “scenario” is the most probable way the disintegration of Russia will be arranged, with “local referend[a], unilateral declaration[s] of independence, [and] recognition of sovereignty by the key powers, the US, China and the European Union.”
“Kaliningrad is already prepared to run to Europe,” Gremin says, and “the rich national regions like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are already anticipating the fruits of [such future] independence” from Moscow.
While this process could be violent, it might be peaceful as was the disintegration of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. “The heads of the subjects of the federation could meeting somewhere in Gorki, sign something like the Belovezhe accords, and return to their gubernias already with the status of presidents, general secretaries, beloved leaders, and emperors.”
“You don’t believe this?” Gremin addresses his readers. “But this is precisely what happened in 1991!”
In such a scenario, Samara oblast, he continues, would occupy a “special” position. Samara is a wealthy region, “and up to 70 percent of the taxes collected there go to Moscow.” As a result, “many suppose that with such resources, we [Samarans] having acquired independence would live as the rich, full and happy.”
But Gremin argues, those who think so are mistaken. “Independence would not work in Samara oblast’s favor,” and “here is why.” On the one hand, Moscow would not want to give us up, and on the other, very quickly, “other strong young states” would “immediately become interested in us.”
“Look at a map,” the journalist suggests. Samara would find itself in that event wedged between “one Islamic world – Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran – and another Islamic world Kazan and Ufa.” Neighboring Orenburg, “also a Russian area rich with oil and gas,” would find itself “in a similar situation.”
As a result, “Samara oblast will never be a self-standing independent state.” Instead it will be fought over by Moscow and “a Tatar-Kazakh alliance.” Indeed that has happened before and “more than once.” And “all our cities – Samara, Saratov, Orenburg and Stavropol – were founded as fortresses, as fortified regions and bases for the conduct of military operations.”
“In the medium term historical perspective,” Gremin suggests, “Samara oblast would automatically fall into the sphere of interests of the Islamic world and territorially would be included apparently within Tatarstan and not Moscow – in part because we the local population already today do not like the Moscow occupation regime and often spend weekends in Kazan.”
Can such a scenario be avoided? Gremin asks rhetorically, and then he observes that “the majority of researches are convinced that it already cannot be. In the ‘blessed’ [first decade of this century] powere was occupied already by others than those that were needed” for an alternative future.
The journalist’s concluding advice to his Russian readers is “Learn Tatar.”
Staunton, April 28 – Many analysts in Moscow and the West have talked in general terms about what they see as the probable disintegration of the Russian Federation into a number of independent states, but a Samara paper this week has taken the next step and discussed what independence would mean for that oblast.
And while this article’s prognostications are no more certain of coming true than those who discuss this possibility in more general terms, they are interesting and important for what they say about how ordinary people are thinking about such outcomes and what their views say about their current expectations and fears.
In an essay in the Tol’yatti paper “Ponedel’nik,” Aleksandr Gremin says that he is not calling for the disintegration of Russia – that is a criminal offense – but only seeking “to analyze what awaits Samara oblast if in the country for one reason or another begins a parade of sovereignties” (rus.ruvr.ru/2011/04/26/49421674.html).
As he points out, “predictions of Russia’s disintegration into regional principalities, khalifates, republics and confederations” are nothing new. They have been a staple of articles from “serious institutes” in the Russian capital and abroad, with most disturbing prognoses eing “the separation of Siberia from European Russia and a split along the Volga-Urals line.”
If the UN is correct, Gremin continues, by 2030, the population of Russia will “fall to 118 million” and “this means that in Siberia and in the Far East the population will be less than would be needed to keep their territories within Russia.” The North Caucasus will likely have already left, “in a Kosovo scenario,” as soon as “the river of money from Moscow runs out.”
Indeed, given the international community’s interest in the natural resources of the Russian lands, the Kosovo “scenario” is the most probable way the disintegration of Russia will be arranged, with “local referend[a], unilateral declaration[s] of independence, [and] recognition of sovereignty by the key powers, the US, China and the European Union.”
“Kaliningrad is already prepared to run to Europe,” Gremin says, and “the rich national regions like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are already anticipating the fruits of [such future] independence” from Moscow.
While this process could be violent, it might be peaceful as was the disintegration of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. “The heads of the subjects of the federation could meeting somewhere in Gorki, sign something like the Belovezhe accords, and return to their gubernias already with the status of presidents, general secretaries, beloved leaders, and emperors.”
“You don’t believe this?” Gremin addresses his readers. “But this is precisely what happened in 1991!”
In such a scenario, Samara oblast, he continues, would occupy a “special” position. Samara is a wealthy region, “and up to 70 percent of the taxes collected there go to Moscow.” As a result, “many suppose that with such resources, we [Samarans] having acquired independence would live as the rich, full and happy.”
But Gremin argues, those who think so are mistaken. “Independence would not work in Samara oblast’s favor,” and “here is why.” On the one hand, Moscow would not want to give us up, and on the other, very quickly, “other strong young states” would “immediately become interested in us.”
“Look at a map,” the journalist suggests. Samara would find itself in that event wedged between “one Islamic world – Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran – and another Islamic world Kazan and Ufa.” Neighboring Orenburg, “also a Russian area rich with oil and gas,” would find itself “in a similar situation.”
As a result, “Samara oblast will never be a self-standing independent state.” Instead it will be fought over by Moscow and “a Tatar-Kazakh alliance.” Indeed that has happened before and “more than once.” And “all our cities – Samara, Saratov, Orenburg and Stavropol – were founded as fortresses, as fortified regions and bases for the conduct of military operations.”
“In the medium term historical perspective,” Gremin suggests, “Samara oblast would automatically fall into the sphere of interests of the Islamic world and territorially would be included apparently within Tatarstan and not Moscow – in part because we the local population already today do not like the Moscow occupation regime and often spend weekends in Kazan.”
Can such a scenario be avoided? Gremin asks rhetorically, and then he observes that “the majority of researches are convinced that it already cannot be. In the ‘blessed’ [first decade of this century] powere was occupied already by others than those that were needed” for an alternative future.
The journalist’s concluding advice to his Russian readers is “Learn Tatar.”
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