Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – Many analysts in Moscow and the West have talked in general terms about what they see as the probable disintegration of the Russian Federation into a number of independent states, but a Samara paper this week has taken the next step and discussed what independence would mean for that oblast.
And while this article’s prognostications are no more certain of coming true than those who discuss this possibility in more general terms, they are interesting and important for what they say about how ordinary people are thinking about such outcomes and what their views say about their current expectations and fears.
In an essay in the Tol’yatti paper “Ponedel’nik,” Aleksandr Gremin says that he is not calling for the disintegration of Russia – that is a criminal offense – but only seeking “to analyze what awaits Samara oblast if in the country for one reason or another begins a parade of sovereignties” (rus.ruvr.ru/2011/04/26/49421674.html).
As he points out, “predictions of Russia’s disintegration into regional principalities, khalifates, republics and confederations” are nothing new. They have been a staple of articles from “serious institutes” in the Russian capital and abroad, with most disturbing prognoses eing “the separation of Siberia from European Russia and a split along the Volga-Urals line.”
If the UN is correct, Gremin continues, by 2030, the population of Russia will “fall to 118 million” and “this means that in Siberia and in the Far East the population will be less than would be needed to keep their territories within Russia.” The North Caucasus will likely have already left, “in a Kosovo scenario,” as soon as “the river of money from Moscow runs out.”
Indeed, given the international community’s interest in the natural resources of the Russian lands, the Kosovo “scenario” is the most probable way the disintegration of Russia will be arranged, with “local referend[a], unilateral declaration[s] of independence, [and] recognition of sovereignty by the key powers, the US, China and the European Union.”
“Kaliningrad is already prepared to run to Europe,” Gremin says, and “the rich national regions like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are already anticipating the fruits of [such future] independence” from Moscow.
While this process could be violent, it might be peaceful as was the disintegration of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. “The heads of the subjects of the federation could meeting somewhere in Gorki, sign something like the Belovezhe accords, and return to their gubernias already with the status of presidents, general secretaries, beloved leaders, and emperors.”
“You don’t believe this?” Gremin addresses his readers. “But this is precisely what happened in 1991!”
In such a scenario, Samara oblast, he continues, would occupy a “special” position. Samara is a wealthy region, “and up to 70 percent of the taxes collected there go to Moscow.” As a result, “many suppose that with such resources, we [Samarans] having acquired independence would live as the rich, full and happy.”
But Gremin argues, those who think so are mistaken. “Independence would not work in Samara oblast’s favor,” and “here is why.” On the one hand, Moscow would not want to give us up, and on the other, very quickly, “other strong young states” would “immediately become interested in us.”
“Look at a map,” the journalist suggests. Samara would find itself in that event wedged between “one Islamic world – Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran – and another Islamic world Kazan and Ufa.” Neighboring Orenburg, “also a Russian area rich with oil and gas,” would find itself “in a similar situation.”
As a result, “Samara oblast will never be a self-standing independent state.” Instead it will be fought over by Moscow and “a Tatar-Kazakh alliance.” Indeed that has happened before and “more than once.” And “all our cities – Samara, Saratov, Orenburg and Stavropol – were founded as fortresses, as fortified regions and bases for the conduct of military operations.”
“In the medium term historical perspective,” Gremin suggests, “Samara oblast would automatically fall into the sphere of interests of the Islamic world and territorially would be included apparently within Tatarstan and not Moscow – in part because we the local population already today do not like the Moscow occupation regime and often spend weekends in Kazan.”
Can such a scenario be avoided? Gremin asks rhetorically, and then he observes that “the majority of researches are convinced that it already cannot be. In the ‘blessed’ [first decade of this century] powere was occupied already by others than those that were needed” for an alternative future.
The journalist’s concluding advice to his Russian readers is “Learn Tatar.”
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Plan to Build All-Russian Muslim Body around New Tatarstan Mufti Runs into Trouble
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 27 – The plans of some in Moscow that the center could build an all-Russian Muslim organization around the new mufti of Tatarstan and thus weaken both the two other Muslim bodies with such pretentions, the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) and the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), have run into trouble before they could take off.
On the one hand, boosting the position of the Muslim leader in Tatarstan has led the authorities in Kazan to adopt an even more Islamic, not to say Islamist, position in their public appeals. And on the other, the election of a new mufti has led to a split in the ranks of the Tatarstan MSD’s congregations with some breaking off to form a new MSD of their own.
Following the election of Ildus Fayzov as the mufti of Tatarstan two weeks ago, Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and notorious for his attacks on SMR head Ravil Gainutdin, played up the idea that Fayzov could become a paramount leader of Islam in Russia (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=dujour&div=374).
Silantyev’s idea was based on Fayzov’s declaration that the Tatarstan MSD of which he had become the leader would not be part of the SMR even though Fayzov’s predecessor Gusman Iskakov had been vice president of this organization “on his own initiative and as a private person,” the Russian Islamic expert said.
Moreover, because the Tatarstan MSD has numerous parishes beyond the borders of that Middle Volga republic and not just in adjoining areas, Silantyev continued, Fayzov is in a position to present himself as “the leader of an all-Russian Muslim structure,” one which already controls, according to Silantyev, a fifth of all the Muslim congregations in Russia.
As Silantyev points out, the Russian government has its problems not only with the SMR and Central MSD in Ufa – the North Caucasus Muslim organization does not play an all-Russian role – and because Moscow is disappointed in the results of its recent effort to create an all-Russian Muftiate up to now. Consequently, the Kremlin “can begin” to look at Fayzov.
The Russian expert outlines some of the reasons for what he calls “a cooling of relations” between the SMR and Kazan, including issue of Wahhabism, ties with the Central MSD and Talgat Tajuddin, and the fact that an SMR leader took the lead in opposing Fayzov in the run up to the mufti election in Kazan.
Silantyev’s suggestion, which almost certainly reflects the ideas of many in Moscow and especially those close to the Russian Orthodox Church, has run into difficulties for reasons that he and others should have anticipated, reasons that reflect both the nature of Russian political life and the nature of Islam.
If Moscow would like to see another center of Islamic administration in the Russian Federation, establishing it in Kazan has the potential to create a serious problem for the center because it gives the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan yet another lever to advance itself as spokesman or at least bellwether for all the non-Russians of the Russian Federation.
That is because Kazan can now, as it is doing, present itself as a spokesman for Islam too. On Monday, for example, Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov noted in a message to the World Congress of Tatars that “religion plays a big role in the preservation of national identity” and that Kazan is “concerned” about the situation of Islam in other parts of Russia.
Islam, the Tatarstan leader continued, is “the foundation of Tatar culture” and consequently, when today “mosques in regions of Russia are passing over into alien hands which do not very much strive to preserve our Tatar traditions, the traditions of our ancestors, it is necessary to focus attention on this (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/15835/).
But perhaps a more immediate if ultimately less serious problem for the Russian authorities is that the Tatarstan MSD is now at risk of disintegrating into two or more smaller MSDs, with Muslims in Almetyevsk declaring today that they do not want to subordinate to the Tatarstan MSD of Fayzov (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40530).
Because the MSD system has no canonical basis in Islam – such institutions are a political-administrative convenience for Russian officials who would like Islam to be a church like Orthodoxy – any parish can decide to opt out of an MSD whenever it likes, at least from the point of view of Islamic law.
And in this case, it appears that local Muslim leaders, at least some of whom opposed Fayzov’s election and his increasingly active program, have decided that the most effective way to register their objections is to withdraw. If they do and if others follow, Fayzov may not have the base that Silantyev and others hope for.
Staunton, April 27 – The plans of some in Moscow that the center could build an all-Russian Muslim organization around the new mufti of Tatarstan and thus weaken both the two other Muslim bodies with such pretentions, the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) and the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), have run into trouble before they could take off.
On the one hand, boosting the position of the Muslim leader in Tatarstan has led the authorities in Kazan to adopt an even more Islamic, not to say Islamist, position in their public appeals. And on the other, the election of a new mufti has led to a split in the ranks of the Tatarstan MSD’s congregations with some breaking off to form a new MSD of their own.
Following the election of Ildus Fayzov as the mufti of Tatarstan two weeks ago, Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and notorious for his attacks on SMR head Ravil Gainutdin, played up the idea that Fayzov could become a paramount leader of Islam in Russia (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=dujour&div=374).
Silantyev’s idea was based on Fayzov’s declaration that the Tatarstan MSD of which he had become the leader would not be part of the SMR even though Fayzov’s predecessor Gusman Iskakov had been vice president of this organization “on his own initiative and as a private person,” the Russian Islamic expert said.
Moreover, because the Tatarstan MSD has numerous parishes beyond the borders of that Middle Volga republic and not just in adjoining areas, Silantyev continued, Fayzov is in a position to present himself as “the leader of an all-Russian Muslim structure,” one which already controls, according to Silantyev, a fifth of all the Muslim congregations in Russia.
As Silantyev points out, the Russian government has its problems not only with the SMR and Central MSD in Ufa – the North Caucasus Muslim organization does not play an all-Russian role – and because Moscow is disappointed in the results of its recent effort to create an all-Russian Muftiate up to now. Consequently, the Kremlin “can begin” to look at Fayzov.
The Russian expert outlines some of the reasons for what he calls “a cooling of relations” between the SMR and Kazan, including issue of Wahhabism, ties with the Central MSD and Talgat Tajuddin, and the fact that an SMR leader took the lead in opposing Fayzov in the run up to the mufti election in Kazan.
Silantyev’s suggestion, which almost certainly reflects the ideas of many in Moscow and especially those close to the Russian Orthodox Church, has run into difficulties for reasons that he and others should have anticipated, reasons that reflect both the nature of Russian political life and the nature of Islam.
If Moscow would like to see another center of Islamic administration in the Russian Federation, establishing it in Kazan has the potential to create a serious problem for the center because it gives the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan yet another lever to advance itself as spokesman or at least bellwether for all the non-Russians of the Russian Federation.
That is because Kazan can now, as it is doing, present itself as a spokesman for Islam too. On Monday, for example, Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov noted in a message to the World Congress of Tatars that “religion plays a big role in the preservation of national identity” and that Kazan is “concerned” about the situation of Islam in other parts of Russia.
Islam, the Tatarstan leader continued, is “the foundation of Tatar culture” and consequently, when today “mosques in regions of Russia are passing over into alien hands which do not very much strive to preserve our Tatar traditions, the traditions of our ancestors, it is necessary to focus attention on this (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/15835/).
But perhaps a more immediate if ultimately less serious problem for the Russian authorities is that the Tatarstan MSD is now at risk of disintegrating into two or more smaller MSDs, with Muslims in Almetyevsk declaring today that they do not want to subordinate to the Tatarstan MSD of Fayzov (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40530).
Because the MSD system has no canonical basis in Islam – such institutions are a political-administrative convenience for Russian officials who would like Islam to be a church like Orthodoxy – any parish can decide to opt out of an MSD whenever it likes, at least from the point of view of Islamic law.
And in this case, it appears that local Muslim leaders, at least some of whom opposed Fayzov’s election and his increasingly active program, have decided that the most effective way to register their objections is to withdraw. If they do and if others follow, Fayzov may not have the base that Silantyev and others hope for.
Window on Eurasia: North Caucasian Reminds Russians Moscow is Subsidizing More than the North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 27 – Russian nationalists are angry that Moscow is subsidizing the Muslim North Caucasus, but a North Caucasus analyst has reminded them and everyone else that Moscow is also subsidizing other and predominantly Russian regions as well, something he suggests the nationalists should be thinking about as well.
On Saturday, the Russian Civic Union and the Front of National Salvation organized a demonstration in Moscow to call for an end to Russian government subsidies to the North Caucasus. About 400 people listened to speakers denounce Russian spending in that restive region (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184396/).
One of the participants in that demonstration, Viktor Sobolyev of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), said that his party was the only one in the Duma which has constantly raised the issue of Russian money flowing into non-Russian portions of the country and wants to see it go to Russian regions instead.
But the meeting was about more than just Russian money supposedly going to waste in the North Caucasus. It also was about corruption, and one participant told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that he fully agreed with speakers there that “’a fish rots from the head’ and that corruption begins here [in Moscow] in the highest echelons of power.?
One North Caucasian commentator, political scientist Ruslan Martagov said it was completely understandable that Russians were concerned about the flow of money to the North Caucasus and to corruption there. “How can one explain such large transfers … to simple people” when there are many worthy projects elsewhere in Russia that remain without funding?
And such ordinary Russians, he continued, are outraged by the corruption in the North Caucasus, although most of them recognize that “the corrupted Kremlin has given birth to a corrupted elite in the North Caucasus It has given it birth and it is feeding it as well.” Over time, this will lead to more inter-ethnic tensions.
That is because Moscow has the opportunity to start up a new conflict in the North Caucasus if its own position becomes shaky, and when it does so, the political scientist suggested, “in the eyes of society, this will be completely justified,” an attitude that makes questions about funding the North Caucasus potentially serious.
But another North Caucasian expert, Aslambek Paskachev, an academic who heads the Russian Congress of Peoples of the Caucasus, said Russian nationalists “should turn their attention to the Far East and the Volga region which are getting more subsidies than the republics of the Caucasus” because of the way in which the Russian system is now arranged.
And as far as corruption is concerned, “then in the North Caucasus, it is just the same as it is everywhere else.” Because that is the case, the holding of the Saturday’s meeting, he suggested, prompts the question as to who may be trying to play “the Caucasus card for their own political purposes.”
On the other hand, Paskachev continued, “let’s consider who is feeding whom and who has fed whom at various periods of modern history.” He noted that he had worked in the Chechen-Ingush Gosplan in Soviet times and that at that time, the republic had sent 21 million tons of oil to the rest of Russia every year” – including rocket fuel for Yuri Gagarin’s flight!
That alone shows how wrong speakers at Saturday’s meeting where when they asserted that “the North Caucasus has never given the country a single scholar, artist or writer … All the income from oil went in those years into a common union pot. And our republic, using the meeting’s language, during the so-called stagnation ‘fed’ more than one region of Russia.”
“Why then is it necessary to hate all those who live in the South of Russia,” Paskachev asked. Advancing “Slogans like ‘the Caucasus for the Caucasians’ and ‘Russia for the Russians,’ the North Caucasian specialist said, “will only lead to the collapse” of the Russian Federation as a whole.
.
Staunton, April 27 – Russian nationalists are angry that Moscow is subsidizing the Muslim North Caucasus, but a North Caucasus analyst has reminded them and everyone else that Moscow is also subsidizing other and predominantly Russian regions as well, something he suggests the nationalists should be thinking about as well.
On Saturday, the Russian Civic Union and the Front of National Salvation organized a demonstration in Moscow to call for an end to Russian government subsidies to the North Caucasus. About 400 people listened to speakers denounce Russian spending in that restive region (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184396/).
One of the participants in that demonstration, Viktor Sobolyev of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), said that his party was the only one in the Duma which has constantly raised the issue of Russian money flowing into non-Russian portions of the country and wants to see it go to Russian regions instead.
But the meeting was about more than just Russian money supposedly going to waste in the North Caucasus. It also was about corruption, and one participant told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that he fully agreed with speakers there that “’a fish rots from the head’ and that corruption begins here [in Moscow] in the highest echelons of power.?
One North Caucasian commentator, political scientist Ruslan Martagov said it was completely understandable that Russians were concerned about the flow of money to the North Caucasus and to corruption there. “How can one explain such large transfers … to simple people” when there are many worthy projects elsewhere in Russia that remain without funding?
And such ordinary Russians, he continued, are outraged by the corruption in the North Caucasus, although most of them recognize that “the corrupted Kremlin has given birth to a corrupted elite in the North Caucasus It has given it birth and it is feeding it as well.” Over time, this will lead to more inter-ethnic tensions.
That is because Moscow has the opportunity to start up a new conflict in the North Caucasus if its own position becomes shaky, and when it does so, the political scientist suggested, “in the eyes of society, this will be completely justified,” an attitude that makes questions about funding the North Caucasus potentially serious.
But another North Caucasian expert, Aslambek Paskachev, an academic who heads the Russian Congress of Peoples of the Caucasus, said Russian nationalists “should turn their attention to the Far East and the Volga region which are getting more subsidies than the republics of the Caucasus” because of the way in which the Russian system is now arranged.
And as far as corruption is concerned, “then in the North Caucasus, it is just the same as it is everywhere else.” Because that is the case, the holding of the Saturday’s meeting, he suggested, prompts the question as to who may be trying to play “the Caucasus card for their own political purposes.”
On the other hand, Paskachev continued, “let’s consider who is feeding whom and who has fed whom at various periods of modern history.” He noted that he had worked in the Chechen-Ingush Gosplan in Soviet times and that at that time, the republic had sent 21 million tons of oil to the rest of Russia every year” – including rocket fuel for Yuri Gagarin’s flight!
That alone shows how wrong speakers at Saturday’s meeting where when they asserted that “the North Caucasus has never given the country a single scholar, artist or writer … All the income from oil went in those years into a common union pot. And our republic, using the meeting’s language, during the so-called stagnation ‘fed’ more than one region of Russia.”
“Why then is it necessary to hate all those who live in the South of Russia,” Paskachev asked. Advancing “Slogans like ‘the Caucasus for the Caucasians’ and ‘Russia for the Russians,’ the North Caucasian specialist said, “will only lead to the collapse” of the Russian Federation as a whole.
.
Window on Eurasia: Despite Rising Oil Prices, Russians’ Standard of Living is Falling
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 27 – Many observers had assumed that recent increases in the price of oil and gas would boost living standards in the Russian Federation, a major exporter, but in fact, according to Moscow’s statistical agency, living standards there are again beginning to fall as is public confidence in the future.
In an article in today’s “Svobodnaya pressa,” Lev Ivanov and Dmitry Ivanov use Rosstat data to show that “despite the growing prices for oil and gas, the standard of living of Russians fell in March compared to a year earlier by 3.4 percent and that popular expectations about the future declined as well (svpressa.ru/economy/article/42654/).
Moreover, the two journalists point out, “if one looks at the graph of monetary incomes of the population offered by Rosstat, then it is obvious that this spring, the statistically average Russian lives approximately at the level of the height of the crisis, the winter of 2008/2009” and has not benefitted from the rise in the price of oil and gas.
Last month, compared to a year earlier and with inflation taken into account, the two “Svobodnaya pressa” writers say, average pay for Russians fell by 0.4 percent. They note that “the main reason” for this trend is not a decline in pay but rather “the continuing growth of the cost of living.”
And that trend in turn has sent consumer confidence tumbling. According to Rosstat, that index fell three percent in the first quarter of 2011, with only 13 percent of the population now expecting an improvement in their material position over the next 12 months, 23 percent expecting a decline, and 53 percent anticipating little change.
These figures, Ivanov and Ivanov say, put Russia in the range of the crisis countries of the European Union, Greece and Portugal, rather than with those EU states which are coming out of the recent economic crisis. And what is worse, they suggest, is that this decline in standard of living “correlates with the worsening situation of the Russian economy as a whole.”
GDP is falling as is investment, and the growth in incomes from the sale of oil and gas is not having an impact on the standard of living of ordinary Russians. Using Rosstat figures, they show that those at the top of the income pyramid are benefitting from these sales but those in the middle and bottom are not – or at least are not at a rate higher than inflation.
Given these figures, the two asked three specialists whether these figures suggested that there is “renewal of recession in Russia.” Aleksey Mikhailov, an expert at the Moscow Center of Economic and Political Research, replied that “all contemporary statistics are practically useless” because “they reflect the desires of the leaders and not real processes in the economy.”
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has declared that GDP grew 4.4 percent in the first quar4ter and so “we will soon with surprise find out that there was no fall in the real incomes of the population and no fall in investment in the first quarter .. Just wait for Rosstat’s corrections! All will be well.”
But if one considers the real situation and not that as presented by the country’s leadership, Mikhailov continues, one sees that investment has fallen well below plans and that ruble has strengthened and will continue to do so at ever higher costs to consumers, a situation that the government is doing nothing to correct.
“Russia is a prisoner of liberal fundamentalism,” the economist says, just as it was before the crisis of 1998. And undoubtedly, this will lead to a new crisis” once the price of oil falls or when the regime commits the next “stupidity” and thus sends Russia into a tailspin.
Yevgeny Yasin, the director of studies of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, was more measured in his language but equally damning in his conclusions. He pointed out that “citizens do not eat oil” and that as a result, income differentiation is increasing with “the majority becoming poorer.”
What is especially worrisome, he continued, is that “when there was a crisis, demand fell and prices should have fallen,” but Russia “did not make use of this situation” and introduce reforms in the economy. Inflation remains high, “and this will lead to a further decline in real incomes.”
“Growing prices for oil will not save the situation,” Yasin said, because “if the temporary extra incomes will be wasted on everyday expenses,” that will only give the illusion that things are well for a time. And “when after this the crisis comes,” the money that could have been put to good use for investment in change won’t be available.
And finally, Mikhail Khazin, the head of the NEOKON consulting company, said that the situation reflects serious distortions in the Russian economy. The price of oil has doubled but domestic production has declined, with all the oil earnings going to the rich rather than being used for social purposes.
“As a result,” Khazin says, “the incomes of the population are falling, [and] real inflation is much higher than what our government says.” Together these trends are promoting “degradation in our economy” at a rapid rate. And that can be seen in particular in the case of inflation.
If one ignores the export sector, one sees that the real disposable incomes of the population are falling and thus the sales of such goods as well. That means, Khazin says, that “the possibility of earning profits” there has declined as well. “Who then will invest in an economy in which profits are falling?”
Staunton, April 27 – Many observers had assumed that recent increases in the price of oil and gas would boost living standards in the Russian Federation, a major exporter, but in fact, according to Moscow’s statistical agency, living standards there are again beginning to fall as is public confidence in the future.
In an article in today’s “Svobodnaya pressa,” Lev Ivanov and Dmitry Ivanov use Rosstat data to show that “despite the growing prices for oil and gas, the standard of living of Russians fell in March compared to a year earlier by 3.4 percent and that popular expectations about the future declined as well (svpressa.ru/economy/article/42654/).
Moreover, the two journalists point out, “if one looks at the graph of monetary incomes of the population offered by Rosstat, then it is obvious that this spring, the statistically average Russian lives approximately at the level of the height of the crisis, the winter of 2008/2009” and has not benefitted from the rise in the price of oil and gas.
Last month, compared to a year earlier and with inflation taken into account, the two “Svobodnaya pressa” writers say, average pay for Russians fell by 0.4 percent. They note that “the main reason” for this trend is not a decline in pay but rather “the continuing growth of the cost of living.”
And that trend in turn has sent consumer confidence tumbling. According to Rosstat, that index fell three percent in the first quarter of 2011, with only 13 percent of the population now expecting an improvement in their material position over the next 12 months, 23 percent expecting a decline, and 53 percent anticipating little change.
These figures, Ivanov and Ivanov say, put Russia in the range of the crisis countries of the European Union, Greece and Portugal, rather than with those EU states which are coming out of the recent economic crisis. And what is worse, they suggest, is that this decline in standard of living “correlates with the worsening situation of the Russian economy as a whole.”
GDP is falling as is investment, and the growth in incomes from the sale of oil and gas is not having an impact on the standard of living of ordinary Russians. Using Rosstat figures, they show that those at the top of the income pyramid are benefitting from these sales but those in the middle and bottom are not – or at least are not at a rate higher than inflation.
Given these figures, the two asked three specialists whether these figures suggested that there is “renewal of recession in Russia.” Aleksey Mikhailov, an expert at the Moscow Center of Economic and Political Research, replied that “all contemporary statistics are practically useless” because “they reflect the desires of the leaders and not real processes in the economy.”
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has declared that GDP grew 4.4 percent in the first quar4ter and so “we will soon with surprise find out that there was no fall in the real incomes of the population and no fall in investment in the first quarter .. Just wait for Rosstat’s corrections! All will be well.”
But if one considers the real situation and not that as presented by the country’s leadership, Mikhailov continues, one sees that investment has fallen well below plans and that ruble has strengthened and will continue to do so at ever higher costs to consumers, a situation that the government is doing nothing to correct.
“Russia is a prisoner of liberal fundamentalism,” the economist says, just as it was before the crisis of 1998. And undoubtedly, this will lead to a new crisis” once the price of oil falls or when the regime commits the next “stupidity” and thus sends Russia into a tailspin.
Yevgeny Yasin, the director of studies of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, was more measured in his language but equally damning in his conclusions. He pointed out that “citizens do not eat oil” and that as a result, income differentiation is increasing with “the majority becoming poorer.”
What is especially worrisome, he continued, is that “when there was a crisis, demand fell and prices should have fallen,” but Russia “did not make use of this situation” and introduce reforms in the economy. Inflation remains high, “and this will lead to a further decline in real incomes.”
“Growing prices for oil will not save the situation,” Yasin said, because “if the temporary extra incomes will be wasted on everyday expenses,” that will only give the illusion that things are well for a time. And “when after this the crisis comes,” the money that could have been put to good use for investment in change won’t be available.
And finally, Mikhail Khazin, the head of the NEOKON consulting company, said that the situation reflects serious distortions in the Russian economy. The price of oil has doubled but domestic production has declined, with all the oil earnings going to the rich rather than being used for social purposes.
“As a result,” Khazin says, “the incomes of the population are falling, [and] real inflation is much higher than what our government says.” Together these trends are promoting “degradation in our economy” at a rapid rate. And that can be seen in particular in the case of inflation.
If one ignores the export sector, one sees that the real disposable incomes of the population are falling and thus the sales of such goods as well. That means, Khazin says, that “the possibility of earning profits” there has declined as well. “Who then will invest in an economy in which profits are falling?”
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Libya’s Circassians Say Qaddafi is Killing Them Too
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – A report last week that a group of Circassians from the North Caucasus had written to Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi and offered to come to fight on his side in the civil war there attracted a fair amount of media attention in the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West.
But the next stage in this story has attracted far less and yet it is in many ways more instructive of what is going on in the Circassian movement. After hearing from Circassians in Libya that Qaddafi is in fact a murder of Circassians and after being urged by Circassian leaders in the North Caucasus and elsewhere not to interfere, the original group has changed its mind.
The original offer to serve as volunteers in Qaddafi’s forcdes came from a group in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was published on the Internet and also sent formally to the Libyan embassy in Moscow. The letter spoke about “the full and unqualified support” of this group of Circassians of Qaddafi’s position (kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184203/ ).
“We ask You,” the letter continued, “to allow us to come to Your country in order with arms in our hands to stand in defense of the independence of Libya. Many years ago, Libya became a refugee for our fellow Circassians, the descendents of whom live there up to now. And we would like in a small play to pay back Your country for its good relations to the Circassians.”
But a few days after this letter became public, a letter came from Libya asking the group to reconsider. Written by Musbakh Shirksi, a Circassian living in the city of Misurat, it said that “Qaddafi is a murder … [who is] killing innocent Libyan Muslims, including Circassians” and suggesting that “if you really want to come to Libya, come to help” Qaddafi’s opponents.
A second letter came from Kazbek Soobzokov, a Circassian now living in California. He urged the group to think again as well. “Qaddafi,” he wrote, “is someone like Stalin who is well known to you. Your good intentions toward Qaddafi are based on a false feeling.” And those letters had their effect.
The original group announced that it had reconsidered its plans and would decide what to do next on the basis of information from the Circassians of Libya. Among the ideas being discussed is “the question of their return to their historical motherland, based on the precedent of the return of the Circassians of Kosovo during the war in Yugoslavia.”
Other Circassian leaders have weighed in as well. Ruslan Kesh, the leader of the Circassian Congress, said that Circassians “respect democratic values and the opinion of the international community and consider that the conflict msut be resolved above all by the Libyans themselves.”
“Circassian interference in the Libyan conflict,” Kesh suggested, “could complicate the international direction of the policy of the national Circassian movement.” At the same time, however, he expressed understanding for the authors of the original appeal: They are “people who do not accept the policy of double standards.”
Moreover, “the traditional readiness of the Circassians to come to the help of those in need shows that the people is alive and that it is capable of reacting to the challenges of the times. As for the Circassian diaspora living in Libya, it is necessary to develop the question about its repatriation to its historical Motherland.”
Unlike many Circassians in the Middle East who trace their origins to the expulsion and partial genocide of their people by the Russian authorities in the 1860s, the Circassians of Libya came to that area with the Mamluks in the 14th century. They do not speak Circassian, but they “remember that they are descendents of the Circassians and call themselves al-Jerkesi.”
In 1998, one Circassian from Libya came to the congress of the International Circassian Association in Krasnodar. He spoke Arabic and had a translator, but he “expressed the desire of the Libyan Circassians to restore their historical ties” with other Circassians.” In this roundabout way, that is now happening.
Staunton, April 26 – A report last week that a group of Circassians from the North Caucasus had written to Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi and offered to come to fight on his side in the civil war there attracted a fair amount of media attention in the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West.
But the next stage in this story has attracted far less and yet it is in many ways more instructive of what is going on in the Circassian movement. After hearing from Circassians in Libya that Qaddafi is in fact a murder of Circassians and after being urged by Circassian leaders in the North Caucasus and elsewhere not to interfere, the original group has changed its mind.
The original offer to serve as volunteers in Qaddafi’s forcdes came from a group in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was published on the Internet and also sent formally to the Libyan embassy in Moscow. The letter spoke about “the full and unqualified support” of this group of Circassians of Qaddafi’s position (kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184203/ ).
“We ask You,” the letter continued, “to allow us to come to Your country in order with arms in our hands to stand in defense of the independence of Libya. Many years ago, Libya became a refugee for our fellow Circassians, the descendents of whom live there up to now. And we would like in a small play to pay back Your country for its good relations to the Circassians.”
But a few days after this letter became public, a letter came from Libya asking the group to reconsider. Written by Musbakh Shirksi, a Circassian living in the city of Misurat, it said that “Qaddafi is a murder … [who is] killing innocent Libyan Muslims, including Circassians” and suggesting that “if you really want to come to Libya, come to help” Qaddafi’s opponents.
A second letter came from Kazbek Soobzokov, a Circassian now living in California. He urged the group to think again as well. “Qaddafi,” he wrote, “is someone like Stalin who is well known to you. Your good intentions toward Qaddafi are based on a false feeling.” And those letters had their effect.
The original group announced that it had reconsidered its plans and would decide what to do next on the basis of information from the Circassians of Libya. Among the ideas being discussed is “the question of their return to their historical motherland, based on the precedent of the return of the Circassians of Kosovo during the war in Yugoslavia.”
Other Circassian leaders have weighed in as well. Ruslan Kesh, the leader of the Circassian Congress, said that Circassians “respect democratic values and the opinion of the international community and consider that the conflict msut be resolved above all by the Libyans themselves.”
“Circassian interference in the Libyan conflict,” Kesh suggested, “could complicate the international direction of the policy of the national Circassian movement.” At the same time, however, he expressed understanding for the authors of the original appeal: They are “people who do not accept the policy of double standards.”
Moreover, “the traditional readiness of the Circassians to come to the help of those in need shows that the people is alive and that it is capable of reacting to the challenges of the times. As for the Circassian diaspora living in Libya, it is necessary to develop the question about its repatriation to its historical Motherland.”
Unlike many Circassians in the Middle East who trace their origins to the expulsion and partial genocide of their people by the Russian authorities in the 1860s, the Circassians of Libya came to that area with the Mamluks in the 14th century. They do not speak Circassian, but they “remember that they are descendents of the Circassians and call themselves al-Jerkesi.”
In 1998, one Circassian from Libya came to the congress of the International Circassian Association in Krasnodar. He spoke Arabic and had a translator, but he “expressed the desire of the Libyan Circassians to restore their historical ties” with other Circassians.” In this roundabout way, that is now happening.
Window on Eurasia: Demographic Realities Forcing Moscow to Boost Draft Intake from North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – Even as some Moscow officials suggest the Russian army would be better off with fewer North Caucasian soldiers or even none at all, the demographic decline among the ethnic Russians at a time of continued growth in many Muslim nationalities has forced the military to dramatically boost draft calls in the North Caucasus.
The current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyashcheye vremya” reported that Moscow had increased the draft quota from an initial 420 people to 5980 and, adding insult to injury, noted that draft officials in that North Caucasus republic say that they could easily send “up to 20,000” if that were required (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5919/109/).
Three weeks ago, the Daghestani weekly noted, “in a number of Russia media outlets appeared the declaration of the military commissary of Chelyabink oblast Nikolay Zakharov to the effect that residents of the Caucasus would not be called into the army because as the media put it, ‘the growth of ethnic tensions’” caused by their appearance in military units.
In the North Caucasus, such assertions “have generated anger both among draftees and also among the higher military command.” In the Daghestan military commissariat, the weekly said, officers said that they “consider such assessments to be an attempt at exacerbating inter-ethnic hostility” and that the courts should take up the matter.
And they noted that the draft quota for Daghestan had been increased from an initial 420 to the final 5980 after Makhachkala asked Moscow to increase it because so many young people from that republic want to serve. But even that number, Yavnus Dzhambalayev, who oversees the draft in Daghestan, said “is not the limit” for his republic.
Today, he continued, there are 27,000 people in the prime draft cohort in Daghestan, “and in fact we could send 20,000 draftees” to the armed forces. “We have many who want to serve and those 7,000 which wer called in by the commission have already passed through the process without any excesses.”
As to where the Daghestani draftees will serve, he said, they will be in units in the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western districts. They won’t serve in their home republic, however; there “only professional soldiers” are used, at least according to the existing rules of the Russian defense ministry.
What makes this Makhachkala report so striking is that in many predominantly ethnic Russian regions around the country, military commissariats are facing a difficult time in meeting much lower draft quotas because the current prime draft cohort, men born 18 to 20 year ago, is so small.
As a result, commissariats there are being forced to go after students in university and to round up people whose health or criminal backgrounds make them poor candidates for military service, a pattern that is likely to intensify if the current demographic trends continue as scholars now predict.
Many military officers would prefer to have fewer people from the Caucasus in their units believing that such people either cause or trigger ethnic conflicts with soldiers of other ethnic groups and thus reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness. But they face serious opposition in taking the steps necessary to make that happen.
On the one hand, many Russian parents actively resent the idea that their children should be at greater risk of being called to military service than the parents of Muslim nationality youth. And on the other, the Russian government cannot easily avoid draft Muslim youth unless it is willing to have a smaller army or to accept serious consequences for the economy,
Moreover, and this may be the most powerful argument against reducing draft quotas in Muslim areas in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. If the Russian military does not take Muslim draftees in ever greater numbers, unemployment and discontent in the North Caucasus will only increase, with some of those not drafted likely choosing to fight another way.
Staunton, April 26 – Even as some Moscow officials suggest the Russian army would be better off with fewer North Caucasian soldiers or even none at all, the demographic decline among the ethnic Russians at a time of continued growth in many Muslim nationalities has forced the military to dramatically boost draft calls in the North Caucasus.
The current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyashcheye vremya” reported that Moscow had increased the draft quota from an initial 420 people to 5980 and, adding insult to injury, noted that draft officials in that North Caucasus republic say that they could easily send “up to 20,000” if that were required (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5919/109/).
Three weeks ago, the Daghestani weekly noted, “in a number of Russia media outlets appeared the declaration of the military commissary of Chelyabink oblast Nikolay Zakharov to the effect that residents of the Caucasus would not be called into the army because as the media put it, ‘the growth of ethnic tensions’” caused by their appearance in military units.
In the North Caucasus, such assertions “have generated anger both among draftees and also among the higher military command.” In the Daghestan military commissariat, the weekly said, officers said that they “consider such assessments to be an attempt at exacerbating inter-ethnic hostility” and that the courts should take up the matter.
And they noted that the draft quota for Daghestan had been increased from an initial 420 to the final 5980 after Makhachkala asked Moscow to increase it because so many young people from that republic want to serve. But even that number, Yavnus Dzhambalayev, who oversees the draft in Daghestan, said “is not the limit” for his republic.
Today, he continued, there are 27,000 people in the prime draft cohort in Daghestan, “and in fact we could send 20,000 draftees” to the armed forces. “We have many who want to serve and those 7,000 which wer called in by the commission have already passed through the process without any excesses.”
As to where the Daghestani draftees will serve, he said, they will be in units in the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western districts. They won’t serve in their home republic, however; there “only professional soldiers” are used, at least according to the existing rules of the Russian defense ministry.
What makes this Makhachkala report so striking is that in many predominantly ethnic Russian regions around the country, military commissariats are facing a difficult time in meeting much lower draft quotas because the current prime draft cohort, men born 18 to 20 year ago, is so small.
As a result, commissariats there are being forced to go after students in university and to round up people whose health or criminal backgrounds make them poor candidates for military service, a pattern that is likely to intensify if the current demographic trends continue as scholars now predict.
Many military officers would prefer to have fewer people from the Caucasus in their units believing that such people either cause or trigger ethnic conflicts with soldiers of other ethnic groups and thus reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness. But they face serious opposition in taking the steps necessary to make that happen.
On the one hand, many Russian parents actively resent the idea that their children should be at greater risk of being called to military service than the parents of Muslim nationality youth. And on the other, the Russian government cannot easily avoid draft Muslim youth unless it is willing to have a smaller army or to accept serious consequences for the economy,
Moreover, and this may be the most powerful argument against reducing draft quotas in Muslim areas in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. If the Russian military does not take Muslim draftees in ever greater numbers, unemployment and discontent in the North Caucasus will only increase, with some of those not drafted likely choosing to fight another way.
Window on Eurasia: Kadyrov has ‘Terrorized’ Chechens into Silence, Alekseyeva Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – The human rights situation in Chechnya has not gotten dramatically worse under Ramzan Kadyrov because it was already bad when he came to office, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says, but it has changed in a dramatic way, she notes, with the population so terrorized that people are afraid to say anything Kadyrov might not like.
If a Chechen dares to do so, Lyudmila Alekseyeva told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru in an interview posted online today, the powers that be will come down hard “not only on that individual but also on all his relatives and friends,” a “Stalnistpractice which is totally illegal and unique above all to Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184361/).
As a result, there is very little information coming out about what is actually going on, a situation that allows Kadyrov to claim that things are fine and improving in Chechnya in much the same way that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from most outsiders the crimes he was committing against the people of the Soviet Union.
Alekseyeva says that there are no independent human rights organizations remaining in Chechnya. “They cannot work normally to the extent that they are under the full control of the Plenipotentiary for human rights in Chechnya Nurdi Nukhazhiyev,” who summons those he is displeased with and “demands that they disown their own words.”
Nukhazhiyev, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru notes, “has not infrequently criticized the activity of Russian human rights activits in Chechnya and especially the work of the Memorial Human Rights Center. He says that this group, “which is financed from abroad is pursuing political goals” by disseminating “negative information” about Chechnya.
According to Alekseyeva, the situation that Kadyrov and Nukhazhiyev have created means that “the only organization which is in a position to operate in Chechnya is the combined group of human rights activists from other regions.” But even they suffer restrictions because Nukhazhiyev says they are “absolutely not needed” in that republic.
Chechen political scientist Ruslan Martagov expands on Alekseyeva’s point. He told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru that those who know the region only from the media have the wrong impression on what is taking place in Chechnya and why. The Russian media suggests Kadyrov is winning the war against the Islamists, but Martagov says the facts are otherwise.
The militants have not left Chechnya for other North Caucasian republics because Kadyrov has frightened them. Instead, they have done so because he is doing what they would like to see the powers do: promote the imposition of Islam on all aspects of political and social life in the North Caucasus.
“In Chechnya,” Martagov points out, “is taking place the clericalization of the republic; the muftiates are becoming an inalienable structure of production, and an official dress code has been introduced. “We are called to give up many of the achievements of a free society” and return to the society of the past, the political scientist continues.
Although hidden from the public media, Kadyrov and his regime are making an attempt at “legalized feudalism and the construction of a theocratic state. This is equivalent to what the Wahhabis want to do.” But there is one difference: Kadyrov’s system would collapse in one day if the money stopped flowing, and he would be swept away by those more radical than he or by those who want a freer future.
Staunton, April 26 – The human rights situation in Chechnya has not gotten dramatically worse under Ramzan Kadyrov because it was already bad when he came to office, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says, but it has changed in a dramatic way, she notes, with the population so terrorized that people are afraid to say anything Kadyrov might not like.
If a Chechen dares to do so, Lyudmila Alekseyeva told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru in an interview posted online today, the powers that be will come down hard “not only on that individual but also on all his relatives and friends,” a “Stalnistpractice which is totally illegal and unique above all to Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184361/).
As a result, there is very little information coming out about what is actually going on, a situation that allows Kadyrov to claim that things are fine and improving in Chechnya in much the same way that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from most outsiders the crimes he was committing against the people of the Soviet Union.
Alekseyeva says that there are no independent human rights organizations remaining in Chechnya. “They cannot work normally to the extent that they are under the full control of the Plenipotentiary for human rights in Chechnya Nurdi Nukhazhiyev,” who summons those he is displeased with and “demands that they disown their own words.”
Nukhazhiyev, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru notes, “has not infrequently criticized the activity of Russian human rights activits in Chechnya and especially the work of the Memorial Human Rights Center. He says that this group, “which is financed from abroad is pursuing political goals” by disseminating “negative information” about Chechnya.
According to Alekseyeva, the situation that Kadyrov and Nukhazhiyev have created means that “the only organization which is in a position to operate in Chechnya is the combined group of human rights activists from other regions.” But even they suffer restrictions because Nukhazhiyev says they are “absolutely not needed” in that republic.
Chechen political scientist Ruslan Martagov expands on Alekseyeva’s point. He told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru that those who know the region only from the media have the wrong impression on what is taking place in Chechnya and why. The Russian media suggests Kadyrov is winning the war against the Islamists, but Martagov says the facts are otherwise.
The militants have not left Chechnya for other North Caucasian republics because Kadyrov has frightened them. Instead, they have done so because he is doing what they would like to see the powers do: promote the imposition of Islam on all aspects of political and social life in the North Caucasus.
“In Chechnya,” Martagov points out, “is taking place the clericalization of the republic; the muftiates are becoming an inalienable structure of production, and an official dress code has been introduced. “We are called to give up many of the achievements of a free society” and return to the society of the past, the political scientist continues.
Although hidden from the public media, Kadyrov and his regime are making an attempt at “legalized feudalism and the construction of a theocratic state. This is equivalent to what the Wahhabis want to do.” But there is one difference: Kadyrov’s system would collapse in one day if the money stopped flowing, and he would be swept away by those more radical than he or by those who want a freer future.
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