Paul Goble
Staunton, April 27 – Many observers had assumed that recent increases in the price of oil and gas would boost living standards in the Russian Federation, a major exporter, but in fact, according to Moscow’s statistical agency, living standards there are again beginning to fall as is public confidence in the future.
In an article in today’s “Svobodnaya pressa,” Lev Ivanov and Dmitry Ivanov use Rosstat data to show that “despite the growing prices for oil and gas, the standard of living of Russians fell in March compared to a year earlier by 3.4 percent and that popular expectations about the future declined as well (svpressa.ru/economy/article/42654/).
Moreover, the two journalists point out, “if one looks at the graph of monetary incomes of the population offered by Rosstat, then it is obvious that this spring, the statistically average Russian lives approximately at the level of the height of the crisis, the winter of 2008/2009” and has not benefitted from the rise in the price of oil and gas.
Last month, compared to a year earlier and with inflation taken into account, the two “Svobodnaya pressa” writers say, average pay for Russians fell by 0.4 percent. They note that “the main reason” for this trend is not a decline in pay but rather “the continuing growth of the cost of living.”
And that trend in turn has sent consumer confidence tumbling. According to Rosstat, that index fell three percent in the first quarter of 2011, with only 13 percent of the population now expecting an improvement in their material position over the next 12 months, 23 percent expecting a decline, and 53 percent anticipating little change.
These figures, Ivanov and Ivanov say, put Russia in the range of the crisis countries of the European Union, Greece and Portugal, rather than with those EU states which are coming out of the recent economic crisis. And what is worse, they suggest, is that this decline in standard of living “correlates with the worsening situation of the Russian economy as a whole.”
GDP is falling as is investment, and the growth in incomes from the sale of oil and gas is not having an impact on the standard of living of ordinary Russians. Using Rosstat figures, they show that those at the top of the income pyramid are benefitting from these sales but those in the middle and bottom are not – or at least are not at a rate higher than inflation.
Given these figures, the two asked three specialists whether these figures suggested that there is “renewal of recession in Russia.” Aleksey Mikhailov, an expert at the Moscow Center of Economic and Political Research, replied that “all contemporary statistics are practically useless” because “they reflect the desires of the leaders and not real processes in the economy.”
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has declared that GDP grew 4.4 percent in the first quar4ter and so “we will soon with surprise find out that there was no fall in the real incomes of the population and no fall in investment in the first quarter .. Just wait for Rosstat’s corrections! All will be well.”
But if one considers the real situation and not that as presented by the country’s leadership, Mikhailov continues, one sees that investment has fallen well below plans and that ruble has strengthened and will continue to do so at ever higher costs to consumers, a situation that the government is doing nothing to correct.
“Russia is a prisoner of liberal fundamentalism,” the economist says, just as it was before the crisis of 1998. And undoubtedly, this will lead to a new crisis” once the price of oil falls or when the regime commits the next “stupidity” and thus sends Russia into a tailspin.
Yevgeny Yasin, the director of studies of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, was more measured in his language but equally damning in his conclusions. He pointed out that “citizens do not eat oil” and that as a result, income differentiation is increasing with “the majority becoming poorer.”
What is especially worrisome, he continued, is that “when there was a crisis, demand fell and prices should have fallen,” but Russia “did not make use of this situation” and introduce reforms in the economy. Inflation remains high, “and this will lead to a further decline in real incomes.”
“Growing prices for oil will not save the situation,” Yasin said, because “if the temporary extra incomes will be wasted on everyday expenses,” that will only give the illusion that things are well for a time. And “when after this the crisis comes,” the money that could have been put to good use for investment in change won’t be available.
And finally, Mikhail Khazin, the head of the NEOKON consulting company, said that the situation reflects serious distortions in the Russian economy. The price of oil has doubled but domestic production has declined, with all the oil earnings going to the rich rather than being used for social purposes.
“As a result,” Khazin says, “the incomes of the population are falling, [and] real inflation is much higher than what our government says.” Together these trends are promoting “degradation in our economy” at a rapid rate. And that can be seen in particular in the case of inflation.
If one ignores the export sector, one sees that the real disposable incomes of the population are falling and thus the sales of such goods as well. That means, Khazin says, that “the possibility of earning profits” there has declined as well. “Who then will invest in an economy in which profits are falling?”
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Libya’s Circassians Say Qaddafi is Killing Them Too
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – A report last week that a group of Circassians from the North Caucasus had written to Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi and offered to come to fight on his side in the civil war there attracted a fair amount of media attention in the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West.
But the next stage in this story has attracted far less and yet it is in many ways more instructive of what is going on in the Circassian movement. After hearing from Circassians in Libya that Qaddafi is in fact a murder of Circassians and after being urged by Circassian leaders in the North Caucasus and elsewhere not to interfere, the original group has changed its mind.
The original offer to serve as volunteers in Qaddafi’s forcdes came from a group in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was published on the Internet and also sent formally to the Libyan embassy in Moscow. The letter spoke about “the full and unqualified support” of this group of Circassians of Qaddafi’s position (kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184203/ ).
“We ask You,” the letter continued, “to allow us to come to Your country in order with arms in our hands to stand in defense of the independence of Libya. Many years ago, Libya became a refugee for our fellow Circassians, the descendents of whom live there up to now. And we would like in a small play to pay back Your country for its good relations to the Circassians.”
But a few days after this letter became public, a letter came from Libya asking the group to reconsider. Written by Musbakh Shirksi, a Circassian living in the city of Misurat, it said that “Qaddafi is a murder … [who is] killing innocent Libyan Muslims, including Circassians” and suggesting that “if you really want to come to Libya, come to help” Qaddafi’s opponents.
A second letter came from Kazbek Soobzokov, a Circassian now living in California. He urged the group to think again as well. “Qaddafi,” he wrote, “is someone like Stalin who is well known to you. Your good intentions toward Qaddafi are based on a false feeling.” And those letters had their effect.
The original group announced that it had reconsidered its plans and would decide what to do next on the basis of information from the Circassians of Libya. Among the ideas being discussed is “the question of their return to their historical motherland, based on the precedent of the return of the Circassians of Kosovo during the war in Yugoslavia.”
Other Circassian leaders have weighed in as well. Ruslan Kesh, the leader of the Circassian Congress, said that Circassians “respect democratic values and the opinion of the international community and consider that the conflict msut be resolved above all by the Libyans themselves.”
“Circassian interference in the Libyan conflict,” Kesh suggested, “could complicate the international direction of the policy of the national Circassian movement.” At the same time, however, he expressed understanding for the authors of the original appeal: They are “people who do not accept the policy of double standards.”
Moreover, “the traditional readiness of the Circassians to come to the help of those in need shows that the people is alive and that it is capable of reacting to the challenges of the times. As for the Circassian diaspora living in Libya, it is necessary to develop the question about its repatriation to its historical Motherland.”
Unlike many Circassians in the Middle East who trace their origins to the expulsion and partial genocide of their people by the Russian authorities in the 1860s, the Circassians of Libya came to that area with the Mamluks in the 14th century. They do not speak Circassian, but they “remember that they are descendents of the Circassians and call themselves al-Jerkesi.”
In 1998, one Circassian from Libya came to the congress of the International Circassian Association in Krasnodar. He spoke Arabic and had a translator, but he “expressed the desire of the Libyan Circassians to restore their historical ties” with other Circassians.” In this roundabout way, that is now happening.
Staunton, April 26 – A report last week that a group of Circassians from the North Caucasus had written to Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi and offered to come to fight on his side in the civil war there attracted a fair amount of media attention in the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West.
But the next stage in this story has attracted far less and yet it is in many ways more instructive of what is going on in the Circassian movement. After hearing from Circassians in Libya that Qaddafi is in fact a murder of Circassians and after being urged by Circassian leaders in the North Caucasus and elsewhere not to interfere, the original group has changed its mind.
The original offer to serve as volunteers in Qaddafi’s forcdes came from a group in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was published on the Internet and also sent formally to the Libyan embassy in Moscow. The letter spoke about “the full and unqualified support” of this group of Circassians of Qaddafi’s position (kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184203/ ).
“We ask You,” the letter continued, “to allow us to come to Your country in order with arms in our hands to stand in defense of the independence of Libya. Many years ago, Libya became a refugee for our fellow Circassians, the descendents of whom live there up to now. And we would like in a small play to pay back Your country for its good relations to the Circassians.”
But a few days after this letter became public, a letter came from Libya asking the group to reconsider. Written by Musbakh Shirksi, a Circassian living in the city of Misurat, it said that “Qaddafi is a murder … [who is] killing innocent Libyan Muslims, including Circassians” and suggesting that “if you really want to come to Libya, come to help” Qaddafi’s opponents.
A second letter came from Kazbek Soobzokov, a Circassian now living in California. He urged the group to think again as well. “Qaddafi,” he wrote, “is someone like Stalin who is well known to you. Your good intentions toward Qaddafi are based on a false feeling.” And those letters had their effect.
The original group announced that it had reconsidered its plans and would decide what to do next on the basis of information from the Circassians of Libya. Among the ideas being discussed is “the question of their return to their historical motherland, based on the precedent of the return of the Circassians of Kosovo during the war in Yugoslavia.”
Other Circassian leaders have weighed in as well. Ruslan Kesh, the leader of the Circassian Congress, said that Circassians “respect democratic values and the opinion of the international community and consider that the conflict msut be resolved above all by the Libyans themselves.”
“Circassian interference in the Libyan conflict,” Kesh suggested, “could complicate the international direction of the policy of the national Circassian movement.” At the same time, however, he expressed understanding for the authors of the original appeal: They are “people who do not accept the policy of double standards.”
Moreover, “the traditional readiness of the Circassians to come to the help of those in need shows that the people is alive and that it is capable of reacting to the challenges of the times. As for the Circassian diaspora living in Libya, it is necessary to develop the question about its repatriation to its historical Motherland.”
Unlike many Circassians in the Middle East who trace their origins to the expulsion and partial genocide of their people by the Russian authorities in the 1860s, the Circassians of Libya came to that area with the Mamluks in the 14th century. They do not speak Circassian, but they “remember that they are descendents of the Circassians and call themselves al-Jerkesi.”
In 1998, one Circassian from Libya came to the congress of the International Circassian Association in Krasnodar. He spoke Arabic and had a translator, but he “expressed the desire of the Libyan Circassians to restore their historical ties” with other Circassians.” In this roundabout way, that is now happening.
Window on Eurasia: Demographic Realities Forcing Moscow to Boost Draft Intake from North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – Even as some Moscow officials suggest the Russian army would be better off with fewer North Caucasian soldiers or even none at all, the demographic decline among the ethnic Russians at a time of continued growth in many Muslim nationalities has forced the military to dramatically boost draft calls in the North Caucasus.
The current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyashcheye vremya” reported that Moscow had increased the draft quota from an initial 420 people to 5980 and, adding insult to injury, noted that draft officials in that North Caucasus republic say that they could easily send “up to 20,000” if that were required (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5919/109/).
Three weeks ago, the Daghestani weekly noted, “in a number of Russia media outlets appeared the declaration of the military commissary of Chelyabink oblast Nikolay Zakharov to the effect that residents of the Caucasus would not be called into the army because as the media put it, ‘the growth of ethnic tensions’” caused by their appearance in military units.
In the North Caucasus, such assertions “have generated anger both among draftees and also among the higher military command.” In the Daghestan military commissariat, the weekly said, officers said that they “consider such assessments to be an attempt at exacerbating inter-ethnic hostility” and that the courts should take up the matter.
And they noted that the draft quota for Daghestan had been increased from an initial 420 to the final 5980 after Makhachkala asked Moscow to increase it because so many young people from that republic want to serve. But even that number, Yavnus Dzhambalayev, who oversees the draft in Daghestan, said “is not the limit” for his republic.
Today, he continued, there are 27,000 people in the prime draft cohort in Daghestan, “and in fact we could send 20,000 draftees” to the armed forces. “We have many who want to serve and those 7,000 which wer called in by the commission have already passed through the process without any excesses.”
As to where the Daghestani draftees will serve, he said, they will be in units in the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western districts. They won’t serve in their home republic, however; there “only professional soldiers” are used, at least according to the existing rules of the Russian defense ministry.
What makes this Makhachkala report so striking is that in many predominantly ethnic Russian regions around the country, military commissariats are facing a difficult time in meeting much lower draft quotas because the current prime draft cohort, men born 18 to 20 year ago, is so small.
As a result, commissariats there are being forced to go after students in university and to round up people whose health or criminal backgrounds make them poor candidates for military service, a pattern that is likely to intensify if the current demographic trends continue as scholars now predict.
Many military officers would prefer to have fewer people from the Caucasus in their units believing that such people either cause or trigger ethnic conflicts with soldiers of other ethnic groups and thus reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness. But they face serious opposition in taking the steps necessary to make that happen.
On the one hand, many Russian parents actively resent the idea that their children should be at greater risk of being called to military service than the parents of Muslim nationality youth. And on the other, the Russian government cannot easily avoid draft Muslim youth unless it is willing to have a smaller army or to accept serious consequences for the economy,
Moreover, and this may be the most powerful argument against reducing draft quotas in Muslim areas in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. If the Russian military does not take Muslim draftees in ever greater numbers, unemployment and discontent in the North Caucasus will only increase, with some of those not drafted likely choosing to fight another way.
Staunton, April 26 – Even as some Moscow officials suggest the Russian army would be better off with fewer North Caucasian soldiers or even none at all, the demographic decline among the ethnic Russians at a time of continued growth in many Muslim nationalities has forced the military to dramatically boost draft calls in the North Caucasus.
The current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyashcheye vremya” reported that Moscow had increased the draft quota from an initial 420 people to 5980 and, adding insult to injury, noted that draft officials in that North Caucasus republic say that they could easily send “up to 20,000” if that were required (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5919/109/).
Three weeks ago, the Daghestani weekly noted, “in a number of Russia media outlets appeared the declaration of the military commissary of Chelyabink oblast Nikolay Zakharov to the effect that residents of the Caucasus would not be called into the army because as the media put it, ‘the growth of ethnic tensions’” caused by their appearance in military units.
In the North Caucasus, such assertions “have generated anger both among draftees and also among the higher military command.” In the Daghestan military commissariat, the weekly said, officers said that they “consider such assessments to be an attempt at exacerbating inter-ethnic hostility” and that the courts should take up the matter.
And they noted that the draft quota for Daghestan had been increased from an initial 420 to the final 5980 after Makhachkala asked Moscow to increase it because so many young people from that republic want to serve. But even that number, Yavnus Dzhambalayev, who oversees the draft in Daghestan, said “is not the limit” for his republic.
Today, he continued, there are 27,000 people in the prime draft cohort in Daghestan, “and in fact we could send 20,000 draftees” to the armed forces. “We have many who want to serve and those 7,000 which wer called in by the commission have already passed through the process without any excesses.”
As to where the Daghestani draftees will serve, he said, they will be in units in the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western districts. They won’t serve in their home republic, however; there “only professional soldiers” are used, at least according to the existing rules of the Russian defense ministry.
What makes this Makhachkala report so striking is that in many predominantly ethnic Russian regions around the country, military commissariats are facing a difficult time in meeting much lower draft quotas because the current prime draft cohort, men born 18 to 20 year ago, is so small.
As a result, commissariats there are being forced to go after students in university and to round up people whose health or criminal backgrounds make them poor candidates for military service, a pattern that is likely to intensify if the current demographic trends continue as scholars now predict.
Many military officers would prefer to have fewer people from the Caucasus in their units believing that such people either cause or trigger ethnic conflicts with soldiers of other ethnic groups and thus reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness. But they face serious opposition in taking the steps necessary to make that happen.
On the one hand, many Russian parents actively resent the idea that their children should be at greater risk of being called to military service than the parents of Muslim nationality youth. And on the other, the Russian government cannot easily avoid draft Muslim youth unless it is willing to have a smaller army or to accept serious consequences for the economy,
Moreover, and this may be the most powerful argument against reducing draft quotas in Muslim areas in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. If the Russian military does not take Muslim draftees in ever greater numbers, unemployment and discontent in the North Caucasus will only increase, with some of those not drafted likely choosing to fight another way.
Window on Eurasia: Kadyrov has ‘Terrorized’ Chechens into Silence, Alekseyeva Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – The human rights situation in Chechnya has not gotten dramatically worse under Ramzan Kadyrov because it was already bad when he came to office, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says, but it has changed in a dramatic way, she notes, with the population so terrorized that people are afraid to say anything Kadyrov might not like.
If a Chechen dares to do so, Lyudmila Alekseyeva told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru in an interview posted online today, the powers that be will come down hard “not only on that individual but also on all his relatives and friends,” a “Stalnistpractice which is totally illegal and unique above all to Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184361/).
As a result, there is very little information coming out about what is actually going on, a situation that allows Kadyrov to claim that things are fine and improving in Chechnya in much the same way that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from most outsiders the crimes he was committing against the people of the Soviet Union.
Alekseyeva says that there are no independent human rights organizations remaining in Chechnya. “They cannot work normally to the extent that they are under the full control of the Plenipotentiary for human rights in Chechnya Nurdi Nukhazhiyev,” who summons those he is displeased with and “demands that they disown their own words.”
Nukhazhiyev, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru notes, “has not infrequently criticized the activity of Russian human rights activits in Chechnya and especially the work of the Memorial Human Rights Center. He says that this group, “which is financed from abroad is pursuing political goals” by disseminating “negative information” about Chechnya.
According to Alekseyeva, the situation that Kadyrov and Nukhazhiyev have created means that “the only organization which is in a position to operate in Chechnya is the combined group of human rights activists from other regions.” But even they suffer restrictions because Nukhazhiyev says they are “absolutely not needed” in that republic.
Chechen political scientist Ruslan Martagov expands on Alekseyeva’s point. He told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru that those who know the region only from the media have the wrong impression on what is taking place in Chechnya and why. The Russian media suggests Kadyrov is winning the war against the Islamists, but Martagov says the facts are otherwise.
The militants have not left Chechnya for other North Caucasian republics because Kadyrov has frightened them. Instead, they have done so because he is doing what they would like to see the powers do: promote the imposition of Islam on all aspects of political and social life in the North Caucasus.
“In Chechnya,” Martagov points out, “is taking place the clericalization of the republic; the muftiates are becoming an inalienable structure of production, and an official dress code has been introduced. “We are called to give up many of the achievements of a free society” and return to the society of the past, the political scientist continues.
Although hidden from the public media, Kadyrov and his regime are making an attempt at “legalized feudalism and the construction of a theocratic state. This is equivalent to what the Wahhabis want to do.” But there is one difference: Kadyrov’s system would collapse in one day if the money stopped flowing, and he would be swept away by those more radical than he or by those who want a freer future.
Staunton, April 26 – The human rights situation in Chechnya has not gotten dramatically worse under Ramzan Kadyrov because it was already bad when he came to office, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says, but it has changed in a dramatic way, she notes, with the population so terrorized that people are afraid to say anything Kadyrov might not like.
If a Chechen dares to do so, Lyudmila Alekseyeva told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru in an interview posted online today, the powers that be will come down hard “not only on that individual but also on all his relatives and friends,” a “Stalnistpractice which is totally illegal and unique above all to Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184361/).
As a result, there is very little information coming out about what is actually going on, a situation that allows Kadyrov to claim that things are fine and improving in Chechnya in much the same way that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from most outsiders the crimes he was committing against the people of the Soviet Union.
Alekseyeva says that there are no independent human rights organizations remaining in Chechnya. “They cannot work normally to the extent that they are under the full control of the Plenipotentiary for human rights in Chechnya Nurdi Nukhazhiyev,” who summons those he is displeased with and “demands that they disown their own words.”
Nukhazhiyev, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru notes, “has not infrequently criticized the activity of Russian human rights activits in Chechnya and especially the work of the Memorial Human Rights Center. He says that this group, “which is financed from abroad is pursuing political goals” by disseminating “negative information” about Chechnya.
According to Alekseyeva, the situation that Kadyrov and Nukhazhiyev have created means that “the only organization which is in a position to operate in Chechnya is the combined group of human rights activists from other regions.” But even they suffer restrictions because Nukhazhiyev says they are “absolutely not needed” in that republic.
Chechen political scientist Ruslan Martagov expands on Alekseyeva’s point. He told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru that those who know the region only from the media have the wrong impression on what is taking place in Chechnya and why. The Russian media suggests Kadyrov is winning the war against the Islamists, but Martagov says the facts are otherwise.
The militants have not left Chechnya for other North Caucasian republics because Kadyrov has frightened them. Instead, they have done so because he is doing what they would like to see the powers do: promote the imposition of Islam on all aspects of political and social life in the North Caucasus.
“In Chechnya,” Martagov points out, “is taking place the clericalization of the republic; the muftiates are becoming an inalienable structure of production, and an official dress code has been introduced. “We are called to give up many of the achievements of a free society” and return to the society of the past, the political scientist continues.
Although hidden from the public media, Kadyrov and his regime are making an attempt at “legalized feudalism and the construction of a theocratic state. This is equivalent to what the Wahhabis want to do.” But there is one difference: Kadyrov’s system would collapse in one day if the money stopped flowing, and he would be swept away by those more radical than he or by those who want a freer future.
Monday, April 25, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Must Develop Siberia In Order Not to Lose It, Chernyakhovsky Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 14 – Moscow must come up with a development strategy for Siberia and the Russian Far East that links these regions with European Russia or face the prospect that over time, the residents of these enormous territories will decide that their fate depends not on the Russian center but on China and other Asian countries, according to a Moscow analyst.
In a commentary in the current “Novaya politika,” Sergey Chernyakhovsky says that simply promoting the development of Siberia and the Far East is not enough because some kinds of development could make these areas less connected to Moscow and make them more closely tied with foreign powers (novopol.ru/-trete-osvoenie-sibiri-text100298.html).
Given “the economic and transportation degradation of the last quarter century,” he writes, people in Siberia and the Far East “feel ever less their ties” with Moscow. As a result, “separatist tendencies are growing although they are now yet openly declared politically” because people there are “ever more integrated with Japan and China.”
And the rise of such attitudes beyond the Urals, Chernyakhovsky continues, has led to discussions typically in private but sometimes in public that Moscow will have to give up “the entire territory beyond the Urals to someone or other.” But preventing that outcome is “not only a question of ‘modernization’ of the country.”
What is required, Chernyakhovsky says, is “a new assimilation of Siberia,” involving not only the exploitation of its wealth but also the integration of the region into Russia as a whole. “If the country as a state-political subject cannot secure the development of Siberia, it will not have the strength or even the moral basis to hold it.”
This third assimilation of Siberia – the first two were in tsarist and Soviet times – will require increasing the region’s population to all-Russian densities and the design of investment programs that will work to the benefit of Russia not only immediately but in the long term rather than only to foreign states.
In designing this program, the Moscow analyst continues, Russians need to ask themselves two questions: “Where will investments go in this region?” and “how will the pattern of such investments affect the vector of integration of Siberia and the Far East?”
According to Chernyakhovsky, investments in this region can go into three distinct spheres. The first involves the extraction and processing of raw materials; the second, “the construction of communications and the development of infrastructure;” and the third, “the development of industrial potential and its technological reconstruction.”
Moscow has been able to attract foreign capital for the first but has given little thought to the long-term consequences of doing so, but the center has had and will continue to have far more difficulties in getting foreign investment in the second and third because those are long-term and will benefit Russia more than anyone else.
In coming up with a strategy for Russia beyond the Urals, Moscow needs to reflect on the differences between an East-West axis of development which will strengthen the country and a North-South one which will weaken it, regardless of how much “modernization” there is otherwise.
Such a focus on these risks, Chernyakhovsky says, is needed because “given the incompetence which the federal center and the Russian powers that be frequently show,” only such a focus will lead them to act in the correct way, “simply out of a feeling of self-preservation.”
In sum, he says, “Russia needs not only to find a means of attracting capital for the development of Siberia and the Far East but of attracting it in a necessary and profitable configuration for itself and for these regions as well.” So far, this strategy is not on offer, but Moscow needs to come up with it soon.
Staunton, April 14 – Moscow must come up with a development strategy for Siberia and the Russian Far East that links these regions with European Russia or face the prospect that over time, the residents of these enormous territories will decide that their fate depends not on the Russian center but on China and other Asian countries, according to a Moscow analyst.
In a commentary in the current “Novaya politika,” Sergey Chernyakhovsky says that simply promoting the development of Siberia and the Far East is not enough because some kinds of development could make these areas less connected to Moscow and make them more closely tied with foreign powers (novopol.ru/-trete-osvoenie-sibiri-text100298.html).
Given “the economic and transportation degradation of the last quarter century,” he writes, people in Siberia and the Far East “feel ever less their ties” with Moscow. As a result, “separatist tendencies are growing although they are now yet openly declared politically” because people there are “ever more integrated with Japan and China.”
And the rise of such attitudes beyond the Urals, Chernyakhovsky continues, has led to discussions typically in private but sometimes in public that Moscow will have to give up “the entire territory beyond the Urals to someone or other.” But preventing that outcome is “not only a question of ‘modernization’ of the country.”
What is required, Chernyakhovsky says, is “a new assimilation of Siberia,” involving not only the exploitation of its wealth but also the integration of the region into Russia as a whole. “If the country as a state-political subject cannot secure the development of Siberia, it will not have the strength or even the moral basis to hold it.”
This third assimilation of Siberia – the first two were in tsarist and Soviet times – will require increasing the region’s population to all-Russian densities and the design of investment programs that will work to the benefit of Russia not only immediately but in the long term rather than only to foreign states.
In designing this program, the Moscow analyst continues, Russians need to ask themselves two questions: “Where will investments go in this region?” and “how will the pattern of such investments affect the vector of integration of Siberia and the Far East?”
According to Chernyakhovsky, investments in this region can go into three distinct spheres. The first involves the extraction and processing of raw materials; the second, “the construction of communications and the development of infrastructure;” and the third, “the development of industrial potential and its technological reconstruction.”
Moscow has been able to attract foreign capital for the first but has given little thought to the long-term consequences of doing so, but the center has had and will continue to have far more difficulties in getting foreign investment in the second and third because those are long-term and will benefit Russia more than anyone else.
In coming up with a strategy for Russia beyond the Urals, Moscow needs to reflect on the differences between an East-West axis of development which will strengthen the country and a North-South one which will weaken it, regardless of how much “modernization” there is otherwise.
Such a focus on these risks, Chernyakhovsky says, is needed because “given the incompetence which the federal center and the Russian powers that be frequently show,” only such a focus will lead them to act in the correct way, “simply out of a feeling of self-preservation.”
In sum, he says, “Russia needs not only to find a means of attracting capital for the development of Siberia and the Far East but of attracting it in a necessary and profitable configuration for itself and for these regions as well.” So far, this strategy is not on offer, but Moscow needs to come up with it soon.
Window on Eurasia: Soviet-Era Russian Translation of Koran Basis for New Sect in Islam
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 25 – A 1963 Russian translation of the Koran has become the basis for a new sect in Islam across the former Soviet space, a sect whose members reject both the view that the Koran exists only in its original Arabic form and the notion that the sunna and hadith are necessary for understanding the text of the Koran itself.
Known as the Krachkovtsy, in reference to Ignaty Krachkovsky, the Soviet orientalist who prepared the translation, its followers believe that “a literal understanding of the translation of the Koran is sufficient,” according to an analysis of this group in the current issue of the Daghestani journal “Nastoyashcheye vremya” (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5909/109/).
In this, the Krachkovtsy resemble the early Protestant denominations in the West who relied on a literal reading of the new translations of the Bible into German and English. But the Krachkovtsy resemble these sects in another way as well: they have been subject to intense persecution by other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Salafi.
The sect emerged “little more than 12 years ago” in Western Kazakhstan, the Daghestani journal notes, but as a result of active missionary work, “it has quickly found numerous followers … across the entire space of the CIS,” most often in the outskirts of cities “of this onetime enormous country.”
A Krachkovsky congregation has now appeared in Daghestan. Initially, it included “about 20 people, largely residents of the Makhachkala districts of Novy Taryky and Pyaty poselok.” And while few members of the community are prepared to talk to the media, one agreed, on the basis of a promise of anonymity, to discuss the Krachkovtsy there.
He told the Daghestani weekly that the followers of this trend in Islam “do not consider it necessary to study Arabic, believing that if that language is not one’s native tongu, “there is no sense in studying it since this will not give the possibility for as deep an understanding as making use of the text in one’s language of everyday conversation.”
“I don’t want to offend you,’ “Ibragim” said. “Simply look around soberly and without prejudice, drop the chains of Sunnism and the hadith and look at the Koran with clear eyes. Here we are called Koranites, are subject to persecution, and my bothers and ssisters in the faith are insulted at eat step. Can this be what Islam is about?”
The Krachkovets continued, “Honestly speaking, I am glad I am a Koranite and not a Sunni,” considering what has happened in Daghestan. “Calling yourselves Sunnis,” he added, “you stress that you follow only the Sunna and not the Koran.”
Challenged by his interviewer that there are passages in the Koran that can be understood only with the assistance of the hadith and sunna, “Ibragim” responded that Allah has made out religion sufficiently easy so that only someone full of pride or mentally ill cannot understand it. Allah the Most High said: ‘The writing is for all who believe in it.’”
According to “Ibragim,” the Krachkovtsy attend regular mosques, say the prayers required by the Koran, “but read [the Koran] in Russian … and refuse to follow practices” required by the sunna but not found in the Koran itself.
The Makhachkala parish of Krachkovtsy now numbers “more than 175 people,” but in addition, representatives of this group are found “in all the cities of Daghestan.” And the followers of this trend believe that “the expansion of their ranks is only a matter of time” even though they are often subject to attack by other Muslims, both traditional and radical.
One of the conflicts “Ibragim” described involved a funeral when Krachkovtsy opposed reading a prayer over a dead man in Arabic, as both Sunni and Salafi Islam require. “What is important is the language in which you think,” “Ibragim” said. “What good is reproducing a set of words which you do not understand?”
In the view of many Muslims, using Russian or any other language besides Arabic in Islam is prohibited as an innovation. But that is simply wrong, “Ibragim” said. Using a language people understand “must not be considered an innovation in Islam.” And it is time to stop struggling over which language to use.
Staunton, April 25 – A 1963 Russian translation of the Koran has become the basis for a new sect in Islam across the former Soviet space, a sect whose members reject both the view that the Koran exists only in its original Arabic form and the notion that the sunna and hadith are necessary for understanding the text of the Koran itself.
Known as the Krachkovtsy, in reference to Ignaty Krachkovsky, the Soviet orientalist who prepared the translation, its followers believe that “a literal understanding of the translation of the Koran is sufficient,” according to an analysis of this group in the current issue of the Daghestani journal “Nastoyashcheye vremya” (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5909/109/).
In this, the Krachkovtsy resemble the early Protestant denominations in the West who relied on a literal reading of the new translations of the Bible into German and English. But the Krachkovtsy resemble these sects in another way as well: they have been subject to intense persecution by other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Salafi.
The sect emerged “little more than 12 years ago” in Western Kazakhstan, the Daghestani journal notes, but as a result of active missionary work, “it has quickly found numerous followers … across the entire space of the CIS,” most often in the outskirts of cities “of this onetime enormous country.”
A Krachkovsky congregation has now appeared in Daghestan. Initially, it included “about 20 people, largely residents of the Makhachkala districts of Novy Taryky and Pyaty poselok.” And while few members of the community are prepared to talk to the media, one agreed, on the basis of a promise of anonymity, to discuss the Krachkovtsy there.
He told the Daghestani weekly that the followers of this trend in Islam “do not consider it necessary to study Arabic, believing that if that language is not one’s native tongu, “there is no sense in studying it since this will not give the possibility for as deep an understanding as making use of the text in one’s language of everyday conversation.”
“I don’t want to offend you,’ “Ibragim” said. “Simply look around soberly and without prejudice, drop the chains of Sunnism and the hadith and look at the Koran with clear eyes. Here we are called Koranites, are subject to persecution, and my bothers and ssisters in the faith are insulted at eat step. Can this be what Islam is about?”
The Krachkovets continued, “Honestly speaking, I am glad I am a Koranite and not a Sunni,” considering what has happened in Daghestan. “Calling yourselves Sunnis,” he added, “you stress that you follow only the Sunna and not the Koran.”
Challenged by his interviewer that there are passages in the Koran that can be understood only with the assistance of the hadith and sunna, “Ibragim” responded that Allah has made out religion sufficiently easy so that only someone full of pride or mentally ill cannot understand it. Allah the Most High said: ‘The writing is for all who believe in it.’”
According to “Ibragim,” the Krachkovtsy attend regular mosques, say the prayers required by the Koran, “but read [the Koran] in Russian … and refuse to follow practices” required by the sunna but not found in the Koran itself.
The Makhachkala parish of Krachkovtsy now numbers “more than 175 people,” but in addition, representatives of this group are found “in all the cities of Daghestan.” And the followers of this trend believe that “the expansion of their ranks is only a matter of time” even though they are often subject to attack by other Muslims, both traditional and radical.
One of the conflicts “Ibragim” described involved a funeral when Krachkovtsy opposed reading a prayer over a dead man in Arabic, as both Sunni and Salafi Islam require. “What is important is the language in which you think,” “Ibragim” said. “What good is reproducing a set of words which you do not understand?”
In the view of many Muslims, using Russian or any other language besides Arabic in Islam is prohibited as an innovation. But that is simply wrong, “Ibragim” said. Using a language people understand “must not be considered an innovation in Islam.” And it is time to stop struggling over which language to use.
Sunday, April 24, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Middle East Unrest Prompts Moscow to Ban DPNI, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 24 – Frightened by the implications of the events in the Middle East, Moscow has finally banned the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), a group that over the last decade has played a major role in shifting Russian nationalism away from the margins of Russian politics to their center, according to one Moscow analyst.
In an article on the APN.ru portal at the end of last week, Aleksei Abanin argues that the decision of the powers that be to take that step will do little to restrict the rise of Russian nationalism and may in fact trigger its spread to even broader groups in the population, thus further weakening the regime (www.apn.ru/publications/article24072.htm).
And while Abanin’s article is certainly excessive in its praise for an organization that has taken openly racist stands toward members of many ethnic and religious minorities and through its website and actions whipped up hostility toward them, its content is a reflection of the thinking of many Russian nationalities at the present time.
According to Abanin, “over the course of the ten years of its existence, the DPNI raised the propaganda of nationalism to a qualitatively new level, by reorienting it from narrow subculture circles to a mass audience” and thus providing the seedbeds for the growth of “an enormous quantity of talented cadres for the Right Movement.”
These people, he says, include, “civic activists, ideologues, human rights defenders, public social figures, publicists and so on.” And together they “carried out many large-scale (and not very) street measures, put out and distributed an enormous quantity of agitation and analytic materials, [and] provided help and support to an enormous number of Russian people.”
In addition, Abanin insists, DPNI “took an active information (and not only) part in the treatment and resolution of all the most serious conflicts and incidents in which Russians were subject to pressure, discrimination or terror by outsiders [and] made an enormous contribution to raising the importance of national discourse to a high political level.”
Thus, in sum, he says, the Movement “made possible the demarginalization of the image of Russian nationalism in the consciousness of society” and thereby contributed in this way to its transformation into “a real and THE ONLY political force which really has the mass support of the people” and is capable in the midterm of replacing the rotting RF regime.”
Because DPNI from the outset constituted a serious “headache” for that regime, Abanin says, the regime began to subject it to repressions already in 2005 when the first Russian March took place and when the DPNI “having understood the senselessness of attempts” to cooperate with the powers “went over into open opposition” even as it remained within the law.
By staying within the law, the DPNI made it difficult for the powers that be to move against it unless they were prepared to violate Russian law on their own and thus show their true nature to the Russian people even more clearly and definitively, the Moscow nationalist commentator continues.
Consequently, and short of that, the regime began to use its “beloved methods” against DPNI, including the dissemination of “yellow compromise” materials and the sponsoring of “the escalation of internal conflicts [within DPNI} with the goal of splitting the organization.” But neither proved effective, Abanin insists.
And their failure prompted the authorities to make use of “police repressions against particular activists and regional sections. But even this did not help the system destroy the spirit of the comrades in arms of the Movement and force them to begin to leave its ranks in massive numbers.”
Instead, DPNI’s street demonstrations “became ever larger and began to generate within the Russian elite not angry responses but real concern. And when throughout almost the entire Middle East suddenly broke out a wave of popular revolutions, the concern of the elite was transformed into fear.”
“For if a revolutionary could unexpectedly take place in Tunisia where no organized opposition existed,” the powers that be in Moscow reflected, “then what might happen in Russia where the national opposition, even given its serious internal contradictions and pressure from the powers, is able to assemble thousands of people in meetings?!”
According to Abanin, “the probability of the realization in the Russian Federation of ‘an Egyptian scenario’ after the prohibition of the largest legal nationalist organization will not fall but only increase.” That is something Moscow does not understand because it does not recognize that “in the first instance, it is not an organization that brings people to meetings.”
Instead, he continues, “Ideas” are what cause people to protest, and “however many movements and parties are banned, good and brave people cannot be. And it is impossible to ban people FROM THINKING WITH THEIR OWN HEADS,” at least for any prolonged period of time.
Abanin thus concludes that while “there is no longer a DPNI, its task will live! In the minds, hearts and actions of thousands of Russian people whom this organization helped to throw off the chains of slavery and gave direction as to how much be constructed a better world than the one in which we now live.”
Staunton, April 24 – Frightened by the implications of the events in the Middle East, Moscow has finally banned the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), a group that over the last decade has played a major role in shifting Russian nationalism away from the margins of Russian politics to their center, according to one Moscow analyst.
In an article on the APN.ru portal at the end of last week, Aleksei Abanin argues that the decision of the powers that be to take that step will do little to restrict the rise of Russian nationalism and may in fact trigger its spread to even broader groups in the population, thus further weakening the regime (www.apn.ru/publications/article24072.htm).
And while Abanin’s article is certainly excessive in its praise for an organization that has taken openly racist stands toward members of many ethnic and religious minorities and through its website and actions whipped up hostility toward them, its content is a reflection of the thinking of many Russian nationalities at the present time.
According to Abanin, “over the course of the ten years of its existence, the DPNI raised the propaganda of nationalism to a qualitatively new level, by reorienting it from narrow subculture circles to a mass audience” and thus providing the seedbeds for the growth of “an enormous quantity of talented cadres for the Right Movement.”
These people, he says, include, “civic activists, ideologues, human rights defenders, public social figures, publicists and so on.” And together they “carried out many large-scale (and not very) street measures, put out and distributed an enormous quantity of agitation and analytic materials, [and] provided help and support to an enormous number of Russian people.”
In addition, Abanin insists, DPNI “took an active information (and not only) part in the treatment and resolution of all the most serious conflicts and incidents in which Russians were subject to pressure, discrimination or terror by outsiders [and] made an enormous contribution to raising the importance of national discourse to a high political level.”
Thus, in sum, he says, the Movement “made possible the demarginalization of the image of Russian nationalism in the consciousness of society” and thereby contributed in this way to its transformation into “a real and THE ONLY political force which really has the mass support of the people” and is capable in the midterm of replacing the rotting RF regime.”
Because DPNI from the outset constituted a serious “headache” for that regime, Abanin says, the regime began to subject it to repressions already in 2005 when the first Russian March took place and when the DPNI “having understood the senselessness of attempts” to cooperate with the powers “went over into open opposition” even as it remained within the law.
By staying within the law, the DPNI made it difficult for the powers that be to move against it unless they were prepared to violate Russian law on their own and thus show their true nature to the Russian people even more clearly and definitively, the Moscow nationalist commentator continues.
Consequently, and short of that, the regime began to use its “beloved methods” against DPNI, including the dissemination of “yellow compromise” materials and the sponsoring of “the escalation of internal conflicts [within DPNI} with the goal of splitting the organization.” But neither proved effective, Abanin insists.
And their failure prompted the authorities to make use of “police repressions against particular activists and regional sections. But even this did not help the system destroy the spirit of the comrades in arms of the Movement and force them to begin to leave its ranks in massive numbers.”
Instead, DPNI’s street demonstrations “became ever larger and began to generate within the Russian elite not angry responses but real concern. And when throughout almost the entire Middle East suddenly broke out a wave of popular revolutions, the concern of the elite was transformed into fear.”
“For if a revolutionary could unexpectedly take place in Tunisia where no organized opposition existed,” the powers that be in Moscow reflected, “then what might happen in Russia where the national opposition, even given its serious internal contradictions and pressure from the powers, is able to assemble thousands of people in meetings?!”
According to Abanin, “the probability of the realization in the Russian Federation of ‘an Egyptian scenario’ after the prohibition of the largest legal nationalist organization will not fall but only increase.” That is something Moscow does not understand because it does not recognize that “in the first instance, it is not an organization that brings people to meetings.”
Instead, he continues, “Ideas” are what cause people to protest, and “however many movements and parties are banned, good and brave people cannot be. And it is impossible to ban people FROM THINKING WITH THEIR OWN HEADS,” at least for any prolonged period of time.
Abanin thus concludes that while “there is no longer a DPNI, its task will live! In the minds, hearts and actions of thousands of Russian people whom this organization helped to throw off the chains of slavery and gave direction as to how much be constructed a better world than the one in which we now live.”
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
