Paul Goble
Staunton, April 14 – Moscow must come up with a development strategy for Siberia and the Russian Far East that links these regions with European Russia or face the prospect that over time, the residents of these enormous territories will decide that their fate depends not on the Russian center but on China and other Asian countries, according to a Moscow analyst.
In a commentary in the current “Novaya politika,” Sergey Chernyakhovsky says that simply promoting the development of Siberia and the Far East is not enough because some kinds of development could make these areas less connected to Moscow and make them more closely tied with foreign powers (novopol.ru/-trete-osvoenie-sibiri-text100298.html).
Given “the economic and transportation degradation of the last quarter century,” he writes, people in Siberia and the Far East “feel ever less their ties” with Moscow. As a result, “separatist tendencies are growing although they are now yet openly declared politically” because people there are “ever more integrated with Japan and China.”
And the rise of such attitudes beyond the Urals, Chernyakhovsky continues, has led to discussions typically in private but sometimes in public that Moscow will have to give up “the entire territory beyond the Urals to someone or other.” But preventing that outcome is “not only a question of ‘modernization’ of the country.”
What is required, Chernyakhovsky says, is “a new assimilation of Siberia,” involving not only the exploitation of its wealth but also the integration of the region into Russia as a whole. “If the country as a state-political subject cannot secure the development of Siberia, it will not have the strength or even the moral basis to hold it.”
This third assimilation of Siberia – the first two were in tsarist and Soviet times – will require increasing the region’s population to all-Russian densities and the design of investment programs that will work to the benefit of Russia not only immediately but in the long term rather than only to foreign states.
In designing this program, the Moscow analyst continues, Russians need to ask themselves two questions: “Where will investments go in this region?” and “how will the pattern of such investments affect the vector of integration of Siberia and the Far East?”
According to Chernyakhovsky, investments in this region can go into three distinct spheres. The first involves the extraction and processing of raw materials; the second, “the construction of communications and the development of infrastructure;” and the third, “the development of industrial potential and its technological reconstruction.”
Moscow has been able to attract foreign capital for the first but has given little thought to the long-term consequences of doing so, but the center has had and will continue to have far more difficulties in getting foreign investment in the second and third because those are long-term and will benefit Russia more than anyone else.
In coming up with a strategy for Russia beyond the Urals, Moscow needs to reflect on the differences between an East-West axis of development which will strengthen the country and a North-South one which will weaken it, regardless of how much “modernization” there is otherwise.
Such a focus on these risks, Chernyakhovsky says, is needed because “given the incompetence which the federal center and the Russian powers that be frequently show,” only such a focus will lead them to act in the correct way, “simply out of a feeling of self-preservation.”
In sum, he says, “Russia needs not only to find a means of attracting capital for the development of Siberia and the Far East but of attracting it in a necessary and profitable configuration for itself and for these regions as well.” So far, this strategy is not on offer, but Moscow needs to come up with it soon.
Monday, April 25, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Soviet-Era Russian Translation of Koran Basis for New Sect in Islam
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 25 – A 1963 Russian translation of the Koran has become the basis for a new sect in Islam across the former Soviet space, a sect whose members reject both the view that the Koran exists only in its original Arabic form and the notion that the sunna and hadith are necessary for understanding the text of the Koran itself.
Known as the Krachkovtsy, in reference to Ignaty Krachkovsky, the Soviet orientalist who prepared the translation, its followers believe that “a literal understanding of the translation of the Koran is sufficient,” according to an analysis of this group in the current issue of the Daghestani journal “Nastoyashcheye vremya” (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5909/109/).
In this, the Krachkovtsy resemble the early Protestant denominations in the West who relied on a literal reading of the new translations of the Bible into German and English. But the Krachkovtsy resemble these sects in another way as well: they have been subject to intense persecution by other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Salafi.
The sect emerged “little more than 12 years ago” in Western Kazakhstan, the Daghestani journal notes, but as a result of active missionary work, “it has quickly found numerous followers … across the entire space of the CIS,” most often in the outskirts of cities “of this onetime enormous country.”
A Krachkovsky congregation has now appeared in Daghestan. Initially, it included “about 20 people, largely residents of the Makhachkala districts of Novy Taryky and Pyaty poselok.” And while few members of the community are prepared to talk to the media, one agreed, on the basis of a promise of anonymity, to discuss the Krachkovtsy there.
He told the Daghestani weekly that the followers of this trend in Islam “do not consider it necessary to study Arabic, believing that if that language is not one’s native tongu, “there is no sense in studying it since this will not give the possibility for as deep an understanding as making use of the text in one’s language of everyday conversation.”
“I don’t want to offend you,’ “Ibragim” said. “Simply look around soberly and without prejudice, drop the chains of Sunnism and the hadith and look at the Koran with clear eyes. Here we are called Koranites, are subject to persecution, and my bothers and ssisters in the faith are insulted at eat step. Can this be what Islam is about?”
The Krachkovets continued, “Honestly speaking, I am glad I am a Koranite and not a Sunni,” considering what has happened in Daghestan. “Calling yourselves Sunnis,” he added, “you stress that you follow only the Sunna and not the Koran.”
Challenged by his interviewer that there are passages in the Koran that can be understood only with the assistance of the hadith and sunna, “Ibragim” responded that Allah has made out religion sufficiently easy so that only someone full of pride or mentally ill cannot understand it. Allah the Most High said: ‘The writing is for all who believe in it.’”
According to “Ibragim,” the Krachkovtsy attend regular mosques, say the prayers required by the Koran, “but read [the Koran] in Russian … and refuse to follow practices” required by the sunna but not found in the Koran itself.
The Makhachkala parish of Krachkovtsy now numbers “more than 175 people,” but in addition, representatives of this group are found “in all the cities of Daghestan.” And the followers of this trend believe that “the expansion of their ranks is only a matter of time” even though they are often subject to attack by other Muslims, both traditional and radical.
One of the conflicts “Ibragim” described involved a funeral when Krachkovtsy opposed reading a prayer over a dead man in Arabic, as both Sunni and Salafi Islam require. “What is important is the language in which you think,” “Ibragim” said. “What good is reproducing a set of words which you do not understand?”
In the view of many Muslims, using Russian or any other language besides Arabic in Islam is prohibited as an innovation. But that is simply wrong, “Ibragim” said. Using a language people understand “must not be considered an innovation in Islam.” And it is time to stop struggling over which language to use.
Staunton, April 25 – A 1963 Russian translation of the Koran has become the basis for a new sect in Islam across the former Soviet space, a sect whose members reject both the view that the Koran exists only in its original Arabic form and the notion that the sunna and hadith are necessary for understanding the text of the Koran itself.
Known as the Krachkovtsy, in reference to Ignaty Krachkovsky, the Soviet orientalist who prepared the translation, its followers believe that “a literal understanding of the translation of the Koran is sufficient,” according to an analysis of this group in the current issue of the Daghestani journal “Nastoyashcheye vremya” (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5909/109/).
In this, the Krachkovtsy resemble the early Protestant denominations in the West who relied on a literal reading of the new translations of the Bible into German and English. But the Krachkovtsy resemble these sects in another way as well: they have been subject to intense persecution by other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Salafi.
The sect emerged “little more than 12 years ago” in Western Kazakhstan, the Daghestani journal notes, but as a result of active missionary work, “it has quickly found numerous followers … across the entire space of the CIS,” most often in the outskirts of cities “of this onetime enormous country.”
A Krachkovsky congregation has now appeared in Daghestan. Initially, it included “about 20 people, largely residents of the Makhachkala districts of Novy Taryky and Pyaty poselok.” And while few members of the community are prepared to talk to the media, one agreed, on the basis of a promise of anonymity, to discuss the Krachkovtsy there.
He told the Daghestani weekly that the followers of this trend in Islam “do not consider it necessary to study Arabic, believing that if that language is not one’s native tongu, “there is no sense in studying it since this will not give the possibility for as deep an understanding as making use of the text in one’s language of everyday conversation.”
“I don’t want to offend you,’ “Ibragim” said. “Simply look around soberly and without prejudice, drop the chains of Sunnism and the hadith and look at the Koran with clear eyes. Here we are called Koranites, are subject to persecution, and my bothers and ssisters in the faith are insulted at eat step. Can this be what Islam is about?”
The Krachkovets continued, “Honestly speaking, I am glad I am a Koranite and not a Sunni,” considering what has happened in Daghestan. “Calling yourselves Sunnis,” he added, “you stress that you follow only the Sunna and not the Koran.”
Challenged by his interviewer that there are passages in the Koran that can be understood only with the assistance of the hadith and sunna, “Ibragim” responded that Allah has made out religion sufficiently easy so that only someone full of pride or mentally ill cannot understand it. Allah the Most High said: ‘The writing is for all who believe in it.’”
According to “Ibragim,” the Krachkovtsy attend regular mosques, say the prayers required by the Koran, “but read [the Koran] in Russian … and refuse to follow practices” required by the sunna but not found in the Koran itself.
The Makhachkala parish of Krachkovtsy now numbers “more than 175 people,” but in addition, representatives of this group are found “in all the cities of Daghestan.” And the followers of this trend believe that “the expansion of their ranks is only a matter of time” even though they are often subject to attack by other Muslims, both traditional and radical.
One of the conflicts “Ibragim” described involved a funeral when Krachkovtsy opposed reading a prayer over a dead man in Arabic, as both Sunni and Salafi Islam require. “What is important is the language in which you think,” “Ibragim” said. “What good is reproducing a set of words which you do not understand?”
In the view of many Muslims, using Russian or any other language besides Arabic in Islam is prohibited as an innovation. But that is simply wrong, “Ibragim” said. Using a language people understand “must not be considered an innovation in Islam.” And it is time to stop struggling over which language to use.
Sunday, April 24, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Middle East Unrest Prompts Moscow to Ban DPNI, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 24 – Frightened by the implications of the events in the Middle East, Moscow has finally banned the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), a group that over the last decade has played a major role in shifting Russian nationalism away from the margins of Russian politics to their center, according to one Moscow analyst.
In an article on the APN.ru portal at the end of last week, Aleksei Abanin argues that the decision of the powers that be to take that step will do little to restrict the rise of Russian nationalism and may in fact trigger its spread to even broader groups in the population, thus further weakening the regime (www.apn.ru/publications/article24072.htm).
And while Abanin’s article is certainly excessive in its praise for an organization that has taken openly racist stands toward members of many ethnic and religious minorities and through its website and actions whipped up hostility toward them, its content is a reflection of the thinking of many Russian nationalities at the present time.
According to Abanin, “over the course of the ten years of its existence, the DPNI raised the propaganda of nationalism to a qualitatively new level, by reorienting it from narrow subculture circles to a mass audience” and thus providing the seedbeds for the growth of “an enormous quantity of talented cadres for the Right Movement.”
These people, he says, include, “civic activists, ideologues, human rights defenders, public social figures, publicists and so on.” And together they “carried out many large-scale (and not very) street measures, put out and distributed an enormous quantity of agitation and analytic materials, [and] provided help and support to an enormous number of Russian people.”
In addition, Abanin insists, DPNI “took an active information (and not only) part in the treatment and resolution of all the most serious conflicts and incidents in which Russians were subject to pressure, discrimination or terror by outsiders [and] made an enormous contribution to raising the importance of national discourse to a high political level.”
Thus, in sum, he says, the Movement “made possible the demarginalization of the image of Russian nationalism in the consciousness of society” and thereby contributed in this way to its transformation into “a real and THE ONLY political force which really has the mass support of the people” and is capable in the midterm of replacing the rotting RF regime.”
Because DPNI from the outset constituted a serious “headache” for that regime, Abanin says, the regime began to subject it to repressions already in 2005 when the first Russian March took place and when the DPNI “having understood the senselessness of attempts” to cooperate with the powers “went over into open opposition” even as it remained within the law.
By staying within the law, the DPNI made it difficult for the powers that be to move against it unless they were prepared to violate Russian law on their own and thus show their true nature to the Russian people even more clearly and definitively, the Moscow nationalist commentator continues.
Consequently, and short of that, the regime began to use its “beloved methods” against DPNI, including the dissemination of “yellow compromise” materials and the sponsoring of “the escalation of internal conflicts [within DPNI} with the goal of splitting the organization.” But neither proved effective, Abanin insists.
And their failure prompted the authorities to make use of “police repressions against particular activists and regional sections. But even this did not help the system destroy the spirit of the comrades in arms of the Movement and force them to begin to leave its ranks in massive numbers.”
Instead, DPNI’s street demonstrations “became ever larger and began to generate within the Russian elite not angry responses but real concern. And when throughout almost the entire Middle East suddenly broke out a wave of popular revolutions, the concern of the elite was transformed into fear.”
“For if a revolutionary could unexpectedly take place in Tunisia where no organized opposition existed,” the powers that be in Moscow reflected, “then what might happen in Russia where the national opposition, even given its serious internal contradictions and pressure from the powers, is able to assemble thousands of people in meetings?!”
According to Abanin, “the probability of the realization in the Russian Federation of ‘an Egyptian scenario’ after the prohibition of the largest legal nationalist organization will not fall but only increase.” That is something Moscow does not understand because it does not recognize that “in the first instance, it is not an organization that brings people to meetings.”
Instead, he continues, “Ideas” are what cause people to protest, and “however many movements and parties are banned, good and brave people cannot be. And it is impossible to ban people FROM THINKING WITH THEIR OWN HEADS,” at least for any prolonged period of time.
Abanin thus concludes that while “there is no longer a DPNI, its task will live! In the minds, hearts and actions of thousands of Russian people whom this organization helped to throw off the chains of slavery and gave direction as to how much be constructed a better world than the one in which we now live.”
Staunton, April 24 – Frightened by the implications of the events in the Middle East, Moscow has finally banned the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), a group that over the last decade has played a major role in shifting Russian nationalism away from the margins of Russian politics to their center, according to one Moscow analyst.
In an article on the APN.ru portal at the end of last week, Aleksei Abanin argues that the decision of the powers that be to take that step will do little to restrict the rise of Russian nationalism and may in fact trigger its spread to even broader groups in the population, thus further weakening the regime (www.apn.ru/publications/article24072.htm).
And while Abanin’s article is certainly excessive in its praise for an organization that has taken openly racist stands toward members of many ethnic and religious minorities and through its website and actions whipped up hostility toward them, its content is a reflection of the thinking of many Russian nationalities at the present time.
According to Abanin, “over the course of the ten years of its existence, the DPNI raised the propaganda of nationalism to a qualitatively new level, by reorienting it from narrow subculture circles to a mass audience” and thus providing the seedbeds for the growth of “an enormous quantity of talented cadres for the Right Movement.”
These people, he says, include, “civic activists, ideologues, human rights defenders, public social figures, publicists and so on.” And together they “carried out many large-scale (and not very) street measures, put out and distributed an enormous quantity of agitation and analytic materials, [and] provided help and support to an enormous number of Russian people.”
In addition, Abanin insists, DPNI “took an active information (and not only) part in the treatment and resolution of all the most serious conflicts and incidents in which Russians were subject to pressure, discrimination or terror by outsiders [and] made an enormous contribution to raising the importance of national discourse to a high political level.”
Thus, in sum, he says, the Movement “made possible the demarginalization of the image of Russian nationalism in the consciousness of society” and thereby contributed in this way to its transformation into “a real and THE ONLY political force which really has the mass support of the people” and is capable in the midterm of replacing the rotting RF regime.”
Because DPNI from the outset constituted a serious “headache” for that regime, Abanin says, the regime began to subject it to repressions already in 2005 when the first Russian March took place and when the DPNI “having understood the senselessness of attempts” to cooperate with the powers “went over into open opposition” even as it remained within the law.
By staying within the law, the DPNI made it difficult for the powers that be to move against it unless they were prepared to violate Russian law on their own and thus show their true nature to the Russian people even more clearly and definitively, the Moscow nationalist commentator continues.
Consequently, and short of that, the regime began to use its “beloved methods” against DPNI, including the dissemination of “yellow compromise” materials and the sponsoring of “the escalation of internal conflicts [within DPNI} with the goal of splitting the organization.” But neither proved effective, Abanin insists.
And their failure prompted the authorities to make use of “police repressions against particular activists and regional sections. But even this did not help the system destroy the spirit of the comrades in arms of the Movement and force them to begin to leave its ranks in massive numbers.”
Instead, DPNI’s street demonstrations “became ever larger and began to generate within the Russian elite not angry responses but real concern. And when throughout almost the entire Middle East suddenly broke out a wave of popular revolutions, the concern of the elite was transformed into fear.”
“For if a revolutionary could unexpectedly take place in Tunisia where no organized opposition existed,” the powers that be in Moscow reflected, “then what might happen in Russia where the national opposition, even given its serious internal contradictions and pressure from the powers, is able to assemble thousands of people in meetings?!”
According to Abanin, “the probability of the realization in the Russian Federation of ‘an Egyptian scenario’ after the prohibition of the largest legal nationalist organization will not fall but only increase.” That is something Moscow does not understand because it does not recognize that “in the first instance, it is not an organization that brings people to meetings.”
Instead, he continues, “Ideas” are what cause people to protest, and “however many movements and parties are banned, good and brave people cannot be. And it is impossible to ban people FROM THINKING WITH THEIR OWN HEADS,” at least for any prolonged period of time.
Abanin thus concludes that while “there is no longer a DPNI, its task will live! In the minds, hearts and actions of thousands of Russian people whom this organization helped to throw off the chains of slavery and gave direction as to how much be constructed a better world than the one in which we now live.”
Saturday, April 23, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Muslims Sure Census Results Will Allow Them to Get More Haj Slots
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 23 – Even though the 2010 Russian Federation census has not released nationality data and did not ask questions about religious affiliation, Russia’s Muslims are confident that the latest enumeration will show that their numbers have increased significantly and that this in turn will allow them to secure a larger quota for the haj.
Yesterday, Ilyas Umakhanov, the vice speaker of the Federation Council and head of Russia’s haj mission, told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that the results of the 2010 census show a growth in the population of the Muslim regions of Russia and this will become the basis for Moscow to seek a larger haj quota (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184169/).
The Saudis as the keepers of Islam’s Holy Places of Mecca and Medina set annual quotas of one haji for every 1,000 Muslims in each country of the world. For the past decade, Russia’s quota has been 20,500, a number based on Saudi estimates that there are 20,500,000 of the faithful in the Russian Federation.
Moscow, at the urging of the Muslims of Russia, has sought a higher quota, occasionally successfully as when two years ago Vladimir Putin secured an additional 5,000 haj slots by using the argument that there was pent up demand from Soviet times when few could make the required pilgrimage.
But the Saudis have been reluctant to grant Moscow extra slots not only because any such concession would anger others or encourage them to demand more slots but also because it would appear to legitimize what is an increasing problem: thousands of Russia’s Muslims simply go to Saudi Arabia outside the limit and “crash” the haj lines.
The results of the 2010 census may give Russia new arguments for boosting the country’s haj quota. “In areas of the compact settlement of Muslims,” Umakhanov said, “the growth of the population all the same shows a very positive dynamic,” one that suggests Russia has more than 20.5 million Muslims and hence should be allotted more than 20,500 haj slots.
According to Umakhanov, during the period from 1945 to 1990, only 900 people made the haj from the entire Soviet Union. But today, “Russia is in the top dozen countries which has the largest quota for the haj, and even as that is the case, the number of those who want to make the pilgrimage is growing.”
Umakhanov said that the Saudis appear likely to want to see the official results of the census before making any adjustment, but he suggested that it is already obvious that the Muslim population of the Russian Federation is growing rapidly, especially among the peoples of the North Caucasus.
“If we consider Daghestan, the Chechen Republic, Tatarstan and Ingushetia alone,” the republics which generate more than 85 percent of all hajis from Russia, the haj commission chief said, then population growth alone in these regions should lead the Saudis to increase the haj quota for the Russian Federation “already in this year.”
Staunton, April 23 – Even though the 2010 Russian Federation census has not released nationality data and did not ask questions about religious affiliation, Russia’s Muslims are confident that the latest enumeration will show that their numbers have increased significantly and that this in turn will allow them to secure a larger quota for the haj.
Yesterday, Ilyas Umakhanov, the vice speaker of the Federation Council and head of Russia’s haj mission, told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that the results of the 2010 census show a growth in the population of the Muslim regions of Russia and this will become the basis for Moscow to seek a larger haj quota (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184169/).
The Saudis as the keepers of Islam’s Holy Places of Mecca and Medina set annual quotas of one haji for every 1,000 Muslims in each country of the world. For the past decade, Russia’s quota has been 20,500, a number based on Saudi estimates that there are 20,500,000 of the faithful in the Russian Federation.
Moscow, at the urging of the Muslims of Russia, has sought a higher quota, occasionally successfully as when two years ago Vladimir Putin secured an additional 5,000 haj slots by using the argument that there was pent up demand from Soviet times when few could make the required pilgrimage.
But the Saudis have been reluctant to grant Moscow extra slots not only because any such concession would anger others or encourage them to demand more slots but also because it would appear to legitimize what is an increasing problem: thousands of Russia’s Muslims simply go to Saudi Arabia outside the limit and “crash” the haj lines.
The results of the 2010 census may give Russia new arguments for boosting the country’s haj quota. “In areas of the compact settlement of Muslims,” Umakhanov said, “the growth of the population all the same shows a very positive dynamic,” one that suggests Russia has more than 20.5 million Muslims and hence should be allotted more than 20,500 haj slots.
According to Umakhanov, during the period from 1945 to 1990, only 900 people made the haj from the entire Soviet Union. But today, “Russia is in the top dozen countries which has the largest quota for the haj, and even as that is the case, the number of those who want to make the pilgrimage is growing.”
Umakhanov said that the Saudis appear likely to want to see the official results of the census before making any adjustment, but he suggested that it is already obvious that the Muslim population of the Russian Federation is growing rapidly, especially among the peoples of the North Caucasus.
“If we consider Daghestan, the Chechen Republic, Tatarstan and Ingushetia alone,” the republics which generate more than 85 percent of all hajis from Russia, the haj commission chief said, then population growth alone in these regions should lead the Saudis to increase the haj quota for the Russian Federation “already in this year.”
Friday, April 22, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Young Russians Hate Bureaucrats More than They Hate North Caucasians, Poll Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – A poll of 1600 young Russians in six major cities found that as much as they dislike migrants from the North Caucasus and support nationalist groups like those who took part in the Manezh Square protests last December, they dislike bureaucrats “even more,” a pattern that may portend even larger and more violent clashes.
Yesterday, the Moscow newspaper “Kommersant” reported about a poll conducted for the Social Chamber which showed that “young [Russians] hate bureaucrats more than they hate people from the Caucasus and give preference to nationalist organizations such as the Nashi movement and Molodaya gvardiya” (www.kommersant.ru/doc/1625661?isSearch=True).
The telephone poll, conducted by the Politex Social Technologies Agency with the support of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, involved 1600 respondents aged 15 to 30 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk.
Three out of four of those answering – 76 percent – said they sympathized with those who took part in the Manezh action. Only one in five – 20 percent – condemned it. Moreover, 78 percent insisted that the December protest was not a nationalistic action, with 58 percent saying that it was a protest against corruption and “so-called” ethnic crime.
The polltakers argued that the view that the Manezh protest was not nationalistic was confirmed by “the fact that ‘the relationship to it of ethnic Russian respondents and representatives of other nationalities was practically identical.
But the situation may be more complicated than that: Sixty-nine percent of the sample said the causes of the conflict were to be found in the fact that corruption, “especially in the law enforcement organs,” is flourishing and when “militiamen release criminals for money or on orders from above.”
Two out of three of those polled are “certain that migrants, especially ‘Caucasians,’ ‘live better,’ as a result of their rapid ability to adapt to the corruption of the authorities.” As a result, while 39 percent of the sample acknowledged they had a negative attitude toward people from the Caucasus, 51 percent had a negative one toward officials, and only 27 percent like the police.
Hostility toward young Caucasians, the poll found, is widespread: 69 percent said they “do not like them because of their ‘aggressive behavior’ and their unwillingness to “live according to our rules.’” As a result, 26 percent said they would “welcome the splitting off of the North Caucasus from Russia,” but a larger number – 40 percent – doubted that would help.
“Kommersant” noted that “it is interesting that only 17 percent of the participants in the poll positively assessed the activity of the Nashi movement,” while 32 percent expressed approval of the actions of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which a Moscow court has just banned.
The poll found that 37 percent of young urban Russians said that they have “acquaintances” who “would take part in actions” like the Manezh Square clashes. And “almost none of them doubted” there would be more such events. “Where and when,” one individual polled said, “I do not know. But they will take place.”
Everything that points to that conclusion, the young Russian said, “is now taking place.”
Staunton, April 22 – A poll of 1600 young Russians in six major cities found that as much as they dislike migrants from the North Caucasus and support nationalist groups like those who took part in the Manezh Square protests last December, they dislike bureaucrats “even more,” a pattern that may portend even larger and more violent clashes.
Yesterday, the Moscow newspaper “Kommersant” reported about a poll conducted for the Social Chamber which showed that “young [Russians] hate bureaucrats more than they hate people from the Caucasus and give preference to nationalist organizations such as the Nashi movement and Molodaya gvardiya” (www.kommersant.ru/doc/1625661?isSearch=True).
The telephone poll, conducted by the Politex Social Technologies Agency with the support of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, involved 1600 respondents aged 15 to 30 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk.
Three out of four of those answering – 76 percent – said they sympathized with those who took part in the Manezh action. Only one in five – 20 percent – condemned it. Moreover, 78 percent insisted that the December protest was not a nationalistic action, with 58 percent saying that it was a protest against corruption and “so-called” ethnic crime.
The polltakers argued that the view that the Manezh protest was not nationalistic was confirmed by “the fact that ‘the relationship to it of ethnic Russian respondents and representatives of other nationalities was practically identical.
But the situation may be more complicated than that: Sixty-nine percent of the sample said the causes of the conflict were to be found in the fact that corruption, “especially in the law enforcement organs,” is flourishing and when “militiamen release criminals for money or on orders from above.”
Two out of three of those polled are “certain that migrants, especially ‘Caucasians,’ ‘live better,’ as a result of their rapid ability to adapt to the corruption of the authorities.” As a result, while 39 percent of the sample acknowledged they had a negative attitude toward people from the Caucasus, 51 percent had a negative one toward officials, and only 27 percent like the police.
Hostility toward young Caucasians, the poll found, is widespread: 69 percent said they “do not like them because of their ‘aggressive behavior’ and their unwillingness to “live according to our rules.’” As a result, 26 percent said they would “welcome the splitting off of the North Caucasus from Russia,” but a larger number – 40 percent – doubted that would help.
“Kommersant” noted that “it is interesting that only 17 percent of the participants in the poll positively assessed the activity of the Nashi movement,” while 32 percent expressed approval of the actions of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which a Moscow court has just banned.
The poll found that 37 percent of young urban Russians said that they have “acquaintances” who “would take part in actions” like the Manezh Square clashes. And “almost none of them doubted” there would be more such events. “Where and when,” one individual polled said, “I do not know. But they will take place.”
Everything that points to that conclusion, the young Russian said, “is now taking place.”
Window on Eurasia: Karimov’s Repression Strengthening Jihadism in Uzbekistan, Memorial Report Concludes
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s “suppression of religious and political disagreements, together with extreme authoritarianism, total corruption, ineffective economics and the absence of social justice is contributing to the spread of the conviction there that positive changes in society can be achieved only by force.”
And that growing conviction, according to a 143-page study of conditions in that most populous Central Asian country, its author Vladimir Ponomarev of Memorial says, is creating the basis for the strengthening of the positions of jihadist groups” rather than weakening them as Karimov and his backers claim (www.agentura.ru/experts/vponomarev/).
Ponomarev’s report, entitled “Political Repressions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010, was financed by the Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and provides a wealth of detail about conditions in Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But each of his 11 conclusions deserves particular attention.
First of all, the Memorial expert says, “Uzbekistan, which has been ruled for 22 years by the former Communist leader Islam Karimov remains one of the most repressive states of the world,” a country in which there is no legal opposition or an independent media and in which “political repression is an indivisible part of state policy.”
Second, “the use of mass repression,” which Karimov began in the 1990s, “continues to this day.” There are now “several thousand political prisoners” and more than 1200 others who are being sought on the basis of such charges. Moreover, over the last two years, “the extent of repressions rose significantly and now appear to exceed even the high level of 2004-2006.”
Third, to this day, Uzbekistan’s criminal code contains various provisions that limit fundamental freedoms, including those which “criminalize any religious activity not sanctioned by the state” and others which define “terrorism” so broadly that almost anyone can be charged with that crime by Uzbek officials.
Fourth, Ponomarev writes, “a large number of [Uzbekistan’s] Muslims, whose actions do not represent a threat to public order and security as before are being condemned on the basis of fabricated accusations of terrorism and extremism.” And most of their convictions are based on confessions obtained by torture.
Fifth, according to the Memorial study, “the main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 were declared to be the Jihadists,” a term which Uzbek official employ to describe “not only the memb ers of the few terrorist groups but also members of various informal Islamic communities which supposedly express ‘radical views.’”
Sixth, despite Tashkent’s claims of a massive upsurge in terrorist activity as justification for the crackdowns, “there is no data” about any terrorist act except for three incidents in May 2009, and “there is no information [at all] about links between the local ‘Jihadists’ with such organizations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Union of ‘Islamic Jihad.’”
Seventh, because Tashkent’s repressive actions touch “not only marginal groups but have become part of the daily life of Uzbekistan,” they have become themselves “an important source of social-political tension” because they appear to justify the arguments of those who say that “positive changes in society can be achieved only by means of force.”
Eighth, just as was the case after the Andijan events of 2005, the Tashkent authorities appear to be using repression against independent human rights activists and journalists because they fear that such people will be the source of “alternative” and independent information and that that in turn “can stimulate protest attitudes in society.
Ninth, given the tight lid that Karimov’s regime has put on any information about the use of force by militants in 2009, it appears, Memorial’s Ponomarev says, that “the powers are afraid also that in the case of even limited success by Jihadist actions, the latter may serve as a model for emulation by others and give an impulse to the rise of new anti-government groups.”
Tenth, Ponomarev argues, “the West (like the partners of Uzbekistan inside the CIS as well) are underestimating the seriousness and extent of the problems connected with political repressions in Uzbekistan and their possible dramatic influence on regional stability” across Central Asia.
In contrast to the situation in 2002-2003, he continues, Western representatives have focused only “about 30” cases involving civil society activists and the democratic opposition, the freeingof which is assessed by some of them as evidence of ‘positive changes’” by the Tashkent leadership.
But in fact and just like in Soviet times, Tashkent is using these people “as hostages for political trade with the West” and is arresting new groups for every one individual it may choose to free. Indeed, the Memorial expert writes, “many are convinced” that the West is “not taking sufficient steps to change the situation.”
And finally, eleventh, Ponomarev aregues, “the current Realpolitik of the US and the European Union toward Uzbekistan needs to be reviewed, especially in the context of the latest events in the Middle East which can be repeated in Central Asia as well,” with Uzbekistan being a candidate for a Libyan rather than Egyptian scenario.
“It should be remembered,” the Memorial expert writes, “that during the period of active cooperation with the United States in 2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners which not only did not create any problems regarding the stability of the domestic political situation but on the contrary made possible a reduction in the level of tensions” there.
And it is also necessary to remember, Ponomarev says, that Karimov’s “’war with Islam’ under the cover of the struggle with terrorism … can have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The use of mass repressions not only represents a clear violation of Uzbekistan’s international obligations but represents a threat to the security and stability of the region.”
Staunton, April 22 – Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s “suppression of religious and political disagreements, together with extreme authoritarianism, total corruption, ineffective economics and the absence of social justice is contributing to the spread of the conviction there that positive changes in society can be achieved only by force.”
And that growing conviction, according to a 143-page study of conditions in that most populous Central Asian country, its author Vladimir Ponomarev of Memorial says, is creating the basis for the strengthening of the positions of jihadist groups” rather than weakening them as Karimov and his backers claim (www.agentura.ru/experts/vponomarev/).
Ponomarev’s report, entitled “Political Repressions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010, was financed by the Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and provides a wealth of detail about conditions in Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But each of his 11 conclusions deserves particular attention.
First of all, the Memorial expert says, “Uzbekistan, which has been ruled for 22 years by the former Communist leader Islam Karimov remains one of the most repressive states of the world,” a country in which there is no legal opposition or an independent media and in which “political repression is an indivisible part of state policy.”
Second, “the use of mass repression,” which Karimov began in the 1990s, “continues to this day.” There are now “several thousand political prisoners” and more than 1200 others who are being sought on the basis of such charges. Moreover, over the last two years, “the extent of repressions rose significantly and now appear to exceed even the high level of 2004-2006.”
Third, to this day, Uzbekistan’s criminal code contains various provisions that limit fundamental freedoms, including those which “criminalize any religious activity not sanctioned by the state” and others which define “terrorism” so broadly that almost anyone can be charged with that crime by Uzbek officials.
Fourth, Ponomarev writes, “a large number of [Uzbekistan’s] Muslims, whose actions do not represent a threat to public order and security as before are being condemned on the basis of fabricated accusations of terrorism and extremism.” And most of their convictions are based on confessions obtained by torture.
Fifth, according to the Memorial study, “the main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 were declared to be the Jihadists,” a term which Uzbek official employ to describe “not only the memb ers of the few terrorist groups but also members of various informal Islamic communities which supposedly express ‘radical views.’”
Sixth, despite Tashkent’s claims of a massive upsurge in terrorist activity as justification for the crackdowns, “there is no data” about any terrorist act except for three incidents in May 2009, and “there is no information [at all] about links between the local ‘Jihadists’ with such organizations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Union of ‘Islamic Jihad.’”
Seventh, because Tashkent’s repressive actions touch “not only marginal groups but have become part of the daily life of Uzbekistan,” they have become themselves “an important source of social-political tension” because they appear to justify the arguments of those who say that “positive changes in society can be achieved only by means of force.”
Eighth, just as was the case after the Andijan events of 2005, the Tashkent authorities appear to be using repression against independent human rights activists and journalists because they fear that such people will be the source of “alternative” and independent information and that that in turn “can stimulate protest attitudes in society.
Ninth, given the tight lid that Karimov’s regime has put on any information about the use of force by militants in 2009, it appears, Memorial’s Ponomarev says, that “the powers are afraid also that in the case of even limited success by Jihadist actions, the latter may serve as a model for emulation by others and give an impulse to the rise of new anti-government groups.”
Tenth, Ponomarev argues, “the West (like the partners of Uzbekistan inside the CIS as well) are underestimating the seriousness and extent of the problems connected with political repressions in Uzbekistan and their possible dramatic influence on regional stability” across Central Asia.
In contrast to the situation in 2002-2003, he continues, Western representatives have focused only “about 30” cases involving civil society activists and the democratic opposition, the freeingof which is assessed by some of them as evidence of ‘positive changes’” by the Tashkent leadership.
But in fact and just like in Soviet times, Tashkent is using these people “as hostages for political trade with the West” and is arresting new groups for every one individual it may choose to free. Indeed, the Memorial expert writes, “many are convinced” that the West is “not taking sufficient steps to change the situation.”
And finally, eleventh, Ponomarev aregues, “the current Realpolitik of the US and the European Union toward Uzbekistan needs to be reviewed, especially in the context of the latest events in the Middle East which can be repeated in Central Asia as well,” with Uzbekistan being a candidate for a Libyan rather than Egyptian scenario.
“It should be remembered,” the Memorial expert writes, “that during the period of active cooperation with the United States in 2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners which not only did not create any problems regarding the stability of the domestic political situation but on the contrary made possible a reduction in the level of tensions” there.
And it is also necessary to remember, Ponomarev says, that Karimov’s “’war with Islam’ under the cover of the struggle with terrorism … can have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The use of mass repressions not only represents a clear violation of Uzbekistan’s international obligations but represents a threat to the security and stability of the region.”
Window on Eurasia: Crimean Tatars Press to Go Back to Latin Script by End of 2011
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – The Crimean Tatars are stepping up the campaign they launched in 1991 to return to the Latin-based script in which their language was written between 1928 and 1938 and thus end the use of the Cyrillic-based script Stalin imposed on them, a step that will further set them apart from Slavic groups and bring them closer to Turkey.
On Monday, Eduard Dudakov, the chairman of the Republic Committee of Crimea for Inter-National Relations and the Affairs of Deported Citizens, told journalists that “the process of shifting the Crimean Tatar language from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to the Latin script is to be completed before the end of the year.
Discussion of this measure has gone on long enough, he continued, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs to adopt modifications in the country’s law on language that can “become the basis for the introduction of changes in the corresponding legal act, regulating the use of various writing systems.”
Dudakov’s comments follow proposals by Mustafa Cemilev, the president of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people who has long sought “a single alphabet for all Crimean Tatars in the world” and the publication last month of “Nenkecan,” a Crimean journal in the Latin script (e-crimea.info/2011/04/18/49428/Kryimskotatarskiy_yazyik_pereydet_na_latinitsu_do_kontsa_goda_.shtml).
Following an overwhelming vote in favor, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on Wednesday called on the country’s parliament to adopt “in as short a time as possible” draft legislation that would regulate the languages of all minority nationalities in Ukraine, including not just Crimean Tatar but also Russian and other groups (www.interfax.com.ua/rus/pol/66910/).
Because such legislation touches on the sensitive issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and on the policies of the incumbent Ukrainian president who earlier promised to boost the status of Russian, that aspect of debates about a new language law is likely to attract the most attention in the coming weeks.
But in fact, the effort of the Crimean Tatars to go back to the Latin script may prove more important, not only because it will set them even more apart from the others on the peninsula but also because it will serve as a model for other Turkic groups in the post-Soviet world, in the first instance the Kazan Tatars, and tighten relations between these communities and Turkey.
The impact on the Kazan Tatars is likely to be especially great given Moscow’s increasing efforts to Russianize Tatarstan and especially the Russian government’s use of an appeal by a group of Kazan parents to reduce the amount of Tatar used in the schools of that Middle Volga republic.
Those Russian efforts have prompted some Tatar and Muslim commentators to ask, in this Year of Gabdulla Tukay, a leader of the Tatar renaissance of a century ago, “whether the language of Tukay [Tatar] will survive until the end of the 21st century?” -- or whether it is fated to be overwhelmed by Russian (www.islam.ru/content/kultura/1240).
Given the historic ties between the Kazan Tatars and the Crimean Tatars, a successful move to return to Latin script among the latter will likely spark calls for a similar step among the former, the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation and often a bellwether for the actions of other nations inside that country.
There are three reasons this Crimean Tatar effort is important in addition of course to its impact on the future of that nation. First, it highlights the way in which over the last year the Crimean Tatars and other nations of Eurasia have reasserted their efforts in the early 1990s to recover their own histories and set themselves apart from the hitherto dominant Russians.
Second, it underscores the ways in which Turkey is gaining influence among these peoples, positioning itself as a regional leader in direct competition with Moscow, Kyiv and other capitals and giving new content to the idea of Turkic world led intellectually at least from Ankara and Istanbul.
And third, it could trigger demands among other nations in Eurasia to shift away from the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic alphabets, including for at least some of the Finno-Ugric and North Caucasian languages and thus increase still further the centrifugal forces on the territory of the former Soviet space.
Staunton, April 22 – The Crimean Tatars are stepping up the campaign they launched in 1991 to return to the Latin-based script in which their language was written between 1928 and 1938 and thus end the use of the Cyrillic-based script Stalin imposed on them, a step that will further set them apart from Slavic groups and bring them closer to Turkey.
On Monday, Eduard Dudakov, the chairman of the Republic Committee of Crimea for Inter-National Relations and the Affairs of Deported Citizens, told journalists that “the process of shifting the Crimean Tatar language from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to the Latin script is to be completed before the end of the year.
Discussion of this measure has gone on long enough, he continued, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs to adopt modifications in the country’s law on language that can “become the basis for the introduction of changes in the corresponding legal act, regulating the use of various writing systems.”
Dudakov’s comments follow proposals by Mustafa Cemilev, the president of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people who has long sought “a single alphabet for all Crimean Tatars in the world” and the publication last month of “Nenkecan,” a Crimean journal in the Latin script (e-crimea.info/2011/04/18/49428/Kryimskotatarskiy_yazyik_pereydet_na_latinitsu_do_kontsa_goda_.shtml).
Following an overwhelming vote in favor, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on Wednesday called on the country’s parliament to adopt “in as short a time as possible” draft legislation that would regulate the languages of all minority nationalities in Ukraine, including not just Crimean Tatar but also Russian and other groups (www.interfax.com.ua/rus/pol/66910/).
Because such legislation touches on the sensitive issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and on the policies of the incumbent Ukrainian president who earlier promised to boost the status of Russian, that aspect of debates about a new language law is likely to attract the most attention in the coming weeks.
But in fact, the effort of the Crimean Tatars to go back to the Latin script may prove more important, not only because it will set them even more apart from the others on the peninsula but also because it will serve as a model for other Turkic groups in the post-Soviet world, in the first instance the Kazan Tatars, and tighten relations between these communities and Turkey.
The impact on the Kazan Tatars is likely to be especially great given Moscow’s increasing efforts to Russianize Tatarstan and especially the Russian government’s use of an appeal by a group of Kazan parents to reduce the amount of Tatar used in the schools of that Middle Volga republic.
Those Russian efforts have prompted some Tatar and Muslim commentators to ask, in this Year of Gabdulla Tukay, a leader of the Tatar renaissance of a century ago, “whether the language of Tukay [Tatar] will survive until the end of the 21st century?” -- or whether it is fated to be overwhelmed by Russian (www.islam.ru/content/kultura/1240).
Given the historic ties between the Kazan Tatars and the Crimean Tatars, a successful move to return to Latin script among the latter will likely spark calls for a similar step among the former, the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation and often a bellwether for the actions of other nations inside that country.
There are three reasons this Crimean Tatar effort is important in addition of course to its impact on the future of that nation. First, it highlights the way in which over the last year the Crimean Tatars and other nations of Eurasia have reasserted their efforts in the early 1990s to recover their own histories and set themselves apart from the hitherto dominant Russians.
Second, it underscores the ways in which Turkey is gaining influence among these peoples, positioning itself as a regional leader in direct competition with Moscow, Kyiv and other capitals and giving new content to the idea of Turkic world led intellectually at least from Ankara and Istanbul.
And third, it could trigger demands among other nations in Eurasia to shift away from the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic alphabets, including for at least some of the Finno-Ugric and North Caucasian languages and thus increase still further the centrifugal forces on the territory of the former Soviet space.
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