Paul Goble
Staunton, April 24 – Frightened by the implications of the events in the Middle East, Moscow has finally banned the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), a group that over the last decade has played a major role in shifting Russian nationalism away from the margins of Russian politics to their center, according to one Moscow analyst.
In an article on the APN.ru portal at the end of last week, Aleksei Abanin argues that the decision of the powers that be to take that step will do little to restrict the rise of Russian nationalism and may in fact trigger its spread to even broader groups in the population, thus further weakening the regime (www.apn.ru/publications/article24072.htm).
And while Abanin’s article is certainly excessive in its praise for an organization that has taken openly racist stands toward members of many ethnic and religious minorities and through its website and actions whipped up hostility toward them, its content is a reflection of the thinking of many Russian nationalities at the present time.
According to Abanin, “over the course of the ten years of its existence, the DPNI raised the propaganda of nationalism to a qualitatively new level, by reorienting it from narrow subculture circles to a mass audience” and thus providing the seedbeds for the growth of “an enormous quantity of talented cadres for the Right Movement.”
These people, he says, include, “civic activists, ideologues, human rights defenders, public social figures, publicists and so on.” And together they “carried out many large-scale (and not very) street measures, put out and distributed an enormous quantity of agitation and analytic materials, [and] provided help and support to an enormous number of Russian people.”
In addition, Abanin insists, DPNI “took an active information (and not only) part in the treatment and resolution of all the most serious conflicts and incidents in which Russians were subject to pressure, discrimination or terror by outsiders [and] made an enormous contribution to raising the importance of national discourse to a high political level.”
Thus, in sum, he says, the Movement “made possible the demarginalization of the image of Russian nationalism in the consciousness of society” and thereby contributed in this way to its transformation into “a real and THE ONLY political force which really has the mass support of the people” and is capable in the midterm of replacing the rotting RF regime.”
Because DPNI from the outset constituted a serious “headache” for that regime, Abanin says, the regime began to subject it to repressions already in 2005 when the first Russian March took place and when the DPNI “having understood the senselessness of attempts” to cooperate with the powers “went over into open opposition” even as it remained within the law.
By staying within the law, the DPNI made it difficult for the powers that be to move against it unless they were prepared to violate Russian law on their own and thus show their true nature to the Russian people even more clearly and definitively, the Moscow nationalist commentator continues.
Consequently, and short of that, the regime began to use its “beloved methods” against DPNI, including the dissemination of “yellow compromise” materials and the sponsoring of “the escalation of internal conflicts [within DPNI} with the goal of splitting the organization.” But neither proved effective, Abanin insists.
And their failure prompted the authorities to make use of “police repressions against particular activists and regional sections. But even this did not help the system destroy the spirit of the comrades in arms of the Movement and force them to begin to leave its ranks in massive numbers.”
Instead, DPNI’s street demonstrations “became ever larger and began to generate within the Russian elite not angry responses but real concern. And when throughout almost the entire Middle East suddenly broke out a wave of popular revolutions, the concern of the elite was transformed into fear.”
“For if a revolutionary could unexpectedly take place in Tunisia where no organized opposition existed,” the powers that be in Moscow reflected, “then what might happen in Russia where the national opposition, even given its serious internal contradictions and pressure from the powers, is able to assemble thousands of people in meetings?!”
According to Abanin, “the probability of the realization in the Russian Federation of ‘an Egyptian scenario’ after the prohibition of the largest legal nationalist organization will not fall but only increase.” That is something Moscow does not understand because it does not recognize that “in the first instance, it is not an organization that brings people to meetings.”
Instead, he continues, “Ideas” are what cause people to protest, and “however many movements and parties are banned, good and brave people cannot be. And it is impossible to ban people FROM THINKING WITH THEIR OWN HEADS,” at least for any prolonged period of time.
Abanin thus concludes that while “there is no longer a DPNI, its task will live! In the minds, hearts and actions of thousands of Russian people whom this organization helped to throw off the chains of slavery and gave direction as to how much be constructed a better world than the one in which we now live.”
Sunday, April 24, 2011
Saturday, April 23, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Muslims Sure Census Results Will Allow Them to Get More Haj Slots
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 23 – Even though the 2010 Russian Federation census has not released nationality data and did not ask questions about religious affiliation, Russia’s Muslims are confident that the latest enumeration will show that their numbers have increased significantly and that this in turn will allow them to secure a larger quota for the haj.
Yesterday, Ilyas Umakhanov, the vice speaker of the Federation Council and head of Russia’s haj mission, told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that the results of the 2010 census show a growth in the population of the Muslim regions of Russia and this will become the basis for Moscow to seek a larger haj quota (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184169/).
The Saudis as the keepers of Islam’s Holy Places of Mecca and Medina set annual quotas of one haji for every 1,000 Muslims in each country of the world. For the past decade, Russia’s quota has been 20,500, a number based on Saudi estimates that there are 20,500,000 of the faithful in the Russian Federation.
Moscow, at the urging of the Muslims of Russia, has sought a higher quota, occasionally successfully as when two years ago Vladimir Putin secured an additional 5,000 haj slots by using the argument that there was pent up demand from Soviet times when few could make the required pilgrimage.
But the Saudis have been reluctant to grant Moscow extra slots not only because any such concession would anger others or encourage them to demand more slots but also because it would appear to legitimize what is an increasing problem: thousands of Russia’s Muslims simply go to Saudi Arabia outside the limit and “crash” the haj lines.
The results of the 2010 census may give Russia new arguments for boosting the country’s haj quota. “In areas of the compact settlement of Muslims,” Umakhanov said, “the growth of the population all the same shows a very positive dynamic,” one that suggests Russia has more than 20.5 million Muslims and hence should be allotted more than 20,500 haj slots.
According to Umakhanov, during the period from 1945 to 1990, only 900 people made the haj from the entire Soviet Union. But today, “Russia is in the top dozen countries which has the largest quota for the haj, and even as that is the case, the number of those who want to make the pilgrimage is growing.”
Umakhanov said that the Saudis appear likely to want to see the official results of the census before making any adjustment, but he suggested that it is already obvious that the Muslim population of the Russian Federation is growing rapidly, especially among the peoples of the North Caucasus.
“If we consider Daghestan, the Chechen Republic, Tatarstan and Ingushetia alone,” the republics which generate more than 85 percent of all hajis from Russia, the haj commission chief said, then population growth alone in these regions should lead the Saudis to increase the haj quota for the Russian Federation “already in this year.”
Staunton, April 23 – Even though the 2010 Russian Federation census has not released nationality data and did not ask questions about religious affiliation, Russia’s Muslims are confident that the latest enumeration will show that their numbers have increased significantly and that this in turn will allow them to secure a larger quota for the haj.
Yesterday, Ilyas Umakhanov, the vice speaker of the Federation Council and head of Russia’s haj mission, told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that the results of the 2010 census show a growth in the population of the Muslim regions of Russia and this will become the basis for Moscow to seek a larger haj quota (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184169/).
The Saudis as the keepers of Islam’s Holy Places of Mecca and Medina set annual quotas of one haji for every 1,000 Muslims in each country of the world. For the past decade, Russia’s quota has been 20,500, a number based on Saudi estimates that there are 20,500,000 of the faithful in the Russian Federation.
Moscow, at the urging of the Muslims of Russia, has sought a higher quota, occasionally successfully as when two years ago Vladimir Putin secured an additional 5,000 haj slots by using the argument that there was pent up demand from Soviet times when few could make the required pilgrimage.
But the Saudis have been reluctant to grant Moscow extra slots not only because any such concession would anger others or encourage them to demand more slots but also because it would appear to legitimize what is an increasing problem: thousands of Russia’s Muslims simply go to Saudi Arabia outside the limit and “crash” the haj lines.
The results of the 2010 census may give Russia new arguments for boosting the country’s haj quota. “In areas of the compact settlement of Muslims,” Umakhanov said, “the growth of the population all the same shows a very positive dynamic,” one that suggests Russia has more than 20.5 million Muslims and hence should be allotted more than 20,500 haj slots.
According to Umakhanov, during the period from 1945 to 1990, only 900 people made the haj from the entire Soviet Union. But today, “Russia is in the top dozen countries which has the largest quota for the haj, and even as that is the case, the number of those who want to make the pilgrimage is growing.”
Umakhanov said that the Saudis appear likely to want to see the official results of the census before making any adjustment, but he suggested that it is already obvious that the Muslim population of the Russian Federation is growing rapidly, especially among the peoples of the North Caucasus.
“If we consider Daghestan, the Chechen Republic, Tatarstan and Ingushetia alone,” the republics which generate more than 85 percent of all hajis from Russia, the haj commission chief said, then population growth alone in these regions should lead the Saudis to increase the haj quota for the Russian Federation “already in this year.”
Friday, April 22, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Young Russians Hate Bureaucrats More than They Hate North Caucasians, Poll Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – A poll of 1600 young Russians in six major cities found that as much as they dislike migrants from the North Caucasus and support nationalist groups like those who took part in the Manezh Square protests last December, they dislike bureaucrats “even more,” a pattern that may portend even larger and more violent clashes.
Yesterday, the Moscow newspaper “Kommersant” reported about a poll conducted for the Social Chamber which showed that “young [Russians] hate bureaucrats more than they hate people from the Caucasus and give preference to nationalist organizations such as the Nashi movement and Molodaya gvardiya” (www.kommersant.ru/doc/1625661?isSearch=True).
The telephone poll, conducted by the Politex Social Technologies Agency with the support of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, involved 1600 respondents aged 15 to 30 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk.
Three out of four of those answering – 76 percent – said they sympathized with those who took part in the Manezh action. Only one in five – 20 percent – condemned it. Moreover, 78 percent insisted that the December protest was not a nationalistic action, with 58 percent saying that it was a protest against corruption and “so-called” ethnic crime.
The polltakers argued that the view that the Manezh protest was not nationalistic was confirmed by “the fact that ‘the relationship to it of ethnic Russian respondents and representatives of other nationalities was practically identical.
But the situation may be more complicated than that: Sixty-nine percent of the sample said the causes of the conflict were to be found in the fact that corruption, “especially in the law enforcement organs,” is flourishing and when “militiamen release criminals for money or on orders from above.”
Two out of three of those polled are “certain that migrants, especially ‘Caucasians,’ ‘live better,’ as a result of their rapid ability to adapt to the corruption of the authorities.” As a result, while 39 percent of the sample acknowledged they had a negative attitude toward people from the Caucasus, 51 percent had a negative one toward officials, and only 27 percent like the police.
Hostility toward young Caucasians, the poll found, is widespread: 69 percent said they “do not like them because of their ‘aggressive behavior’ and their unwillingness to “live according to our rules.’” As a result, 26 percent said they would “welcome the splitting off of the North Caucasus from Russia,” but a larger number – 40 percent – doubted that would help.
“Kommersant” noted that “it is interesting that only 17 percent of the participants in the poll positively assessed the activity of the Nashi movement,” while 32 percent expressed approval of the actions of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which a Moscow court has just banned.
The poll found that 37 percent of young urban Russians said that they have “acquaintances” who “would take part in actions” like the Manezh Square clashes. And “almost none of them doubted” there would be more such events. “Where and when,” one individual polled said, “I do not know. But they will take place.”
Everything that points to that conclusion, the young Russian said, “is now taking place.”
Staunton, April 22 – A poll of 1600 young Russians in six major cities found that as much as they dislike migrants from the North Caucasus and support nationalist groups like those who took part in the Manezh Square protests last December, they dislike bureaucrats “even more,” a pattern that may portend even larger and more violent clashes.
Yesterday, the Moscow newspaper “Kommersant” reported about a poll conducted for the Social Chamber which showed that “young [Russians] hate bureaucrats more than they hate people from the Caucasus and give preference to nationalist organizations such as the Nashi movement and Molodaya gvardiya” (www.kommersant.ru/doc/1625661?isSearch=True).
The telephone poll, conducted by the Politex Social Technologies Agency with the support of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, involved 1600 respondents aged 15 to 30 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk.
Three out of four of those answering – 76 percent – said they sympathized with those who took part in the Manezh action. Only one in five – 20 percent – condemned it. Moreover, 78 percent insisted that the December protest was not a nationalistic action, with 58 percent saying that it was a protest against corruption and “so-called” ethnic crime.
The polltakers argued that the view that the Manezh protest was not nationalistic was confirmed by “the fact that ‘the relationship to it of ethnic Russian respondents and representatives of other nationalities was practically identical.
But the situation may be more complicated than that: Sixty-nine percent of the sample said the causes of the conflict were to be found in the fact that corruption, “especially in the law enforcement organs,” is flourishing and when “militiamen release criminals for money or on orders from above.”
Two out of three of those polled are “certain that migrants, especially ‘Caucasians,’ ‘live better,’ as a result of their rapid ability to adapt to the corruption of the authorities.” As a result, while 39 percent of the sample acknowledged they had a negative attitude toward people from the Caucasus, 51 percent had a negative one toward officials, and only 27 percent like the police.
Hostility toward young Caucasians, the poll found, is widespread: 69 percent said they “do not like them because of their ‘aggressive behavior’ and their unwillingness to “live according to our rules.’” As a result, 26 percent said they would “welcome the splitting off of the North Caucasus from Russia,” but a larger number – 40 percent – doubted that would help.
“Kommersant” noted that “it is interesting that only 17 percent of the participants in the poll positively assessed the activity of the Nashi movement,” while 32 percent expressed approval of the actions of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which a Moscow court has just banned.
The poll found that 37 percent of young urban Russians said that they have “acquaintances” who “would take part in actions” like the Manezh Square clashes. And “almost none of them doubted” there would be more such events. “Where and when,” one individual polled said, “I do not know. But they will take place.”
Everything that points to that conclusion, the young Russian said, “is now taking place.”
Window on Eurasia: Karimov’s Repression Strengthening Jihadism in Uzbekistan, Memorial Report Concludes
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s “suppression of religious and political disagreements, together with extreme authoritarianism, total corruption, ineffective economics and the absence of social justice is contributing to the spread of the conviction there that positive changes in society can be achieved only by force.”
And that growing conviction, according to a 143-page study of conditions in that most populous Central Asian country, its author Vladimir Ponomarev of Memorial says, is creating the basis for the strengthening of the positions of jihadist groups” rather than weakening them as Karimov and his backers claim (www.agentura.ru/experts/vponomarev/).
Ponomarev’s report, entitled “Political Repressions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010, was financed by the Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and provides a wealth of detail about conditions in Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But each of his 11 conclusions deserves particular attention.
First of all, the Memorial expert says, “Uzbekistan, which has been ruled for 22 years by the former Communist leader Islam Karimov remains one of the most repressive states of the world,” a country in which there is no legal opposition or an independent media and in which “political repression is an indivisible part of state policy.”
Second, “the use of mass repression,” which Karimov began in the 1990s, “continues to this day.” There are now “several thousand political prisoners” and more than 1200 others who are being sought on the basis of such charges. Moreover, over the last two years, “the extent of repressions rose significantly and now appear to exceed even the high level of 2004-2006.”
Third, to this day, Uzbekistan’s criminal code contains various provisions that limit fundamental freedoms, including those which “criminalize any religious activity not sanctioned by the state” and others which define “terrorism” so broadly that almost anyone can be charged with that crime by Uzbek officials.
Fourth, Ponomarev writes, “a large number of [Uzbekistan’s] Muslims, whose actions do not represent a threat to public order and security as before are being condemned on the basis of fabricated accusations of terrorism and extremism.” And most of their convictions are based on confessions obtained by torture.
Fifth, according to the Memorial study, “the main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 were declared to be the Jihadists,” a term which Uzbek official employ to describe “not only the memb ers of the few terrorist groups but also members of various informal Islamic communities which supposedly express ‘radical views.’”
Sixth, despite Tashkent’s claims of a massive upsurge in terrorist activity as justification for the crackdowns, “there is no data” about any terrorist act except for three incidents in May 2009, and “there is no information [at all] about links between the local ‘Jihadists’ with such organizations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Union of ‘Islamic Jihad.’”
Seventh, because Tashkent’s repressive actions touch “not only marginal groups but have become part of the daily life of Uzbekistan,” they have become themselves “an important source of social-political tension” because they appear to justify the arguments of those who say that “positive changes in society can be achieved only by means of force.”
Eighth, just as was the case after the Andijan events of 2005, the Tashkent authorities appear to be using repression against independent human rights activists and journalists because they fear that such people will be the source of “alternative” and independent information and that that in turn “can stimulate protest attitudes in society.
Ninth, given the tight lid that Karimov’s regime has put on any information about the use of force by militants in 2009, it appears, Memorial’s Ponomarev says, that “the powers are afraid also that in the case of even limited success by Jihadist actions, the latter may serve as a model for emulation by others and give an impulse to the rise of new anti-government groups.”
Tenth, Ponomarev argues, “the West (like the partners of Uzbekistan inside the CIS as well) are underestimating the seriousness and extent of the problems connected with political repressions in Uzbekistan and their possible dramatic influence on regional stability” across Central Asia.
In contrast to the situation in 2002-2003, he continues, Western representatives have focused only “about 30” cases involving civil society activists and the democratic opposition, the freeingof which is assessed by some of them as evidence of ‘positive changes’” by the Tashkent leadership.
But in fact and just like in Soviet times, Tashkent is using these people “as hostages for political trade with the West” and is arresting new groups for every one individual it may choose to free. Indeed, the Memorial expert writes, “many are convinced” that the West is “not taking sufficient steps to change the situation.”
And finally, eleventh, Ponomarev aregues, “the current Realpolitik of the US and the European Union toward Uzbekistan needs to be reviewed, especially in the context of the latest events in the Middle East which can be repeated in Central Asia as well,” with Uzbekistan being a candidate for a Libyan rather than Egyptian scenario.
“It should be remembered,” the Memorial expert writes, “that during the period of active cooperation with the United States in 2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners which not only did not create any problems regarding the stability of the domestic political situation but on the contrary made possible a reduction in the level of tensions” there.
And it is also necessary to remember, Ponomarev says, that Karimov’s “’war with Islam’ under the cover of the struggle with terrorism … can have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The use of mass repressions not only represents a clear violation of Uzbekistan’s international obligations but represents a threat to the security and stability of the region.”
Staunton, April 22 – Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s “suppression of religious and political disagreements, together with extreme authoritarianism, total corruption, ineffective economics and the absence of social justice is contributing to the spread of the conviction there that positive changes in society can be achieved only by force.”
And that growing conviction, according to a 143-page study of conditions in that most populous Central Asian country, its author Vladimir Ponomarev of Memorial says, is creating the basis for the strengthening of the positions of jihadist groups” rather than weakening them as Karimov and his backers claim (www.agentura.ru/experts/vponomarev/).
Ponomarev’s report, entitled “Political Repressions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010, was financed by the Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and provides a wealth of detail about conditions in Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But each of his 11 conclusions deserves particular attention.
First of all, the Memorial expert says, “Uzbekistan, which has been ruled for 22 years by the former Communist leader Islam Karimov remains one of the most repressive states of the world,” a country in which there is no legal opposition or an independent media and in which “political repression is an indivisible part of state policy.”
Second, “the use of mass repression,” which Karimov began in the 1990s, “continues to this day.” There are now “several thousand political prisoners” and more than 1200 others who are being sought on the basis of such charges. Moreover, over the last two years, “the extent of repressions rose significantly and now appear to exceed even the high level of 2004-2006.”
Third, to this day, Uzbekistan’s criminal code contains various provisions that limit fundamental freedoms, including those which “criminalize any religious activity not sanctioned by the state” and others which define “terrorism” so broadly that almost anyone can be charged with that crime by Uzbek officials.
Fourth, Ponomarev writes, “a large number of [Uzbekistan’s] Muslims, whose actions do not represent a threat to public order and security as before are being condemned on the basis of fabricated accusations of terrorism and extremism.” And most of their convictions are based on confessions obtained by torture.
Fifth, according to the Memorial study, “the main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 were declared to be the Jihadists,” a term which Uzbek official employ to describe “not only the memb ers of the few terrorist groups but also members of various informal Islamic communities which supposedly express ‘radical views.’”
Sixth, despite Tashkent’s claims of a massive upsurge in terrorist activity as justification for the crackdowns, “there is no data” about any terrorist act except for three incidents in May 2009, and “there is no information [at all] about links between the local ‘Jihadists’ with such organizations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Union of ‘Islamic Jihad.’”
Seventh, because Tashkent’s repressive actions touch “not only marginal groups but have become part of the daily life of Uzbekistan,” they have become themselves “an important source of social-political tension” because they appear to justify the arguments of those who say that “positive changes in society can be achieved only by means of force.”
Eighth, just as was the case after the Andijan events of 2005, the Tashkent authorities appear to be using repression against independent human rights activists and journalists because they fear that such people will be the source of “alternative” and independent information and that that in turn “can stimulate protest attitudes in society.
Ninth, given the tight lid that Karimov’s regime has put on any information about the use of force by militants in 2009, it appears, Memorial’s Ponomarev says, that “the powers are afraid also that in the case of even limited success by Jihadist actions, the latter may serve as a model for emulation by others and give an impulse to the rise of new anti-government groups.”
Tenth, Ponomarev argues, “the West (like the partners of Uzbekistan inside the CIS as well) are underestimating the seriousness and extent of the problems connected with political repressions in Uzbekistan and their possible dramatic influence on regional stability” across Central Asia.
In contrast to the situation in 2002-2003, he continues, Western representatives have focused only “about 30” cases involving civil society activists and the democratic opposition, the freeingof which is assessed by some of them as evidence of ‘positive changes’” by the Tashkent leadership.
But in fact and just like in Soviet times, Tashkent is using these people “as hostages for political trade with the West” and is arresting new groups for every one individual it may choose to free. Indeed, the Memorial expert writes, “many are convinced” that the West is “not taking sufficient steps to change the situation.”
And finally, eleventh, Ponomarev aregues, “the current Realpolitik of the US and the European Union toward Uzbekistan needs to be reviewed, especially in the context of the latest events in the Middle East which can be repeated in Central Asia as well,” with Uzbekistan being a candidate for a Libyan rather than Egyptian scenario.
“It should be remembered,” the Memorial expert writes, “that during the period of active cooperation with the United States in 2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners which not only did not create any problems regarding the stability of the domestic political situation but on the contrary made possible a reduction in the level of tensions” there.
And it is also necessary to remember, Ponomarev says, that Karimov’s “’war with Islam’ under the cover of the struggle with terrorism … can have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The use of mass repressions not only represents a clear violation of Uzbekistan’s international obligations but represents a threat to the security and stability of the region.”
Window on Eurasia: Crimean Tatars Press to Go Back to Latin Script by End of 2011
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – The Crimean Tatars are stepping up the campaign they launched in 1991 to return to the Latin-based script in which their language was written between 1928 and 1938 and thus end the use of the Cyrillic-based script Stalin imposed on them, a step that will further set them apart from Slavic groups and bring them closer to Turkey.
On Monday, Eduard Dudakov, the chairman of the Republic Committee of Crimea for Inter-National Relations and the Affairs of Deported Citizens, told journalists that “the process of shifting the Crimean Tatar language from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to the Latin script is to be completed before the end of the year.
Discussion of this measure has gone on long enough, he continued, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs to adopt modifications in the country’s law on language that can “become the basis for the introduction of changes in the corresponding legal act, regulating the use of various writing systems.”
Dudakov’s comments follow proposals by Mustafa Cemilev, the president of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people who has long sought “a single alphabet for all Crimean Tatars in the world” and the publication last month of “Nenkecan,” a Crimean journal in the Latin script (e-crimea.info/2011/04/18/49428/Kryimskotatarskiy_yazyik_pereydet_na_latinitsu_do_kontsa_goda_.shtml).
Following an overwhelming vote in favor, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on Wednesday called on the country’s parliament to adopt “in as short a time as possible” draft legislation that would regulate the languages of all minority nationalities in Ukraine, including not just Crimean Tatar but also Russian and other groups (www.interfax.com.ua/rus/pol/66910/).
Because such legislation touches on the sensitive issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and on the policies of the incumbent Ukrainian president who earlier promised to boost the status of Russian, that aspect of debates about a new language law is likely to attract the most attention in the coming weeks.
But in fact, the effort of the Crimean Tatars to go back to the Latin script may prove more important, not only because it will set them even more apart from the others on the peninsula but also because it will serve as a model for other Turkic groups in the post-Soviet world, in the first instance the Kazan Tatars, and tighten relations between these communities and Turkey.
The impact on the Kazan Tatars is likely to be especially great given Moscow’s increasing efforts to Russianize Tatarstan and especially the Russian government’s use of an appeal by a group of Kazan parents to reduce the amount of Tatar used in the schools of that Middle Volga republic.
Those Russian efforts have prompted some Tatar and Muslim commentators to ask, in this Year of Gabdulla Tukay, a leader of the Tatar renaissance of a century ago, “whether the language of Tukay [Tatar] will survive until the end of the 21st century?” -- or whether it is fated to be overwhelmed by Russian (www.islam.ru/content/kultura/1240).
Given the historic ties between the Kazan Tatars and the Crimean Tatars, a successful move to return to Latin script among the latter will likely spark calls for a similar step among the former, the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation and often a bellwether for the actions of other nations inside that country.
There are three reasons this Crimean Tatar effort is important in addition of course to its impact on the future of that nation. First, it highlights the way in which over the last year the Crimean Tatars and other nations of Eurasia have reasserted their efforts in the early 1990s to recover their own histories and set themselves apart from the hitherto dominant Russians.
Second, it underscores the ways in which Turkey is gaining influence among these peoples, positioning itself as a regional leader in direct competition with Moscow, Kyiv and other capitals and giving new content to the idea of Turkic world led intellectually at least from Ankara and Istanbul.
And third, it could trigger demands among other nations in Eurasia to shift away from the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic alphabets, including for at least some of the Finno-Ugric and North Caucasian languages and thus increase still further the centrifugal forces on the territory of the former Soviet space.
Staunton, April 22 – The Crimean Tatars are stepping up the campaign they launched in 1991 to return to the Latin-based script in which their language was written between 1928 and 1938 and thus end the use of the Cyrillic-based script Stalin imposed on them, a step that will further set them apart from Slavic groups and bring them closer to Turkey.
On Monday, Eduard Dudakov, the chairman of the Republic Committee of Crimea for Inter-National Relations and the Affairs of Deported Citizens, told journalists that “the process of shifting the Crimean Tatar language from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to the Latin script is to be completed before the end of the year.
Discussion of this measure has gone on long enough, he continued, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs to adopt modifications in the country’s law on language that can “become the basis for the introduction of changes in the corresponding legal act, regulating the use of various writing systems.”
Dudakov’s comments follow proposals by Mustafa Cemilev, the president of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people who has long sought “a single alphabet for all Crimean Tatars in the world” and the publication last month of “Nenkecan,” a Crimean journal in the Latin script (e-crimea.info/2011/04/18/49428/Kryimskotatarskiy_yazyik_pereydet_na_latinitsu_do_kontsa_goda_.shtml).
Following an overwhelming vote in favor, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on Wednesday called on the country’s parliament to adopt “in as short a time as possible” draft legislation that would regulate the languages of all minority nationalities in Ukraine, including not just Crimean Tatar but also Russian and other groups (www.interfax.com.ua/rus/pol/66910/).
Because such legislation touches on the sensitive issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and on the policies of the incumbent Ukrainian president who earlier promised to boost the status of Russian, that aspect of debates about a new language law is likely to attract the most attention in the coming weeks.
But in fact, the effort of the Crimean Tatars to go back to the Latin script may prove more important, not only because it will set them even more apart from the others on the peninsula but also because it will serve as a model for other Turkic groups in the post-Soviet world, in the first instance the Kazan Tatars, and tighten relations between these communities and Turkey.
The impact on the Kazan Tatars is likely to be especially great given Moscow’s increasing efforts to Russianize Tatarstan and especially the Russian government’s use of an appeal by a group of Kazan parents to reduce the amount of Tatar used in the schools of that Middle Volga republic.
Those Russian efforts have prompted some Tatar and Muslim commentators to ask, in this Year of Gabdulla Tukay, a leader of the Tatar renaissance of a century ago, “whether the language of Tukay [Tatar] will survive until the end of the 21st century?” -- or whether it is fated to be overwhelmed by Russian (www.islam.ru/content/kultura/1240).
Given the historic ties between the Kazan Tatars and the Crimean Tatars, a successful move to return to Latin script among the latter will likely spark calls for a similar step among the former, the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation and often a bellwether for the actions of other nations inside that country.
There are three reasons this Crimean Tatar effort is important in addition of course to its impact on the future of that nation. First, it highlights the way in which over the last year the Crimean Tatars and other nations of Eurasia have reasserted their efforts in the early 1990s to recover their own histories and set themselves apart from the hitherto dominant Russians.
Second, it underscores the ways in which Turkey is gaining influence among these peoples, positioning itself as a regional leader in direct competition with Moscow, Kyiv and other capitals and giving new content to the idea of Turkic world led intellectually at least from Ankara and Istanbul.
And third, it could trigger demands among other nations in Eurasia to shift away from the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic alphabets, including for at least some of the Finno-Ugric and North Caucasian languages and thus increase still further the centrifugal forces on the territory of the former Soviet space.
Monday, April 18, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Chechen Internet ‘Developing Not Badly,’ Insider Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 17 – Given the role of the Internet and social media in the spread of popular revolts in many countries, there has been a great deal of speculation about how these new media are developing in places like Chechnya, but most of the commentary on such issues has come from outsiders rather than direct participants.
The current issue of the Daghestani online newspaper, “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” provides a welcome exception with its publication of information supplied anonymously by a Chechen blogger about how the Internet with its blogs and social media is developing in his republic (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5875/109/).
The paper’s Bagdat Tumalayev who writes frequently about new media in the Caucasus but relatively seldom about developments in that sector in Chechnya reports that “a Chechen blogger who wishes to remain anonymous has decided to talk about the state of affairs with regard to the Internet in his native region.”
The Chechen blogger’s desire for anonymity, Tumalayev says, “is understandable even though today this region has become stable” because “it isn’t especially comfortable for anyone living in Chechnya itself to write about this openly.” But the Daghestani journalist continues, “judging [from his text], the Internet in Chechnya is developing in a not bad way!”
Moreover, he continues, conditions are being created for its future growth. Vaynakh-Telecon, the leading Internet provide in Grozny, has recently “significantly lowered [its] prices.” Now, Chechens who want to go online can do so at a speed of 1mb/second for only 1200 rubles (40 US dollars) a month.
Among the most popular sites in Chechnya are Chechen-republic.com, Checheninfor.ru, and Chechnyafree.ru, a project of the Golos Rossii radio station. A social network for Vaynakhs, waynahi.ru, has arisen and offers itself as “a national social network for Chechnya and Ingushetia,” although the paper says “it is difficult to speak about how well known it is.”
But social networks are growing. There are already 211,000 Chechen residents registerd on the Russian social network, Odnoklassniki.ru, and there are 26,000 Grozny residents who use the Vkontakte.ru service. Also important in this regard, the Chechen blogger relates, is the Internet forum, vchechne.ru, where there are discussions about all kinds of issues.
The Grozni.org site carries photographs of the Chechen capital today, while Grozny.vrcal.com has photos from before the first Chechen campaign. Current news about the city is available on grozny-inform.ru, the Chechen blogger says, without indicating what he thinks of the content of that outlet.
Other interesting cites the blogger refers to include moct.org, the site of the graduates of the Grozny Oil Institute, fc-terek.ru, terek-grozny.ru,and Chechen sport.com which follow sports clubs. Also important are chechenasso.ru, which features news on Chechen communities outside of Chechnya, garikish.com and gakish.livejournal.com, which discuss social issues.
Ratings of these and other Chechen sites is available at chechentop.ru. There are also “several dozen” Chechen bloggers. The most widely read of these sites are the blog of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, ya_kadyrov.livejournal.com and that of Chechen journalist Timur Aliyev, timur_aliyev.livejournal.com.
Other blogs of note include the diary of Murat Mamirgov, the editor of Islamtv.ru, at mamirgov.livejournal.com, the blog of Arslan Khasavov, a Chechen writer of Daghestani origin, ubl.livejournal.com, and the blog of Leko Gudayev, the webmaster of the Checheninfor site, leko007.livejournal.com.
According to the anonymous Chechen blogger, the Chechen government is actively supporting these bloggers by giving them gifts and prizes as part of what it calls “The Golden Site of CHENET.” He does not say whether such arrangements are intended to ensure that the government knows what is going on, but that possibility cannot be excluded.
Staunton, April 17 – Given the role of the Internet and social media in the spread of popular revolts in many countries, there has been a great deal of speculation about how these new media are developing in places like Chechnya, but most of the commentary on such issues has come from outsiders rather than direct participants.
The current issue of the Daghestani online newspaper, “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” provides a welcome exception with its publication of information supplied anonymously by a Chechen blogger about how the Internet with its blogs and social media is developing in his republic (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5875/109/).
The paper’s Bagdat Tumalayev who writes frequently about new media in the Caucasus but relatively seldom about developments in that sector in Chechnya reports that “a Chechen blogger who wishes to remain anonymous has decided to talk about the state of affairs with regard to the Internet in his native region.”
The Chechen blogger’s desire for anonymity, Tumalayev says, “is understandable even though today this region has become stable” because “it isn’t especially comfortable for anyone living in Chechnya itself to write about this openly.” But the Daghestani journalist continues, “judging [from his text], the Internet in Chechnya is developing in a not bad way!”
Moreover, he continues, conditions are being created for its future growth. Vaynakh-Telecon, the leading Internet provide in Grozny, has recently “significantly lowered [its] prices.” Now, Chechens who want to go online can do so at a speed of 1mb/second for only 1200 rubles (40 US dollars) a month.
Among the most popular sites in Chechnya are Chechen-republic.com, Checheninfor.ru, and Chechnyafree.ru, a project of the Golos Rossii radio station. A social network for Vaynakhs, waynahi.ru, has arisen and offers itself as “a national social network for Chechnya and Ingushetia,” although the paper says “it is difficult to speak about how well known it is.”
But social networks are growing. There are already 211,000 Chechen residents registerd on the Russian social network, Odnoklassniki.ru, and there are 26,000 Grozny residents who use the Vkontakte.ru service. Also important in this regard, the Chechen blogger relates, is the Internet forum, vchechne.ru, where there are discussions about all kinds of issues.
The Grozni.org site carries photographs of the Chechen capital today, while Grozny.vrcal.com has photos from before the first Chechen campaign. Current news about the city is available on grozny-inform.ru, the Chechen blogger says, without indicating what he thinks of the content of that outlet.
Other interesting cites the blogger refers to include moct.org, the site of the graduates of the Grozny Oil Institute, fc-terek.ru, terek-grozny.ru,and Chechen sport.com which follow sports clubs. Also important are chechenasso.ru, which features news on Chechen communities outside of Chechnya, garikish.com and gakish.livejournal.com, which discuss social issues.
Ratings of these and other Chechen sites is available at chechentop.ru. There are also “several dozen” Chechen bloggers. The most widely read of these sites are the blog of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, ya_kadyrov.livejournal.com and that of Chechen journalist Timur Aliyev, timur_aliyev.livejournal.com.
Other blogs of note include the diary of Murat Mamirgov, the editor of Islamtv.ru, at mamirgov.livejournal.com, the blog of Arslan Khasavov, a Chechen writer of Daghestani origin, ubl.livejournal.com, and the blog of Leko Gudayev, the webmaster of the Checheninfor site, leko007.livejournal.com.
According to the anonymous Chechen blogger, the Chechen government is actively supporting these bloggers by giving them gifts and prizes as part of what it calls “The Golden Site of CHENET.” He does not say whether such arrangements are intended to ensure that the government knows what is going on, but that possibility cannot be excluded.
Window on Eurasia: Russian Campaign against Muslim Moderates Strengthens Islamist Extremists, Commentators Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 18 – Those Russians who oppose the modernization and integration of Russia’s Muslims into the political and social life of their country are unwittingly providing support to the Islamist radicals who argue that “there is no chance for normal legal work for the development of Islam” in Russia, two Muslim commentators say.
Indeed, Ruslan Kurbanov and Rinat Mukhametov argue in a lengthy article on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, this ongoing campaign against those within the Russian umma who want to modernize Islam represents “a serious threat to the common state interests of security and development” (www.russ.ru/pole/Islamskaya-modernizaciya-i-ee-vragi).
The occasion for their article, Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, is “the unceasing media-administrative campaign against the Union of Muftis of Russia [SMR]and its leader [Ravil Gainutdin]” and the fact that this campaign is “a clear testimony to the sharpening of the situation in the social-religious life of the country.”
They say that there are now “serious concerns that influential forces would like to exclude even the potential possibility of the enlivening and even more productive activity of domestic Muslims not to speak about some sort of more serious steps such as attempts at the unification” of the Russian umma.
“No one is obligated to love Islam and Muslims,” they continue, but such efforts, “which are trying to tie down the Russian umma hand and foot represent a serious threat” to Russia, and it is not surprising, they point out that “all this is being carefully observed by the imamate ‘forest,’” a reference to the militants in the North Caucasus and elsewhere.
Unlike Talgat Tajuddin of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), Ismail Berdiyevof the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus, and Mukhammad Rakhimov of the Russian Association of Islamic Accord (RAIS), Gainutdin and his SMR have attracted negative comment precisely because of their support for Muslim modernization.
The SMR, in contrast to the three other umbrella MSDs, “has been attempting to lead young people along the path of what is called ‘constructive Jihad,’ of legal Islamic social, cultural, media, intellectual and other types of activity,” Kurbanov and Mukkhametov say, “and this for various reasons does not please a large number of people.”
Much of Gainutdin’s program remains “the level of declaration,” they note, “but this positive example of the possibility of the normal peaceful development of Islam, the modernization and integration of the Muslim intelligentsia and young people” is attracting the interest “of all Muslim Russia.”
That is because Gainutdin and his SMR represent the possibility that Muslims in Russia will be able to “establish real and effective mechanisms and models of adaptation of Islam within the framework of contemporary Russian statehood,” something “without which, the solution of the problem of extremism is impossible.”
“Islamophobes” – and these are “completely definite forces with political and financial interests,” the two writers continue, “do not see a future for Islam in Russia.” Some of them believe that Islam should not be part of a Russian nation state, and others argue that Islam should be reduced in influence so that Russian can become “part of the Western world.”
But both the one and the other, Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, “however suprising this may appear, are in agreement with the so-called ‘forest brothers’ in the Caucasus and with all those who sympathize with them [because] they too do not see Islam and Muslims as an inalienable part of Russia and Russian identity.”
The attacks on Gainutdin and the SMR, the two Muslim writers say, reflects a faulty logic, one that if applied to the Russian Orthodox Church would require everyone to blame Patriarch Kirill for the actions of the skinheads and serial murders of non-Russians. “We do not think that a discussion at this level is useful for the Russian state.”
Kurbanov and Mukhametov devote most of their article to a discussion of the history of Russian attitudes toward Islam and Muslim organizations, and they demonstrate that both in the pre-1917 period and now, Islamophobes opposed any modernization of Islam and promoted both the spread of Orthodox Christianity and Russification.
But in contrast to the sophistication of the pre-revolutionary leaders of this approach, the current Islamophobes are destroying their own case by promoting discredited leaders within Islam, leader who, Kurbanov and Mukhametov says, are “not cable of influencing Muslims the muftis of which they consider themselves to be,” in the hopes of destroying the umma.
The government-assisted rise of such leaders, they say, represents “a big gift to ‘the forest,’” one that the Caucasus Emirate “could not have imagined on its own.” The propagandists of that group treat what the Islamophobes are doing in Russia as evidence of the rightness of the struggle against Moscow.
“In ‘kafir’ Russia,” the Emirate’s propagandists say, “Leaders are imposed on Muslims who have lost any authority as a result of their declarations and activity; consequently, the development of Islam is blocked; and that in turn means that ‘our task is right’ and that ‘we will win.’”
In this way, and despite the failure of many to understand what is going on, Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, “the attack on the modernization of Muslim institutions is an attack on the security” of the country as a whole, all the more so because “without modernization [of the country],” Russia will not be able to respond to the challenges of the 21st century.
Those who oppose modernization generally and in the Muslim umma “are only playing into the hands of those who want that Russian Muslims do not feel themselves masters in their own land and of those … would like to remove the ‘Muslim’ bricks from the building of the single state and thus make possible the destruction of our entire common home.”
Russia’s Islamophobes oppose the consolidation of the umma on a platform of modernization, the two writers argue, and believe that the difficulties within the Islamic community there are not “problems of growth” but systemic and that “Islam always will be a factor of destabilization and a headache” for Russia.
These opponents of Muslims “advise the bureaucrats that it is necessary to continue the course on the step by step elimination of Islam – not ‘Islamism’ and ‘Wahhabism’ but Islam as such.” And to that end, they urge that “the official Islamic institutions in Russia remain at the level of Soviet times.”
But such an approach entails some really tragic consequences, Kurbanov and Mukhametov argue. It means that those really interested in Islam will be forced to go into “semi-legal or even illegal” places, that the official leaders will remain “illiterate and reactionary,” and that Islam n Russia will again be reduced to “rituals” rather than “faith.”
“In fact,” they say, what Islamophobes like Roman Silantyev are calling for would represent “a return to the pre-Catherine policy toward Islam, the core idea of which was Christianization by any means, including the use of force,” an approach that will in the present circumstances lead to an explosion.
That is because “the formation of the umma and the Islamic awakening in Russia are an irreversible process,” the two Muslim writers say. “The point of no-return has been passed.” The modernizers understand this and want to ensure that the rebirth of Islam takes place within Russia, while “the Islamophobes and ‘the forest brothers’ want this not to happen.”
“For different reasons, the one and the other do not want to see Islam within Russia.” But “sooner or later, a normal working system of interrelationships with Muslims will have to be developed. Those who have any doubts about this should carefully study the results of the last census of the population.”
“In order to avoid problems,” Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, “it would be better to do this sooner rather than later. The state, the Russian people, the Union of Muftis and ‘the modernizers’ have an interest in doing it sooner. The Islamophobes and ‘the forest’ want it to happen as late as possible or better still not at all.”
Staunton, April 18 – Those Russians who oppose the modernization and integration of Russia’s Muslims into the political and social life of their country are unwittingly providing support to the Islamist radicals who argue that “there is no chance for normal legal work for the development of Islam” in Russia, two Muslim commentators say.
Indeed, Ruslan Kurbanov and Rinat Mukhametov argue in a lengthy article on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, this ongoing campaign against those within the Russian umma who want to modernize Islam represents “a serious threat to the common state interests of security and development” (www.russ.ru/pole/Islamskaya-modernizaciya-i-ee-vragi).
The occasion for their article, Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, is “the unceasing media-administrative campaign against the Union of Muftis of Russia [SMR]and its leader [Ravil Gainutdin]” and the fact that this campaign is “a clear testimony to the sharpening of the situation in the social-religious life of the country.”
They say that there are now “serious concerns that influential forces would like to exclude even the potential possibility of the enlivening and even more productive activity of domestic Muslims not to speak about some sort of more serious steps such as attempts at the unification” of the Russian umma.
“No one is obligated to love Islam and Muslims,” they continue, but such efforts, “which are trying to tie down the Russian umma hand and foot represent a serious threat” to Russia, and it is not surprising, they point out that “all this is being carefully observed by the imamate ‘forest,’” a reference to the militants in the North Caucasus and elsewhere.
Unlike Talgat Tajuddin of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), Ismail Berdiyevof the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus, and Mukhammad Rakhimov of the Russian Association of Islamic Accord (RAIS), Gainutdin and his SMR have attracted negative comment precisely because of their support for Muslim modernization.
The SMR, in contrast to the three other umbrella MSDs, “has been attempting to lead young people along the path of what is called ‘constructive Jihad,’ of legal Islamic social, cultural, media, intellectual and other types of activity,” Kurbanov and Mukkhametov say, “and this for various reasons does not please a large number of people.”
Much of Gainutdin’s program remains “the level of declaration,” they note, “but this positive example of the possibility of the normal peaceful development of Islam, the modernization and integration of the Muslim intelligentsia and young people” is attracting the interest “of all Muslim Russia.”
That is because Gainutdin and his SMR represent the possibility that Muslims in Russia will be able to “establish real and effective mechanisms and models of adaptation of Islam within the framework of contemporary Russian statehood,” something “without which, the solution of the problem of extremism is impossible.”
“Islamophobes” – and these are “completely definite forces with political and financial interests,” the two writers continue, “do not see a future for Islam in Russia.” Some of them believe that Islam should not be part of a Russian nation state, and others argue that Islam should be reduced in influence so that Russian can become “part of the Western world.”
But both the one and the other, Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, “however suprising this may appear, are in agreement with the so-called ‘forest brothers’ in the Caucasus and with all those who sympathize with them [because] they too do not see Islam and Muslims as an inalienable part of Russia and Russian identity.”
The attacks on Gainutdin and the SMR, the two Muslim writers say, reflects a faulty logic, one that if applied to the Russian Orthodox Church would require everyone to blame Patriarch Kirill for the actions of the skinheads and serial murders of non-Russians. “We do not think that a discussion at this level is useful for the Russian state.”
Kurbanov and Mukhametov devote most of their article to a discussion of the history of Russian attitudes toward Islam and Muslim organizations, and they demonstrate that both in the pre-1917 period and now, Islamophobes opposed any modernization of Islam and promoted both the spread of Orthodox Christianity and Russification.
But in contrast to the sophistication of the pre-revolutionary leaders of this approach, the current Islamophobes are destroying their own case by promoting discredited leaders within Islam, leader who, Kurbanov and Mukhametov says, are “not cable of influencing Muslims the muftis of which they consider themselves to be,” in the hopes of destroying the umma.
The government-assisted rise of such leaders, they say, represents “a big gift to ‘the forest,’” one that the Caucasus Emirate “could not have imagined on its own.” The propagandists of that group treat what the Islamophobes are doing in Russia as evidence of the rightness of the struggle against Moscow.
“In ‘kafir’ Russia,” the Emirate’s propagandists say, “Leaders are imposed on Muslims who have lost any authority as a result of their declarations and activity; consequently, the development of Islam is blocked; and that in turn means that ‘our task is right’ and that ‘we will win.’”
In this way, and despite the failure of many to understand what is going on, Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, “the attack on the modernization of Muslim institutions is an attack on the security” of the country as a whole, all the more so because “without modernization [of the country],” Russia will not be able to respond to the challenges of the 21st century.
Those who oppose modernization generally and in the Muslim umma “are only playing into the hands of those who want that Russian Muslims do not feel themselves masters in their own land and of those … would like to remove the ‘Muslim’ bricks from the building of the single state and thus make possible the destruction of our entire common home.”
Russia’s Islamophobes oppose the consolidation of the umma on a platform of modernization, the two writers argue, and believe that the difficulties within the Islamic community there are not “problems of growth” but systemic and that “Islam always will be a factor of destabilization and a headache” for Russia.
These opponents of Muslims “advise the bureaucrats that it is necessary to continue the course on the step by step elimination of Islam – not ‘Islamism’ and ‘Wahhabism’ but Islam as such.” And to that end, they urge that “the official Islamic institutions in Russia remain at the level of Soviet times.”
But such an approach entails some really tragic consequences, Kurbanov and Mukhametov argue. It means that those really interested in Islam will be forced to go into “semi-legal or even illegal” places, that the official leaders will remain “illiterate and reactionary,” and that Islam n Russia will again be reduced to “rituals” rather than “faith.”
“In fact,” they say, what Islamophobes like Roman Silantyev are calling for would represent “a return to the pre-Catherine policy toward Islam, the core idea of which was Christianization by any means, including the use of force,” an approach that will in the present circumstances lead to an explosion.
That is because “the formation of the umma and the Islamic awakening in Russia are an irreversible process,” the two Muslim writers say. “The point of no-return has been passed.” The modernizers understand this and want to ensure that the rebirth of Islam takes place within Russia, while “the Islamophobes and ‘the forest brothers’ want this not to happen.”
“For different reasons, the one and the other do not want to see Islam within Russia.” But “sooner or later, a normal working system of interrelationships with Muslims will have to be developed. Those who have any doubts about this should carefully study the results of the last census of the population.”
“In order to avoid problems,” Kurbanov and Mukhametov say, “it would be better to do this sooner rather than later. The state, the Russian people, the Union of Muftis and ‘the modernizers’ have an interest in doing it sooner. The Islamophobes and ‘the forest’ want it to happen as late as possible or better still not at all.”
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