Paul Goble
Staunton, April 11 – The emergence of enormous agricultural holding companies in the Russian Federation is not only destroying much of the social infrastructure of the rural portions of that country but also threatening Russian society as a whole, according to a leading Moscow specialist on rural economics.
In an interview to “Svobodnaya pressa,” Aleksandr Nikulin, the director of the Center of Agrarian Research of the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service, explains how this situation has come about and why it threatens the Third Rome just as Pliny the Elder warned that it threatened the First (svpressa.ru/society/article/41718/).
As Nikulin’s interviewer Kirill Zubkov says, the recent tragic events in Kushchevskaya, “where a local criminal community created ‘a state within a state,’” highlight some of the most obvious dangers of the emergence in Russia of “an analogue of Latin American latifundia with the total lack of rights of the peasants and the death squadrons.”
But the Moscow expert provides a less sensationalist but far more disturbing picture of what is going on, one that positions what is taking place in rural Russia today not just in terms of the Russian and Soviet pasts but also relative to certain international trends in agricultural economics and organization.
Nikulin notes that there are “two basic types of agrarian production:” the amily farm and the agrarian enterprise where “production is achieved through the use of a hired workforce.” Latifundias are “a special case” of the latter and represent a kind of “super-large agrarian enterprise.”
At the end of the Soviet period, there wer approximately 25,000 kokhozes and sovkhozes, and reformers wanted “entirely” correctly Nikulin says to create a more diverse agriculture that would include family farms as well as larger agrarian enterprises as part of a plan to overcome “the multitutde of problems” of rural people.
Two decades later, there are now “approximately 260,000 farmers” in the Russian Federation. And their appearance led many “ideologues of liberal reforms” to believe that “after a few years” there would be a Stolypin-style rural population at the center of which would be strong individual family farms.
That has not happened, Nikulin says, and such farmers “produce only about seven percent of the total of agrarian production.” Worse, many new social problems in rural areas have emerged, and “tens of thousands” of supposed farmers do not engage in agricultural activities at all.
Indeed, the Moscow expert continues, “only about 20,000 farmers (of 260,000) are farmer-entrepreneurs in the Western sense,” while “more than 100,000” of these people are involved in subsistence agriculture rather than production for sale. Consequently, one must look elsewhere for the major producers.
Part of the reason for the failure of these reforms lay in the difficulties of the 1990s, the lack of the kind of institutions and assistance the transformation the reformers wanted required, Nikulin says. And part of it lies with the fact that collective forms of agriculture “displayed a surprising vitality” over this period.
Not only were these institutions larger and thus capable of using mechanization more effectively, but they “were not agrarian enterprises. Instead, they were means of organization of rural communities” which provided “all the social infrastructure – schools, roads, water supplies, and hospitals.”
Until 1998, Russian capitalists showed little interest in rural areas because agriculture did not appear to be a profit center. But the default changed that by making Russian farm products more attractive to the domestic market and even to the international one. As a result and because almost everything else had been privatized by then, investors moved into the rural aras.
Beginning at that time, however, investors began forming large agro-holdings of as much as 400,000 hectares, holdings that dwarf all other forms of agriculture. There are now “more than 700” of these, and as in many other countries, these “farms” are setting the weather for all the others, including family farms.
Until the economic crisis hit in 2008, investors around the world engaged in a speculative race to buy enormous amounts of rural land, sometimes in their own countries but often in others. Thus, The Chinese have bought land in Africa and the Russian Far East, European and US concerns in South America, and European and American firms in Ukraine
As a result of these various trends, Nikulin says, “over the last decade, a land and property redivision has taken place in rural Russia, one analogous to that which took place in the 1990s in the industrial and raw materials sectors.” And as in both of them, “colossal, vertically integrated” corporations have emerged as the dominant players.
But in agriculture, these entities have proved much less successful because they have ignored the local conditions and the specific requirements of farming. As a result, the Russian landscape is littered with a cemetary of these ‘agro-dinosaurs,’” institutions that existed a few years and then declared bankruptcy.
The latifundia which remain, however, are having serious “social and political consequences,” Nikulin says. The big firms have little interest in maintaining the collateral institutions like schools and hospitals on which rural life depends. As those institutions perish because of a lack of support, so too will the rural portion of the country.
The short-term, profit-driven approach of the agro-holdings means that their managers consider those who work for them not individual farmers but “a faceless wage work force.” To keep such people in line, these firms use “private security companies” and are lobbying for various means to hold workers to the land much as under serfdom.
“Historical experience shows,” he continues, “that there were rural places completely fall under the control of latifundia owner oligarchs, the entire society tends toward decline and emptying out.” That is what Pliny the Elder warned about in Rome, and unless Russia adopts “a tough social and economic policy” for its rural areas, the same could happen to it.
Monday, April 11, 2011
Window on Eurasia: One in Three East of the Urals Now Identifies as a Siberian, Irkutsk Priest Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 11 – Approximately one in every three residents of the Russian Federation east of the Urals now identifies as a Siberian, an identification that will intensify into fullblown nationhood unless Moscow arranges to dispatch more ethnic Russians from European portions of the country there, according to a Russian Orthodox churchman in Irkutsk.
In a comment on the debate over whether Siberians constitute a nation, a sub-ethnos or only a regional identity, Archpriest Vyacheslav Pushkarev says that “Sibiryaks” now form 30 to 35 percent of the population east of the Urals, making them the second largest ethnos in that region (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/04/06/sibiryaki_eto_subetnicheskaya_obwnost/).
According to Pushkarev, the situation regarding identity in Siberia and the Far East is far more complicated than most of the participants in the debate over whether Siberians are a nationality or not suspect, the result of both the complex history of the settlement of that region and recent changes.
“In Siberia and the Far East,” he writes, “a situation evolved in which in reality live side by side two major ethnoses and a mass of small ones.” The first “and still the dominant one” are the Great Russians, people “who as a rule are children of recent resettlers who came or were sent to [the region] in the 1950s to the 1970s.”
“These people spent all their childhood and each summer as guests of their grandmothers in Central Russia and the South of the country” and viewed “life in Siberia” as “atemporary phenomenon … constantly dreaming and now dreaming of returning to the historic Motherland of their fathers and mothers.”
And it is this group of people who make up the 100,000 who annually leave Siberia and the Far East every year, departures that mean that those who “call themselves [ethnic] Russian people and are proud of their origins.” They now form roughly half of the population of the region, but their share is constantly declining.
“The second major ethnos,” the archpriest says, “is a mass of people who now call themselves and for a long time have felt themselves to be Sibirians.” This is “already an accomplished fact.” They are “justbegining to understand themselves as a single community, but this process is developing very quickly.”
These “Siberians” represent now approximately 30-35 percent of the total population.[They] are descendents of voluntary settlers whocame to Siberia from the 17th to the end of the 19th century and of course as well the children of numerous mixed marriages [with indigenous nationalities] in various generations.”
They “did not have a childhood in the South,” and “they do not connect their future with the Core Russia because no one is waiting for them there and all that they have was given to them by Siberia. Why do they call themselves Siberians? Because by blood they are already far from Russians and are distinguished even by their anthropological type.”
“In addition,” Pushkarev writes, as the authority of the Great Russian nation has fallen, those who are the products of mixed marriages but who do not want to identify as Buryats, Yakuts or Udygeys are interested in an identity that reflects their unique character as a people in between.
“The people in these districts are now not very religious, and religion does not unify them,” Pushkarev says. “Geography does.” That feeling is intensified by the sense that many of them feel that “for Moscow,” the residents of this enormous land are only servants of the interests of the center.
“To call themselves Siberians,” the archpriest says, “is just as natural and comfortable as it is for Anglo-Saxons to call themselves Canadians, Australians or Americans.” And that is all the more so “under conditions when the [ethnic] Russian people does not have special rights and even its own territory,”while small non-Russian peoples do.
In this way as in many others, the Siberians resemble the small peoples of Siberia with whom they are interrelated. “For the Siberians, the small peoples of Siberia are part of their blood and their history and therefore they are closer to them than to the Great Russians and only they can be seriously concerned about the rapid dying out of communities of local people.”
Pushkarev says that “Siberians now are becoming the leading force in Siberia since they intend to live in it in the future and therefore their self-determination and self-advancement will continue, and no political science commentaries or ethnographic definitions are going to help” change that.
The only thing that would help, the Russian Orthodox priest says, would be “the flooding of Siberia and the Far East with Great Russians”—“a minimum of 100 million “would be needed,” he says – and the shifting of the political capital of the country “closer to the center of the entire Russian Federation so that each will feel that it near and common” to all.
Unless these things happen – and they aren’t, Pushkarev observes – “then the phenomenon of the Siberians as a nationality will become an anthropological and political fact with all the snuring centrifugal consequences up to the loss by the Russian Federation of the territories of Siberia and the Far East.”
“This is where the truth is,” the archipriest concludes, “and not in assertions that the Siberians supposedly do not exist. One must not close one’s eyes to an accomplished fact,” as some Moscow commentators are doing, people who are “far from an understanding of the essence of the problem” beyond the Urals.
Staunton, April 11 – Approximately one in every three residents of the Russian Federation east of the Urals now identifies as a Siberian, an identification that will intensify into fullblown nationhood unless Moscow arranges to dispatch more ethnic Russians from European portions of the country there, according to a Russian Orthodox churchman in Irkutsk.
In a comment on the debate over whether Siberians constitute a nation, a sub-ethnos or only a regional identity, Archpriest Vyacheslav Pushkarev says that “Sibiryaks” now form 30 to 35 percent of the population east of the Urals, making them the second largest ethnos in that region (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/04/06/sibiryaki_eto_subetnicheskaya_obwnost/).
According to Pushkarev, the situation regarding identity in Siberia and the Far East is far more complicated than most of the participants in the debate over whether Siberians are a nationality or not suspect, the result of both the complex history of the settlement of that region and recent changes.
“In Siberia and the Far East,” he writes, “a situation evolved in which in reality live side by side two major ethnoses and a mass of small ones.” The first “and still the dominant one” are the Great Russians, people “who as a rule are children of recent resettlers who came or were sent to [the region] in the 1950s to the 1970s.”
“These people spent all their childhood and each summer as guests of their grandmothers in Central Russia and the South of the country” and viewed “life in Siberia” as “atemporary phenomenon … constantly dreaming and now dreaming of returning to the historic Motherland of their fathers and mothers.”
And it is this group of people who make up the 100,000 who annually leave Siberia and the Far East every year, departures that mean that those who “call themselves [ethnic] Russian people and are proud of their origins.” They now form roughly half of the population of the region, but their share is constantly declining.
“The second major ethnos,” the archpriest says, “is a mass of people who now call themselves and for a long time have felt themselves to be Sibirians.” This is “already an accomplished fact.” They are “justbegining to understand themselves as a single community, but this process is developing very quickly.”
These “Siberians” represent now approximately 30-35 percent of the total population.[They] are descendents of voluntary settlers whocame to Siberia from the 17th to the end of the 19th century and of course as well the children of numerous mixed marriages [with indigenous nationalities] in various generations.”
They “did not have a childhood in the South,” and “they do not connect their future with the Core Russia because no one is waiting for them there and all that they have was given to them by Siberia. Why do they call themselves Siberians? Because by blood they are already far from Russians and are distinguished even by their anthropological type.”
“In addition,” Pushkarev writes, as the authority of the Great Russian nation has fallen, those who are the products of mixed marriages but who do not want to identify as Buryats, Yakuts or Udygeys are interested in an identity that reflects their unique character as a people in between.
“The people in these districts are now not very religious, and religion does not unify them,” Pushkarev says. “Geography does.” That feeling is intensified by the sense that many of them feel that “for Moscow,” the residents of this enormous land are only servants of the interests of the center.
“To call themselves Siberians,” the archpriest says, “is just as natural and comfortable as it is for Anglo-Saxons to call themselves Canadians, Australians or Americans.” And that is all the more so “under conditions when the [ethnic] Russian people does not have special rights and even its own territory,”while small non-Russian peoples do.
In this way as in many others, the Siberians resemble the small peoples of Siberia with whom they are interrelated. “For the Siberians, the small peoples of Siberia are part of their blood and their history and therefore they are closer to them than to the Great Russians and only they can be seriously concerned about the rapid dying out of communities of local people.”
Pushkarev says that “Siberians now are becoming the leading force in Siberia since they intend to live in it in the future and therefore their self-determination and self-advancement will continue, and no political science commentaries or ethnographic definitions are going to help” change that.
The only thing that would help, the Russian Orthodox priest says, would be “the flooding of Siberia and the Far East with Great Russians”—“a minimum of 100 million “would be needed,” he says – and the shifting of the political capital of the country “closer to the center of the entire Russian Federation so that each will feel that it near and common” to all.
Unless these things happen – and they aren’t, Pushkarev observes – “then the phenomenon of the Siberians as a nationality will become an anthropological and political fact with all the snuring centrifugal consequences up to the loss by the Russian Federation of the territories of Siberia and the Far East.”
“This is where the truth is,” the archipriest concludes, “and not in assertions that the Siberians supposedly do not exist. One must not close one’s eyes to an accomplished fact,” as some Moscow commentators are doing, people who are “far from an understanding of the essence of the problem” beyond the Urals.
Sunday, April 10, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Some Russian Orthodox Seek Common Cause with Protestants Against Islam, Russian Evangelical Leader Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 10 – Because of the success Protestant missionaries have had in traditionally Muslim regions in the Russian Federation, some in the Orthodox Church want to make common cause with them against Islam, a view that the leader of the Evangelical Church there rejects.
In an interview published in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” Bishop Sergey Ryakhovsky, the president of the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians, says that he is against such an approach that just as he is against “crusades in any of their manifestation” (religion.ng.ru/events/2011-04-06/1_episkop.html).
Ryakhovsky says that it is a fundamental tenet of his church that an individual is either a Christian or he is not and that ethnic or denominational differences are secondary to that fundamental requirement, but he adds that he does not want his church to become embroiled in a clash with followers of other faiths.
The recent murder of Bishop Artur Suleymanov in the North Caucasus, Ryakhovsky continues, “was not a war of Islam with Christianity,” however much some may want to treat it in that way. “In the Russian Caucasus,” he points out, “the number of imams killed is an order of magnitude greater than that of Christian pastors.”
Bishop Arthus, the Russian Evangelical leader continues, “lived very peaceably with his neighbors who professed Islam and was a man respected in their eyes as a man of the Book and a just figure. The same situation obtains in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan,” Ryakhovsky adds, because “we teach believers to be respectful toward all people, their culture [and] traditions.”
Bishop Ryakhovsky adds that he has longstanding and good relations with the leaders “of the majority of the major centralized Muslim structures of Russia,” relations that have allowed the realization of “joint projects in the majority in the social sphere and in the area of strengthening inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace in our country.”
None of these leaders, the bishop adds, has ever criticized him or the Protestant community “for aggressiveness or anything else. But it is natural that the successes [that the Protestant churches have enjoyed in Russia] has generated jealousy … Not everyone likes this [and] it is usually easier to cry with the weeping than be glad with the joyous.”
One young Russian Orthodox priest recently approached him, Ryakhovsky recounts, and said that “his goal was to convert to Orthodoxy as many Protestants as possible in order that they then under Orthodox banners would convert Muslims to Orthodoxy.” He said that the success of the Protestants and their “charisma” made such an approach desirable.
After making this comment, the bishop says, the young priest turned away without waiting for an answer. Apparently, Ryakhovsky adds, the priest did not learn much Greek in seminary. Had he, the bishop said, he would have known that charisma is “a gift of God” and that one must search for it in oneself rather than “attempt to find it in others.”
What makes this exchange so intriguing is that it represents a break in the Moscow Patriarchate’s efforts to freeze out the Protestants whom it often calls “sects” just as Patriarch Kirill is expanding dialogue with the Catholics and that such attitudes reflect the sense even among the Orthodox that all Christians must come together to fight the growth of Islam.
How far either of these trends can go, of course, remains very much a matter of debate. On the one hand, many Orthodox priests and bishops oppose anything resembling ecumenism as recent events in Izhevsk. And on the other, a too public effort to unite Christians against Muslims in Russia would likely backfire, leading to even greater unity among the latter.
Staunton, April 10 – Because of the success Protestant missionaries have had in traditionally Muslim regions in the Russian Federation, some in the Orthodox Church want to make common cause with them against Islam, a view that the leader of the Evangelical Church there rejects.
In an interview published in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” Bishop Sergey Ryakhovsky, the president of the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians, says that he is against such an approach that just as he is against “crusades in any of their manifestation” (religion.ng.ru/events/2011-04-06/1_episkop.html).
Ryakhovsky says that it is a fundamental tenet of his church that an individual is either a Christian or he is not and that ethnic or denominational differences are secondary to that fundamental requirement, but he adds that he does not want his church to become embroiled in a clash with followers of other faiths.
The recent murder of Bishop Artur Suleymanov in the North Caucasus, Ryakhovsky continues, “was not a war of Islam with Christianity,” however much some may want to treat it in that way. “In the Russian Caucasus,” he points out, “the number of imams killed is an order of magnitude greater than that of Christian pastors.”
Bishop Arthus, the Russian Evangelical leader continues, “lived very peaceably with his neighbors who professed Islam and was a man respected in their eyes as a man of the Book and a just figure. The same situation obtains in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan,” Ryakhovsky adds, because “we teach believers to be respectful toward all people, their culture [and] traditions.”
Bishop Ryakhovsky adds that he has longstanding and good relations with the leaders “of the majority of the major centralized Muslim structures of Russia,” relations that have allowed the realization of “joint projects in the majority in the social sphere and in the area of strengthening inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace in our country.”
None of these leaders, the bishop adds, has ever criticized him or the Protestant community “for aggressiveness or anything else. But it is natural that the successes [that the Protestant churches have enjoyed in Russia] has generated jealousy … Not everyone likes this [and] it is usually easier to cry with the weeping than be glad with the joyous.”
One young Russian Orthodox priest recently approached him, Ryakhovsky recounts, and said that “his goal was to convert to Orthodoxy as many Protestants as possible in order that they then under Orthodox banners would convert Muslims to Orthodoxy.” He said that the success of the Protestants and their “charisma” made such an approach desirable.
After making this comment, the bishop says, the young priest turned away without waiting for an answer. Apparently, Ryakhovsky adds, the priest did not learn much Greek in seminary. Had he, the bishop said, he would have known that charisma is “a gift of God” and that one must search for it in oneself rather than “attempt to find it in others.”
What makes this exchange so intriguing is that it represents a break in the Moscow Patriarchate’s efforts to freeze out the Protestants whom it often calls “sects” just as Patriarch Kirill is expanding dialogue with the Catholics and that such attitudes reflect the sense even among the Orthodox that all Christians must come together to fight the growth of Islam.
How far either of these trends can go, of course, remains very much a matter of debate. On the one hand, many Orthodox priests and bishops oppose anything resembling ecumenism as recent events in Izhevsk. And on the other, a too public effort to unite Christians against Muslims in Russia would likely backfire, leading to even greater unity among the latter.
Window on Eurasia: Bukovsky’s Call to Try Gorbachev Deserves Support Not Condemnation, Podrabinek Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 10 – Vladimir Bukovsky’s call to bring Mikhail Gorbachev to trial for the crimes he committed as Soviet leader has met with “almost universal condemnation,” Aleksandr Podrabinek says, when the appeal of the former Soviet dissident should have been met with understanding and support.
In an essay on the Grani.ru portal, Podrabinek, himself a former dissident and longtime human rights activist argues that “the most intellectual and socially conscious part” of Russian society has failed by not helping Bukovsky in his “efforts to cleanse our history of myths and lies” (grani.ru/opinion/m.187520.html).
Among the actions for which the last Soviet leader would appear to bear responsibility, the human rights activist says, are the various applications of military force against peaceful civilian populations in Tbilisi in April 1989, Baku in January 1990, and Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 which left many dead and wounded in their wake.
“Behind all these operations of the Soviet army, the MVD and the KGB stood the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and (after March 1990) USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev,” Podravinek points out. “He was the supreme commander and first person” of that “still totalitarian state.”
Consequently, Podrabinek continues with the rhetorical question, “who if not he must in the first instance answer for the concrete crimes of the Soviet regime” during that period? That is the basis of Bukovsky’s argument, he says, but Bukovsky’s critics “from that most intellectual and conscious part” of society won’t face up to that.
“Their basic argument,” he continues, “is the absence of arguments! They do not argue with Bukovsky;” they simply condemn him. “They do not speak about those who died, about the responsibilities of the criminals whom it is necessary to find and judge. They forgive Gorbachev these victims,” and instead attack Bukovsky for raising the issue.
Among those doing so, Podrabinek says, is Leonid Radzikhovsky, who observed that the issue of trying Gorbachev does not arise because “no one has arrested [the former Soviet leader]” Consequently, in the view of that liberal commentator, “Bukovsky simply is engaging in PR for himself” (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/762216-echo/).
Another liberal, Vasily Utkin, has taken the same position, Podrabinek observes, calling Bukovsky’s call for Gorbachev to be tried “a step … dictated exclusively either by some absolutely absurd motives or by a desire simply to advertise himself” to the Russian public (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot-evening/762220-echo/).
Two more, Vladislav Bykov and Olga Derkach, simply “laugh[ed]” over Bukovsky’s idea by asking a series of “rhetorical questions [like] Has Bukovsky begun with Gorbachev only because in contrast to Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Yeltsin he is still alive? [or] what about the leaders of the more than 200 other countries? (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/187470.html).
“It is extremely easy” to answer such queries, Podrabinek observes. Only living people can be brought to trial, Bukovsky “lacks the time and strength” to deal with all the world’s leaders. And Gorbachev should answer “not for all Soviet history but for military actions against the civilian population” while he was in office.
Aleksandr Skobov even suggests that he is “grateful to Gorbachev for liberating political prisoners, an action that counts for a lot” (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/187498.html). But Podrabinek says, Skobov, himself a political prisoner, ought to remember those who died in Soviet jails while Gorbachev was ruler, including Vasil Stus’ and Anatoly Marchenko.
Moreover, if anyone tries to insist as Skobov and others have that Gorbachev didn’t “kill” these people, Podrabinek argues, then he says he will respond that “it was not he personally who liberated the political prisoners either.”
Nor does it suffice to argue as Valeriya Novodvorskaya and Konstantin Borovoy have that Gorbachev should not be held accountable because “in August 1991 he did not control the situation” (www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hjqg-FRifA0). Are they prepared to say the Soviet leader “didn’t control the situation in 1989/”
And finally Viktor Shenderovich attacks Bukovsky for showing a lack of good taste (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/761960-echo/). But Podrabinek asks what does taste have to do with the issue? “This isn’t a restaurant or a theater or a game or even politics. This is a question of justice and of the duty of those who have survived before those who have died.”
The inability to bring Gorbachev to trial, something Podrabinek admits is “almost impossible,” is “not a curiosity but a misforture for our country and a shame for our jurisprudence.” It is an indictment on a society “which is prepared so easily to forget and forgive” what was done to it – and thus makes a repetition of such things more likely.
Some people like Bukovsky are prepared to stand up and make this demand, but “alas” such people are relatively few. “The majority experiences toward Gorbachev a feeling of devoted gratitude for the fact that he did not drown the country in blood,” with many thinking that “on the conscience of every leader of a country are such sins.”
But that is not the case. In Europe, what countries “except the socialist and the fascist have put down civil protests with tanks?” Podrabinek asks, pointing out that “this is not an all-human misfortune.” Instead, “it is a characteristic sign of totalitarian regimes” like the one Gorbachev ruled over.
Many Russians live by myths because they “do not want to know the truth. One of these myths is about Gorbachev as a reformer, a peacemaker and the author of democratic transformations.” But in fact, forces were at work beyond his control that led to the destruction of the totalitarian system, even as Gorbachev sought to defend it.
“Without doubt,” Podrabinek says, Gorbachev had “a first-class apparatchik nose” for events. Even during the August coup, he “said in Foros “in order then to come to victory, it was unimportant whose.” He would have remained in office had these larger forces not made it impossible for him to do so.
When Gorbachev finally “understood that it was impossible to save [the CPSU and the Soviet Empire], he successfully saved his own reputation,” but nothing more, Podrabinek argues. And thus he did not behave at the very last as Ceaucescu or Milosevich did, allowing many to conclude that he gets credit for avoiding a civil war.
But “whether one should be grateful to a tyrant for the fact that he did not tear to death all his subjects is a personal issue,” Podrabinek insists. Tragically, the West has not behaved any better than the Russian people in its assessment of Gorbachev and the role he played at the end of the Cold War and the end of the USSR.
“Europe is grateful [to Gorbachev] for the destruction of the Berlin Wall,” but “I have watched these remarkable pictures,” Podrabinek says. “Gorbachev was not there. The youth of Berlin destroyed the wall. Gorbachev took this as a given and di not begin to send in tanks,” undoubtedly a correct response but one any sensible politician would have adopted.
Where in this is “the heroism for which the West loves him?” Podrabinek asks, and he suggests that what has been taking place is evidence of “’the Stockholm syndrome’ of Western civilization,” of a situation in which hostages display positive feelings towards those who have taken or held them hostage.
“Communist collapsed not thanks to Gorbachev or even not in spite of him,” Podrabinek concludes. “He was too unremarkable a figure despite what would seem to be great opportunities. The tyranny was fated to be destroyed, and Gorbachev couldn’t do anything about that,” despite all his efforts and his willingness to sacrifice “hundreds of human lives.”
Staunton, April 10 – Vladimir Bukovsky’s call to bring Mikhail Gorbachev to trial for the crimes he committed as Soviet leader has met with “almost universal condemnation,” Aleksandr Podrabinek says, when the appeal of the former Soviet dissident should have been met with understanding and support.
In an essay on the Grani.ru portal, Podrabinek, himself a former dissident and longtime human rights activist argues that “the most intellectual and socially conscious part” of Russian society has failed by not helping Bukovsky in his “efforts to cleanse our history of myths and lies” (grani.ru/opinion/m.187520.html).
Among the actions for which the last Soviet leader would appear to bear responsibility, the human rights activist says, are the various applications of military force against peaceful civilian populations in Tbilisi in April 1989, Baku in January 1990, and Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 which left many dead and wounded in their wake.
“Behind all these operations of the Soviet army, the MVD and the KGB stood the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and (after March 1990) USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev,” Podravinek points out. “He was the supreme commander and first person” of that “still totalitarian state.”
Consequently, Podrabinek continues with the rhetorical question, “who if not he must in the first instance answer for the concrete crimes of the Soviet regime” during that period? That is the basis of Bukovsky’s argument, he says, but Bukovsky’s critics “from that most intellectual and conscious part” of society won’t face up to that.
“Their basic argument,” he continues, “is the absence of arguments! They do not argue with Bukovsky;” they simply condemn him. “They do not speak about those who died, about the responsibilities of the criminals whom it is necessary to find and judge. They forgive Gorbachev these victims,” and instead attack Bukovsky for raising the issue.
Among those doing so, Podrabinek says, is Leonid Radzikhovsky, who observed that the issue of trying Gorbachev does not arise because “no one has arrested [the former Soviet leader]” Consequently, in the view of that liberal commentator, “Bukovsky simply is engaging in PR for himself” (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/762216-echo/).
Another liberal, Vasily Utkin, has taken the same position, Podrabinek observes, calling Bukovsky’s call for Gorbachev to be tried “a step … dictated exclusively either by some absolutely absurd motives or by a desire simply to advertise himself” to the Russian public (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot-evening/762220-echo/).
Two more, Vladislav Bykov and Olga Derkach, simply “laugh[ed]” over Bukovsky’s idea by asking a series of “rhetorical questions [like] Has Bukovsky begun with Gorbachev only because in contrast to Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Yeltsin he is still alive? [or] what about the leaders of the more than 200 other countries? (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/187470.html).
“It is extremely easy” to answer such queries, Podrabinek observes. Only living people can be brought to trial, Bukovsky “lacks the time and strength” to deal with all the world’s leaders. And Gorbachev should answer “not for all Soviet history but for military actions against the civilian population” while he was in office.
Aleksandr Skobov even suggests that he is “grateful to Gorbachev for liberating political prisoners, an action that counts for a lot” (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/187498.html). But Podrabinek says, Skobov, himself a political prisoner, ought to remember those who died in Soviet jails while Gorbachev was ruler, including Vasil Stus’ and Anatoly Marchenko.
Moreover, if anyone tries to insist as Skobov and others have that Gorbachev didn’t “kill” these people, Podrabinek argues, then he says he will respond that “it was not he personally who liberated the political prisoners either.”
Nor does it suffice to argue as Valeriya Novodvorskaya and Konstantin Borovoy have that Gorbachev should not be held accountable because “in August 1991 he did not control the situation” (www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hjqg-FRifA0). Are they prepared to say the Soviet leader “didn’t control the situation in 1989/”
And finally Viktor Shenderovich attacks Bukovsky for showing a lack of good taste (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/761960-echo/). But Podrabinek asks what does taste have to do with the issue? “This isn’t a restaurant or a theater or a game or even politics. This is a question of justice and of the duty of those who have survived before those who have died.”
The inability to bring Gorbachev to trial, something Podrabinek admits is “almost impossible,” is “not a curiosity but a misforture for our country and a shame for our jurisprudence.” It is an indictment on a society “which is prepared so easily to forget and forgive” what was done to it – and thus makes a repetition of such things more likely.
Some people like Bukovsky are prepared to stand up and make this demand, but “alas” such people are relatively few. “The majority experiences toward Gorbachev a feeling of devoted gratitude for the fact that he did not drown the country in blood,” with many thinking that “on the conscience of every leader of a country are such sins.”
But that is not the case. In Europe, what countries “except the socialist and the fascist have put down civil protests with tanks?” Podrabinek asks, pointing out that “this is not an all-human misfortune.” Instead, “it is a characteristic sign of totalitarian regimes” like the one Gorbachev ruled over.
Many Russians live by myths because they “do not want to know the truth. One of these myths is about Gorbachev as a reformer, a peacemaker and the author of democratic transformations.” But in fact, forces were at work beyond his control that led to the destruction of the totalitarian system, even as Gorbachev sought to defend it.
“Without doubt,” Podrabinek says, Gorbachev had “a first-class apparatchik nose” for events. Even during the August coup, he “said in Foros “in order then to come to victory, it was unimportant whose.” He would have remained in office had these larger forces not made it impossible for him to do so.
When Gorbachev finally “understood that it was impossible to save [the CPSU and the Soviet Empire], he successfully saved his own reputation,” but nothing more, Podrabinek argues. And thus he did not behave at the very last as Ceaucescu or Milosevich did, allowing many to conclude that he gets credit for avoiding a civil war.
But “whether one should be grateful to a tyrant for the fact that he did not tear to death all his subjects is a personal issue,” Podrabinek insists. Tragically, the West has not behaved any better than the Russian people in its assessment of Gorbachev and the role he played at the end of the Cold War and the end of the USSR.
“Europe is grateful [to Gorbachev] for the destruction of the Berlin Wall,” but “I have watched these remarkable pictures,” Podrabinek says. “Gorbachev was not there. The youth of Berlin destroyed the wall. Gorbachev took this as a given and di not begin to send in tanks,” undoubtedly a correct response but one any sensible politician would have adopted.
Where in this is “the heroism for which the West loves him?” Podrabinek asks, and he suggests that what has been taking place is evidence of “’the Stockholm syndrome’ of Western civilization,” of a situation in which hostages display positive feelings towards those who have taken or held them hostage.
“Communist collapsed not thanks to Gorbachev or even not in spite of him,” Podrabinek concludes. “He was too unremarkable a figure despite what would seem to be great opportunities. The tyranny was fated to be destroyed, and Gorbachev couldn’t do anything about that,” despite all his efforts and his willingness to sacrifice “hundreds of human lives.”
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Ainu Community Makes Its Existence Known
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 10 – In addition to the Siberians, another indigenous nationality has surfaced in the Russian Federation east of the Urals in the 2010 census – the Ainu – one whose small number – approximately 100 -- bely the potential political and geopolitical significance of an ethnic community most of whose members are in Japan.
On the one hand, the recent earthquake and tsunami have focused attention on Japan, increasing the importance of all things that connect that country with others, including Russia. And on the other, because the Ainu live among other places in the Kurile Islands, the Ainu of Russia are likely to come to play a role in that dispute between Moscow and Tokyo.
Indeed, Russian scholars say, the very name Kurile derives from the Ainu word “Kuru” which simply means “people,” an origin that Russian officials are certain to point to in order to bolster Russian claims to these islands, especially now that Moscow is acknowledging that there are Ainu in Russia itself.
During preparations for the census, the Inforos.ru portal notes, the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology noted that “despite the absence [of this group] in the official enumeration of Russian peoples, part of our fellow citizens firmly continue to consider themselves Ainus” (inforos.ru/ru/?module=news&action=view&id=27280%20).
In Russian investigations beginning in the 18th century, the Ainu of the Russian Far East were often called Kamchadal Kurilites rather than Ainu because the term Ainu itself derives from the Ainu word “man” or “worthy man” and typically was connected with “military actions” and achievements.
Although the Ainu people have been indigenous to the area of the Far East and Japan for at least 7,000 years, Russian scholars say, “in Japan, the Ainus are considered ‘barbarians’ … and social marginals,” because they speak a language different from and look entirely different than the Japanese.
These same scholars report that “at the end of the 19th century,about 1500 Ainu lived in Russia,” but “after World War II, they were in part expelled and in part left on their own with the Japanese population.” Many of the others assimilated to the ethnic Russian population of the Russian Far East.
“According to the assertions of the Kamchadal Kurilites”—or Ainu of Russia – “all the names of the islands of the southern area were given by the tribes of the Ainu which at one point in the past occupied these territories.” Thus, Russian commentators say, “it is very change to say” that the Ainu were never there as some Japanese writers do.
That matters, these Russian commentators say, because “there are Ainus in Russia, an indigenous people which also has the right to consider these islands their own immemorial lands.”
One of these commentators, P. Alekseyev, argues that the Ainu should play a role in the resolution of the dispute over the Kurile Islands. “For this,” he says, “it is necessary to permit the Ainu (who were expelled by the Soviet government to Japan in 1945) to return from Japan to the land of their ancestors,” land that includes the Kuriles and much of the Russian Far East.
Russia “has neither people nor means fo rhte development of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but the Ainu do,” Alekseyev says. Consequently, their return would “give a push to the economy of the Russian Far East” especially if there were formed for them “a national autonmy” within Russia that would embrace the Kurile Islands as well.
At the very least, Alekseyev argues, the Ainus now in Japan, precisely because they used to be “our citizens” and because “they were never allies of Japan and never will be” could become “the allies of Russia” as far as the Kuriles are concerned and held “liquidate” the present focus on the southern Kuriles in the Russian-Japanese relationship.
The Ainu of Russia have been pressing for official recognition as a nationality for some time. There were a spate of articles about them in the early 1990s, and after the Japanese recognized the Ainu as a distinct nationality in 2008, the Ainu of Kamchatka pressed for local recognition there (www.rg.ru/2008/04/03/reg-dvostok/ainu.html).
Now, especially in the wake of the natural disasters in Japan, the Ainus of Russia are pressing for greater recognition. There is now a Russian Association of the Far-Eastern Ainu (RADA as its Russian acronym) headed by Rechkabo Kakukhoningen (Boris Yaravoy), which is pressing the Ainu case.
For more details on this movement, its goals and its prospects, see among other sources, see among other articles, rusk.ru/st.php?idar=44728, tron.ru/ainu/rada/, tron.ru/ainu/kuril/dom.htm, and zvezdolettv.blogspot.com/2009/01/10.html?zx=b017943a71c2ad03,)
Staunton, April 10 – In addition to the Siberians, another indigenous nationality has surfaced in the Russian Federation east of the Urals in the 2010 census – the Ainu – one whose small number – approximately 100 -- bely the potential political and geopolitical significance of an ethnic community most of whose members are in Japan.
On the one hand, the recent earthquake and tsunami have focused attention on Japan, increasing the importance of all things that connect that country with others, including Russia. And on the other, because the Ainu live among other places in the Kurile Islands, the Ainu of Russia are likely to come to play a role in that dispute between Moscow and Tokyo.
Indeed, Russian scholars say, the very name Kurile derives from the Ainu word “Kuru” which simply means “people,” an origin that Russian officials are certain to point to in order to bolster Russian claims to these islands, especially now that Moscow is acknowledging that there are Ainu in Russia itself.
During preparations for the census, the Inforos.ru portal notes, the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology noted that “despite the absence [of this group] in the official enumeration of Russian peoples, part of our fellow citizens firmly continue to consider themselves Ainus” (inforos.ru/ru/?module=news&action=view&id=27280%20).
In Russian investigations beginning in the 18th century, the Ainu of the Russian Far East were often called Kamchadal Kurilites rather than Ainu because the term Ainu itself derives from the Ainu word “man” or “worthy man” and typically was connected with “military actions” and achievements.
Although the Ainu people have been indigenous to the area of the Far East and Japan for at least 7,000 years, Russian scholars say, “in Japan, the Ainus are considered ‘barbarians’ … and social marginals,” because they speak a language different from and look entirely different than the Japanese.
These same scholars report that “at the end of the 19th century,about 1500 Ainu lived in Russia,” but “after World War II, they were in part expelled and in part left on their own with the Japanese population.” Many of the others assimilated to the ethnic Russian population of the Russian Far East.
“According to the assertions of the Kamchadal Kurilites”—or Ainu of Russia – “all the names of the islands of the southern area were given by the tribes of the Ainu which at one point in the past occupied these territories.” Thus, Russian commentators say, “it is very change to say” that the Ainu were never there as some Japanese writers do.
That matters, these Russian commentators say, because “there are Ainus in Russia, an indigenous people which also has the right to consider these islands their own immemorial lands.”
One of these commentators, P. Alekseyev, argues that the Ainu should play a role in the resolution of the dispute over the Kurile Islands. “For this,” he says, “it is necessary to permit the Ainu (who were expelled by the Soviet government to Japan in 1945) to return from Japan to the land of their ancestors,” land that includes the Kuriles and much of the Russian Far East.
Russia “has neither people nor means fo rhte development of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but the Ainu do,” Alekseyev says. Consequently, their return would “give a push to the economy of the Russian Far East” especially if there were formed for them “a national autonmy” within Russia that would embrace the Kurile Islands as well.
At the very least, Alekseyev argues, the Ainus now in Japan, precisely because they used to be “our citizens” and because “they were never allies of Japan and never will be” could become “the allies of Russia” as far as the Kuriles are concerned and held “liquidate” the present focus on the southern Kuriles in the Russian-Japanese relationship.
The Ainu of Russia have been pressing for official recognition as a nationality for some time. There were a spate of articles about them in the early 1990s, and after the Japanese recognized the Ainu as a distinct nationality in 2008, the Ainu of Kamchatka pressed for local recognition there (www.rg.ru/2008/04/03/reg-dvostok/ainu.html).
Now, especially in the wake of the natural disasters in Japan, the Ainus of Russia are pressing for greater recognition. There is now a Russian Association of the Far-Eastern Ainu (RADA as its Russian acronym) headed by Rechkabo Kakukhoningen (Boris Yaravoy), which is pressing the Ainu case.
For more details on this movement, its goals and its prospects, see among other sources, see among other articles, rusk.ru/st.php?idar=44728, tron.ru/ainu/rada/, tron.ru/ainu/kuril/dom.htm, and zvezdolettv.blogspot.com/2009/01/10.html?zx=b017943a71c2ad03,)
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Reform “Paradoxically” Depends on Rising Oil Prices, Moscow Paper Says
Staunton, April 5 -- Because Russia’s ruling elite views reform as a luxury rather than a necessity, declines in oil prices have a paradoxical impact on Moscow, the editors of “Nezavisimaya gazeta” say, pushing reform off the table rather than making it a matter of survival as is the case in other oil-exporting countries.
In a leading article today, the editors of this independent Moscow paper write, the dependence Russia’s rulers have on the price of oil is “abnormal and paradoxical” because a fall in oil revenues forces them to drop plans for reform while an increase in prices can give them a chance to take reformist steps (www.ng.ru/editorial/2011-04-05/2_red.html).
This Russian pattern, very different than in other such countries “in which a decline in prices for raw materials stimulates the transformation of a raw materials,” the editors say reflects the peculiarities of the Russian political system and in particular the calculations of the current Russian elite.
The editors begin by noting that according to the latest Levada Center poll, “51 percent of Russians consider that a growth in prices for oil harms the economy of the country,” although it appears that few of them understand precisely how “oil superprofits freeze reforms and the reconstruction of the economy.”
Moreover, the editors say, “in public” at least, Russian leaders from “the modernizer” Dmitry Medvedev to “the conservative” Vladimir Putin “recognize that the raw materials economy has exhausted its possibilities, that a favorable situationmust not be allowed to weaken us, and that modernization is necessary.”
Even as they say this, however, the paper continues, “the powers that be are sitting on two stools. On the one hand, they … recognize the need for change.” But “on the other, the mandate for the administration of the country has been given to the current ruling elite by a paternalist and not reformist electorate.”
That second stool, the “Nezavisimaya” editors emphasize, thus rests on “a voter who is accustomed to populism and the transfer of responsibility ‘upwards’ with the fulfillment of the social obligations of the state. Without [that voter], the existing powers would not be the powers.”
Thus, “when the Russian budget is not receiving oil superprofits,” the paper’s editors say, “the powers are forced to choose one of the two stools; and they choose populism rather than economic reforms” which are certain to be unpopular at least as concerns their short-term consequences.
“The nature and character of the preferences of the existing powers are such that the question of social obligations is for them a matter of self-preservation,” “Nezavisimaya”argues. And from this it follows, that “as soon as additional oil revenues again become to arrive in support of the budget, the powers have the chance” to take steps toward reform.
“In this way,” the paper continues, “an increase in the price of oil gives the Russian ruling elite the opportunity to realize the liberal order of the day,” a pattern just the reverse of what would be the case in most countries where “a fall in prices for raw materials stimulates the transformation of a raw materials economy.
In a leading article today, the editors of this independent Moscow paper write, the dependence Russia’s rulers have on the price of oil is “abnormal and paradoxical” because a fall in oil revenues forces them to drop plans for reform while an increase in prices can give them a chance to take reformist steps (www.ng.ru/editorial/2011-04-05/2_red.html).
This Russian pattern, very different than in other such countries “in which a decline in prices for raw materials stimulates the transformation of a raw materials,” the editors say reflects the peculiarities of the Russian political system and in particular the calculations of the current Russian elite.
The editors begin by noting that according to the latest Levada Center poll, “51 percent of Russians consider that a growth in prices for oil harms the economy of the country,” although it appears that few of them understand precisely how “oil superprofits freeze reforms and the reconstruction of the economy.”
Moreover, the editors say, “in public” at least, Russian leaders from “the modernizer” Dmitry Medvedev to “the conservative” Vladimir Putin “recognize that the raw materials economy has exhausted its possibilities, that a favorable situationmust not be allowed to weaken us, and that modernization is necessary.”
Even as they say this, however, the paper continues, “the powers that be are sitting on two stools. On the one hand, they … recognize the need for change.” But “on the other, the mandate for the administration of the country has been given to the current ruling elite by a paternalist and not reformist electorate.”
That second stool, the “Nezavisimaya” editors emphasize, thus rests on “a voter who is accustomed to populism and the transfer of responsibility ‘upwards’ with the fulfillment of the social obligations of the state. Without [that voter], the existing powers would not be the powers.”
Thus, “when the Russian budget is not receiving oil superprofits,” the paper’s editors say, “the powers are forced to choose one of the two stools; and they choose populism rather than economic reforms” which are certain to be unpopular at least as concerns their short-term consequences.
“The nature and character of the preferences of the existing powers are such that the question of social obligations is for them a matter of self-preservation,” “Nezavisimaya”argues. And from this it follows, that “as soon as additional oil revenues again become to arrive in support of the budget, the powers have the chance” to take steps toward reform.
“In this way,” the paper continues, “an increase in the price of oil gives the Russian ruling elite the opportunity to realize the liberal order of the day,” a pattern just the reverse of what would be the case in most countries where “a fall in prices for raw materials stimulates the transformation of a raw materials economy.
Window on Eurasia: National Self-Determination and Integrity of States Need Not Be in Conflict, Tatar Historian Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 5 – The right of nations to self-determination and the principle of the territorial integrity of states need not be contradictory,a leading Tatar historian says, but if this right is ignored by untrammeled majoritarian democracy or if states try to suppress it by force, many invoking this right will decide that they have no alternative but to seek independence.
In an essay posted on the Tatar-Tribun.ru portal this week, Rafael Khakimov, director of the Kazan Institute of History and at one time a political advisor to former Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev, argues that states with ethnic minorities must recognize this reality and its risks (tatar-tribun.ru/tribuna/nacionalnye-konflikty-i-mezhdunarodnoe-pravo.html#more-2316).
But even though Khakimov focuses on various situations elsewhere and says that “Tatarstan never raised the question about leaving Russia” but rather worked with Moscow to broaden the rights of the Tatars, his argument is likely to strike many as provocatory in the current Russian political environment.
Khakimov begins his essay by noting that “the world consists not only of states but also of peoples who are seeking to increase the level of [their] freedom,” adding that “this collision” can produce conflicts” and also that either ignoring the rights of nations or seeking to suppress them will only make the situation more difficult.
In recent times, the Kazan historian continues, many Russian media outlets have “criticized the right of self-determination of peoples as an invention of the Bolsheviks, which apparently led to the destruction of the USSR and has created a threat to the integrity of Russia, as if a legal document creates the pursuit of freedom by peoples and not the other way around.”
“Many peoples do not suspect that there is exists a right to self-determination written down on paper,” Khakimov continues. “Nevertheless, they strive to achieve it, sometimes with arms in their hands. And this pursuit of the broadening of freedom is the main vector of history. It cannot be stopped.”
Consequently, “any limitation of the existing status of a people is fraught with conflicts,” he notes, pointing the process that was set in train when Serbia “at the end of the 1990s liquidated the autonomy of Kosovo.” That made “a conflict inevitable, and it [was] ended by the separation of the Kosovars.”
Using force against those seeking greater freedom makes such conflicts all the more intense, Khakimov says, arguing that “sometimes by means of negotiations it is possible to preserve the integrity of states by offering guarantees to the people.” But these outcomes, which require pragmatism on all sides, are “political” rather than “legal.”
Unfortunately, he continues, “in public opinion and however strange this may b e even among lawyers and politicians, the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples is treated as separate from the state, as the destruction of its integrity and as a striving toward complete independence.”
“In fact,” Khakimov says, “there can be various forms of self-determination,” many of which are compatible with the territorial integrity of the states within which the peoples seeking to implement this right find themselves. It can take the form of “a confederation or federation, associated status, autonomy or even complete dissolution in the structure of the state.”
At the very least, “self-determination and complete independence are not equivalent terms. Separation from the state is only one of the forms of self-determination, albeit the most radical,” and “not all peoples” seek this, preferring instead “broad autonomy within the framework of a single state.”
“For example,” Khakimov points out, “Tatarstan never raised the question of leaving Russia but demanded and with complete justification a broadening of its rights, with which the Russian side agreed.”
Those who say that Tatarstan put pressure on Russia are “naïve,” Khakimov says. “Little Tatarstan could not impose its will on an enormous country.” Moreover, “Tatarstan is one of the most disciplined tax payers.” And consequently, the accord delimiting the rights and powers of each satisfied the interests of both sides.
“The self-proclaimed republics of the post-Soviet space have attempted to repeat [the Tatarstan Model] but unsuccessfully,” Khakimov says. “Broad autonomy … would have been profitable for all,” both in the case of Georgia with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and “much more” in that of Moldova regarding Transdniestria.
“The mistake Georgia or Moldova made regarding the self-proclaimed republics,” the Kazan scholar and political commentator says, “consisted in the fact that instead of negotiations, they attempted to resolve the conflict by force, intensifying it to the point where people are not listening to one another.”
“At a certain point,” he continues, when Eduard Shevardnadze was Georgian president, there was a chance to “build a federation” there “with a guarantee of the rights of the relatively small Abkhaz and Osetian populations. [But] this did not happen,” and Georgia has been torn apart.
“Unfortunately,” Khakimov continues, there is another problem besides an inclination to use force. “Democracy in the post-Soviet space is treated as the will of the mechanical majority alone. Whoever has the most votes is right.” But this is “a faulty principle,” as even the briefest reflection will show.
“Yes, the number of Tatars in Russia is an order smaller than that of ethnic Russians. By means of a vote in the Stae Duma it [would be] possible to liquidate the Repulbic of Tatarstan, to declare the Tatars a non-existing nation, to limit the use of the national language, and to close schools and television broadcasts” in Tatar.
But “this does not mean” that the Tatars will “disappear.” And if Russians themselves think this way, then they should remember that the ethnic Russians “are a minority in comparison with the Chinese.” “False principles” of this kind simply “drive the conflict deeper” on both sides.
From this it follows that “democracy is not a panacea for the resolution of such problems but only an instrument in politics. For the harmonization of inter-ethnic relations, it must be liberalized by taking into account the interests of numerically smaller peoples.” Otherwise, Khakimov implies, disaster awaits them and the state.
Negotiations are needed to resolve these problems, and in them, “procedures themselves” are critically important. Shevardnadze failed in his talks because “they were conducted by a narrow circle of trusted people” rather than more broadly. And that meant some on each side felt too much had been given away without their consent.
“Tatarstan used a different method,” Khakimov, one of the participants in this process, recalls. “The negotiations were open, they took place on three levels, and they involved a large circle of participants” and state institutions over a period of three years. And there was a great deal of trust between Yeltsin and Shaimiyev
Khakimov concludes with this observation: “Conflict studies is a special discipline at the border of science and practice.” In talks, “the habits of the negotiators are no less important than the positions of the sides which as a rule are extremely tough at the start of contacts.” He adds that “international law unfortunately more often divides the sides than brings them together.”
Staunton, April 5 – The right of nations to self-determination and the principle of the territorial integrity of states need not be contradictory,a leading Tatar historian says, but if this right is ignored by untrammeled majoritarian democracy or if states try to suppress it by force, many invoking this right will decide that they have no alternative but to seek independence.
In an essay posted on the Tatar-Tribun.ru portal this week, Rafael Khakimov, director of the Kazan Institute of History and at one time a political advisor to former Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev, argues that states with ethnic minorities must recognize this reality and its risks (tatar-tribun.ru/tribuna/nacionalnye-konflikty-i-mezhdunarodnoe-pravo.html#more-2316).
But even though Khakimov focuses on various situations elsewhere and says that “Tatarstan never raised the question about leaving Russia” but rather worked with Moscow to broaden the rights of the Tatars, his argument is likely to strike many as provocatory in the current Russian political environment.
Khakimov begins his essay by noting that “the world consists not only of states but also of peoples who are seeking to increase the level of [their] freedom,” adding that “this collision” can produce conflicts” and also that either ignoring the rights of nations or seeking to suppress them will only make the situation more difficult.
In recent times, the Kazan historian continues, many Russian media outlets have “criticized the right of self-determination of peoples as an invention of the Bolsheviks, which apparently led to the destruction of the USSR and has created a threat to the integrity of Russia, as if a legal document creates the pursuit of freedom by peoples and not the other way around.”
“Many peoples do not suspect that there is exists a right to self-determination written down on paper,” Khakimov continues. “Nevertheless, they strive to achieve it, sometimes with arms in their hands. And this pursuit of the broadening of freedom is the main vector of history. It cannot be stopped.”
Consequently, “any limitation of the existing status of a people is fraught with conflicts,” he notes, pointing the process that was set in train when Serbia “at the end of the 1990s liquidated the autonomy of Kosovo.” That made “a conflict inevitable, and it [was] ended by the separation of the Kosovars.”
Using force against those seeking greater freedom makes such conflicts all the more intense, Khakimov says, arguing that “sometimes by means of negotiations it is possible to preserve the integrity of states by offering guarantees to the people.” But these outcomes, which require pragmatism on all sides, are “political” rather than “legal.”
Unfortunately, he continues, “in public opinion and however strange this may b e even among lawyers and politicians, the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples is treated as separate from the state, as the destruction of its integrity and as a striving toward complete independence.”
“In fact,” Khakimov says, “there can be various forms of self-determination,” many of which are compatible with the territorial integrity of the states within which the peoples seeking to implement this right find themselves. It can take the form of “a confederation or federation, associated status, autonomy or even complete dissolution in the structure of the state.”
At the very least, “self-determination and complete independence are not equivalent terms. Separation from the state is only one of the forms of self-determination, albeit the most radical,” and “not all peoples” seek this, preferring instead “broad autonomy within the framework of a single state.”
“For example,” Khakimov points out, “Tatarstan never raised the question of leaving Russia but demanded and with complete justification a broadening of its rights, with which the Russian side agreed.”
Those who say that Tatarstan put pressure on Russia are “naïve,” Khakimov says. “Little Tatarstan could not impose its will on an enormous country.” Moreover, “Tatarstan is one of the most disciplined tax payers.” And consequently, the accord delimiting the rights and powers of each satisfied the interests of both sides.
“The self-proclaimed republics of the post-Soviet space have attempted to repeat [the Tatarstan Model] but unsuccessfully,” Khakimov says. “Broad autonomy … would have been profitable for all,” both in the case of Georgia with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and “much more” in that of Moldova regarding Transdniestria.
“The mistake Georgia or Moldova made regarding the self-proclaimed republics,” the Kazan scholar and political commentator says, “consisted in the fact that instead of negotiations, they attempted to resolve the conflict by force, intensifying it to the point where people are not listening to one another.”
“At a certain point,” he continues, when Eduard Shevardnadze was Georgian president, there was a chance to “build a federation” there “with a guarantee of the rights of the relatively small Abkhaz and Osetian populations. [But] this did not happen,” and Georgia has been torn apart.
“Unfortunately,” Khakimov continues, there is another problem besides an inclination to use force. “Democracy in the post-Soviet space is treated as the will of the mechanical majority alone. Whoever has the most votes is right.” But this is “a faulty principle,” as even the briefest reflection will show.
“Yes, the number of Tatars in Russia is an order smaller than that of ethnic Russians. By means of a vote in the Stae Duma it [would be] possible to liquidate the Repulbic of Tatarstan, to declare the Tatars a non-existing nation, to limit the use of the national language, and to close schools and television broadcasts” in Tatar.
But “this does not mean” that the Tatars will “disappear.” And if Russians themselves think this way, then they should remember that the ethnic Russians “are a minority in comparison with the Chinese.” “False principles” of this kind simply “drive the conflict deeper” on both sides.
From this it follows that “democracy is not a panacea for the resolution of such problems but only an instrument in politics. For the harmonization of inter-ethnic relations, it must be liberalized by taking into account the interests of numerically smaller peoples.” Otherwise, Khakimov implies, disaster awaits them and the state.
Negotiations are needed to resolve these problems, and in them, “procedures themselves” are critically important. Shevardnadze failed in his talks because “they were conducted by a narrow circle of trusted people” rather than more broadly. And that meant some on each side felt too much had been given away without their consent.
“Tatarstan used a different method,” Khakimov, one of the participants in this process, recalls. “The negotiations were open, they took place on three levels, and they involved a large circle of participants” and state institutions over a period of three years. And there was a great deal of trust between Yeltsin and Shaimiyev
Khakimov concludes with this observation: “Conflict studies is a special discipline at the border of science and practice.” In talks, “the habits of the negotiators are no less important than the positions of the sides which as a rule are extremely tough at the start of contacts.” He adds that “international law unfortunately more often divides the sides than brings them together.”
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
