Paul Goble
Chattanooga, March 4 – In a comment that will enflame passions among non-Russians living in the Russian Federation and annoy those in Moscow seeking to promote a supra-ethnic civic identity, Andrey Savelyev, the leader of the Great Russia Party, argues that there is no difference between the ethnic “Russky” and the ostensibly non-ethnic “Rossiisky.”
Responding to an article by Vyacheslav Nikonov on these two terms and the reasons they are not the same (www.russkie.org/index.php?module=fullitem&id=20961), Savelyev, who is also a Moscow State professor, says there is nothing in the one that is not in the other and vice versa (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/02/28/net_nichego_rossijskogo_chto_ne_bylo_by_russkim/).
People like Nikonov, Savelyev continues, “who never occupied themselves with the question of Russian identity somehow are trying to promote themselves” as experts. “First they become leaders of a government financed structure and then they begin to thing that this structure must do something.”
“In fact,” Savelyev says, “an individual of Russian culture whatever his ethnic origin is called both in Russia and beyond its borders an [ethnic] Russian. This is the definition of Russianness. Russian identity is not only an origin from Russian parents; it is much wider than simply ethnic origin.”
“’To be born a Russia is too little: one must be one; one must become one,’” as Igor Severyanin wrote, Savelyev quotes with approval, addthing that “in this sense, the creation of a Russian man is the mastery of Russian culture.” And that puts paid to any idea that the ethnic and the non-ethnic terms are different in meaning.
“There is nothing [non-ethnically] Russian that is not [ethnically] Russian and vice versa,” Savelyev insists. And that is true even though on the territory of Russia “live other peoples” because all but a tiny minority of them know the Russian language and are part of Russian culture.
The fewer than five percent who don’t, Savelyev says, “undoubtedly are not [ethically] Russian or [nonethnically] Russian.” Instead, they are representatives of their own ethnos and nothing more than that.” If there is “nothing [ethnically] Russian” in their identities, then it follows that there is nothing non-ethnically Russian either.
The rights of these peoples should be respected, the Moscow State scholar says, but there is no reason to play games with Russianness as Nikonov “and other ‘Kremlin dreamers’” are inclined to do because they “do not understand that in so doing they are destroying any identity whatsoever.”
The only people who think that “Rossiisky” is separate from “Russky” are those who “are separating themselves from Russian history, fromt the Russian people, and,” Savelyev says, “in the final analysis from the Russian state.” That is because the state is “[ethnically]Russian; there is nothing there Tatar, nor Udmurt, nor Chechen, nor Yakut.”
Moreover, it is through this ethnic Russianness that Russians are connected with the broader European culture. “Small peoples, and except for the Russian, all the remaining peoples living in Russia are small must understand that they enter into world culture only by the mediation of Russian culture.”
In fact, Savelyev says, “to the extent that [these small peoples] are Russian, it is to that extent that they belong to all-human culture.” And if they refuse to be part of the Russian culture, then their fate will be to remain “in the framework of their ethnically archaic enclaves.” They have that choice, but it is not an attractive one, he implies.
It is of course possible, the Moscow State professor continues, that people like Nikonov want to form ust such a community of “[non-ethnic] Russians,” a community that “will consist of those intelligents like himself with advanced thought who donot understand the meaning of the word [ethnic] Russianorthe values of Russian culture and Russian identity.”
Nikonov and his like can “choose any identity they like” and rest assured that their “civil rights” will not be threatened in any way. But there is one thing that is obvious, he and his friends are not part of the “[ethnic] Russian world.” To that, Savelyev says, he and they have “no relations” whatsoever.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Religion as Organized by the Kremlin Unlikely to Play an Integrative Role in Russia, Experts Say
Paul Goble
Chattanooga, March 4 – On the day the Kremlin created a Commission on Inter-National and Inter-Religious Relations, experts at a Moscow conference on the social role of religion expressed skepticism that religion by itself could play an integrative role in the multi-religious and mutli-national Russian society.
Indeed, in the words of Professor Ekaterina Elbakyan of the Moscow Academy of Labor and Social Relations, “to speak about the integrating role of religion in poly-ethnic and multi-cultural societies is not serious.” Instead, she argued, “it is necessary to seek a different basis for integration, for example, law” (www.ej.ru/?a=news&id=10434).
And another expert, Aleksandr Verkhovsky of the SOVA analytic center, said that the creation of this new commission could be valuable as religious leaders have a role to play in helping individuals and groups overcome conflict situations. But that is not the only thing that can happen when religious leaders get involved.
He pointed to certain negative consequences of such intervention by religious figures of the kind included in the new commission, including giving “certain ethnically charged conflicts … a religious coloration,” that could have the result of making existing conflicts even more difficult to resolve.
However that may be, the creation of the new commission is clearly an important event for what it says about thinking in the Kremlin. Its composition does not follow the “traditional” religions list that the Moscow authorities have normally followed, leaving out several key players from the Muslim community and including instead Catholics and others.
At the same time, the new group is dominated by the Moscow Patriarchate with Father Vsevolod Chaplin playing the main role. At the commission’s first session, he stressed that “peacemaking work is especially important when inter-ethnic relations are being tested and when the unity of our people without which our future is unthinkable is being attacked from inside and out” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=39714).
But if the Kremlin and its commission were confident religious groups could play a positive role from above, speakers at the Moscow conference were not. Zhan Toshchenko, a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences said that achieving moral political unity was only possible from below (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=39639).
Andrey Sebentsov, another expert, argued that in Dmitry Medvedev’s “conception of modernization … the role of religion had been reduced to a minimum.” But in practice, he continued, the Russian Orthodox Church has dominated his thinking and led him to adopt “the Orthodox position” on many issues.
What is needed instead, Sebentsov said, is for the government to find “a common language” with religious leaders of all faiths rather than allowing itself to be captured by just one of them, at least if there is to be any hope that religious groups will play a positive role in overcoming conflict rather than making the current situation worse.
Father Yakov Krotov added another dimension to this discussion. He suggested that the social role of religion in Russia had been put in doubt by what he called “the contemporary ‘religious revolution’ in which faiths have been subject to “privatization” by one or another religious leader, something he said only honest dialogue could prevent.
Meanwhile, Ruslan Kurbanov, a researcher at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, pointed to yet another problem with groups like the new commission: The Kremlin may confuse the loyalty of particular figures with religious tolerance more generally and thus find itself in even more difficulty (religion.ng.ru/society/2011-03-02/6_islam.html).
Chattanooga, March 4 – On the day the Kremlin created a Commission on Inter-National and Inter-Religious Relations, experts at a Moscow conference on the social role of religion expressed skepticism that religion by itself could play an integrative role in the multi-religious and mutli-national Russian society.
Indeed, in the words of Professor Ekaterina Elbakyan of the Moscow Academy of Labor and Social Relations, “to speak about the integrating role of religion in poly-ethnic and multi-cultural societies is not serious.” Instead, she argued, “it is necessary to seek a different basis for integration, for example, law” (www.ej.ru/?a=news&id=10434).
And another expert, Aleksandr Verkhovsky of the SOVA analytic center, said that the creation of this new commission could be valuable as religious leaders have a role to play in helping individuals and groups overcome conflict situations. But that is not the only thing that can happen when religious leaders get involved.
He pointed to certain negative consequences of such intervention by religious figures of the kind included in the new commission, including giving “certain ethnically charged conflicts … a religious coloration,” that could have the result of making existing conflicts even more difficult to resolve.
However that may be, the creation of the new commission is clearly an important event for what it says about thinking in the Kremlin. Its composition does not follow the “traditional” religions list that the Moscow authorities have normally followed, leaving out several key players from the Muslim community and including instead Catholics and others.
At the same time, the new group is dominated by the Moscow Patriarchate with Father Vsevolod Chaplin playing the main role. At the commission’s first session, he stressed that “peacemaking work is especially important when inter-ethnic relations are being tested and when the unity of our people without which our future is unthinkable is being attacked from inside and out” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=39714).
But if the Kremlin and its commission were confident religious groups could play a positive role from above, speakers at the Moscow conference were not. Zhan Toshchenko, a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences said that achieving moral political unity was only possible from below (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=39639).
Andrey Sebentsov, another expert, argued that in Dmitry Medvedev’s “conception of modernization … the role of religion had been reduced to a minimum.” But in practice, he continued, the Russian Orthodox Church has dominated his thinking and led him to adopt “the Orthodox position” on many issues.
What is needed instead, Sebentsov said, is for the government to find “a common language” with religious leaders of all faiths rather than allowing itself to be captured by just one of them, at least if there is to be any hope that religious groups will play a positive role in overcoming conflict rather than making the current situation worse.
Father Yakov Krotov added another dimension to this discussion. He suggested that the social role of religion in Russia had been put in doubt by what he called “the contemporary ‘religious revolution’ in which faiths have been subject to “privatization” by one or another religious leader, something he said only honest dialogue could prevent.
Meanwhile, Ruslan Kurbanov, a researcher at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, pointed to yet another problem with groups like the new commission: The Kremlin may confuse the loyalty of particular figures with religious tolerance more generally and thus find itself in even more difficulty (religion.ng.ru/society/2011-03-02/6_islam.html).
Window on Eurasia: To Stem Moral Decline, Russians Look to Family, School and State, Not to the Church, Study Finds
Paul Goble
Chattanooga, March 3 – Sensing that their society may be sinking into an irreversible moral decline, Russians are far more inclined to look to the family, school, and state for a way out of this situation than to organized religion, according to a series of recent sociological surveys.
According to one poll, Leonid Chupry writes in a survey of both Russian concerns and Russian proposals of which institutions could best help address this problem,67 percent pointed to the family, 48 percent to the school, 45 percent to state power, and 28 percent to the media. Only 18 percent mentioned religious groups (www.apn.ru/publications/article23740.htm).
Chupry provides a disturbing set of indicators of the moral decline of Russian society over the last few decades, a period during which he, the director of the Genesis Center of Social-Political Reswearch, says, “society [has lost]its cultural traditions which had served as a moral anchor.”
Faced with this societal tragedy, many are calling for creating “a national idea,” but that will not be enough, Chupry argues. Instead, he insists that there is a need to increase punishments so that people will be less inclined to ignore legal and moral precepts, punishments that only the state can impose in many cases.
According to Chupry, “the level of theft in Russia now exceeds all imaginable limits.” And he gives as an example the case of the construction of the Eastern Siberian-Pacific pipeline. For that project alone, those involved stole four million US dollars –an amount that works out to approximately 35 US dollars for every adult in the country.
Many have mistakenly thought that as Russians become richer, they will steal less, Chupry says, but in fact, there is no link between theft and wealth. Instead, the amount of theft “directly depends” on the harshness of punishment.” Where punishments are severe and certain, there is less theft.
Several years ago, he points out, 1,000 Muscovites were polled about these issues. Fifty-eight percent of them agreed with the assertion that Russians “live in a society of selfishness, a lack of spirituality, one in which moral norms are forgotten.” And 66 percent of those polled said that the situation “could lead to serious social disturbances in the future.”
Experts like religious affairs analyst Roman Silantyev said that the findings would have been even more disturbing if this investigation had tapped opinions across Russia and not just in Moscow. Indeed, Chupry says, Silantyev said that Russians “unfortunately” are now close to a situation in which there are simply no values beyond greed and fear.
Other commentators on the results of this poll, Chupry said, drew other conclusions. Some suggested that they showed “an obvious social demand” for a more active role on the part of the state in moral instruction, while others noted that the results suggested people doubt the efficacy of the traditional channels of moral instruction like the church.
Perhaps most disturbing of all, Chupry says is that compared to other nations, Russians are much more prepared to declare that “an individual can violate the law and be right to do so.” Those who say that violating the law is impermissible in all cases, he notes, have been about 10 to 15 percent throughout the last 15 years.
To cope with this situation, Chupry makes six recommendations. First, there must be “an effective dialogue between the powers and the people.” Second, the legal code must be toughened to defend morality. Third, the principles of social justice must guide the actions of the powers that be.
Fourth, there must be a positive effort to “decriminalize” Russian society. Fifth, there must be an effort to create “an effective system” to educate the rising generation. And sixth, there must be “an active rebirth of morality through religious institutions” both to increase their authority and to try to save the situation of Russian society as a whole.
Chattanooga, March 3 – Sensing that their society may be sinking into an irreversible moral decline, Russians are far more inclined to look to the family, school, and state for a way out of this situation than to organized religion, according to a series of recent sociological surveys.
According to one poll, Leonid Chupry writes in a survey of both Russian concerns and Russian proposals of which institutions could best help address this problem,67 percent pointed to the family, 48 percent to the school, 45 percent to state power, and 28 percent to the media. Only 18 percent mentioned religious groups (www.apn.ru/publications/article23740.htm).
Chupry provides a disturbing set of indicators of the moral decline of Russian society over the last few decades, a period during which he, the director of the Genesis Center of Social-Political Reswearch, says, “society [has lost]its cultural traditions which had served as a moral anchor.”
Faced with this societal tragedy, many are calling for creating “a national idea,” but that will not be enough, Chupry argues. Instead, he insists that there is a need to increase punishments so that people will be less inclined to ignore legal and moral precepts, punishments that only the state can impose in many cases.
According to Chupry, “the level of theft in Russia now exceeds all imaginable limits.” And he gives as an example the case of the construction of the Eastern Siberian-Pacific pipeline. For that project alone, those involved stole four million US dollars –an amount that works out to approximately 35 US dollars for every adult in the country.
Many have mistakenly thought that as Russians become richer, they will steal less, Chupry says, but in fact, there is no link between theft and wealth. Instead, the amount of theft “directly depends” on the harshness of punishment.” Where punishments are severe and certain, there is less theft.
Several years ago, he points out, 1,000 Muscovites were polled about these issues. Fifty-eight percent of them agreed with the assertion that Russians “live in a society of selfishness, a lack of spirituality, one in which moral norms are forgotten.” And 66 percent of those polled said that the situation “could lead to serious social disturbances in the future.”
Experts like religious affairs analyst Roman Silantyev said that the findings would have been even more disturbing if this investigation had tapped opinions across Russia and not just in Moscow. Indeed, Chupry says, Silantyev said that Russians “unfortunately” are now close to a situation in which there are simply no values beyond greed and fear.
Other commentators on the results of this poll, Chupry said, drew other conclusions. Some suggested that they showed “an obvious social demand” for a more active role on the part of the state in moral instruction, while others noted that the results suggested people doubt the efficacy of the traditional channels of moral instruction like the church.
Perhaps most disturbing of all, Chupry says is that compared to other nations, Russians are much more prepared to declare that “an individual can violate the law and be right to do so.” Those who say that violating the law is impermissible in all cases, he notes, have been about 10 to 15 percent throughout the last 15 years.
To cope with this situation, Chupry makes six recommendations. First, there must be “an effective dialogue between the powers and the people.” Second, the legal code must be toughened to defend morality. Third, the principles of social justice must guide the actions of the powers that be.
Fourth, there must be a positive effort to “decriminalize” Russian society. Fifth, there must be an effort to create “an effective system” to educate the rising generation. And sixth, there must be “an active rebirth of morality through religious institutions” both to increase their authority and to try to save the situation of Russian society as a whole.
Window on Eurasia: Putin Promoting Same Trends that Led to the End of the USSR, Satarov Says
Paul Goble
Chattanooga, March 3 – Although this has been sometimes obscured by high oil and gas prices, the policies Vladimir Putin has carried out over the last decade “are contributing to an economic and political trend which repeats that which led to the demise of the Soviet Union,” according to a leading Moscow commentator.
Writing in “Novaya gazeta,” Georgy Satarov, the head of the INDEM Foundation, argues that once these trends and the dangers they present are recognized by Russian society “disappointment with Putin will be much deeper and more severe than the [currently widespread] disappointment in Gorbachev or Yeltsin (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/022/12.html).
Anyone who compiles a balance sheet on Russia today will be disturbed, Satarov says. On the positive side “is nothing except high prices for oil and gas.” But on the negative is widespread corruption, economic and political degradation, a power afraid of its own people, cynicism, hypocrisy and outright lying about the situation in the country.
Indeed, the Moscow analyst continues, “the threats to the present are competing with the threats to the future.”
Some commentators, Satarov notes, say Russia faces a “Weimar scenario.” But others – and they are becoming more numerous, he suggests, have decided that Russia is moving toward disintegration, largely because the country’s leadership “over the last decade has promoted the economic and political trend which repeats that which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
According to Satarov, “the main question” is whether Russians are dealing with “the irreversible agony of Russian civilization which is preparing to leave the historical stage or with an illness that allows for the possibility of a cure.”
Russia as an empire has faced and survived challenges to its existence before. The Russian Empire was the only one to survive World War I, he continues, albeit in a very different form under the Bolsheviks who put off its further decline for 70 years. But while it was seriously reduced in size by the events of 1991, Satarov notes, it still faces serious problems in this regard.
An important question is whether the collapse of empire will lead to the destruction of the national statehood of the metropolitan country. For many non-contiguous empires, the answer, Satarov says, is clearly not. For empires with contiguous colonies, however, the record is far more mixed.
After the collapse of the USSR, Satarov points out, “the territory of Russia declined by a third, and within the Russian Federation remains, with one exception only those territorial units which wanted to remain.” As a result, he argues, “Russia in fact ceased to be an empire.”
That conclusion, he continues, is justified because, thanks to the policies of Boris Yeltsin and his team in the 1990s, “after the introduction of elections of regional leaders the most important imperial characteristic disappeared: the loyalty of territorial leaders exchanged for the right to rule.” Russia became a federation, “weak but a federation” with a chance to survive.
But “after 1000, power in the country step by step began to be seized” by people who did not understand either the nature of the underlying challenges and instead sought to promote their personal power and wealth. “As a result, [Russians] have obtained an explosive mix: an unprecedentedly corrupt and uniquely ineffective power in imperial dress.”
If one consider the nature of this mixture, Satarov says, one sees that “the ruling clique is becoming ever richer, the list of its crimes ever broader, and the fear of losing power ever greater, but at the same time, its effectiveness in carrying out its public functions is declining at an accelerating rate.”
“It is important also to stress,” he continues, “that the current regime has destroyed all autonomous institutions both power and social which earlier supplied an adaptive strength to the political system (as for example in 1998). [And consequently] it is not difficult to show” that the current regime has achieved “destructiveness” far exceeding the Romanovs or Brezhnev.
“Let us begin with the attempts of reestablishing imperial ambitions,” Satarov suggests, immediately adding that he is “certain that the current regime isn’t thinking about any attempts at restoring the former imperial space even by half.” Its advisors certainly know that this would lead to “a complete collapse.”
Consequently, the current Moscow regime has not proclaimed that as a goal. But “the criminality of the propaganda policy of the ruling clique consists in the fact that instead of the planned cure of imperial complexes, it is exploiting them in its own selfish goals (in the literal sense of this word).”
In fact, “the words of Putin are an insane and dangerous game,” given the shock of the loss of empire that many Russians feel. But they are even more dangerous because there are some in Moscow “among whom by the way are not a few military personnel” who “are reading these signals differently.”
Such people “consider the rhetoric of the powers that be as a deception,” the INDEM leader continues. “They agree with the content of the signals but are angry that this is all a fabrication imitation. [And] they dream of going from words to the deed itself,” either by pushing the regime to do what it says or by replacing it.
And these outcomes, Satarov insists, are related to corruption. Because corruption of the level Russia is experiencing means the decay of administration, this invariably leads members of the elite to call for combating corruption. But such efforts themselves in this situation can have serious and even frightening consequences.
“Out of the struggle with corruption in the Weimar Republic (in combination with revenge for defeat), Hitler came to power,” Sattarov notes. Moreover, “Franco struggled with the corruption of the Republicans in Spain. [And] Lukashenka began [his rise] with the theme of the struggle against corruption.”
Thus, he continues, it is entirely possible that “disappointment with Putin will be much deeper and more severe [for the future of Russia] than the disappointment [many in Russia feel] for Gorbachev and Yeltsin,” Sattarov concludes. The powers that come after Putin will be “forced willy nilly” to consider this reality.
Obviously, the current rulers of Russia have “a multitude of important concerns” but “the single thing they should be thinking about is how to get out of the current situation alive andhow to hand over power in a way secure for themselves – and to whom.” Whether this will be Russia’s “death agony” or “a disease that can be cured remains an open question.
Chattanooga, March 3 – Although this has been sometimes obscured by high oil and gas prices, the policies Vladimir Putin has carried out over the last decade “are contributing to an economic and political trend which repeats that which led to the demise of the Soviet Union,” according to a leading Moscow commentator.
Writing in “Novaya gazeta,” Georgy Satarov, the head of the INDEM Foundation, argues that once these trends and the dangers they present are recognized by Russian society “disappointment with Putin will be much deeper and more severe than the [currently widespread] disappointment in Gorbachev or Yeltsin (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/022/12.html).
Anyone who compiles a balance sheet on Russia today will be disturbed, Satarov says. On the positive side “is nothing except high prices for oil and gas.” But on the negative is widespread corruption, economic and political degradation, a power afraid of its own people, cynicism, hypocrisy and outright lying about the situation in the country.
Indeed, the Moscow analyst continues, “the threats to the present are competing with the threats to the future.”
Some commentators, Satarov notes, say Russia faces a “Weimar scenario.” But others – and they are becoming more numerous, he suggests, have decided that Russia is moving toward disintegration, largely because the country’s leadership “over the last decade has promoted the economic and political trend which repeats that which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
According to Satarov, “the main question” is whether Russians are dealing with “the irreversible agony of Russian civilization which is preparing to leave the historical stage or with an illness that allows for the possibility of a cure.”
Russia as an empire has faced and survived challenges to its existence before. The Russian Empire was the only one to survive World War I, he continues, albeit in a very different form under the Bolsheviks who put off its further decline for 70 years. But while it was seriously reduced in size by the events of 1991, Satarov notes, it still faces serious problems in this regard.
An important question is whether the collapse of empire will lead to the destruction of the national statehood of the metropolitan country. For many non-contiguous empires, the answer, Satarov says, is clearly not. For empires with contiguous colonies, however, the record is far more mixed.
After the collapse of the USSR, Satarov points out, “the territory of Russia declined by a third, and within the Russian Federation remains, with one exception only those territorial units which wanted to remain.” As a result, he argues, “Russia in fact ceased to be an empire.”
That conclusion, he continues, is justified because, thanks to the policies of Boris Yeltsin and his team in the 1990s, “after the introduction of elections of regional leaders the most important imperial characteristic disappeared: the loyalty of territorial leaders exchanged for the right to rule.” Russia became a federation, “weak but a federation” with a chance to survive.
But “after 1000, power in the country step by step began to be seized” by people who did not understand either the nature of the underlying challenges and instead sought to promote their personal power and wealth. “As a result, [Russians] have obtained an explosive mix: an unprecedentedly corrupt and uniquely ineffective power in imperial dress.”
If one consider the nature of this mixture, Satarov says, one sees that “the ruling clique is becoming ever richer, the list of its crimes ever broader, and the fear of losing power ever greater, but at the same time, its effectiveness in carrying out its public functions is declining at an accelerating rate.”
“It is important also to stress,” he continues, “that the current regime has destroyed all autonomous institutions both power and social which earlier supplied an adaptive strength to the political system (as for example in 1998). [And consequently] it is not difficult to show” that the current regime has achieved “destructiveness” far exceeding the Romanovs or Brezhnev.
“Let us begin with the attempts of reestablishing imperial ambitions,” Satarov suggests, immediately adding that he is “certain that the current regime isn’t thinking about any attempts at restoring the former imperial space even by half.” Its advisors certainly know that this would lead to “a complete collapse.”
Consequently, the current Moscow regime has not proclaimed that as a goal. But “the criminality of the propaganda policy of the ruling clique consists in the fact that instead of the planned cure of imperial complexes, it is exploiting them in its own selfish goals (in the literal sense of this word).”
In fact, “the words of Putin are an insane and dangerous game,” given the shock of the loss of empire that many Russians feel. But they are even more dangerous because there are some in Moscow “among whom by the way are not a few military personnel” who “are reading these signals differently.”
Such people “consider the rhetoric of the powers that be as a deception,” the INDEM leader continues. “They agree with the content of the signals but are angry that this is all a fabrication imitation. [And] they dream of going from words to the deed itself,” either by pushing the regime to do what it says or by replacing it.
And these outcomes, Satarov insists, are related to corruption. Because corruption of the level Russia is experiencing means the decay of administration, this invariably leads members of the elite to call for combating corruption. But such efforts themselves in this situation can have serious and even frightening consequences.
“Out of the struggle with corruption in the Weimar Republic (in combination with revenge for defeat), Hitler came to power,” Sattarov notes. Moreover, “Franco struggled with the corruption of the Republicans in Spain. [And] Lukashenka began [his rise] with the theme of the struggle against corruption.”
Thus, he continues, it is entirely possible that “disappointment with Putin will be much deeper and more severe [for the future of Russia] than the disappointment [many in Russia feel] for Gorbachev and Yeltsin,” Sattarov concludes. The powers that come after Putin will be “forced willy nilly” to consider this reality.
Obviously, the current rulers of Russia have “a multitude of important concerns” but “the single thing they should be thinking about is how to get out of the current situation alive andhow to hand over power in a way secure for themselves – and to whom.” Whether this will be Russia’s “death agony” or “a disease that can be cured remains an open question.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Experts Assess Reliability of Lukashenka’s Last Line of Defense
Paul Goble
Huntsville, March 2 – It is a measure of the fragility or presumed fragility of the hold some post-Soviet leaders now have on power that the analytic community in Moscow is beginning to ask not only whether they will be challenged by popular uprisings but also whether they have the resources to resist such challenges.
Recent events in Arab countries show that in countries lacking “the broad development of democratic institutions and civil society,” Nikolay Radov, an analyst of Belarusian affairs says, “the law enforcement organs and militarized parts [of the regime] play the main role in what is taking place” (belarus.regnum.ru/news/1378463.html).
For Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his regime, the analyst continues, “force resources also play a first order role,” far eclipsing “the ideological” in ensuring that the current powers that be in Minsk remain in power. Consequently, it is worth asking “whether Lukashenka can count on the Belarusian militia and army in the case of the destabilization of the situation [there].”
Radov concludes that “at present, the Belarusian army and the organs of the MVD and KGB represent the most real foundation of the political regime of Lukashenka” and that the officers in these agencies are prepared to “help” the Belarusian president turn his country into something worse “than Kosovo or Chechnya” if he is threatened.
But because such institutions can and in the case of Arab countries have changed sides, Radov provides a more detailed survey of these and other “force structures” in Lukashenka’s Belarus. The militia, whose ranks makeup approximately one percent of the country’s population, enjoys not a bad reputation among the people but not the opposition.
Lukashenka appears to be relatively satisfied with them and they with him, but he has criticized them, something Radov says is part of his effort to boost his standing with the people. But in fact, he concludes, the Belarusian leader makes these remarks in order to ensure the loyalty of the MVD ranks as “one of the main defenders of the regime.”
According to Radov, “in the opinion of many exper4ts, over the last several years, the main enemy of the Belarusian militia besides thieves and murderers is the opposition, the activists of which are kept” under constant monitoring and threat of arrest by the militia and other organs.
The Belarusian army is well financed, its officers are well paid, and those serving in it are proud of their uniforms, Radov says. And Lukashenka has announced plans to boost their benefits further, a possible indication that he sees the military as a group he must treat well in order to ensure its loyalty to his person.
Lukashenka has spoken openly about the army being the last line of defense. If the situation developed so that the regime would be threatened, he has declared “I would not stop before using the Armed Forces.” In short, “the main assignment of the army of Belarus is armed struggle with its own people.”
Finally, Radov considers the Belarusian KGB. A decade ago, there were obvious tensions between Lukashenka and this security agency, but over the last several years, these appear to have been overcome with the KGB getting many of the things it wants via new and invasive legislation.
Indeed, Radov concludes, “the events which took place after December 19, 2010 [when the elections took place in Belarus] are convincing evidence that the organs of the KGB have passed completely under the leadership of Lukashenka and have been converted into a weapon of the regime.”
Huntsville, March 2 – It is a measure of the fragility or presumed fragility of the hold some post-Soviet leaders now have on power that the analytic community in Moscow is beginning to ask not only whether they will be challenged by popular uprisings but also whether they have the resources to resist such challenges.
Recent events in Arab countries show that in countries lacking “the broad development of democratic institutions and civil society,” Nikolay Radov, an analyst of Belarusian affairs says, “the law enforcement organs and militarized parts [of the regime] play the main role in what is taking place” (belarus.regnum.ru/news/1378463.html).
For Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his regime, the analyst continues, “force resources also play a first order role,” far eclipsing “the ideological” in ensuring that the current powers that be in Minsk remain in power. Consequently, it is worth asking “whether Lukashenka can count on the Belarusian militia and army in the case of the destabilization of the situation [there].”
Radov concludes that “at present, the Belarusian army and the organs of the MVD and KGB represent the most real foundation of the political regime of Lukashenka” and that the officers in these agencies are prepared to “help” the Belarusian president turn his country into something worse “than Kosovo or Chechnya” if he is threatened.
But because such institutions can and in the case of Arab countries have changed sides, Radov provides a more detailed survey of these and other “force structures” in Lukashenka’s Belarus. The militia, whose ranks makeup approximately one percent of the country’s population, enjoys not a bad reputation among the people but not the opposition.
Lukashenka appears to be relatively satisfied with them and they with him, but he has criticized them, something Radov says is part of his effort to boost his standing with the people. But in fact, he concludes, the Belarusian leader makes these remarks in order to ensure the loyalty of the MVD ranks as “one of the main defenders of the regime.”
According to Radov, “in the opinion of many exper4ts, over the last several years, the main enemy of the Belarusian militia besides thieves and murderers is the opposition, the activists of which are kept” under constant monitoring and threat of arrest by the militia and other organs.
The Belarusian army is well financed, its officers are well paid, and those serving in it are proud of their uniforms, Radov says. And Lukashenka has announced plans to boost their benefits further, a possible indication that he sees the military as a group he must treat well in order to ensure its loyalty to his person.
Lukashenka has spoken openly about the army being the last line of defense. If the situation developed so that the regime would be threatened, he has declared “I would not stop before using the Armed Forces.” In short, “the main assignment of the army of Belarus is armed struggle with its own people.”
Finally, Radov considers the Belarusian KGB. A decade ago, there were obvious tensions between Lukashenka and this security agency, but over the last several years, these appear to have been overcome with the KGB getting many of the things it wants via new and invasive legislation.
Indeed, Radov concludes, “the events which took place after December 19, 2010 [when the elections took place in Belarus] are convincing evidence that the organs of the KGB have passed completely under the leadership of Lukashenka and have been converted into a weapon of the regime.”
Window on Eurasia: Post-Soviet Generation Lacks Feeling for Inter-Ethnic Relations, Leader of Kazakh Community in Moscow Says
Paul Goble
Huntsville, March 2 – The generation born in 1991 or later lacks the positive promotion of inter-ethnic relations of their parents and thus is “lost” as far as promoting good ties between people of different national groups in the Russian Federation, according to the head of the Kazakh national autonomy in Moscow.
In a speech to a conference on nationality policy at Moscow State University, Polad Dzamalov, the president of the Kazakh national-cultural autonomy of the Russian capital, said that “we have lost” this post-Soviet generation because “for them, the understanding of inter-ethnic relations does not exist” (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/obshestvo/meznaz/33634.html).
And like other speakers at the session, the ethnic Kazakh leader pointed to “the positive experience of the Soviet Union is the solution of such problems and [underscored what he and they view as] the negative influence of the absence of a clearly-defined nationality policy in the succeeding years.”
Other speakers were even more negative: Ivan Fomin, the editor of the journal “Sokrat,” stressed that “nationality policy is a derivative of government policy more general” and that continuing “inertia” in this area “can lead to the splitting up of Russia into separate ethnic fragment-states.”
That need not be the case, participants at the roundtable said, with several pointing to “positive” approaches in other countries including the Peoples Republic of China. But most of the experts, activists, and officials at the session appear to be extremely pessimistic about the future.
Indeed, the problem may be even more difficult to resolve than they suggest. If Dzhamalov is right that the generation born since the end of the Soviet Union or whose members have entered into conscious life during that time, this cohort forms roughly half of the population in most post-Soviet states.
In the non-Russian countries, most of which have organized themselves as nation states, the shift in values that Dzhamalov decries may in fact help them solidify their national identities. But in the case of the Russian Federation, this shift may make it impossible to maintain social stability and civic peace in the near term expect at extremely high levels of coercion.
In a 6,000-word article in the current issue of “Oktyabr,” Aleksandr Tarasov writes about one aspect of this generational shift, the right-wing xenophobic nationalism of many football fans, most of whom are drawn from younger age groups and thus reflect an extreme form of the problem Dzhamalov is referring to (magazines.russ.ru/october/2011/2/t8.html)
Entitled “The Swastika at the Stadium,” Tarasov’s article traces the way in which this young subculture is increasingly affected by nationalistic ideas, yet another reason for pessimism about the rising generation, precisely the people in whom so many in the West have placed so much hope for the future of Russia.
Huntsville, March 2 – The generation born in 1991 or later lacks the positive promotion of inter-ethnic relations of their parents and thus is “lost” as far as promoting good ties between people of different national groups in the Russian Federation, according to the head of the Kazakh national autonomy in Moscow.
In a speech to a conference on nationality policy at Moscow State University, Polad Dzamalov, the president of the Kazakh national-cultural autonomy of the Russian capital, said that “we have lost” this post-Soviet generation because “for them, the understanding of inter-ethnic relations does not exist” (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/obshestvo/meznaz/33634.html).
And like other speakers at the session, the ethnic Kazakh leader pointed to “the positive experience of the Soviet Union is the solution of such problems and [underscored what he and they view as] the negative influence of the absence of a clearly-defined nationality policy in the succeeding years.”
Other speakers were even more negative: Ivan Fomin, the editor of the journal “Sokrat,” stressed that “nationality policy is a derivative of government policy more general” and that continuing “inertia” in this area “can lead to the splitting up of Russia into separate ethnic fragment-states.”
That need not be the case, participants at the roundtable said, with several pointing to “positive” approaches in other countries including the Peoples Republic of China. But most of the experts, activists, and officials at the session appear to be extremely pessimistic about the future.
Indeed, the problem may be even more difficult to resolve than they suggest. If Dzhamalov is right that the generation born since the end of the Soviet Union or whose members have entered into conscious life during that time, this cohort forms roughly half of the population in most post-Soviet states.
In the non-Russian countries, most of which have organized themselves as nation states, the shift in values that Dzhamalov decries may in fact help them solidify their national identities. But in the case of the Russian Federation, this shift may make it impossible to maintain social stability and civic peace in the near term expect at extremely high levels of coercion.
In a 6,000-word article in the current issue of “Oktyabr,” Aleksandr Tarasov writes about one aspect of this generational shift, the right-wing xenophobic nationalism of many football fans, most of whom are drawn from younger age groups and thus reflect an extreme form of the problem Dzhamalov is referring to (magazines.russ.ru/october/2011/2/t8.html)
Entitled “The Swastika at the Stadium,” Tarasov’s article traces the way in which this young subculture is increasingly affected by nationalistic ideas, yet another reason for pessimism about the rising generation, precisely the people in whom so many in the West have placed so much hope for the future of Russia.
Monday, February 28, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russians Beyond the Urals ‘No Longer Want to Be Russians,’ Census Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, February 28 – Russians living east of the Urals “no longer want to be Russians,” many there say, and Moscow commentators are beginning to consider the possibility that these Siberians may be a greater threat to the center’s control of that region with its enormous reserves of natural resources than the Chinese will ever represent.
Although the results of the last census have not yet been officially published, officials in Rosstat’s regional adminsitraitons have acknowledged that a significant number of residentsof “Tyumen, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Barnaul, and Yakutsk have declared themselves to be “Siberians” rather than Russians (rusrep.ru/article/2011/02/22/sibir/).
Such declarations, especially given that only eight years earlier, few if any of the ethnic Russians there declared that nationality, reflect a reality which can be seen with the unaided eye, a Russky reporter journalist says, and “form a threat which five to ten years from now may declare itself more loudly than the Caucasus.”
During the 2002 census, a Rosstat official said, “the majority of these people considered themselves to be Russian” by nationality. But “after only eight years, they have become Siberians,” adding that there “really are a lot of them!” Moreover, the Rosstat official noted, there would have been more if the census had been conducted honestly.
In many cases, he said, the census takers did not do their jobs properly. They did not go anywhere and simply “filled the forms using data from housing books [and] there were in general no Siberians in those books,” only ethnic Russians or some other nationality. Moreover, officials actively discouraged people from calling themselves something other than Russians.
“It is indicative,” the journalist said, “that initially the idea of writing down ‘Siberian’ was born in the Internet, and thiswasviewedby many as the latest flashmob action of young people, but unexpectedly for the initiatorsitquickly passed beyond the limits of virtual space and began to win over the masses.”
Aleksandr Konovalov, a Krasnoyarsk blogger, who helped organize the effort, said that he “feels himself to be a Siberian … we are different [that Russians]. This is difficult to explain but it’s so. In general, I consider that we do not know what Russians are. During the Soviet period, we lost Russian culture and became ‘the Soviet people.’”
As a result, the blogger continued, “a Russian is some kind of an abstraction. Even our country is Russia not Rus. Siberian is more concrete.” Moreover, Konovalovsaid, “the image of Russians both in the country and abroad is very poor. But this negative attitude does not extend to Siberians.”
Konovalov explained why the Siberians had chosen to use the census to announce themselves to the world. “Meetings today are in fact prohibited, and the census becameth eonly all-national possibility to express protest.” Moreover, people in Siberia are moremistreated than those in the Caucasus who at least are showered with budget funds.
According to the report in “Russky reporter,” when Siberians talk about Muscovites, they are referring “not to the residents of Moscow but to a certain evil community, therepresentatives of which conduct themselves the way the British administrationdid in colonial America” – taking away as much of value as possible and leaving as little to the residents.
Many in Moscow see the Siberian movement as “laughable” because they are certain that “no one will ever leave Russia.” But some Siberians say that even if they don’t seek independence – and many of them deny that as a goal – their self-identification as Siberians is important because it helps them overcome self-destructive Russian behaviors.
And Russians in the region say that if the Siberians change their minds and do pursue separatist goals, arguing that they are victims of “colonialism and imperialism,” then beyond any doubt, Moscow will use armed force to restrain them. “Any state would resolve such a problem with force,” they say.
Staunton, February 28 – Russians living east of the Urals “no longer want to be Russians,” many there say, and Moscow commentators are beginning to consider the possibility that these Siberians may be a greater threat to the center’s control of that region with its enormous reserves of natural resources than the Chinese will ever represent.
Although the results of the last census have not yet been officially published, officials in Rosstat’s regional adminsitraitons have acknowledged that a significant number of residentsof “Tyumen, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Barnaul, and Yakutsk have declared themselves to be “Siberians” rather than Russians (rusrep.ru/article/2011/02/22/sibir/).
Such declarations, especially given that only eight years earlier, few if any of the ethnic Russians there declared that nationality, reflect a reality which can be seen with the unaided eye, a Russky reporter journalist says, and “form a threat which five to ten years from now may declare itself more loudly than the Caucasus.”
During the 2002 census, a Rosstat official said, “the majority of these people considered themselves to be Russian” by nationality. But “after only eight years, they have become Siberians,” adding that there “really are a lot of them!” Moreover, the Rosstat official noted, there would have been more if the census had been conducted honestly.
In many cases, he said, the census takers did not do their jobs properly. They did not go anywhere and simply “filled the forms using data from housing books [and] there were in general no Siberians in those books,” only ethnic Russians or some other nationality. Moreover, officials actively discouraged people from calling themselves something other than Russians.
“It is indicative,” the journalist said, “that initially the idea of writing down ‘Siberian’ was born in the Internet, and thiswasviewedby many as the latest flashmob action of young people, but unexpectedly for the initiatorsitquickly passed beyond the limits of virtual space and began to win over the masses.”
Aleksandr Konovalov, a Krasnoyarsk blogger, who helped organize the effort, said that he “feels himself to be a Siberian … we are different [that Russians]. This is difficult to explain but it’s so. In general, I consider that we do not know what Russians are. During the Soviet period, we lost Russian culture and became ‘the Soviet people.’”
As a result, the blogger continued, “a Russian is some kind of an abstraction. Even our country is Russia not Rus. Siberian is more concrete.” Moreover, Konovalovsaid, “the image of Russians both in the country and abroad is very poor. But this negative attitude does not extend to Siberians.”
Konovalov explained why the Siberians had chosen to use the census to announce themselves to the world. “Meetings today are in fact prohibited, and the census becameth eonly all-national possibility to express protest.” Moreover, people in Siberia are moremistreated than those in the Caucasus who at least are showered with budget funds.
According to the report in “Russky reporter,” when Siberians talk about Muscovites, they are referring “not to the residents of Moscow but to a certain evil community, therepresentatives of which conduct themselves the way the British administrationdid in colonial America” – taking away as much of value as possible and leaving as little to the residents.
Many in Moscow see the Siberian movement as “laughable” because they are certain that “no one will ever leave Russia.” But some Siberians say that even if they don’t seek independence – and many of them deny that as a goal – their self-identification as Siberians is important because it helps them overcome self-destructive Russian behaviors.
And Russians in the region say that if the Siberians change their minds and do pursue separatist goals, arguing that they are victims of “colonialism and imperialism,” then beyond any doubt, Moscow will use armed force to restrain them. “Any state would resolve such a problem with force,” they say.
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