Paul Goble
Staunton, October 24 – Much of the unrest among immigrants in France in recent times has come not from the first generation of immigrants who often feel compelled to accept discrimination as a price for improved economic circumstances rather from the second whose members demand that they be treated equally.
Anatoly Vishnevsky, director of the Moscow Institute of Demography of the Higher School of Economics, argues that in Russia, the situation is different and that despite the problems that country is experiencing with the first migrant generation, it is in a position to “make a bet on the children of migrants” (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/118/10.html).
But if that is the upside of Vishnevsky’s analysis, his suggestion that immigrants will change the face of Russia over the next several generations is likely to anger many Russian nationalists and frighten a larger number of ordinary Russians who may be drawn to xenophobic causes.
Few of the adults in the first generation of immigrants will fully integrate into Russian society, he says. “but if they have children or if such children appear already in emigration, their prospects for emigration are entirely different.” If these children learn Russian, “study together with [Russian] children, live together with [Russians], then they will fit into our society.”
As the experience of other countries shows, however, that outcome is not a given. “For this,” Vishnevsky says, “a special long-term policy directed at their integration must be conducted.” But unless Russia adopts such a policy, the decline in the country’s population will not stop.
As his interviewers noted, Vishnevsky recently pointed out that “in 2100, the current population of Russia and its descendents will be converted into a minority; that is, in essence, this will be a different and new population of the country.” Consequently, they suggested, he was talking about the formation of a new and different nation altogether.
Vishnevsky said that such a prospect was not utopian and pointed to the experience of the United States where WASPS are rapidly losing their preponderant position, and he said that “besides that, this is the only possible path for Russia,” however different it is from that country’s past and however much some Russians may object.
In the decade ahead, the problem will become even more acute than it is now, he points out. The number of young mothers will “sharply fall” and as a result, so too will the number of births.” Moreover, there will be “fewer young men,” which means fewer draftees, something the military will oppose but only with a negative impact on the economy.
Russians are not about to become a minority in their own country, Vishnevsky says, “but in the distant perspective, it is impossible to exclude that.” And because that is a possibility, Russians need to think now about how they will integrate the migrants and thereby create a new combined nationality.
What that will look like should be the subject of discussion. What is it that Russians want to preserve: “The preservation of racial identity? Or linguistic and cultural?” These are “different” things. “The racial composition of the population could be changed but the language and culture could remain Russian,” albeit “enriched” by the contributions of the arrivals.
What will happen depends to a very large extent on what Russian politicians decide to do, Vishnevsky argues, and he suggests that the outcome will depend not only on how the Russian powers that be treat immigrants but also what immigrants they encourage and accept, given that migrants is “a collective term.”
There are both permanent immigrants who will have an effect on the country’s demographic future and temporary ones who will play a major role in the economy but who won’t affect, at least not profoundly, the ethnic face of the country. Unfortunately, for policy makers, “there is no clear border” between these two groups.
As far as migration within the Russian Federation is concerned, Vishnevsky points out that “the Caucasus is the only region of Russia where there has been a demographic explosion,” and he argues that this underlies both the political and military dimension of the problem there. In sum, he says, in the North Caucasus, “there are a lot of people and only a little land.”
Vishnevsky said he had profound doubts about the possibility of promoting the return of ethnic Russians to that region as some officials have proposed. There simply are not the kind of jobs Russians want there. And of course, it will be extremely difficult to get predominantly ethnic Russian regions to accept more people from the Caucasus.
At the most global level, Moscow must permit, even encourage, more immigration if it wants to keep the population from falling. The post-1945 babies are now aging, and the number of young mothers is contracting As a result, now Russia needs about 200,000-300,000 immigrants every year. In five years, Vishnevsky says, it will need 500 to 800,000.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
Window on Eurasia: USSR’s Collapse Left 180 Ethnic Conflicts in Its Wake, RF’s Last Nationalities Minister Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 24 – The disintegration of the Soviet Union left approximately 180 places, many along borders put in place by Stalin, where ethno-national tensions are high and where in approximately 20 cases they have already broken out in violence, according to Vladimir Zorin, a Moscow ethnographer who served as Russia’s last minister for nationality affairs.
In an interview with “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” Zorin, who is now deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology but served as nationalities minister until Vladimir Putin disbanded that agency, outlines why Russians should be concerned about that reality (kp.ru/daily/24578/748669/).
On the one hand, Zorin told the paper’s Galina Sapozhnikova, it is a mistake to become too alarmed by the recent upsurge in ethnic violence. Such violence tends to surge in the summer months, and experts have concluded that there has been “a stabilization in [Russia’s] social-political situation [over the last 10-15 years] including in the area of inter-ethnic relations.”
That is not to say, he continues, that there are no problems with “migrant-ophobia, Caucasus-ophobia and anti-Semitism,” but “these are marginal phenomena” rather than being a matter of “state policy” or reflecting “the point of view of the majority of the population” of the Russian Federation.
But on the other hand, Zorin insists, there is a real basis for concern “because conflicts are the borderlands of the former USSR are not resolved and have acquired a delayed status and can at any moment break out anew,” as events in Kyrgyzstan over the last several months have demonstrated.
Moscow experts, the ethnographer continues, had taken note of “a significant growth in tensions” there already last year and had predicted a disaster which “to one’s great regret has taken place.” One reason the expert community was sure that would happen is because of the cyclical pattern of ethnic conflicts.
“In the 1990s,” Zorin points out, “there was also an inter-ethnic conflict in this region And conflicts of this kind have a tendency to display a cyclical return after 15 to 20 years. A young generation grows up which has experienced terror, denigration and fear, and it wants revenge” – a pattern that is not limited to the Uzbek south of Kyrgyzstan.
Russians are “not indifferent about how the Russian-language population in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia and any other new independent state feels,” Zorin continues, “just as residents of these countries absolutely are not indifferent if Tajiks and Uzbeks are killed [in the Russian Federation]. All this is very interconnected.”
Among “the first-order Russian risks,” the former nationalities minister says, are “the growth of tension on the borders of our countries and especially in the countries of the CIS. Many of these conflict situations were laid down by the national-territorial delimitation carried out” by Stalin, who believed “this ‘cocktail of peoples’ would strengthen the country.”
“The roots of the Osh conflict, the second series of which we observed in May 2010, are to be found there,” Zorin says. He adds that “experts have counted such zones (of various degrees of tension, numbers, and size of territory) are approximately 180.” Not all have exploded by “20 of them have already been realized in various forms, in armed and unarmed conflicts.”
Thus, Zorin argues, the division of the Soviet Union was not only a tragedy as Putin has said but the cutting apart of something living as Mikhail Gorbachev argued. At the same time, however, it was not the Russians who “redrew” the borders, the stability of which had been “the capstone of stability” in post-war Europe.”
He points to the case of Kosovo, where the West recognized border changes, arguing that “if the world goes along the path of the Kosovo variant and begins to support separatism, this could have unpredictable consequences.” But like most Russian commentators, he does not discuss Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, at least directly.
In response to a question about the possibility of “solving” such conflicts, Zorin argues that “it is impossible” to return to the status quo ante. Instead, what is “most important is to extinguish the armed stage” of the conflict, a step that he suggests is “a major success” given the difficulty of getting the sides to make a compromise.
Not all potential disputes have to break out into violence, he says, but that can happen “if they will be used by political forces for the resolution of specific ambitious tasks and if the powers that be, acting in an illiterate fashion, do not begin to consider the ethno-political factor in the resolutions which they take.”
“For example,” Zorin says, “everyone knows about the Transdniestria situation. But they forget that in this same Moldova, there was also a Gagauz problem. It has been resolved; a formula has been found. [And] that means it is possible to find other formulas” for other conflicts.
One of the best means, Zorin suggests, is the use of federalism. In the 1990s, Moscow pushed Georgia to become a federation “but [then-President Zviad] Gamsakhurdia did not want to listen to anyone.” And as a result, Russia, “where the most numerous people forms 80 percent of the population, retained a federal system,” but the other states did not create one.
Fears among Russian leaders about new ethnic conflicts are very real, of course. And one indication of that is the comment of Vladislav Surkov, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, to a meeting in the Chechen capital of Grozny on Friday (www.interfax.ru/politics/news.asp?id=161634).
In words that recall Winston Churchill’s declarations about the permanence of British rule in India, Surkov said that “everyone must know that the Caucasus was and forever will remain a constituent part of Russia,” something about which he suggested “the leadership of Russia has not the slightest doubt.”
Staunton, October 24 – The disintegration of the Soviet Union left approximately 180 places, many along borders put in place by Stalin, where ethno-national tensions are high and where in approximately 20 cases they have already broken out in violence, according to Vladimir Zorin, a Moscow ethnographer who served as Russia’s last minister for nationality affairs.
In an interview with “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” Zorin, who is now deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology but served as nationalities minister until Vladimir Putin disbanded that agency, outlines why Russians should be concerned about that reality (kp.ru/daily/24578/748669/).
On the one hand, Zorin told the paper’s Galina Sapozhnikova, it is a mistake to become too alarmed by the recent upsurge in ethnic violence. Such violence tends to surge in the summer months, and experts have concluded that there has been “a stabilization in [Russia’s] social-political situation [over the last 10-15 years] including in the area of inter-ethnic relations.”
That is not to say, he continues, that there are no problems with “migrant-ophobia, Caucasus-ophobia and anti-Semitism,” but “these are marginal phenomena” rather than being a matter of “state policy” or reflecting “the point of view of the majority of the population” of the Russian Federation.
But on the other hand, Zorin insists, there is a real basis for concern “because conflicts are the borderlands of the former USSR are not resolved and have acquired a delayed status and can at any moment break out anew,” as events in Kyrgyzstan over the last several months have demonstrated.
Moscow experts, the ethnographer continues, had taken note of “a significant growth in tensions” there already last year and had predicted a disaster which “to one’s great regret has taken place.” One reason the expert community was sure that would happen is because of the cyclical pattern of ethnic conflicts.
“In the 1990s,” Zorin points out, “there was also an inter-ethnic conflict in this region And conflicts of this kind have a tendency to display a cyclical return after 15 to 20 years. A young generation grows up which has experienced terror, denigration and fear, and it wants revenge” – a pattern that is not limited to the Uzbek south of Kyrgyzstan.
Russians are “not indifferent about how the Russian-language population in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia and any other new independent state feels,” Zorin continues, “just as residents of these countries absolutely are not indifferent if Tajiks and Uzbeks are killed [in the Russian Federation]. All this is very interconnected.”
Among “the first-order Russian risks,” the former nationalities minister says, are “the growth of tension on the borders of our countries and especially in the countries of the CIS. Many of these conflict situations were laid down by the national-territorial delimitation carried out” by Stalin, who believed “this ‘cocktail of peoples’ would strengthen the country.”
“The roots of the Osh conflict, the second series of which we observed in May 2010, are to be found there,” Zorin says. He adds that “experts have counted such zones (of various degrees of tension, numbers, and size of territory) are approximately 180.” Not all have exploded by “20 of them have already been realized in various forms, in armed and unarmed conflicts.”
Thus, Zorin argues, the division of the Soviet Union was not only a tragedy as Putin has said but the cutting apart of something living as Mikhail Gorbachev argued. At the same time, however, it was not the Russians who “redrew” the borders, the stability of which had been “the capstone of stability” in post-war Europe.”
He points to the case of Kosovo, where the West recognized border changes, arguing that “if the world goes along the path of the Kosovo variant and begins to support separatism, this could have unpredictable consequences.” But like most Russian commentators, he does not discuss Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, at least directly.
In response to a question about the possibility of “solving” such conflicts, Zorin argues that “it is impossible” to return to the status quo ante. Instead, what is “most important is to extinguish the armed stage” of the conflict, a step that he suggests is “a major success” given the difficulty of getting the sides to make a compromise.
Not all potential disputes have to break out into violence, he says, but that can happen “if they will be used by political forces for the resolution of specific ambitious tasks and if the powers that be, acting in an illiterate fashion, do not begin to consider the ethno-political factor in the resolutions which they take.”
“For example,” Zorin says, “everyone knows about the Transdniestria situation. But they forget that in this same Moldova, there was also a Gagauz problem. It has been resolved; a formula has been found. [And] that means it is possible to find other formulas” for other conflicts.
One of the best means, Zorin suggests, is the use of federalism. In the 1990s, Moscow pushed Georgia to become a federation “but [then-President Zviad] Gamsakhurdia did not want to listen to anyone.” And as a result, Russia, “where the most numerous people forms 80 percent of the population, retained a federal system,” but the other states did not create one.
Fears among Russian leaders about new ethnic conflicts are very real, of course. And one indication of that is the comment of Vladislav Surkov, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, to a meeting in the Chechen capital of Grozny on Friday (www.interfax.ru/politics/news.asp?id=161634).
In words that recall Winston Churchill’s declarations about the permanence of British rule in India, Surkov said that “everyone must know that the Caucasus was and forever will remain a constituent part of Russia,” something about which he suggested “the leadership of Russia has not the slightest doubt.”
Friday, October 22, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Lake Balkhash Becoming ‘a Second Aral Sea’ -- and with Potentially More Serious Political Consequences
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 22 – Lake Balkhash, the 12th largest lake in the world, is on the way to becoming “a second Aral Sea,” a Russian commentator says, but one with potentially even more serious political consequences because both the causes of the lake’s decline and the impact of its death involve not only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but China.
The demise of the Aral Sea and the impact of that development on the peoples of Central Asia have attracted intense international interest for many years, and this fall, the United Nations has organized a special session on how to save that inland sea that many believe is now far beyond the point of no return.
But the similar fate of Lake Balkhash, a 16,400 square kilometer body of water in southeastern Kazakhstan whose waters are fed by rivers rising in and often diverted by Kyrgyzstan and China has not, Vladimir Gavrilenko argues in an essay posted online this week (nsi-press.ru/2010/10/nauka/650).
That is because it, like Baikal, is today “under threat of disappearing.” Over the last several years, the surface area of Balkhash has decreased by some 2,000 square kilometers, “and the situation continues to get worse,” with one part of the lake already saline and the population around all of the lake already suffering from the exposure of chemicals.
According to Gavrilenko, the lake’s decline is entirely the result of human activity, and its approaching death will produce “an ecological catastrophe,” one that will affect not only Kazakhstan but Kyrgyzstan, China’s Xinjiang Province, other countries in Central Asia, and parts of the Russian Federation.
The lake’s decline was accelerated at the end of the last century, he notes, when the Chinese built a dam on the Ili River which had provided Balkhash with most of its water and then proceeded to take out ever greater percentages of its flow, something that has reduced the water level in the lake by two meters.
Given that Chinese demand on this source of water shows no sign of easing, ecologists say that “the Western part of the lake could disappear entirely” in the relatively near future, something that will create economic and health disasters for the three million people living in the region but also likely spark political tensions between Kazakhstan and China.
But China is not the only source of the lake’s problem, Gavrilenko says. People living around the lake, long used to having all the fresh water they wanted, “have not been accustomed to think about its economic use.” Instead, they have wasted enormous amounts of water because of outdated irrigation systems
Moreover, industrial facilities around the lake and along the six feeder rivers have been dumping toxic wastes into the flow, and many cities and towns have put untreated sewage into these rivers and the lake itself. The results should not have surprised anyone, Gavrilenko suggests, and the likely consequences in the future should disturb everyone.
Water shortages symbolized by the death of the Aral Sea have sparked numerous international conflicts, sometimes to the point of violence, among the Central Asian countries, especially between the water supplier countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and the downstream consumer countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The demise of Lake Balkhash almost certainly will increase tensions between Kazakhstan and China, tensions that are likely to be all the greater because the Balkhash crisis unlike the death of the Aral Sea has failed to attract the international attention that might help the people around the lake and cause the two sides to think more rationally about what is taking place.
But perhaps equally important, because the Lake Balkhash problem is so obviously the result of human action, expanded coverage of this environmental tragedy likely will further energize ecological movements in the Russian Federation east of the Urals, all the more so because people there are likely to link water issues to ethno-national ones.
Staunton, October 22 – Lake Balkhash, the 12th largest lake in the world, is on the way to becoming “a second Aral Sea,” a Russian commentator says, but one with potentially even more serious political consequences because both the causes of the lake’s decline and the impact of its death involve not only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but China.
The demise of the Aral Sea and the impact of that development on the peoples of Central Asia have attracted intense international interest for many years, and this fall, the United Nations has organized a special session on how to save that inland sea that many believe is now far beyond the point of no return.
But the similar fate of Lake Balkhash, a 16,400 square kilometer body of water in southeastern Kazakhstan whose waters are fed by rivers rising in and often diverted by Kyrgyzstan and China has not, Vladimir Gavrilenko argues in an essay posted online this week (nsi-press.ru/2010/10/nauka/650).
That is because it, like Baikal, is today “under threat of disappearing.” Over the last several years, the surface area of Balkhash has decreased by some 2,000 square kilometers, “and the situation continues to get worse,” with one part of the lake already saline and the population around all of the lake already suffering from the exposure of chemicals.
According to Gavrilenko, the lake’s decline is entirely the result of human activity, and its approaching death will produce “an ecological catastrophe,” one that will affect not only Kazakhstan but Kyrgyzstan, China’s Xinjiang Province, other countries in Central Asia, and parts of the Russian Federation.
The lake’s decline was accelerated at the end of the last century, he notes, when the Chinese built a dam on the Ili River which had provided Balkhash with most of its water and then proceeded to take out ever greater percentages of its flow, something that has reduced the water level in the lake by two meters.
Given that Chinese demand on this source of water shows no sign of easing, ecologists say that “the Western part of the lake could disappear entirely” in the relatively near future, something that will create economic and health disasters for the three million people living in the region but also likely spark political tensions between Kazakhstan and China.
But China is not the only source of the lake’s problem, Gavrilenko says. People living around the lake, long used to having all the fresh water they wanted, “have not been accustomed to think about its economic use.” Instead, they have wasted enormous amounts of water because of outdated irrigation systems
Moreover, industrial facilities around the lake and along the six feeder rivers have been dumping toxic wastes into the flow, and many cities and towns have put untreated sewage into these rivers and the lake itself. The results should not have surprised anyone, Gavrilenko suggests, and the likely consequences in the future should disturb everyone.
Water shortages symbolized by the death of the Aral Sea have sparked numerous international conflicts, sometimes to the point of violence, among the Central Asian countries, especially between the water supplier countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and the downstream consumer countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The demise of Lake Balkhash almost certainly will increase tensions between Kazakhstan and China, tensions that are likely to be all the greater because the Balkhash crisis unlike the death of the Aral Sea has failed to attract the international attention that might help the people around the lake and cause the two sides to think more rationally about what is taking place.
But perhaps equally important, because the Lake Balkhash problem is so obviously the result of human action, expanded coverage of this environmental tragedy likely will further energize ecological movements in the Russian Federation east of the Urals, all the more so because people there are likely to link water issues to ethno-national ones.
Window on Eurasia: To Solve Russia's Demographic Problems, Moscow Should Fight High Mortality Rather than Seek to Boost Low Birthrate, Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 22 – If Russia is to slow or even reverse its demographic decline, a Moscow commentator says, it cannot rely on pro-natalist policies alone but much address super-high mortality rates among working-age Russian males that are now ten times higher than for the counterparts in developed countries.
In an article in “Svobodnaya pressa” today, Andrey Polunin points out that despite a slight uptick in the number of births in 2009, an increase linked more to a temporary increase in the number of women in prime years for childbirth rather than to the regime’s pro-natalist policies, “Russia is slowly but surely dying out” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32430/).
For most of the last two decades, the Russian powers that be have tried to address the country’s demographic decline by trying to boost the birthrate, Polunin notes, but despite the “optimism” on this point expressed by President Dmitry Medvedev, such an approach “is practically useless.”
“Such measures [at best] produce a short-term effect,” Polunin points out. “Women give birth to a planned child at what they consider a profitable moment, but they do not become multi-child mothers.” Consequently, pro-natalist efforts, at least of the kind that Moscow has employed, are doing little or nothing to slow the country’s demographic decline.
But he argues that “it is possible to stop the withering away of Russia.” That is obvious if one remembers the observation of one expert that Russia has “European birthrates and African mortality rates” and then decides to focus on the latter. Were Russia to do that and reduce the mortality rates even to the levels of the 1980s, Russia would be growing, not declining.
Efforts to reduce mortality rates not only are possible but can be effective, Polunin says, and he points to the struggle against mortality that the European Union carried out from the 1970s to 2002. Over that period, mortality rates fell dramatically and life expectancy among both men and women increased “more than seven years.”
Russia has even a greater opportunity in this regard that the Europeans did. “Mortality among Russian men of working age exceeds the indicators of the developed countries by ten times and the figures in developing countries by five. Child mortality in Russia is twice as high as it is abroad, and the gap in life expectancy among men and women has reached 13 years.”
In his detailed essay, Polunin examines the situation in five areas where he suggests Russia could make real progress in reducing mortality rates. First of all, deaths on highways. Last year Russia lost more than 26,000 dead from road accidents. Eliminating all deaths on the roads is impossible, but reducing that figure is certainly possible, as the US has shown.
Second, deaths from alcohol. By several orders of magnitude, Russians die more often from alcohol than do residents of other countries. Officially, Russians of all ages consume an average of 18 liters of pure alcohol every year. Experts say the actual figure is closer to 30, and since most children don’t drink, the consumption of alcohol among adults is much higher.
Nikolay Gerasimenko, first deputy chairman of the Duma’s health committee, says that “mortality from alcohol has reached from 350,000 to 700,000 people every year,” and if one adds deaths in which alcohol combined with other problems, losses linked to alcohol are “higher still.”
Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, as unpopular as it was, cut the death rate from alcohol by 200,000 a year for five years, according to Health Minister Tatyana Golikova. That means that one million people lived who otherwise might have died. If a similar program were introduced now, the results would be similar.
“Could the government of the Russian Federation do this?” Polunin asks, and then says that obviously the answer is yes, “but somehow it isn’t doing so.”
Third, suicides. Last year, 35,000 Russians took their own lives – “or 29 for every 100,000 population,” a figure that is “twice greater than the international average” and one that is far greater than in the past except in the years of high Stalinism, 1937 and 1947 when Russian figures were also large.
“It is possible,” Polunin continues, that “a more democratic arrangement of society and more stable social-economic situation would reduce the number of suicides among [Russians]” to the level in the US or Canada (11-12 per 100,000. That would “save” another 17,000 lives for the future.
Fourth, deaths at work. Because Russian employers do not have to pay out large sums if a worker is injured or dies, “our employers prefer not to waste profit on ‘petty things’ like the introducing secure technology. As a result, many Russians die at work. Officially the number is 6,000, but in fact, Polunin says, the real figure may be as high as 190,000. Many could be saved.
And fifth, disappearances. Russian officials acknowledge that some 50,000 people disappear every year in that country, and experts say that almost all of them are dead, killed by others, a reflection of the fact that “the number of murders in Russia is three times that of the US and 19 to 20 times that of the countries of the European Union.”
That means that if Russia could reduce its violent crime to the level of the US, it would save “at a minimum,” 35,000 lives each year, and if it could cut murders to European levels, it could save “practically all of these 50,000,” something that would help the country’s demographic problems far more that pro-natalist pronouncements.
In sum, Polunin says that if Russia had “normal roads, a struggle with drunkenness, order in the system of insuring workers, and the de-criminalization of society,” that would result “at a minimum” in saving 353,000 lives every year. And it is possible that that number could be increased by eliminating medical mistakes as well as taking other steps.
As anyone can see, this would mean nearly “a half million lives saved each year” and that goal is “completely realistic” for the Russian Federation. If birthrates stay where they are, the country’s population would start growing again. “But for this, alas, Russia would have to become a completely different country.”
Staunton, October 22 – If Russia is to slow or even reverse its demographic decline, a Moscow commentator says, it cannot rely on pro-natalist policies alone but much address super-high mortality rates among working-age Russian males that are now ten times higher than for the counterparts in developed countries.
In an article in “Svobodnaya pressa” today, Andrey Polunin points out that despite a slight uptick in the number of births in 2009, an increase linked more to a temporary increase in the number of women in prime years for childbirth rather than to the regime’s pro-natalist policies, “Russia is slowly but surely dying out” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32430/).
For most of the last two decades, the Russian powers that be have tried to address the country’s demographic decline by trying to boost the birthrate, Polunin notes, but despite the “optimism” on this point expressed by President Dmitry Medvedev, such an approach “is practically useless.”
“Such measures [at best] produce a short-term effect,” Polunin points out. “Women give birth to a planned child at what they consider a profitable moment, but they do not become multi-child mothers.” Consequently, pro-natalist efforts, at least of the kind that Moscow has employed, are doing little or nothing to slow the country’s demographic decline.
But he argues that “it is possible to stop the withering away of Russia.” That is obvious if one remembers the observation of one expert that Russia has “European birthrates and African mortality rates” and then decides to focus on the latter. Were Russia to do that and reduce the mortality rates even to the levels of the 1980s, Russia would be growing, not declining.
Efforts to reduce mortality rates not only are possible but can be effective, Polunin says, and he points to the struggle against mortality that the European Union carried out from the 1970s to 2002. Over that period, mortality rates fell dramatically and life expectancy among both men and women increased “more than seven years.”
Russia has even a greater opportunity in this regard that the Europeans did. “Mortality among Russian men of working age exceeds the indicators of the developed countries by ten times and the figures in developing countries by five. Child mortality in Russia is twice as high as it is abroad, and the gap in life expectancy among men and women has reached 13 years.”
In his detailed essay, Polunin examines the situation in five areas where he suggests Russia could make real progress in reducing mortality rates. First of all, deaths on highways. Last year Russia lost more than 26,000 dead from road accidents. Eliminating all deaths on the roads is impossible, but reducing that figure is certainly possible, as the US has shown.
Second, deaths from alcohol. By several orders of magnitude, Russians die more often from alcohol than do residents of other countries. Officially, Russians of all ages consume an average of 18 liters of pure alcohol every year. Experts say the actual figure is closer to 30, and since most children don’t drink, the consumption of alcohol among adults is much higher.
Nikolay Gerasimenko, first deputy chairman of the Duma’s health committee, says that “mortality from alcohol has reached from 350,000 to 700,000 people every year,” and if one adds deaths in which alcohol combined with other problems, losses linked to alcohol are “higher still.”
Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, as unpopular as it was, cut the death rate from alcohol by 200,000 a year for five years, according to Health Minister Tatyana Golikova. That means that one million people lived who otherwise might have died. If a similar program were introduced now, the results would be similar.
“Could the government of the Russian Federation do this?” Polunin asks, and then says that obviously the answer is yes, “but somehow it isn’t doing so.”
Third, suicides. Last year, 35,000 Russians took their own lives – “or 29 for every 100,000 population,” a figure that is “twice greater than the international average” and one that is far greater than in the past except in the years of high Stalinism, 1937 and 1947 when Russian figures were also large.
“It is possible,” Polunin continues, that “a more democratic arrangement of society and more stable social-economic situation would reduce the number of suicides among [Russians]” to the level in the US or Canada (11-12 per 100,000. That would “save” another 17,000 lives for the future.
Fourth, deaths at work. Because Russian employers do not have to pay out large sums if a worker is injured or dies, “our employers prefer not to waste profit on ‘petty things’ like the introducing secure technology. As a result, many Russians die at work. Officially the number is 6,000, but in fact, Polunin says, the real figure may be as high as 190,000. Many could be saved.
And fifth, disappearances. Russian officials acknowledge that some 50,000 people disappear every year in that country, and experts say that almost all of them are dead, killed by others, a reflection of the fact that “the number of murders in Russia is three times that of the US and 19 to 20 times that of the countries of the European Union.”
That means that if Russia could reduce its violent crime to the level of the US, it would save “at a minimum,” 35,000 lives each year, and if it could cut murders to European levels, it could save “practically all of these 50,000,” something that would help the country’s demographic problems far more that pro-natalist pronouncements.
In sum, Polunin says that if Russia had “normal roads, a struggle with drunkenness, order in the system of insuring workers, and the de-criminalization of society,” that would result “at a minimum” in saving 353,000 lives every year. And it is possible that that number could be increased by eliminating medical mistakes as well as taking other steps.
As anyone can see, this would mean nearly “a half million lives saved each year” and that goal is “completely realistic” for the Russian Federation. If birthrates stay where they are, the country’s population would start growing again. “But for this, alas, Russia would have to become a completely different country.”
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Increasing Traffic on Northern Sea Route Sparks Security Concerns in Moscow
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Now that the first cargo ship ever has traversed the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, traffic in the Arctic Sea north of Russia is set to expand dramatically next year, a development that along with concerns about access to mineral 32resources and geopolitical competition there, is raising new concerns in Moscow.
Three days ago, a Norilsk-Nikel ship docked in Shanghai after a 32-day voyage thus becoming the first cargo vessel in history to have sailed across the entire Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, according to a company press release cited by Barents Observer (www.barentsobserver.com/norilsk-nickel-shipment-arrived-in-shanghai.4831545-116320.html).
While the ship, the “Monchegorsk,” is “an ice-classed vessel,” meaning that it is able to pass through waters where break ice is present, its latest voyage, the company said, marks “the first time in the history of the navigation of the Northern Sea Route … that such a large vessel passed through the eastern section of [that route] without icebreaker assistance.”
The ship is currently off-loading its cargo of metal and will return with Chinese manufacturing and consumer goods, and officials of the company say that this routing will take on average 20 days as compared to the 60 to 65 days of sailing that would be required if ships took the traditional southern route via the Suez Canal.
Global warming has reduced the ice cover and extended the shipping season for the Northern Sea Route, but as the last icebreaker-assisted convoys leave this week, Barents Observer says, more companies are poised to send their ships along this passage next year (www.barentsobserver.com/preparing-for-next-years-northern-sea-route-season.4832790-116320.html).
Six convoys are already scheduled for 2011, Rosatomflot says, and that organization’s icebreaker fleet reports that it currently has 15 requests for assistance, a big increase from this year and one that suggests 2010 will be remembered, as Barents Observer has said, as a breakthrough year.
Global warming and the retreat of the icepack have made this possible, with September 2010 becoming “the first time in modern history that the Northern Sea Route was totally ice-free, with only a few places [ion which even] drift ice could been seen from the bridges of vessels sailing that route.”
Not only is this route shorter, Barents Observer continues, but it “also has the advantage of not being frequented by the sorts of pirates that lurk off the coast of Somalia,” near the entrance to the Suez Canal. Indeed, the failure of the international community to find a way of suppressing piracy is an increasingly important factor in making the Arctic route attractive.
Within the Russian Federation, the prospect of more traffic is having two consequences. On the one hand, it is leading to the construction of new port facilities at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. And on the other hand, it is feeding Russian concerns about Moscow’s ability to maintain security along the Russian Federation’s northern border.
In an article in the current issue of “Novaya versiya,” Moscow journalist surveys these concerns and draws the conclusion, on the basis of conversations with independent Russian experts on the military that Moscow is “not prepared for a large-scale war” north of the Arctic Circle but could defend its interests with respect to shipping.
Three weeks ago, Anton Vasilyev, the special representative of the Russian President, declared that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” despite provisions of Moscow’s security doctrine saying just the opposite (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/18/voennoe_vozvraschenie_rossii_v_arktiku).
This latest “new look” in Russian diplomacy may reflect a desire to project a more cooperative attitude in the region, both because more powers, including China, are getting involved there and because many in the Russian capital appear to recognize that some of Moscow’s earlier pretensions in the region are not sustainable.
But Aleksandr Tsyganok, one of Russia’s leading independent security analysts, says that however that may be, Moscow must take steps to ensure its “control over the sea routes” to the north of the borders of the Russian Federation which are rapidly becoming ice-free and thus more attractive to international shipping.
He suggests that at a minimum Russia should “already today” build a base for a naval flotilla “at the mouth of one of the major rivers of Siberia” in order to ensure that no other country will be able to project power into the high north and thus threaten Russia’s interests there.
If Moscow decides to take that step, it is likely to present it as providing a search and rescue capability for shipping, whatever its actual intent. But the central Russian powers that be are likely to face other obstacles than international ones: the costs of such a distant base would be high and most of the numerically small ethnic groups there would likely oppose it as well.
Vienna, October 21 – Now that the first cargo ship ever has traversed the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, traffic in the Arctic Sea north of Russia is set to expand dramatically next year, a development that along with concerns about access to mineral 32resources and geopolitical competition there, is raising new concerns in Moscow.
Three days ago, a Norilsk-Nikel ship docked in Shanghai after a 32-day voyage thus becoming the first cargo vessel in history to have sailed across the entire Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, according to a company press release cited by Barents Observer (www.barentsobserver.com/norilsk-nickel-shipment-arrived-in-shanghai.4831545-116320.html).
While the ship, the “Monchegorsk,” is “an ice-classed vessel,” meaning that it is able to pass through waters where break ice is present, its latest voyage, the company said, marks “the first time in the history of the navigation of the Northern Sea Route … that such a large vessel passed through the eastern section of [that route] without icebreaker assistance.”
The ship is currently off-loading its cargo of metal and will return with Chinese manufacturing and consumer goods, and officials of the company say that this routing will take on average 20 days as compared to the 60 to 65 days of sailing that would be required if ships took the traditional southern route via the Suez Canal.
Global warming has reduced the ice cover and extended the shipping season for the Northern Sea Route, but as the last icebreaker-assisted convoys leave this week, Barents Observer says, more companies are poised to send their ships along this passage next year (www.barentsobserver.com/preparing-for-next-years-northern-sea-route-season.4832790-116320.html).
Six convoys are already scheduled for 2011, Rosatomflot says, and that organization’s icebreaker fleet reports that it currently has 15 requests for assistance, a big increase from this year and one that suggests 2010 will be remembered, as Barents Observer has said, as a breakthrough year.
Global warming and the retreat of the icepack have made this possible, with September 2010 becoming “the first time in modern history that the Northern Sea Route was totally ice-free, with only a few places [ion which even] drift ice could been seen from the bridges of vessels sailing that route.”
Not only is this route shorter, Barents Observer continues, but it “also has the advantage of not being frequented by the sorts of pirates that lurk off the coast of Somalia,” near the entrance to the Suez Canal. Indeed, the failure of the international community to find a way of suppressing piracy is an increasingly important factor in making the Arctic route attractive.
Within the Russian Federation, the prospect of more traffic is having two consequences. On the one hand, it is leading to the construction of new port facilities at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. And on the other hand, it is feeding Russian concerns about Moscow’s ability to maintain security along the Russian Federation’s northern border.
In an article in the current issue of “Novaya versiya,” Moscow journalist surveys these concerns and draws the conclusion, on the basis of conversations with independent Russian experts on the military that Moscow is “not prepared for a large-scale war” north of the Arctic Circle but could defend its interests with respect to shipping.
Three weeks ago, Anton Vasilyev, the special representative of the Russian President, declared that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” despite provisions of Moscow’s security doctrine saying just the opposite (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/18/voennoe_vozvraschenie_rossii_v_arktiku).
This latest “new look” in Russian diplomacy may reflect a desire to project a more cooperative attitude in the region, both because more powers, including China, are getting involved there and because many in the Russian capital appear to recognize that some of Moscow’s earlier pretensions in the region are not sustainable.
But Aleksandr Tsyganok, one of Russia’s leading independent security analysts, says that however that may be, Moscow must take steps to ensure its “control over the sea routes” to the north of the borders of the Russian Federation which are rapidly becoming ice-free and thus more attractive to international shipping.
He suggests that at a minimum Russia should “already today” build a base for a naval flotilla “at the mouth of one of the major rivers of Siberia” in order to ensure that no other country will be able to project power into the high north and thus threaten Russia’s interests there.
If Moscow decides to take that step, it is likely to present it as providing a search and rescue capability for shipping, whatever its actual intent. But the central Russian powers that be are likely to face other obstacles than international ones: the costs of such a distant base would be high and most of the numerically small ethnic groups there would likely oppose it as well.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Patriarchate Faces ‘Parade of Sovereignties’ Within Orthodoxy, Russian Historian Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Window on Eurasia: Most Russians Ignore Political Advice from Religious Leaders, Poll Shows
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
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