Paul Goble
Staunton, October 22 – Lake Balkhash, the 12th largest lake in the world, is on the way to becoming “a second Aral Sea,” a Russian commentator says, but one with potentially even more serious political consequences because both the causes of the lake’s decline and the impact of its death involve not only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but China.
The demise of the Aral Sea and the impact of that development on the peoples of Central Asia have attracted intense international interest for many years, and this fall, the United Nations has organized a special session on how to save that inland sea that many believe is now far beyond the point of no return.
But the similar fate of Lake Balkhash, a 16,400 square kilometer body of water in southeastern Kazakhstan whose waters are fed by rivers rising in and often diverted by Kyrgyzstan and China has not, Vladimir Gavrilenko argues in an essay posted online this week (nsi-press.ru/2010/10/nauka/650).
That is because it, like Baikal, is today “under threat of disappearing.” Over the last several years, the surface area of Balkhash has decreased by some 2,000 square kilometers, “and the situation continues to get worse,” with one part of the lake already saline and the population around all of the lake already suffering from the exposure of chemicals.
According to Gavrilenko, the lake’s decline is entirely the result of human activity, and its approaching death will produce “an ecological catastrophe,” one that will affect not only Kazakhstan but Kyrgyzstan, China’s Xinjiang Province, other countries in Central Asia, and parts of the Russian Federation.
The lake’s decline was accelerated at the end of the last century, he notes, when the Chinese built a dam on the Ili River which had provided Balkhash with most of its water and then proceeded to take out ever greater percentages of its flow, something that has reduced the water level in the lake by two meters.
Given that Chinese demand on this source of water shows no sign of easing, ecologists say that “the Western part of the lake could disappear entirely” in the relatively near future, something that will create economic and health disasters for the three million people living in the region but also likely spark political tensions between Kazakhstan and China.
But China is not the only source of the lake’s problem, Gavrilenko says. People living around the lake, long used to having all the fresh water they wanted, “have not been accustomed to think about its economic use.” Instead, they have wasted enormous amounts of water because of outdated irrigation systems
Moreover, industrial facilities around the lake and along the six feeder rivers have been dumping toxic wastes into the flow, and many cities and towns have put untreated sewage into these rivers and the lake itself. The results should not have surprised anyone, Gavrilenko suggests, and the likely consequences in the future should disturb everyone.
Water shortages symbolized by the death of the Aral Sea have sparked numerous international conflicts, sometimes to the point of violence, among the Central Asian countries, especially between the water supplier countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and the downstream consumer countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The demise of Lake Balkhash almost certainly will increase tensions between Kazakhstan and China, tensions that are likely to be all the greater because the Balkhash crisis unlike the death of the Aral Sea has failed to attract the international attention that might help the people around the lake and cause the two sides to think more rationally about what is taking place.
But perhaps equally important, because the Lake Balkhash problem is so obviously the result of human action, expanded coverage of this environmental tragedy likely will further energize ecological movements in the Russian Federation east of the Urals, all the more so because people there are likely to link water issues to ethno-national ones.
Friday, October 22, 2010
Window on Eurasia: To Solve Russia's Demographic Problems, Moscow Should Fight High Mortality Rather than Seek to Boost Low Birthrate, Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 22 – If Russia is to slow or even reverse its demographic decline, a Moscow commentator says, it cannot rely on pro-natalist policies alone but much address super-high mortality rates among working-age Russian males that are now ten times higher than for the counterparts in developed countries.
In an article in “Svobodnaya pressa” today, Andrey Polunin points out that despite a slight uptick in the number of births in 2009, an increase linked more to a temporary increase in the number of women in prime years for childbirth rather than to the regime’s pro-natalist policies, “Russia is slowly but surely dying out” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32430/).
For most of the last two decades, the Russian powers that be have tried to address the country’s demographic decline by trying to boost the birthrate, Polunin notes, but despite the “optimism” on this point expressed by President Dmitry Medvedev, such an approach “is practically useless.”
“Such measures [at best] produce a short-term effect,” Polunin points out. “Women give birth to a planned child at what they consider a profitable moment, but they do not become multi-child mothers.” Consequently, pro-natalist efforts, at least of the kind that Moscow has employed, are doing little or nothing to slow the country’s demographic decline.
But he argues that “it is possible to stop the withering away of Russia.” That is obvious if one remembers the observation of one expert that Russia has “European birthrates and African mortality rates” and then decides to focus on the latter. Were Russia to do that and reduce the mortality rates even to the levels of the 1980s, Russia would be growing, not declining.
Efforts to reduce mortality rates not only are possible but can be effective, Polunin says, and he points to the struggle against mortality that the European Union carried out from the 1970s to 2002. Over that period, mortality rates fell dramatically and life expectancy among both men and women increased “more than seven years.”
Russia has even a greater opportunity in this regard that the Europeans did. “Mortality among Russian men of working age exceeds the indicators of the developed countries by ten times and the figures in developing countries by five. Child mortality in Russia is twice as high as it is abroad, and the gap in life expectancy among men and women has reached 13 years.”
In his detailed essay, Polunin examines the situation in five areas where he suggests Russia could make real progress in reducing mortality rates. First of all, deaths on highways. Last year Russia lost more than 26,000 dead from road accidents. Eliminating all deaths on the roads is impossible, but reducing that figure is certainly possible, as the US has shown.
Second, deaths from alcohol. By several orders of magnitude, Russians die more often from alcohol than do residents of other countries. Officially, Russians of all ages consume an average of 18 liters of pure alcohol every year. Experts say the actual figure is closer to 30, and since most children don’t drink, the consumption of alcohol among adults is much higher.
Nikolay Gerasimenko, first deputy chairman of the Duma’s health committee, says that “mortality from alcohol has reached from 350,000 to 700,000 people every year,” and if one adds deaths in which alcohol combined with other problems, losses linked to alcohol are “higher still.”
Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, as unpopular as it was, cut the death rate from alcohol by 200,000 a year for five years, according to Health Minister Tatyana Golikova. That means that one million people lived who otherwise might have died. If a similar program were introduced now, the results would be similar.
“Could the government of the Russian Federation do this?” Polunin asks, and then says that obviously the answer is yes, “but somehow it isn’t doing so.”
Third, suicides. Last year, 35,000 Russians took their own lives – “or 29 for every 100,000 population,” a figure that is “twice greater than the international average” and one that is far greater than in the past except in the years of high Stalinism, 1937 and 1947 when Russian figures were also large.
“It is possible,” Polunin continues, that “a more democratic arrangement of society and more stable social-economic situation would reduce the number of suicides among [Russians]” to the level in the US or Canada (11-12 per 100,000. That would “save” another 17,000 lives for the future.
Fourth, deaths at work. Because Russian employers do not have to pay out large sums if a worker is injured or dies, “our employers prefer not to waste profit on ‘petty things’ like the introducing secure technology. As a result, many Russians die at work. Officially the number is 6,000, but in fact, Polunin says, the real figure may be as high as 190,000. Many could be saved.
And fifth, disappearances. Russian officials acknowledge that some 50,000 people disappear every year in that country, and experts say that almost all of them are dead, killed by others, a reflection of the fact that “the number of murders in Russia is three times that of the US and 19 to 20 times that of the countries of the European Union.”
That means that if Russia could reduce its violent crime to the level of the US, it would save “at a minimum,” 35,000 lives each year, and if it could cut murders to European levels, it could save “practically all of these 50,000,” something that would help the country’s demographic problems far more that pro-natalist pronouncements.
In sum, Polunin says that if Russia had “normal roads, a struggle with drunkenness, order in the system of insuring workers, and the de-criminalization of society,” that would result “at a minimum” in saving 353,000 lives every year. And it is possible that that number could be increased by eliminating medical mistakes as well as taking other steps.
As anyone can see, this would mean nearly “a half million lives saved each year” and that goal is “completely realistic” for the Russian Federation. If birthrates stay where they are, the country’s population would start growing again. “But for this, alas, Russia would have to become a completely different country.”
Staunton, October 22 – If Russia is to slow or even reverse its demographic decline, a Moscow commentator says, it cannot rely on pro-natalist policies alone but much address super-high mortality rates among working-age Russian males that are now ten times higher than for the counterparts in developed countries.
In an article in “Svobodnaya pressa” today, Andrey Polunin points out that despite a slight uptick in the number of births in 2009, an increase linked more to a temporary increase in the number of women in prime years for childbirth rather than to the regime’s pro-natalist policies, “Russia is slowly but surely dying out” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32430/).
For most of the last two decades, the Russian powers that be have tried to address the country’s demographic decline by trying to boost the birthrate, Polunin notes, but despite the “optimism” on this point expressed by President Dmitry Medvedev, such an approach “is practically useless.”
“Such measures [at best] produce a short-term effect,” Polunin points out. “Women give birth to a planned child at what they consider a profitable moment, but they do not become multi-child mothers.” Consequently, pro-natalist efforts, at least of the kind that Moscow has employed, are doing little or nothing to slow the country’s demographic decline.
But he argues that “it is possible to stop the withering away of Russia.” That is obvious if one remembers the observation of one expert that Russia has “European birthrates and African mortality rates” and then decides to focus on the latter. Were Russia to do that and reduce the mortality rates even to the levels of the 1980s, Russia would be growing, not declining.
Efforts to reduce mortality rates not only are possible but can be effective, Polunin says, and he points to the struggle against mortality that the European Union carried out from the 1970s to 2002. Over that period, mortality rates fell dramatically and life expectancy among both men and women increased “more than seven years.”
Russia has even a greater opportunity in this regard that the Europeans did. “Mortality among Russian men of working age exceeds the indicators of the developed countries by ten times and the figures in developing countries by five. Child mortality in Russia is twice as high as it is abroad, and the gap in life expectancy among men and women has reached 13 years.”
In his detailed essay, Polunin examines the situation in five areas where he suggests Russia could make real progress in reducing mortality rates. First of all, deaths on highways. Last year Russia lost more than 26,000 dead from road accidents. Eliminating all deaths on the roads is impossible, but reducing that figure is certainly possible, as the US has shown.
Second, deaths from alcohol. By several orders of magnitude, Russians die more often from alcohol than do residents of other countries. Officially, Russians of all ages consume an average of 18 liters of pure alcohol every year. Experts say the actual figure is closer to 30, and since most children don’t drink, the consumption of alcohol among adults is much higher.
Nikolay Gerasimenko, first deputy chairman of the Duma’s health committee, says that “mortality from alcohol has reached from 350,000 to 700,000 people every year,” and if one adds deaths in which alcohol combined with other problems, losses linked to alcohol are “higher still.”
Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, as unpopular as it was, cut the death rate from alcohol by 200,000 a year for five years, according to Health Minister Tatyana Golikova. That means that one million people lived who otherwise might have died. If a similar program were introduced now, the results would be similar.
“Could the government of the Russian Federation do this?” Polunin asks, and then says that obviously the answer is yes, “but somehow it isn’t doing so.”
Third, suicides. Last year, 35,000 Russians took their own lives – “or 29 for every 100,000 population,” a figure that is “twice greater than the international average” and one that is far greater than in the past except in the years of high Stalinism, 1937 and 1947 when Russian figures were also large.
“It is possible,” Polunin continues, that “a more democratic arrangement of society and more stable social-economic situation would reduce the number of suicides among [Russians]” to the level in the US or Canada (11-12 per 100,000. That would “save” another 17,000 lives for the future.
Fourth, deaths at work. Because Russian employers do not have to pay out large sums if a worker is injured or dies, “our employers prefer not to waste profit on ‘petty things’ like the introducing secure technology. As a result, many Russians die at work. Officially the number is 6,000, but in fact, Polunin says, the real figure may be as high as 190,000. Many could be saved.
And fifth, disappearances. Russian officials acknowledge that some 50,000 people disappear every year in that country, and experts say that almost all of them are dead, killed by others, a reflection of the fact that “the number of murders in Russia is three times that of the US and 19 to 20 times that of the countries of the European Union.”
That means that if Russia could reduce its violent crime to the level of the US, it would save “at a minimum,” 35,000 lives each year, and if it could cut murders to European levels, it could save “practically all of these 50,000,” something that would help the country’s demographic problems far more that pro-natalist pronouncements.
In sum, Polunin says that if Russia had “normal roads, a struggle with drunkenness, order in the system of insuring workers, and the de-criminalization of society,” that would result “at a minimum” in saving 353,000 lives every year. And it is possible that that number could be increased by eliminating medical mistakes as well as taking other steps.
As anyone can see, this would mean nearly “a half million lives saved each year” and that goal is “completely realistic” for the Russian Federation. If birthrates stay where they are, the country’s population would start growing again. “But for this, alas, Russia would have to become a completely different country.”
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Increasing Traffic on Northern Sea Route Sparks Security Concerns in Moscow
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Now that the first cargo ship ever has traversed the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, traffic in the Arctic Sea north of Russia is set to expand dramatically next year, a development that along with concerns about access to mineral 32resources and geopolitical competition there, is raising new concerns in Moscow.
Three days ago, a Norilsk-Nikel ship docked in Shanghai after a 32-day voyage thus becoming the first cargo vessel in history to have sailed across the entire Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, according to a company press release cited by Barents Observer (www.barentsobserver.com/norilsk-nickel-shipment-arrived-in-shanghai.4831545-116320.html).
While the ship, the “Monchegorsk,” is “an ice-classed vessel,” meaning that it is able to pass through waters where break ice is present, its latest voyage, the company said, marks “the first time in the history of the navigation of the Northern Sea Route … that such a large vessel passed through the eastern section of [that route] without icebreaker assistance.”
The ship is currently off-loading its cargo of metal and will return with Chinese manufacturing and consumer goods, and officials of the company say that this routing will take on average 20 days as compared to the 60 to 65 days of sailing that would be required if ships took the traditional southern route via the Suez Canal.
Global warming has reduced the ice cover and extended the shipping season for the Northern Sea Route, but as the last icebreaker-assisted convoys leave this week, Barents Observer says, more companies are poised to send their ships along this passage next year (www.barentsobserver.com/preparing-for-next-years-northern-sea-route-season.4832790-116320.html).
Six convoys are already scheduled for 2011, Rosatomflot says, and that organization’s icebreaker fleet reports that it currently has 15 requests for assistance, a big increase from this year and one that suggests 2010 will be remembered, as Barents Observer has said, as a breakthrough year.
Global warming and the retreat of the icepack have made this possible, with September 2010 becoming “the first time in modern history that the Northern Sea Route was totally ice-free, with only a few places [ion which even] drift ice could been seen from the bridges of vessels sailing that route.”
Not only is this route shorter, Barents Observer continues, but it “also has the advantage of not being frequented by the sorts of pirates that lurk off the coast of Somalia,” near the entrance to the Suez Canal. Indeed, the failure of the international community to find a way of suppressing piracy is an increasingly important factor in making the Arctic route attractive.
Within the Russian Federation, the prospect of more traffic is having two consequences. On the one hand, it is leading to the construction of new port facilities at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. And on the other hand, it is feeding Russian concerns about Moscow’s ability to maintain security along the Russian Federation’s northern border.
In an article in the current issue of “Novaya versiya,” Moscow journalist surveys these concerns and draws the conclusion, on the basis of conversations with independent Russian experts on the military that Moscow is “not prepared for a large-scale war” north of the Arctic Circle but could defend its interests with respect to shipping.
Three weeks ago, Anton Vasilyev, the special representative of the Russian President, declared that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” despite provisions of Moscow’s security doctrine saying just the opposite (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/18/voennoe_vozvraschenie_rossii_v_arktiku).
This latest “new look” in Russian diplomacy may reflect a desire to project a more cooperative attitude in the region, both because more powers, including China, are getting involved there and because many in the Russian capital appear to recognize that some of Moscow’s earlier pretensions in the region are not sustainable.
But Aleksandr Tsyganok, one of Russia’s leading independent security analysts, says that however that may be, Moscow must take steps to ensure its “control over the sea routes” to the north of the borders of the Russian Federation which are rapidly becoming ice-free and thus more attractive to international shipping.
He suggests that at a minimum Russia should “already today” build a base for a naval flotilla “at the mouth of one of the major rivers of Siberia” in order to ensure that no other country will be able to project power into the high north and thus threaten Russia’s interests there.
If Moscow decides to take that step, it is likely to present it as providing a search and rescue capability for shipping, whatever its actual intent. But the central Russian powers that be are likely to face other obstacles than international ones: the costs of such a distant base would be high and most of the numerically small ethnic groups there would likely oppose it as well.
Vienna, October 21 – Now that the first cargo ship ever has traversed the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, traffic in the Arctic Sea north of Russia is set to expand dramatically next year, a development that along with concerns about access to mineral 32resources and geopolitical competition there, is raising new concerns in Moscow.
Three days ago, a Norilsk-Nikel ship docked in Shanghai after a 32-day voyage thus becoming the first cargo vessel in history to have sailed across the entire Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, according to a company press release cited by Barents Observer (www.barentsobserver.com/norilsk-nickel-shipment-arrived-in-shanghai.4831545-116320.html).
While the ship, the “Monchegorsk,” is “an ice-classed vessel,” meaning that it is able to pass through waters where break ice is present, its latest voyage, the company said, marks “the first time in the history of the navigation of the Northern Sea Route … that such a large vessel passed through the eastern section of [that route] without icebreaker assistance.”
The ship is currently off-loading its cargo of metal and will return with Chinese manufacturing and consumer goods, and officials of the company say that this routing will take on average 20 days as compared to the 60 to 65 days of sailing that would be required if ships took the traditional southern route via the Suez Canal.
Global warming has reduced the ice cover and extended the shipping season for the Northern Sea Route, but as the last icebreaker-assisted convoys leave this week, Barents Observer says, more companies are poised to send their ships along this passage next year (www.barentsobserver.com/preparing-for-next-years-northern-sea-route-season.4832790-116320.html).
Six convoys are already scheduled for 2011, Rosatomflot says, and that organization’s icebreaker fleet reports that it currently has 15 requests for assistance, a big increase from this year and one that suggests 2010 will be remembered, as Barents Observer has said, as a breakthrough year.
Global warming and the retreat of the icepack have made this possible, with September 2010 becoming “the first time in modern history that the Northern Sea Route was totally ice-free, with only a few places [ion which even] drift ice could been seen from the bridges of vessels sailing that route.”
Not only is this route shorter, Barents Observer continues, but it “also has the advantage of not being frequented by the sorts of pirates that lurk off the coast of Somalia,” near the entrance to the Suez Canal. Indeed, the failure of the international community to find a way of suppressing piracy is an increasingly important factor in making the Arctic route attractive.
Within the Russian Federation, the prospect of more traffic is having two consequences. On the one hand, it is leading to the construction of new port facilities at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. And on the other hand, it is feeding Russian concerns about Moscow’s ability to maintain security along the Russian Federation’s northern border.
In an article in the current issue of “Novaya versiya,” Moscow journalist surveys these concerns and draws the conclusion, on the basis of conversations with independent Russian experts on the military that Moscow is “not prepared for a large-scale war” north of the Arctic Circle but could defend its interests with respect to shipping.
Three weeks ago, Anton Vasilyev, the special representative of the Russian President, declared that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” despite provisions of Moscow’s security doctrine saying just the opposite (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/18/voennoe_vozvraschenie_rossii_v_arktiku).
This latest “new look” in Russian diplomacy may reflect a desire to project a more cooperative attitude in the region, both because more powers, including China, are getting involved there and because many in the Russian capital appear to recognize that some of Moscow’s earlier pretensions in the region are not sustainable.
But Aleksandr Tsyganok, one of Russia’s leading independent security analysts, says that however that may be, Moscow must take steps to ensure its “control over the sea routes” to the north of the borders of the Russian Federation which are rapidly becoming ice-free and thus more attractive to international shipping.
He suggests that at a minimum Russia should “already today” build a base for a naval flotilla “at the mouth of one of the major rivers of Siberia” in order to ensure that no other country will be able to project power into the high north and thus threaten Russia’s interests there.
If Moscow decides to take that step, it is likely to present it as providing a search and rescue capability for shipping, whatever its actual intent. But the central Russian powers that be are likely to face other obstacles than international ones: the costs of such a distant base would be high and most of the numerically small ethnic groups there would likely oppose it as well.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Patriarchate Faces ‘Parade of Sovereignties’ Within Orthodoxy, Russian Historian Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Window on Eurasia: Most Russians Ignore Political Advice from Religious Leaders, Poll Shows
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Seeks to Throw Veil of Secrecy over Counter-Terrorism Budget
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 20 – Although rights activists have succeeded in eliminating a provision of an FSB-proposed draft bill on state secrets that would have blocked the media from covering most counter-terrorist operations, another provision of this measure – one that throws the veil of secrecy over the financing of such activities – has the potential to do even more harm.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Andrey Soldatov, the head of Agentura.ru and one of Moscow’s leading independent experts on Russia’s intelligence services, says that victory the media rights activists was not only partial but that they have ignored this bigger threat to the public’s Constitutional right to know (ej.ru/?a=note&id=10482).
As approved last week by the Duma’s security committee on second reading, the bill limits the activities of journalists in the collection of information on terrorism to talking with “people in the special services themselves, who officially or unofficially enter into contact with the press”
That “in practice” means that the journalists do not have any opportunity to check the information that the security services put out and thus invites those services to present to journalists only the most self-serving information, something that will reduce attention to the actions of terrorists but also to the mistakes of the security services themselves.
But the Duma committee “left without change” another part of the bill, Soldatov notes, and that provision may have even more far-reaching consequences. According to the measure, all information about the financing of anti-terrorist activities is, at the insistence of the FSB, to be classified as secret.
Soldatov argues that the arguments of the FSB on this point “were not simply weak, they did not correspond to reality.” The FSB said it had no choice but to ask for this in order not to have to reveal the payments to informers and others that the agency has made “to prevent terrorist actions.”
But such payments are already classified secret under the provisions of the law on the operations of the security services, Soldatov points out, and that suggests that “the actual goal of the new point in the law is to gain the chance to classify any data about financial flows which come from the budget for the struggle with terrorism.”
If it is passed, then people “who do not have access to state secrets – journalists, the expert community and deputies – [will not be able] to assess how the Russian special services are spending money on the struggle with terrorism” and thus to know whether budget funds are being used effectively or being wasted
That is no small thing, the Agentura.ru editor continues, pointing out that “when we speak about the financing of the struggle with terrorism, we are talking about not only the purchase of special weapons and technology for special operations and the payment of agents.” Instead, in Russia, albeit to “a lesser degree than in the US,” this involves a whole “industry.”
Two years ago, Nikolay Patrushev, then head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, approved a plan for the “struggle with the ideology of terrorism.” This program, which continues until 2012, involves “the production of films, the creation of websites, the holding of competitions for the best works on counter-terrorism, international conferences and festivals and even the publication of artistic literature.”
If the budget of these activities is concealed, Soldatov points out, then who are creating them is hidden as well, something that makes it extremely difficult for anyone lacking access to state secrets “to assess the effectiveness of these programs,” something they could certainly do if they knew where the funding was coming from.
Soldatov says that he personally would “very much like to hear the opinion of specialists about the directive ‘to develop and introduce into the practice of the work of specialized medical institutions complex psycho-physiological methods of identifying risk groups (‘those inclined to terrorist activity’)” for deciding on “prophylactic measures.”
It would be most interesting to learn “just what measures are being used” – those of Lombroso or a little more contemporary such as eugenics?” And it would be “especially interesting to find out just what funds have already been spent for the development and introduction of such measures.”
But what is “also curious,” Soldatov points out, “is that the media and the legal rights community have almost not turned attention to this line in the draft bill. Apparently, the problem is that in our country there have never been undertaken attempts to put under public control government spending for the force structures.”
This is the unfortunate “status quo,” he concludes, and perhaps it will seem strange to some that the powers that be are “taking away from us a right which we have never attempted to make use of.”
Staunton, October 20 – Although rights activists have succeeded in eliminating a provision of an FSB-proposed draft bill on state secrets that would have blocked the media from covering most counter-terrorist operations, another provision of this measure – one that throws the veil of secrecy over the financing of such activities – has the potential to do even more harm.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Andrey Soldatov, the head of Agentura.ru and one of Moscow’s leading independent experts on Russia’s intelligence services, says that victory the media rights activists was not only partial but that they have ignored this bigger threat to the public’s Constitutional right to know (ej.ru/?a=note&id=10482).
As approved last week by the Duma’s security committee on second reading, the bill limits the activities of journalists in the collection of information on terrorism to talking with “people in the special services themselves, who officially or unofficially enter into contact with the press”
That “in practice” means that the journalists do not have any opportunity to check the information that the security services put out and thus invites those services to present to journalists only the most self-serving information, something that will reduce attention to the actions of terrorists but also to the mistakes of the security services themselves.
But the Duma committee “left without change” another part of the bill, Soldatov notes, and that provision may have even more far-reaching consequences. According to the measure, all information about the financing of anti-terrorist activities is, at the insistence of the FSB, to be classified as secret.
Soldatov argues that the arguments of the FSB on this point “were not simply weak, they did not correspond to reality.” The FSB said it had no choice but to ask for this in order not to have to reveal the payments to informers and others that the agency has made “to prevent terrorist actions.”
But such payments are already classified secret under the provisions of the law on the operations of the security services, Soldatov points out, and that suggests that “the actual goal of the new point in the law is to gain the chance to classify any data about financial flows which come from the budget for the struggle with terrorism.”
If it is passed, then people “who do not have access to state secrets – journalists, the expert community and deputies – [will not be able] to assess how the Russian special services are spending money on the struggle with terrorism” and thus to know whether budget funds are being used effectively or being wasted
That is no small thing, the Agentura.ru editor continues, pointing out that “when we speak about the financing of the struggle with terrorism, we are talking about not only the purchase of special weapons and technology for special operations and the payment of agents.” Instead, in Russia, albeit to “a lesser degree than in the US,” this involves a whole “industry.”
Two years ago, Nikolay Patrushev, then head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, approved a plan for the “struggle with the ideology of terrorism.” This program, which continues until 2012, involves “the production of films, the creation of websites, the holding of competitions for the best works on counter-terrorism, international conferences and festivals and even the publication of artistic literature.”
If the budget of these activities is concealed, Soldatov points out, then who are creating them is hidden as well, something that makes it extremely difficult for anyone lacking access to state secrets “to assess the effectiveness of these programs,” something they could certainly do if they knew where the funding was coming from.
Soldatov says that he personally would “very much like to hear the opinion of specialists about the directive ‘to develop and introduce into the practice of the work of specialized medical institutions complex psycho-physiological methods of identifying risk groups (‘those inclined to terrorist activity’)” for deciding on “prophylactic measures.”
It would be most interesting to learn “just what measures are being used” – those of Lombroso or a little more contemporary such as eugenics?” And it would be “especially interesting to find out just what funds have already been spent for the development and introduction of such measures.”
But what is “also curious,” Soldatov points out, “is that the media and the legal rights community have almost not turned attention to this line in the draft bill. Apparently, the problem is that in our country there have never been undertaken attempts to put under public control government spending for the force structures.”
This is the unfortunate “status quo,” he concludes, and perhaps it will seem strange to some that the powers that be are “taking away from us a right which we have never attempted to make use of.”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Approach to the North Caucasus is Ineffective Because It is Superficial, KBR Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 20 – The situation in the North Caucasus is “dangerous” not only because of the many problems there but also because of the “inadequate” and “superficial” approach that the Russian “political class” has adopted in dealing with it, according to a leading specialist on the region.
At an international conference in Pyatigorsk last week, Khazhismel Tkhagapsoyev, a professor at the Kabardino-Balkaria State University and an advisor to the KBR government, said that Russian officials as a result have focused on dealing with symptoms rather than the underlying problems (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175630/).
These officials, he continued has sought to counter terrorist activity, to restore Chechnya, and to overcome unemployment by the creation of a large number of workplaces in medium and large industries, but Tkhagapsoyev suggested, “these issues, despite their importance do not cover or exhaust ‘the essence of the Caucasus problem.”
That problem, he argued, is “the re-integration [of the peoples of the North Caucasus] into the [non-ethnic] Russian cultural and civilizational space.”
The reforms the citizens of Russia have experienced over the last two decades, Tkhagapsoyev continued, “have turned out to be ‘especially injurious for the Caucasus’ and for the sphere of nationality relations” there, generating “political separatism, ardent chauvinism, mutual deafness, the alienation of cultures, and the mass outflow of ethnic Russians.”
“Today,” the KBR scholar continued, “Russia de facto is a space of cultures and ethnic groups which co-exist in parallel” worlds, with little interaction. “If Rasul Gamzatov, Kaysyn Kuliyev [or other Soviet-era writers from the region] were living and creating at present, hardly anyone in Russia would have heard of them.”
Moreover, Tkhagapsoyev said, “for the contemporary Russian powers that be, the neglect of the cultural factor is characteristic, something that in the Caucasus region leads to unacceptable losses.” As an example of this, he pointed to Moscow’s recent decision to fight unemployment by investing in large and medium-sized industries.
That sounds good, he said, but it ignores a reality: “in the region there are a sufficient number of vacancies for workers but they remain unfilled because there is no one who wants to take them.” In addition, if a family in the Caucasus has a small business, all the family members will want to work for it, regardless of the specific nature of the job.
“It would seem that everything is clear,” the KBR academic and government advisor says. The powers that be need to go “along the path of family business and small entrepreneurial efforts. However, many things interfere with this.” Among them, he pointed out, is the lack of a resolution of disputes about land, “the main economic resource of the Caucasus.”
As things have worked out, “land is in the hands of major renters or in the shadow economy, but residents of the Caucasus do not see themselves in the role of paid agricultural workers.” As a result, the land isn’t being worked, and social and economic uncertainty and tension are leading to “a lack of faith in the powers that be.”
That is not the only example of Moscow’s inattention to culture, Tkhagapsoyev suggested. Another and equally important kind of neglect involves the history of the peoples of the North Caucasus and especially their clashes with the Russian state in the Caucasus War, the period of Stalinist repressions and the more recent war in Chechnya.
While Moscow has been prepared to condemn the Stalinist repressions in the region and to downplay the Chechen conflict, the scholar noted, there has not been any effort by the Russian powers that be to deal with the Caucasus War, the century-long conflict as the result of which the Russian Empire took control of the region.
This is not a question about “a revision” of the geopolitical results of that war, Tkhagapsoyev continued. Such a step “would be dangerous and fatal for the Caucasus peoples.” Instead, what is needed but not yet forthcoming is “an assessment about the moral aspect of this war and its demographic consequences” – including the expulsion of the Circassians.
A related problem involves “the contemporary situation of ethnic cultures and languages of the Caucasus, to the development of which,” the KBR scholar suggests, “the federal powers that be are not devoting sufficient attention.” Instead, the Duma has passed a law that eliminates language and cultures from the curriculum and at the same time further divides the population.
By introducing into the school special and distinct courses on Orthodox culture or Islamic culture, the powers that be are forcing children to “divide themselves up according to their religious memberships. And in this way, without having resolved the old problems of the mutual alienation of cultures and peoples, they have introduced new ones.”
Yet another problem involves higher education. “In the country a system of elite, privileged higher educational institutions is emerging. There are about 30, but not one institution in the ethnic republics of the region is among this ‘elect’” Instead, there is a sense that Moscow has decided on “a directed provincialization’ of the intellect and culture” of this region.
And finally, Tkhagapsoyev says, there is the problem of the way in which the region is treated in the electronic media of the Russian Federation. As in the past, “the face of the person of Caucasus nationality is repulsive” and clearly intended to be whatever the facts of the case happen to be.
“You will not see any traces of ethnic culture on the all-Russian channels, even on ‘Kultura,’” he points out. Given that, “about what kind of dialogue and consolidation of peoples and cultures can we speak? And how can we move toward an all-national identity of [non-ethnic] Russians.”
If that does not happen, if Moscow doesn’t move beyond its current superficial approach, then, the Kabardino-Balkaria scholar concludes, “the historical prospects of Russia are cloudy indeed.”
Staunton, October 20 – The situation in the North Caucasus is “dangerous” not only because of the many problems there but also because of the “inadequate” and “superficial” approach that the Russian “political class” has adopted in dealing with it, according to a leading specialist on the region.
At an international conference in Pyatigorsk last week, Khazhismel Tkhagapsoyev, a professor at the Kabardino-Balkaria State University and an advisor to the KBR government, said that Russian officials as a result have focused on dealing with symptoms rather than the underlying problems (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175630/).
These officials, he continued has sought to counter terrorist activity, to restore Chechnya, and to overcome unemployment by the creation of a large number of workplaces in medium and large industries, but Tkhagapsoyev suggested, “these issues, despite their importance do not cover or exhaust ‘the essence of the Caucasus problem.”
That problem, he argued, is “the re-integration [of the peoples of the North Caucasus] into the [non-ethnic] Russian cultural and civilizational space.”
The reforms the citizens of Russia have experienced over the last two decades, Tkhagapsoyev continued, “have turned out to be ‘especially injurious for the Caucasus’ and for the sphere of nationality relations” there, generating “political separatism, ardent chauvinism, mutual deafness, the alienation of cultures, and the mass outflow of ethnic Russians.”
“Today,” the KBR scholar continued, “Russia de facto is a space of cultures and ethnic groups which co-exist in parallel” worlds, with little interaction. “If Rasul Gamzatov, Kaysyn Kuliyev [or other Soviet-era writers from the region] were living and creating at present, hardly anyone in Russia would have heard of them.”
Moreover, Tkhagapsoyev said, “for the contemporary Russian powers that be, the neglect of the cultural factor is characteristic, something that in the Caucasus region leads to unacceptable losses.” As an example of this, he pointed to Moscow’s recent decision to fight unemployment by investing in large and medium-sized industries.
That sounds good, he said, but it ignores a reality: “in the region there are a sufficient number of vacancies for workers but they remain unfilled because there is no one who wants to take them.” In addition, if a family in the Caucasus has a small business, all the family members will want to work for it, regardless of the specific nature of the job.
“It would seem that everything is clear,” the KBR academic and government advisor says. The powers that be need to go “along the path of family business and small entrepreneurial efforts. However, many things interfere with this.” Among them, he pointed out, is the lack of a resolution of disputes about land, “the main economic resource of the Caucasus.”
As things have worked out, “land is in the hands of major renters or in the shadow economy, but residents of the Caucasus do not see themselves in the role of paid agricultural workers.” As a result, the land isn’t being worked, and social and economic uncertainty and tension are leading to “a lack of faith in the powers that be.”
That is not the only example of Moscow’s inattention to culture, Tkhagapsoyev suggested. Another and equally important kind of neglect involves the history of the peoples of the North Caucasus and especially their clashes with the Russian state in the Caucasus War, the period of Stalinist repressions and the more recent war in Chechnya.
While Moscow has been prepared to condemn the Stalinist repressions in the region and to downplay the Chechen conflict, the scholar noted, there has not been any effort by the Russian powers that be to deal with the Caucasus War, the century-long conflict as the result of which the Russian Empire took control of the region.
This is not a question about “a revision” of the geopolitical results of that war, Tkhagapsoyev continued. Such a step “would be dangerous and fatal for the Caucasus peoples.” Instead, what is needed but not yet forthcoming is “an assessment about the moral aspect of this war and its demographic consequences” – including the expulsion of the Circassians.
A related problem involves “the contemporary situation of ethnic cultures and languages of the Caucasus, to the development of which,” the KBR scholar suggests, “the federal powers that be are not devoting sufficient attention.” Instead, the Duma has passed a law that eliminates language and cultures from the curriculum and at the same time further divides the population.
By introducing into the school special and distinct courses on Orthodox culture or Islamic culture, the powers that be are forcing children to “divide themselves up according to their religious memberships. And in this way, without having resolved the old problems of the mutual alienation of cultures and peoples, they have introduced new ones.”
Yet another problem involves higher education. “In the country a system of elite, privileged higher educational institutions is emerging. There are about 30, but not one institution in the ethnic republics of the region is among this ‘elect’” Instead, there is a sense that Moscow has decided on “a directed provincialization’ of the intellect and culture” of this region.
And finally, Tkhagapsoyev says, there is the problem of the way in which the region is treated in the electronic media of the Russian Federation. As in the past, “the face of the person of Caucasus nationality is repulsive” and clearly intended to be whatever the facts of the case happen to be.
“You will not see any traces of ethnic culture on the all-Russian channels, even on ‘Kultura,’” he points out. Given that, “about what kind of dialogue and consolidation of peoples and cultures can we speak? And how can we move toward an all-national identity of [non-ethnic] Russians.”
If that does not happen, if Moscow doesn’t move beyond its current superficial approach, then, the Kabardino-Balkaria scholar concludes, “the historical prospects of Russia are cloudy indeed.”
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