Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s recent meeting with Bartholomew I, the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople, has disturbed many in the Moscow Patriarchate who believe that, despite Minsk’s denials, Belarus is now on the “separatist” road to the establishment of a nationally-based autocephalous Orthodox Church.
But even if those denials are true, church historian Vadim Venediktov writes in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” the Moscow Patriarchate faces a new “parade of church sovereignties” in the former Soviet space, one that he says will ultimately mean there will be as many Orthodox churches as there are countries (religion.ng.ru/events/2010-10-20/3_parad.html).
At the present time, Venediktov points out, the Moscow Patriarchate officially recognizes and is in communion with 15 autocephalous and four autonomous churches within Orthodoxy around the world. Among the 15 autocephalous churches, nine have patriarchs, including Moscow and Tbilisi on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The issue of autocephaly has been a highly contentious one because it calls into question the universalism of the church, but over the last 150 years, Venediktov says, Orthodoxy has generally been moving toward the view that “church autocephaly should follow the political independence of the state.”
That idea has its roots in the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Bulgaria in the 1870s, he continues, but it is far from universally established, as shown by the conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchate and between the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox communities in the former Soviet space.
Among the first of the latter conflicts were those between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Universal Patriarch of Constantinople concerning the subordination of Orthodox sees in Estonia following that country’s recovery of its de facto independence in 1991, a conflict that has made Moscow especially nervous about anything Bartholomew does in its area.
More recently, the Moscow Patriarchate has been confronted with other challenges: In Ukraine, there are several competing patriarchates, only one of which is subordinate to Moscow. And in 2008, the Russian Church was faced with a Hobson’s choice given Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate very much wanted to be supportive of the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda, but on the other, it was reluctant to recognize the autocephaly or transfer of allegiance of Orthodox bishops in those two republics lest that step under its pretensions in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
It is a measure of just how serious the Moscow Patriarchate views such threats to its power that Kirill came down on the side of the Church rather than on the side of the Russian state, although it is probable that over time, the political changes there will have religious administrative effects as well.
As Venediktov notes, the recent meeting between Lukashenka and the Universal Patriarch means that Moscow now must deal with “the problem of Belarusian autocephaly,” something that “from the canonical point of view” should be resolved on the basis of the principle that “church autocephaly follows the political independence of states.”
“If Alyaksandr Lukashenka pushes for the church autocephaly of his state, his actions in this case are completely logical and justified,” Venediktov says, “because an independent state ought to have an independent Church” – although Lukashenka and his religious leaders should be talking to the Moscow Patriarchate rather than the Universal one to achieve that.
Such a requirement, the church historian says, reflects the fact that “the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church is possible only with the agreement” of the Orthodox Church that had been its administrative superior, in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. The same principle holds, Venediktov continues, with regard to the possible autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
“If [Moscow Patriarchate] recognizes that Belarus and Ukraine are independent states, then [it] must offer the Churches of these independent state autocephaly or perhaps autonomy. But if the church leadership does not offer autocephaly to Belarus and Ukraine, this means that [Moscow] doubts the lawfulness of the sovereignty of these states,” Venediktov argues.
And he concludes that despite all the anger about the Lukashenka meeting, “in all probability the Orthodox world is moving to a situation in which in the not distant future there will be just as many autocephalous Churches as there are Orthodox peoples,” not just beyond the borders of the former Soviet space but within them as well.
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Most Russians Ignore Political Advice from Religious Leaders, Poll Shows
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
Vienna, October 21 – Three out of four Russians say that the opinion of religious leaders have no influence on their political choices, a poll finding that will discourage some religious leaders who have hoped that they have a greater impact than that but on that will be welcomed by many who are worried about growing religious influence on Russian life.
But at the same time, this poll also found that a majority of those with an opinion on the subject believed that the Russian state should pay for the construction and rebuilding of religious facilities, at least those of the Russian Orthodox Church, and that they view Russia as an Orthodox country.
That combination of findings, of course, suggests that while the specific influence of religion or at least Orthodoxy on Russian life may be relatively small, its role as a definer of the background of life there is large and could under certain conditions of inter-religious conflict, especially with Islam, crystallize into a major political force.
At the request of the editors of “NG-Religii,” SuperJob.ru polled 3,000 Russians living across the country as to whether religious leaders had an impact on their support for a particular party or candidate and whether they believed the government should provide funds for building religious facilities (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-10-20/2_opros.html).
With respect to the first question, “NG-Religii” reports in its current issue, 74 percent of those surveyed that that “the opinion of religious leaders did not have any influence on their political choices. Eighteen percent said they found it “difficult to answer” that question. “And only eight percent” acknowledged that they did take guidance from religious on such questions.
The responses varied by both age and income level Those over 35 were somewhat more likely to listen to religious leaders on political issues, and those with incomes above 45,000 rubles were the least likely to do so, a pattern that is typical of that found in many other countries as well.
Those who responded to this question negatively said that “religion and politics must not be mixed in present-day Russia. The church is separate from the state. [And] more than that, a religious leader, in their opinion should not publically express his view on this or that political event.”
Indeed, one 38-year-old Muscovite said that “the influence of the clergy would make sense only if the Church were permitted to participate in politics,” something that it is nominally excluded from doing because religious parties have been banned by Russian law since Vladimir Putin’s time as president.
Responses to the second question regarding church support for building religious facilities, however, were somewhat different, “NG-Religii” reports. The Superjob.ru poll found that 50 percent of the sample supported the idea that the state should pay for building and repair of religious institutions. Thirty-two percent were opposed, with 18 percent uncertain.
Support for a state role in this area was greatest among Russians under the age of 24, and least among those over 45, with 53 percent of that age group opposed to the idea That pattern suggests that young people may be somewhat less committed to the separation of church and state than their Soviet-era educated elders.
Attitudes on this question also varied with income, with poorer groups more prepared to see the state play a role and wealthier ones opposed to this idea.
But comments from those polled make it clear that most of those who favored state support for the construction or repair of religious facilities believed state funds should be used only for the Russian Orthodox Church facilities and not for those of any other religious group, particularly Islam.
Many of those polls “mistakenly” believe that “Russia is an Orthodox state” and that it should help restore and build Orthodox churches because in communist times, only Orthodox churches were closed. That, of course, is not true: the Soviets shuttered at least as large and perhaps a greater percentage of mosques, synagogues, and other religious centers as well.
Indeed, some Russians in this poll suggested that state funds spent on rebuilding Orthodox churches represented a kind of compensation for “the sins” of the communists, although many of them, perhaps not surprisingly given the mosque controversy in Moscow, were “categorically against” giving tax money to Islam.
What this poll says about attitudes toward Orthodoxy and Islam, however, is less important than the texture it provides about Russian views, nearly 20 years after the fall of communism, about the separation of church and state, attitudes that are still very much in flux rather than as many have assumed now set in stone.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Seeks to Throw Veil of Secrecy over Counter-Terrorism Budget
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 20 – Although rights activists have succeeded in eliminating a provision of an FSB-proposed draft bill on state secrets that would have blocked the media from covering most counter-terrorist operations, another provision of this measure – one that throws the veil of secrecy over the financing of such activities – has the potential to do even more harm.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Andrey Soldatov, the head of Agentura.ru and one of Moscow’s leading independent experts on Russia’s intelligence services, says that victory the media rights activists was not only partial but that they have ignored this bigger threat to the public’s Constitutional right to know (ej.ru/?a=note&id=10482).
As approved last week by the Duma’s security committee on second reading, the bill limits the activities of journalists in the collection of information on terrorism to talking with “people in the special services themselves, who officially or unofficially enter into contact with the press”
That “in practice” means that the journalists do not have any opportunity to check the information that the security services put out and thus invites those services to present to journalists only the most self-serving information, something that will reduce attention to the actions of terrorists but also to the mistakes of the security services themselves.
But the Duma committee “left without change” another part of the bill, Soldatov notes, and that provision may have even more far-reaching consequences. According to the measure, all information about the financing of anti-terrorist activities is, at the insistence of the FSB, to be classified as secret.
Soldatov argues that the arguments of the FSB on this point “were not simply weak, they did not correspond to reality.” The FSB said it had no choice but to ask for this in order not to have to reveal the payments to informers and others that the agency has made “to prevent terrorist actions.”
But such payments are already classified secret under the provisions of the law on the operations of the security services, Soldatov points out, and that suggests that “the actual goal of the new point in the law is to gain the chance to classify any data about financial flows which come from the budget for the struggle with terrorism.”
If it is passed, then people “who do not have access to state secrets – journalists, the expert community and deputies – [will not be able] to assess how the Russian special services are spending money on the struggle with terrorism” and thus to know whether budget funds are being used effectively or being wasted
That is no small thing, the Agentura.ru editor continues, pointing out that “when we speak about the financing of the struggle with terrorism, we are talking about not only the purchase of special weapons and technology for special operations and the payment of agents.” Instead, in Russia, albeit to “a lesser degree than in the US,” this involves a whole “industry.”
Two years ago, Nikolay Patrushev, then head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, approved a plan for the “struggle with the ideology of terrorism.” This program, which continues until 2012, involves “the production of films, the creation of websites, the holding of competitions for the best works on counter-terrorism, international conferences and festivals and even the publication of artistic literature.”
If the budget of these activities is concealed, Soldatov points out, then who are creating them is hidden as well, something that makes it extremely difficult for anyone lacking access to state secrets “to assess the effectiveness of these programs,” something they could certainly do if they knew where the funding was coming from.
Soldatov says that he personally would “very much like to hear the opinion of specialists about the directive ‘to develop and introduce into the practice of the work of specialized medical institutions complex psycho-physiological methods of identifying risk groups (‘those inclined to terrorist activity’)” for deciding on “prophylactic measures.”
It would be most interesting to learn “just what measures are being used” – those of Lombroso or a little more contemporary such as eugenics?” And it would be “especially interesting to find out just what funds have already been spent for the development and introduction of such measures.”
But what is “also curious,” Soldatov points out, “is that the media and the legal rights community have almost not turned attention to this line in the draft bill. Apparently, the problem is that in our country there have never been undertaken attempts to put under public control government spending for the force structures.”
This is the unfortunate “status quo,” he concludes, and perhaps it will seem strange to some that the powers that be are “taking away from us a right which we have never attempted to make use of.”
Staunton, October 20 – Although rights activists have succeeded in eliminating a provision of an FSB-proposed draft bill on state secrets that would have blocked the media from covering most counter-terrorist operations, another provision of this measure – one that throws the veil of secrecy over the financing of such activities – has the potential to do even more harm.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Andrey Soldatov, the head of Agentura.ru and one of Moscow’s leading independent experts on Russia’s intelligence services, says that victory the media rights activists was not only partial but that they have ignored this bigger threat to the public’s Constitutional right to know (ej.ru/?a=note&id=10482).
As approved last week by the Duma’s security committee on second reading, the bill limits the activities of journalists in the collection of information on terrorism to talking with “people in the special services themselves, who officially or unofficially enter into contact with the press”
That “in practice” means that the journalists do not have any opportunity to check the information that the security services put out and thus invites those services to present to journalists only the most self-serving information, something that will reduce attention to the actions of terrorists but also to the mistakes of the security services themselves.
But the Duma committee “left without change” another part of the bill, Soldatov notes, and that provision may have even more far-reaching consequences. According to the measure, all information about the financing of anti-terrorist activities is, at the insistence of the FSB, to be classified as secret.
Soldatov argues that the arguments of the FSB on this point “were not simply weak, they did not correspond to reality.” The FSB said it had no choice but to ask for this in order not to have to reveal the payments to informers and others that the agency has made “to prevent terrorist actions.”
But such payments are already classified secret under the provisions of the law on the operations of the security services, Soldatov points out, and that suggests that “the actual goal of the new point in the law is to gain the chance to classify any data about financial flows which come from the budget for the struggle with terrorism.”
If it is passed, then people “who do not have access to state secrets – journalists, the expert community and deputies – [will not be able] to assess how the Russian special services are spending money on the struggle with terrorism” and thus to know whether budget funds are being used effectively or being wasted
That is no small thing, the Agentura.ru editor continues, pointing out that “when we speak about the financing of the struggle with terrorism, we are talking about not only the purchase of special weapons and technology for special operations and the payment of agents.” Instead, in Russia, albeit to “a lesser degree than in the US,” this involves a whole “industry.”
Two years ago, Nikolay Patrushev, then head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, approved a plan for the “struggle with the ideology of terrorism.” This program, which continues until 2012, involves “the production of films, the creation of websites, the holding of competitions for the best works on counter-terrorism, international conferences and festivals and even the publication of artistic literature.”
If the budget of these activities is concealed, Soldatov points out, then who are creating them is hidden as well, something that makes it extremely difficult for anyone lacking access to state secrets “to assess the effectiveness of these programs,” something they could certainly do if they knew where the funding was coming from.
Soldatov says that he personally would “very much like to hear the opinion of specialists about the directive ‘to develop and introduce into the practice of the work of specialized medical institutions complex psycho-physiological methods of identifying risk groups (‘those inclined to terrorist activity’)” for deciding on “prophylactic measures.”
It would be most interesting to learn “just what measures are being used” – those of Lombroso or a little more contemporary such as eugenics?” And it would be “especially interesting to find out just what funds have already been spent for the development and introduction of such measures.”
But what is “also curious,” Soldatov points out, “is that the media and the legal rights community have almost not turned attention to this line in the draft bill. Apparently, the problem is that in our country there have never been undertaken attempts to put under public control government spending for the force structures.”
This is the unfortunate “status quo,” he concludes, and perhaps it will seem strange to some that the powers that be are “taking away from us a right which we have never attempted to make use of.”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Approach to the North Caucasus is Ineffective Because It is Superficial, KBR Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 20 – The situation in the North Caucasus is “dangerous” not only because of the many problems there but also because of the “inadequate” and “superficial” approach that the Russian “political class” has adopted in dealing with it, according to a leading specialist on the region.
At an international conference in Pyatigorsk last week, Khazhismel Tkhagapsoyev, a professor at the Kabardino-Balkaria State University and an advisor to the KBR government, said that Russian officials as a result have focused on dealing with symptoms rather than the underlying problems (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175630/).
These officials, he continued has sought to counter terrorist activity, to restore Chechnya, and to overcome unemployment by the creation of a large number of workplaces in medium and large industries, but Tkhagapsoyev suggested, “these issues, despite their importance do not cover or exhaust ‘the essence of the Caucasus problem.”
That problem, he argued, is “the re-integration [of the peoples of the North Caucasus] into the [non-ethnic] Russian cultural and civilizational space.”
The reforms the citizens of Russia have experienced over the last two decades, Tkhagapsoyev continued, “have turned out to be ‘especially injurious for the Caucasus’ and for the sphere of nationality relations” there, generating “political separatism, ardent chauvinism, mutual deafness, the alienation of cultures, and the mass outflow of ethnic Russians.”
“Today,” the KBR scholar continued, “Russia de facto is a space of cultures and ethnic groups which co-exist in parallel” worlds, with little interaction. “If Rasul Gamzatov, Kaysyn Kuliyev [or other Soviet-era writers from the region] were living and creating at present, hardly anyone in Russia would have heard of them.”
Moreover, Tkhagapsoyev said, “for the contemporary Russian powers that be, the neglect of the cultural factor is characteristic, something that in the Caucasus region leads to unacceptable losses.” As an example of this, he pointed to Moscow’s recent decision to fight unemployment by investing in large and medium-sized industries.
That sounds good, he said, but it ignores a reality: “in the region there are a sufficient number of vacancies for workers but they remain unfilled because there is no one who wants to take them.” In addition, if a family in the Caucasus has a small business, all the family members will want to work for it, regardless of the specific nature of the job.
“It would seem that everything is clear,” the KBR academic and government advisor says. The powers that be need to go “along the path of family business and small entrepreneurial efforts. However, many things interfere with this.” Among them, he pointed out, is the lack of a resolution of disputes about land, “the main economic resource of the Caucasus.”
As things have worked out, “land is in the hands of major renters or in the shadow economy, but residents of the Caucasus do not see themselves in the role of paid agricultural workers.” As a result, the land isn’t being worked, and social and economic uncertainty and tension are leading to “a lack of faith in the powers that be.”
That is not the only example of Moscow’s inattention to culture, Tkhagapsoyev suggested. Another and equally important kind of neglect involves the history of the peoples of the North Caucasus and especially their clashes with the Russian state in the Caucasus War, the period of Stalinist repressions and the more recent war in Chechnya.
While Moscow has been prepared to condemn the Stalinist repressions in the region and to downplay the Chechen conflict, the scholar noted, there has not been any effort by the Russian powers that be to deal with the Caucasus War, the century-long conflict as the result of which the Russian Empire took control of the region.
This is not a question about “a revision” of the geopolitical results of that war, Tkhagapsoyev continued. Such a step “would be dangerous and fatal for the Caucasus peoples.” Instead, what is needed but not yet forthcoming is “an assessment about the moral aspect of this war and its demographic consequences” – including the expulsion of the Circassians.
A related problem involves “the contemporary situation of ethnic cultures and languages of the Caucasus, to the development of which,” the KBR scholar suggests, “the federal powers that be are not devoting sufficient attention.” Instead, the Duma has passed a law that eliminates language and cultures from the curriculum and at the same time further divides the population.
By introducing into the school special and distinct courses on Orthodox culture or Islamic culture, the powers that be are forcing children to “divide themselves up according to their religious memberships. And in this way, without having resolved the old problems of the mutual alienation of cultures and peoples, they have introduced new ones.”
Yet another problem involves higher education. “In the country a system of elite, privileged higher educational institutions is emerging. There are about 30, but not one institution in the ethnic republics of the region is among this ‘elect’” Instead, there is a sense that Moscow has decided on “a directed provincialization’ of the intellect and culture” of this region.
And finally, Tkhagapsoyev says, there is the problem of the way in which the region is treated in the electronic media of the Russian Federation. As in the past, “the face of the person of Caucasus nationality is repulsive” and clearly intended to be whatever the facts of the case happen to be.
“You will not see any traces of ethnic culture on the all-Russian channels, even on ‘Kultura,’” he points out. Given that, “about what kind of dialogue and consolidation of peoples and cultures can we speak? And how can we move toward an all-national identity of [non-ethnic] Russians.”
If that does not happen, if Moscow doesn’t move beyond its current superficial approach, then, the Kabardino-Balkaria scholar concludes, “the historical prospects of Russia are cloudy indeed.”
Staunton, October 20 – The situation in the North Caucasus is “dangerous” not only because of the many problems there but also because of the “inadequate” and “superficial” approach that the Russian “political class” has adopted in dealing with it, according to a leading specialist on the region.
At an international conference in Pyatigorsk last week, Khazhismel Tkhagapsoyev, a professor at the Kabardino-Balkaria State University and an advisor to the KBR government, said that Russian officials as a result have focused on dealing with symptoms rather than the underlying problems (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175630/).
These officials, he continued has sought to counter terrorist activity, to restore Chechnya, and to overcome unemployment by the creation of a large number of workplaces in medium and large industries, but Tkhagapsoyev suggested, “these issues, despite their importance do not cover or exhaust ‘the essence of the Caucasus problem.”
That problem, he argued, is “the re-integration [of the peoples of the North Caucasus] into the [non-ethnic] Russian cultural and civilizational space.”
The reforms the citizens of Russia have experienced over the last two decades, Tkhagapsoyev continued, “have turned out to be ‘especially injurious for the Caucasus’ and for the sphere of nationality relations” there, generating “political separatism, ardent chauvinism, mutual deafness, the alienation of cultures, and the mass outflow of ethnic Russians.”
“Today,” the KBR scholar continued, “Russia de facto is a space of cultures and ethnic groups which co-exist in parallel” worlds, with little interaction. “If Rasul Gamzatov, Kaysyn Kuliyev [or other Soviet-era writers from the region] were living and creating at present, hardly anyone in Russia would have heard of them.”
Moreover, Tkhagapsoyev said, “for the contemporary Russian powers that be, the neglect of the cultural factor is characteristic, something that in the Caucasus region leads to unacceptable losses.” As an example of this, he pointed to Moscow’s recent decision to fight unemployment by investing in large and medium-sized industries.
That sounds good, he said, but it ignores a reality: “in the region there are a sufficient number of vacancies for workers but they remain unfilled because there is no one who wants to take them.” In addition, if a family in the Caucasus has a small business, all the family members will want to work for it, regardless of the specific nature of the job.
“It would seem that everything is clear,” the KBR academic and government advisor says. The powers that be need to go “along the path of family business and small entrepreneurial efforts. However, many things interfere with this.” Among them, he pointed out, is the lack of a resolution of disputes about land, “the main economic resource of the Caucasus.”
As things have worked out, “land is in the hands of major renters or in the shadow economy, but residents of the Caucasus do not see themselves in the role of paid agricultural workers.” As a result, the land isn’t being worked, and social and economic uncertainty and tension are leading to “a lack of faith in the powers that be.”
That is not the only example of Moscow’s inattention to culture, Tkhagapsoyev suggested. Another and equally important kind of neglect involves the history of the peoples of the North Caucasus and especially their clashes with the Russian state in the Caucasus War, the period of Stalinist repressions and the more recent war in Chechnya.
While Moscow has been prepared to condemn the Stalinist repressions in the region and to downplay the Chechen conflict, the scholar noted, there has not been any effort by the Russian powers that be to deal with the Caucasus War, the century-long conflict as the result of which the Russian Empire took control of the region.
This is not a question about “a revision” of the geopolitical results of that war, Tkhagapsoyev continued. Such a step “would be dangerous and fatal for the Caucasus peoples.” Instead, what is needed but not yet forthcoming is “an assessment about the moral aspect of this war and its demographic consequences” – including the expulsion of the Circassians.
A related problem involves “the contemporary situation of ethnic cultures and languages of the Caucasus, to the development of which,” the KBR scholar suggests, “the federal powers that be are not devoting sufficient attention.” Instead, the Duma has passed a law that eliminates language and cultures from the curriculum and at the same time further divides the population.
By introducing into the school special and distinct courses on Orthodox culture or Islamic culture, the powers that be are forcing children to “divide themselves up according to their religious memberships. And in this way, without having resolved the old problems of the mutual alienation of cultures and peoples, they have introduced new ones.”
Yet another problem involves higher education. “In the country a system of elite, privileged higher educational institutions is emerging. There are about 30, but not one institution in the ethnic republics of the region is among this ‘elect’” Instead, there is a sense that Moscow has decided on “a directed provincialization’ of the intellect and culture” of this region.
And finally, Tkhagapsoyev says, there is the problem of the way in which the region is treated in the electronic media of the Russian Federation. As in the past, “the face of the person of Caucasus nationality is repulsive” and clearly intended to be whatever the facts of the case happen to be.
“You will not see any traces of ethnic culture on the all-Russian channels, even on ‘Kultura,’” he points out. Given that, “about what kind of dialogue and consolidation of peoples and cultures can we speak? And how can we move toward an all-national identity of [non-ethnic] Russians.”
If that does not happen, if Moscow doesn’t move beyond its current superficial approach, then, the Kabardino-Balkaria scholar concludes, “the historical prospects of Russia are cloudy indeed.”
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Xenophobic Nationalists Threaten to Make Russia into a Post-1918 Austria, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 19 – Russian imperial and xenophobic nationalists, a leading Moscow human rights analysts, are conducting the kind of “political experiments” that threaten their country with “yet another ‘greatest catastrophe,’” albeit one “not of the 20th century but of the 21st,” one that would leave it in a position much like Austria found itself after 1918
In an article on Grani.ru portal today, Yevgeny Ikhlov, the head of the analytic center of the For Human Rights Movement, draws that conclusion on the basis of his reading of the meaning of the efforts by Stavropol residents to leave the North Caucasus Federal District and of Muscovites to block the construction of new mosques (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/182759.html).
Ikhlov says that from his point of view, “the Stavropol residents are profoundly right” in what they are trying to do. While the southern part of their kray is “geo-economically” part of the North Caucasus, “’everyone understands’ that the North Caucasus Federal District is a governorship general for the control as people said the century before last of unruly natives.”
“The Slavs of Stavropol do not want to be included among the natives,” he continues, because it is obvious that in that case, Stavropol kray “will always be forgotten” compared to hotspots like Daghestan. If they can secure a place in the Southern Federal District, the residents of the kray have good reason to think they can get “more proportionate” attention.”
The people of Stavropol thus find themselves in an awkward position now that “the former larger Southern FD is historically and civilizationally split into two absolutely different segments – a citadel of the south Russian sub-ethnos and the lands of the Caucasian peoples, annexed by the tsarist empire in its centuries-long drive toward the Middle East.”
But if the Stavropol residents succeed in being shifted from the North Caucasus to the Southern FD, then, this “will make the border [one] between the imperial metropolis and imperial acquisitions, between what everyone understands as Russia and that which should be called ‘the Federation’” on the basis with the analogous division in the Roman empire of antiquity.
“The price of preserving the official illusion that the Russian Federation is not an empire but a cleverly devised in 1993 ‘United States of Northern Eurasia’ became the unification of the Stavropol residents to the North Caucasus Federal District which was set up for the struggle with the already 11-year-old North Caucasus guerilla war.”
Ikhlov suggests that “this bureaucratic solution is only a small part of the bill for the ambitions of the Russian tsars” and Soviet leaders, a bill that many Russians complain about when despite everything their ancestors did, they are forced to “pay” for it by getting visas in order to travel to Kaliningrad, the former German land.
“For the conquest and annexation of the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia and for the Westernization of these territories with fire and sword by the communists, it is also necessary to pay,” he argues, just as France, Britain and Germany have had to pay for their past imperial ambitions by being forced to deal with “millions” of culturally distinct immigrants.”
“For its Eurasian empire, Moscow must cope with millions of Muslims in the capital and surrounding territories,” Ikhlov says. “the capital of a universal empire – and the Third Rome by definition is a universal empire – is always a cosmopolitan megalopolis, i.e., a Babylon.” Thus, “Moscow never will be ‘a Russian Orthodox’ metropolis,” whatever the nationalists think.
The huge Muslim community of Moscow “must have a sufficient number of mosques,” he argues, saying that “it is time to get rid of the illusion that if Muslims are left without a mosque, they will first become ethnically and religiously colorless [non-ethnic] Russians and then eventually become [ethnic] Russians and even Orthodox Christians.”
If the communists couldn’t achieve that goal with “two million Soviet Jews,” then the current Russian powers that be won’t be able to achieve such a transformation among “the 20 million people whose ancestors professed Islam.”
Of course, “in principle,” Ikhlov says, “it would be possible to free Moscow and all of central Russia from Muslims by setting up an Orthodox-fascist Muscovite Rus, the territory of which would be somewhat smaller than the current Russian Federation.” But those who think that would be a good idea should remember what happened to Austria after the empire.
Such a prospect for Russia, the human rights analyst argues, “ought to convince angriest Moscow chauvinists and Islamophobes that the flourishing of the capital [of their country] is worth 20 mosques.” But unfortunately, as recent developments in France and Germany with regard to the Roma suggest, they may not recognize that danger.
According to Ikhlov, “the problem is that neither the Russian nor the West European elites have been able to create a universal super-ethnic model which has been so notably established in North America.” And consequently, “our proud imperialists of the Kipplingesque type will continue their political experiments.”
That is until, the For Human Rights expert concludes, they succeed in bringing about “yet another ‘greatest catastrophe,’” a reference to Vladimir Putin’s description of the disintegration of the USSR. “Only this will not be in the 20th century” as that event was but rather sometime “in the 21st.”
Staunton, October 19 – Russian imperial and xenophobic nationalists, a leading Moscow human rights analysts, are conducting the kind of “political experiments” that threaten their country with “yet another ‘greatest catastrophe,’” albeit one “not of the 20th century but of the 21st,” one that would leave it in a position much like Austria found itself after 1918
In an article on Grani.ru portal today, Yevgeny Ikhlov, the head of the analytic center of the For Human Rights Movement, draws that conclusion on the basis of his reading of the meaning of the efforts by Stavropol residents to leave the North Caucasus Federal District and of Muscovites to block the construction of new mosques (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/182759.html).
Ikhlov says that from his point of view, “the Stavropol residents are profoundly right” in what they are trying to do. While the southern part of their kray is “geo-economically” part of the North Caucasus, “’everyone understands’ that the North Caucasus Federal District is a governorship general for the control as people said the century before last of unruly natives.”
“The Slavs of Stavropol do not want to be included among the natives,” he continues, because it is obvious that in that case, Stavropol kray “will always be forgotten” compared to hotspots like Daghestan. If they can secure a place in the Southern Federal District, the residents of the kray have good reason to think they can get “more proportionate” attention.”
The people of Stavropol thus find themselves in an awkward position now that “the former larger Southern FD is historically and civilizationally split into two absolutely different segments – a citadel of the south Russian sub-ethnos and the lands of the Caucasian peoples, annexed by the tsarist empire in its centuries-long drive toward the Middle East.”
But if the Stavropol residents succeed in being shifted from the North Caucasus to the Southern FD, then, this “will make the border [one] between the imperial metropolis and imperial acquisitions, between what everyone understands as Russia and that which should be called ‘the Federation’” on the basis with the analogous division in the Roman empire of antiquity.
“The price of preserving the official illusion that the Russian Federation is not an empire but a cleverly devised in 1993 ‘United States of Northern Eurasia’ became the unification of the Stavropol residents to the North Caucasus Federal District which was set up for the struggle with the already 11-year-old North Caucasus guerilla war.”
Ikhlov suggests that “this bureaucratic solution is only a small part of the bill for the ambitions of the Russian tsars” and Soviet leaders, a bill that many Russians complain about when despite everything their ancestors did, they are forced to “pay” for it by getting visas in order to travel to Kaliningrad, the former German land.
“For the conquest and annexation of the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia and for the Westernization of these territories with fire and sword by the communists, it is also necessary to pay,” he argues, just as France, Britain and Germany have had to pay for their past imperial ambitions by being forced to deal with “millions” of culturally distinct immigrants.”
“For its Eurasian empire, Moscow must cope with millions of Muslims in the capital and surrounding territories,” Ikhlov says. “the capital of a universal empire – and the Third Rome by definition is a universal empire – is always a cosmopolitan megalopolis, i.e., a Babylon.” Thus, “Moscow never will be ‘a Russian Orthodox’ metropolis,” whatever the nationalists think.
The huge Muslim community of Moscow “must have a sufficient number of mosques,” he argues, saying that “it is time to get rid of the illusion that if Muslims are left without a mosque, they will first become ethnically and religiously colorless [non-ethnic] Russians and then eventually become [ethnic] Russians and even Orthodox Christians.”
If the communists couldn’t achieve that goal with “two million Soviet Jews,” then the current Russian powers that be won’t be able to achieve such a transformation among “the 20 million people whose ancestors professed Islam.”
Of course, “in principle,” Ikhlov says, “it would be possible to free Moscow and all of central Russia from Muslims by setting up an Orthodox-fascist Muscovite Rus, the territory of which would be somewhat smaller than the current Russian Federation.” But those who think that would be a good idea should remember what happened to Austria after the empire.
Such a prospect for Russia, the human rights analyst argues, “ought to convince angriest Moscow chauvinists and Islamophobes that the flourishing of the capital [of their country] is worth 20 mosques.” But unfortunately, as recent developments in France and Germany with regard to the Roma suggest, they may not recognize that danger.
According to Ikhlov, “the problem is that neither the Russian nor the West European elites have been able to create a universal super-ethnic model which has been so notably established in North America.” And consequently, “our proud imperialists of the Kipplingesque type will continue their political experiments.”
That is until, the For Human Rights expert concludes, they succeed in bringing about “yet another ‘greatest catastrophe,’” a reference to Vladimir Putin’s description of the disintegration of the USSR. “Only this will not be in the 20th century” as that event was but rather sometime “in the 21st.”
Window on Eurasia: Dushanbe Asks Muslim Countries to Return Tajiks Studying Abroad
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 19 – Earlier this year, Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmon asked the parents of Tajiks studying in Islamic universities and medrassahs abroad to have them return to their homes. Now, underscoring Dushanbe’s nervousness the republic’s foreign minister has begun talks with the governments involved to enlist their aid in this effort.
Khamrokhon Zarifi, the foreign minister, told the Regnum.ru news agency that talks are now going on with these countries in the expectation that they will agree to return the young Tajik students so that they will not become, in Rakhmon’s words, “terrorists and extremists” (www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/tajik/1337141.html).
According to the Tajik minister, the problem is a large one. At Cairo’s Al-Azhar University alone, for example, there are some700 Tajiks, all of whom are studying religious subjects like shariat law and theology rather than scientific or technical ones and 90 percent of whom are there illegally, at least from Dushanbe’s point of view (islamsng.com/tjk/news/301).
Indeed at his press conference, Zarifi said that “there is not a single one of our compatriots who is studying in the secular faculties of this higher educational institution which prepare engineers and doctors, although such people are very much needed in our country.” And consequently, Dushanbe wants them back.
According to the Tajik government, there are currently about 1400 Tajik young people studying in Islamic universities and medrassahs abroad, although the actual number is almost certainly far greater than that as many Tajiks, like students from other Muslim groups in the former Soviet space, often declare they are studying one place but then shift to another.
To date, the Tajik government, Foreign Minister Zarifi said, have been able to secure the return of “approximately 50,” an indication that Dushanbe faces an uphill battle unless foreign governments become actively involved, something that few, except for Iran – which has sent Tajiks home – appear all that interested in doing.
But Dushanbe’s efforts in this regard if they are successful may create three problems for the regime at home in addition to any difficulties it may have with its foreign interlocutors. First, because of mass unemployment in Tajikistan, many of those forced to return will be furious at the government and join militant groups seeking to overturn it.
Second, such half-trained Muslim adepts, history has shown, are far more likely to take a radical position than those who may be more fully exposed to Islamic doctrines, especially at places like Cairo’s Al-Azhar, and thus bring back with them exactly the opposite message that the Dushanbe government hopes for.
And third, if young Tajiks are precluded from getting an Islamic education abroad, then more of them are likely to demand Islamic education at home, something the authorities in Dushanbe say they favor but may be hard pressed to support, especially given that country’s economic difficulties at the present time.
But despite those difficulties, the governments of other post-Soviet states, many of whom have even more of their nationals studying at Islamic institutions abroad than does Tajikistan, are likely to follow Dushanbe’s lead. And that by itself makes what the Tajiks are doing even more important.
Staunton, October 19 – Earlier this year, Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmon asked the parents of Tajiks studying in Islamic universities and medrassahs abroad to have them return to their homes. Now, underscoring Dushanbe’s nervousness the republic’s foreign minister has begun talks with the governments involved to enlist their aid in this effort.
Khamrokhon Zarifi, the foreign minister, told the Regnum.ru news agency that talks are now going on with these countries in the expectation that they will agree to return the young Tajik students so that they will not become, in Rakhmon’s words, “terrorists and extremists” (www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/tajik/1337141.html).
According to the Tajik minister, the problem is a large one. At Cairo’s Al-Azhar University alone, for example, there are some700 Tajiks, all of whom are studying religious subjects like shariat law and theology rather than scientific or technical ones and 90 percent of whom are there illegally, at least from Dushanbe’s point of view (islamsng.com/tjk/news/301).
Indeed at his press conference, Zarifi said that “there is not a single one of our compatriots who is studying in the secular faculties of this higher educational institution which prepare engineers and doctors, although such people are very much needed in our country.” And consequently, Dushanbe wants them back.
According to the Tajik government, there are currently about 1400 Tajik young people studying in Islamic universities and medrassahs abroad, although the actual number is almost certainly far greater than that as many Tajiks, like students from other Muslim groups in the former Soviet space, often declare they are studying one place but then shift to another.
To date, the Tajik government, Foreign Minister Zarifi said, have been able to secure the return of “approximately 50,” an indication that Dushanbe faces an uphill battle unless foreign governments become actively involved, something that few, except for Iran – which has sent Tajiks home – appear all that interested in doing.
But Dushanbe’s efforts in this regard if they are successful may create three problems for the regime at home in addition to any difficulties it may have with its foreign interlocutors. First, because of mass unemployment in Tajikistan, many of those forced to return will be furious at the government and join militant groups seeking to overturn it.
Second, such half-trained Muslim adepts, history has shown, are far more likely to take a radical position than those who may be more fully exposed to Islamic doctrines, especially at places like Cairo’s Al-Azhar, and thus bring back with them exactly the opposite message that the Dushanbe government hopes for.
And third, if young Tajiks are precluded from getting an Islamic education abroad, then more of them are likely to demand Islamic education at home, something the authorities in Dushanbe say they favor but may be hard pressed to support, especially given that country’s economic difficulties at the present time.
But despite those difficulties, the governments of other post-Soviet states, many of whom have even more of their nationals studying at Islamic institutions abroad than does Tajikistan, are likely to follow Dushanbe’s lead. And that by itself makes what the Tajiks are doing even more important.
Window on Eurasia: Attack on Chechen Parliament Undercuts Kadyrov's Position and Putin's Claims
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 19 – Even more than the August raid on Ramzan Kadyrov’s home village of Tsentoroy, the attack Chechen militants carried out against the republic parliament this morning shows that Chechnya has not become the island of stability in the North Caucasus Kadyrov and his Moscow patron Vladimir Putin routinely claim.
That in turn increases the likelihood that some in Moscow will begin asking pointed questions about Kadyrov’s approach as the best model for other republic leaders in the North Caucasus, a model that he and Putin have been pushing -- and even about Kadyrov’s fitness to continue in office in Grozny.
And while the difficulties Moscow would face in displacing Kadyrov are enormous – he controls a large armed force and has few obvious successors who would not pursue an even more anti-Russian approach – the likelihood that such possibilities are going to be discussed will inevitably erode Kadyrov’s power and authority.
Chechen, Russian and Western news outlets have offered somewhat contradictory accounts of what has taken place, but an examination of a variety of them suggests that at least three people were killed and more than a dozen hospitalized as a result of the attack and that after a hour-long firefight, four of “the bandits” were, in Kadyrov’s words, “liquidated.”
Initial reports that militants had taken hostages within the parliament building itself or that they had attacked other Chechen government buildings have not been confirmed. But as “Svobodnaya pressa” put it, “the seriousness of the situation” is reflected in the fact that Putin spoke with Kadyrov even as it was going on (svpressa.ru/accidents/article/32346/).
More details may become available over the coming days because investigators from the North Caucasus and Southern Federal Districts jointly have formed a special group to find out what took place, although it is entirely possible that they will throw a veil of secrecy over today’s events.
Chechen officials have already tried to play down the event, although the comments of some may have just the opposite effect. Anzor Davletuniyev, a journalist at Grozny’s “Vesti respubliki,” told “Svobodnaya pressa” that “our people have been accustomed to such things for a long time.”
And Moscow media outlets, both electronic and print, have devoted most of their comments to what they describe as “the end of a counter-terrorist operation” against the militants rather than on why the militants have taken this action now, although some have linked it to recent conflicts within the Caucasus Emirate.
But in an interview “Svobodnaya pressa” had, Geydar Dzhemal, the president of the Islamic Committee of Russia, suggested that any discussions about what had occurred should not involve a focus on this or that individual but on what he called “a much larger problem … [the use of] this operation to discredit Ramzan Kadyrov” and more generally the policies he espouses.
By this action, even more than the Tsentoroy attack, the militants of those behind them, Dzhemal argued, are seeking to prove that Kadyrov and the policy of “Chechenization” can be “a panacea for the armed resistance in the Caucasus,” a policy Putin and his allies among the siloviki have pushed for the last several years.
According to Dzhemal, someone needs the situation to develop in such a way that “Kadyrov will be discredited in order to prepare the conditions for his departure. Therefore, the action was conducted when Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev was in Grozny” and when there were parliamentarians from Sverdlovsk oblast there who could serve as witnesses.
The Muslim commentator said that he “considers that this was not an ordinary action and even not one of the caliber of the attack on Tsentoroy.” Rather, he suggested, that “in this case, we are dealing with a far reaching political operation which is related to processes which are taking place in Russia at the federal level.”
Kadyrov, Dzhemal continued, is “a powerful trump card” in the hands of the Russian siloviki, and consequently and entirely naturally “someone is interested that this resource of the party of the siloviki be taken away from them and that [as a result] problems for the entire system of power sharply increase.”
In the coming days and weeks, the Moscow analyst continued, Kadyrov is going to find himself under “growing political pressure” because “the attack on the parliament demonstrated that he is not in control of the situation in his own home” and that “the system of security which he has organized” isn’t working.
Dzhemal’s comments likely overstate the threat to Kadyrov – again, Moscow has few good options – but they are suggestive of a shift in attitudes toward him in the Russian capital, a shift that the militants are likely to exploit and that the Chechen leader will now have to try to do something to reverse.
Staunton, October 19 – Even more than the August raid on Ramzan Kadyrov’s home village of Tsentoroy, the attack Chechen militants carried out against the republic parliament this morning shows that Chechnya has not become the island of stability in the North Caucasus Kadyrov and his Moscow patron Vladimir Putin routinely claim.
That in turn increases the likelihood that some in Moscow will begin asking pointed questions about Kadyrov’s approach as the best model for other republic leaders in the North Caucasus, a model that he and Putin have been pushing -- and even about Kadyrov’s fitness to continue in office in Grozny.
And while the difficulties Moscow would face in displacing Kadyrov are enormous – he controls a large armed force and has few obvious successors who would not pursue an even more anti-Russian approach – the likelihood that such possibilities are going to be discussed will inevitably erode Kadyrov’s power and authority.
Chechen, Russian and Western news outlets have offered somewhat contradictory accounts of what has taken place, but an examination of a variety of them suggests that at least three people were killed and more than a dozen hospitalized as a result of the attack and that after a hour-long firefight, four of “the bandits” were, in Kadyrov’s words, “liquidated.”
Initial reports that militants had taken hostages within the parliament building itself or that they had attacked other Chechen government buildings have not been confirmed. But as “Svobodnaya pressa” put it, “the seriousness of the situation” is reflected in the fact that Putin spoke with Kadyrov even as it was going on (svpressa.ru/accidents/article/32346/).
More details may become available over the coming days because investigators from the North Caucasus and Southern Federal Districts jointly have formed a special group to find out what took place, although it is entirely possible that they will throw a veil of secrecy over today’s events.
Chechen officials have already tried to play down the event, although the comments of some may have just the opposite effect. Anzor Davletuniyev, a journalist at Grozny’s “Vesti respubliki,” told “Svobodnaya pressa” that “our people have been accustomed to such things for a long time.”
And Moscow media outlets, both electronic and print, have devoted most of their comments to what they describe as “the end of a counter-terrorist operation” against the militants rather than on why the militants have taken this action now, although some have linked it to recent conflicts within the Caucasus Emirate.
But in an interview “Svobodnaya pressa” had, Geydar Dzhemal, the president of the Islamic Committee of Russia, suggested that any discussions about what had occurred should not involve a focus on this or that individual but on what he called “a much larger problem … [the use of] this operation to discredit Ramzan Kadyrov” and more generally the policies he espouses.
By this action, even more than the Tsentoroy attack, the militants of those behind them, Dzhemal argued, are seeking to prove that Kadyrov and the policy of “Chechenization” can be “a panacea for the armed resistance in the Caucasus,” a policy Putin and his allies among the siloviki have pushed for the last several years.
According to Dzhemal, someone needs the situation to develop in such a way that “Kadyrov will be discredited in order to prepare the conditions for his departure. Therefore, the action was conducted when Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev was in Grozny” and when there were parliamentarians from Sverdlovsk oblast there who could serve as witnesses.
The Muslim commentator said that he “considers that this was not an ordinary action and even not one of the caliber of the attack on Tsentoroy.” Rather, he suggested, that “in this case, we are dealing with a far reaching political operation which is related to processes which are taking place in Russia at the federal level.”
Kadyrov, Dzhemal continued, is “a powerful trump card” in the hands of the Russian siloviki, and consequently and entirely naturally “someone is interested that this resource of the party of the siloviki be taken away from them and that [as a result] problems for the entire system of power sharply increase.”
In the coming days and weeks, the Moscow analyst continued, Kadyrov is going to find himself under “growing political pressure” because “the attack on the parliament demonstrated that he is not in control of the situation in his own home” and that “the system of security which he has organized” isn’t working.
Dzhemal’s comments likely overstate the threat to Kadyrov – again, Moscow has few good options – but they are suggestive of a shift in attitudes toward him in the Russian capital, a shift that the militants are likely to exploit and that the Chechen leader will now have to try to do something to reverse.
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