Paul Goble
Staunton, October 18 – Several deputies in the Legislative Assembly of Primorsky kray in Russia’s Far East recently suggested re-introducing a regional currency much as that region and more than 20 others had in the early 1990s in order to make social payments and thus avoid public protests when there is a delay in the physical transfer of rubles from Moscow.
While there is no indication that that legislators there are prepared to take a step that would violate a 1995 Russian Federation law, Ruslan Gorevoy says in today’s “Novaya versiya,” the proposal shows that “subjects of the Federation are [even now] keeping their own currency from the early 1990s” (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/18/poyavlenie_v_rossii_regionalnih_valut).
And that makes an examination of what many of the country’s regions and republics did at that time not only a matter of historical interest but quite possibly a model that some regional elites may follow in the event of the onset of a serious financial or political crisis in the Russian capital at some point in the future.
After the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, Gorevoy writes, the value of the ruble fell so rapidly that Moscow was often incapable of supplying the regions with the physical currency to pay what the government owed the population. And as a result, he says, “the Russian government secretly permitted 20 some regional leaders to print their own money.”
Other regional leaders soon followed, and had any of them shown real initiative, businessman Artyom Tarasov says, after only a few years no one in the Russian Federation would even have had a memory about the ruble. But most, locked in Soviet-style caution, didn’t push these regional currencies very hard, and they circulated right alongside the ruble.
“Only in 1995,” Gorevoy continues, did Moscow adopt a law on the Russian Central Bank, one of whose provisions (Article 27) was that “the introduction on the territory of the Russian Federation of other monetary units and the production of monetary surrogates is prohibited.”
But as the “Novaya versiya” writer suggests, “if in the Far East or in Kaliningrad there isn’t enough money to deal with budget allocations, the local powers that be could perfectly well say to Moscow that there isn’t enough cash and thereby provoke in this way new conversations about their own money, ‘not tied’ to Moscow.”
Tatarstan was “one of the first” to introduce its own currency, taking that step already in the summer of 1990. It then imported currency printed in Britain in February 1992 with plans to introduce it on January 1, 1994. The reason, Tarasov says, is that Kazan didn’t want to take that step at the same time as others and thus prompt Moscow to come down on all of them at once.
At that time, the businessman continues, Yegor Gaidar had a plan for such currencies: they were supposed to function “on an equal basis with the ruble but only on the territory of the Russian Federation.” They were not to be used internationally – “in any case, according to the federal powers that be.”
Such local money was “immediately issued” in Nizhny Novgorod, Khakasia, Blagoveshchensk “and a number of other cities” and regions across Russia. There were many problems and curiosities: In Nizhny, the bills were so poorly printed that counterfeiting was simple and thus widely practiced.
Because of that, they were quickly replaced by government bonds. The bonds were then paid off, “and the unsuitable rubles destroyed – and this is the only case when ‘separatist’ money was not carefully saved until better times.” Elsewhere the physical bills generally have been retained, even if they are not honored as legal tender.
Meanwhile, in Blagoveshchensk, the local authorities wanted to avoid Moscow’s anger and so they had the currency they needed issued by an industrial concern as internal accounting funds. The name of the firm was SOPPIT, and that became the name of the denominations. “Sopps circulated alongside the ruble until 1995.”
The most famous case of regional currency involved the Urals francs printed up by Governor Eduard Rossel after he secured Gaidar’s approval. He said he had warned the Moscow official that planned reforms would leave Western Siberian governments without the currency they needed to make payments, and Gaidar agreed to the issuance of that regional currency
Many “Urals francs” are still around. “In 1996 and again in 1998, the Office of the Procurator General sanctioned the destruction of these bills,” Gorevoy says, “but this was not done.” And people there, he implies, appear to be retaining them less as curiosities from the past but as potentially valuable pieces of paper.
The most curious case of regional currency involves Chechnya. In early May 1993, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the National Bank of the Chechen Republic, at a time when Dzhokar Dudayev was president, signed an agreement on money, “in which was de facto recognized the financial-credit sovereignty of the republic.”
Six months later, the Chechen authorities decided to issue their own bills and ordered them from a British firm. The bills were printed but the war prevented their widespread introduction. More recently, Gorevoy says, there have been rumors that current Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov has had all the rest of the print run transferred.
If that is the case, the “Novaya versiya” journalist asks rhetorically, “why did he do so?”
But if Chechnya is not thinking about having its own currency again, others apparently are. Tarasov told Gorevoy that “at the present time, the prospects for the appearance in Russia of regional currencies exist,” and those prospects will only brighten if the economic and political clouds over Moscow darken.
Monday, October 18, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Islamist Radicals Waging ‘Aggressive Religious War’ Against Traditional Islam in the Middle Volga Region, Mordvin Mufti Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 18 – Islamist radicals, often with roots in foreign countries, are now waging “an aggressive religious war” against the traditional Muslim communities of the nations of the Middle Volga, a conflict that could ultimately involve violence and chaos, according to the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Mordvinia.
In an interview with Interfax-Religion.ru, Mufti Fagim Shafiyev argues that “the virus of religious radicalism is an effective weapon and instrument” of those who seek to gain power by weakening others, and he acknowledges that “this spiritual illness” at present has spread throughout the Muslim community more than any other.
The reason for that is “the naïve economic experience [of that community], its lower level of education, patriarchal way of life and political passivity,” Shafiyev continues, and those who want to conduct “’a dirty little war’” thus have chosen that community to “create administered chaos” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=interview&div=293&domain=3).
Until recently, this conflict existed most obviously among the Muslims of the North Caucasus between the Salafis and the Sufis; but now, the mufti says, it has spread to and is intensifying in the Middle Volga, the traditional home of the most moderate form of Islam, one fully compatible with Russian political life.
And what makes this virus so dangerous is that those who make use of it as a weapon often lose control of their creation, and “having led the genie out of the bottle,” find that they are harming “not only innocent people but even the creators” of such ideas, “most of all, the Muslims of a traditional direction who do not share the views of the extremists.”
In this scenario, Mufti Shafiyev argues, it is precisely the traditional Muslims who become the first innocent victory of the informational, political and economic wars that have been unleashed and that rapidly shift into armed confrontation. Today, the danger of the transition to this phase is greater than ever before for the Middle Volga.”
According to Shafiyev, this situation also reflects the choice that Muslims in Russia have had to make “between unrestrained freedom and spiritual security.” As a result of the appearance of freedom of conscience and belief, the threat of religious radicalism and splits has grown. In other words, everyone received freedom but many did not add conscience to it.”
Shafiyev notes that the extremists or “new Muslims” as he calls them insist on purity of belief, something they argue can be achieved only a return to the principles of the time of the Prophet and “the Arabization of Muslims,” an argument many Muslims of the Middle Volga find superficially attractive.
The Muslims of the Middle Volga, the mufti points out, “consider any Arab or arrival from the East a real Muslim even though among the latter are also to be found Christians, representatives of various sects and tendencies of Islam and even unbelieving, completely secular people.”
These people, he notes, “preserve their identity even here in Russia,” even though they insist that other Muslims give up their national distinctions” Why must we Russian Muslims who represent various nationalities lose our unique national identity in favor of that of those who have come to us? This is impermissible.”
But unfortunately, he says, the Muslims of Russia are not in a good position to resist because as a result of this “aggressive religious war,” they are being forced to take part in “a discussion about which we earlier did not have any idea but which [as a result of this lack of preparation] leads to splits and divisions.”
To counter this, Shafiyev argues, “we must strive to achieve canonical unity in each particular country while there is not hope for the achievement of unity of the worldwide umma.” And the Muslims of Russia must launch “an attack on all fronts,” one that takes into account the fact that “the forms of struggle by the enemies of traditional Islam have changed.”
That will require the distribution of more and better information about Islam and its enemies. At present, the mufti notes, “there is no regular Muslim programming on television, no major professional federal Muslim newspaper, and no reliable information source about orthodox Muslims in Russia.”
Those shortcomings, he insists, not only “disorient many foreign Muslims” about the nature of Islam in Russia but also “push Russia’s Islamic youth to search for spiritual values outside” of that community, a trend that Islamist radicals are all too ready to exploit and turn against the Muslim community of Russia.
Some may inclined to dismiss Mufti Shafiyev’s remarks as the latest effort of a Muslim leader to put pressure on the Russian government to provide more resources or to support the formation of a single MSD with tighter controls over individual parishes across the Russian Federation.
But that would be a mistake because his most important message is that the struggle within Islam that has been taking place in the North Caucasus has now spread to the Middle Volga, the heartland of traditionally moderate Russian Islam, and that this struggle, more than attacks from outside Islam, is likely to dominate events there in the coming months and years.
Staunton, October 18 – Islamist radicals, often with roots in foreign countries, are now waging “an aggressive religious war” against the traditional Muslim communities of the nations of the Middle Volga, a conflict that could ultimately involve violence and chaos, according to the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Mordvinia.
In an interview with Interfax-Religion.ru, Mufti Fagim Shafiyev argues that “the virus of religious radicalism is an effective weapon and instrument” of those who seek to gain power by weakening others, and he acknowledges that “this spiritual illness” at present has spread throughout the Muslim community more than any other.
The reason for that is “the naïve economic experience [of that community], its lower level of education, patriarchal way of life and political passivity,” Shafiyev continues, and those who want to conduct “’a dirty little war’” thus have chosen that community to “create administered chaos” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=interview&div=293&domain=3).
Until recently, this conflict existed most obviously among the Muslims of the North Caucasus between the Salafis and the Sufis; but now, the mufti says, it has spread to and is intensifying in the Middle Volga, the traditional home of the most moderate form of Islam, one fully compatible with Russian political life.
And what makes this virus so dangerous is that those who make use of it as a weapon often lose control of their creation, and “having led the genie out of the bottle,” find that they are harming “not only innocent people but even the creators” of such ideas, “most of all, the Muslims of a traditional direction who do not share the views of the extremists.”
In this scenario, Mufti Shafiyev argues, it is precisely the traditional Muslims who become the first innocent victory of the informational, political and economic wars that have been unleashed and that rapidly shift into armed confrontation. Today, the danger of the transition to this phase is greater than ever before for the Middle Volga.”
According to Shafiyev, this situation also reflects the choice that Muslims in Russia have had to make “between unrestrained freedom and spiritual security.” As a result of the appearance of freedom of conscience and belief, the threat of religious radicalism and splits has grown. In other words, everyone received freedom but many did not add conscience to it.”
Shafiyev notes that the extremists or “new Muslims” as he calls them insist on purity of belief, something they argue can be achieved only a return to the principles of the time of the Prophet and “the Arabization of Muslims,” an argument many Muslims of the Middle Volga find superficially attractive.
The Muslims of the Middle Volga, the mufti points out, “consider any Arab or arrival from the East a real Muslim even though among the latter are also to be found Christians, representatives of various sects and tendencies of Islam and even unbelieving, completely secular people.”
These people, he notes, “preserve their identity even here in Russia,” even though they insist that other Muslims give up their national distinctions” Why must we Russian Muslims who represent various nationalities lose our unique national identity in favor of that of those who have come to us? This is impermissible.”
But unfortunately, he says, the Muslims of Russia are not in a good position to resist because as a result of this “aggressive religious war,” they are being forced to take part in “a discussion about which we earlier did not have any idea but which [as a result of this lack of preparation] leads to splits and divisions.”
To counter this, Shafiyev argues, “we must strive to achieve canonical unity in each particular country while there is not hope for the achievement of unity of the worldwide umma.” And the Muslims of Russia must launch “an attack on all fronts,” one that takes into account the fact that “the forms of struggle by the enemies of traditional Islam have changed.”
That will require the distribution of more and better information about Islam and its enemies. At present, the mufti notes, “there is no regular Muslim programming on television, no major professional federal Muslim newspaper, and no reliable information source about orthodox Muslims in Russia.”
Those shortcomings, he insists, not only “disorient many foreign Muslims” about the nature of Islam in Russia but also “push Russia’s Islamic youth to search for spiritual values outside” of that community, a trend that Islamist radicals are all too ready to exploit and turn against the Muslim community of Russia.
Some may inclined to dismiss Mufti Shafiyev’s remarks as the latest effort of a Muslim leader to put pressure on the Russian government to provide more resources or to support the formation of a single MSD with tighter controls over individual parishes across the Russian Federation.
But that would be a mistake because his most important message is that the struggle within Islam that has been taking place in the North Caucasus has now spread to the Middle Volga, the heartland of traditionally moderate Russian Islam, and that this struggle, more than attacks from outside Islam, is likely to dominate events there in the coming months and years.
Window on Eurasia: Russian General Staff to Experiment with ‘Mono-Ethnic’ and ‘Mono-Religious’ Units
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 18 – Confronted by growing violence in the ranks often along ethnic and religious lines and by calls from the Russian Soldiers’ Mothers Committees not put their sons in units with people of other nationalities, Moscow is planning to set up as an experiment some “mono-ethnic” and “mono-religious” battalions, according to a Moscow newspaper.
In “Nezavisimaya gazeta” today, Vladimir Mukhin reports that because of the growth of “dedovshchina” in the Russian military – officials say it is up by more than a third over the last year – the General Staff is studying the experience of “the Savage Divisions” as the mono-ethnic units at the end of the Russian Imperial period were known (www.ng.ru/printed/246560).
An anonymous source in the General Staff told Mukhin that the high command sees the formation of such units in which would serve “individuals of a single nationality or followers of a single religion” as “a way out of the situation” in which violence and indiscipline has become commonplace.
The source added that these units will be formed as “an experiment” in several of the strategic commands and will resemble the already existing East and West battalions in Chechnya, yet another way in which Chechnya is having an impact on Russian life far beyond the borders of the North Caucasus.
Yury Netkachev, a retired lieutenant journal and frequent commentator on military affairs, told the Moscow daily that “in essence, this is a return to the experience of ‘the Savage Divisions’ which existed first in the army of the Russian Empire and then for a certain time in Soviet forces.” And he suggested that the idea had merit.
The Russian military leadership shares that view and sees the formation of such units as a means of avoiding a continuing rise in the number of criminal cases involving clashes between the increasingly numerous non-Russian and non-Orthodox troops and Russian soldiers, who as a result of demographic decline form an ever smaller share of those in uniform.
Over the past months there have been a number of clashes along ethnic and religious lines in the Russian army, most recently at the Sokol Air Base near Perm where soldiers from the North Caucasus refused to obey orders and the commander turned to the local mufti for assistance.
According to Colonel Vladimir Popov, a historian and specialist on the Caucasus, the reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg, and the extent of this problem is far greater than many assume. He noted that in the formation of units in Chechnya, the General Staff had even established a special rule on the balance of Caucasians and Russians.
If there are too many soldiers from the Caucasus relative to the number of Russian commanders, the former often refuse to obey the latter. And that problem is now spreading, he said. “With the deteriorating demographic situation and the higher birthrate in the North Caucasus, Muslim draftees from there will soon form more than half of the entire contingent of the Russian Army.”
“On the one hand,” he said, “it would be better if they all served in one unit and were commanded by officers from their own region” But such an approach carries with it problems of its own: What happens if at some point “entire battalions” formed in this way “refuse to subordinate themselves to the Ministry of Defense as happened in June 1941.”
Retired Major General Vladimir Bogatyrev, a member of the Association of Units of Reserve Officers, is even more worried about the consequences of forming mono-ethnic or mono-religious units. Doing so, he said, “will not save [the army] from the problems” of insubordination and violence.
Those can be overcome only if officers learn how to better work with soldiers as educators as well as commanders, something he suggested the current leadership of the defense ministry does not appear to understand. And he said that restoring “the Savage Divisions” would be a mistake: A century ago, many of the peoples of the empire “did not know Russian.”
But today, he continued, “the situation is different. Russia is trying to build a democratic society. And corresponding to that, its army must be both democratic and international.” If it isn’t, he clearly implied, then the Russian Federation faces an increasingly problematic future, one that might involve either collapse or even greater authoritarianism.
The “Nezavisimaya” article did not discuss in any detail the history of the Savage Division of the last years of the Russian Empire, but there is one aspect of their history that may also be playing a certain role in the thinking of those at the top of the Russian military and political system now.
The units that made up the Savage Division were among the most disciplined and combat ready in the Russian Imperial Army, and perhaps most relevant now, they were the last to be infected by the revolutionary spirit that ultimately destroyed not only the Russian Imperial Army but the Russian Empire itself.
Staunton, October 18 – Confronted by growing violence in the ranks often along ethnic and religious lines and by calls from the Russian Soldiers’ Mothers Committees not put their sons in units with people of other nationalities, Moscow is planning to set up as an experiment some “mono-ethnic” and “mono-religious” battalions, according to a Moscow newspaper.
In “Nezavisimaya gazeta” today, Vladimir Mukhin reports that because of the growth of “dedovshchina” in the Russian military – officials say it is up by more than a third over the last year – the General Staff is studying the experience of “the Savage Divisions” as the mono-ethnic units at the end of the Russian Imperial period were known (www.ng.ru/printed/246560).
An anonymous source in the General Staff told Mukhin that the high command sees the formation of such units in which would serve “individuals of a single nationality or followers of a single religion” as “a way out of the situation” in which violence and indiscipline has become commonplace.
The source added that these units will be formed as “an experiment” in several of the strategic commands and will resemble the already existing East and West battalions in Chechnya, yet another way in which Chechnya is having an impact on Russian life far beyond the borders of the North Caucasus.
Yury Netkachev, a retired lieutenant journal and frequent commentator on military affairs, told the Moscow daily that “in essence, this is a return to the experience of ‘the Savage Divisions’ which existed first in the army of the Russian Empire and then for a certain time in Soviet forces.” And he suggested that the idea had merit.
The Russian military leadership shares that view and sees the formation of such units as a means of avoiding a continuing rise in the number of criminal cases involving clashes between the increasingly numerous non-Russian and non-Orthodox troops and Russian soldiers, who as a result of demographic decline form an ever smaller share of those in uniform.
Over the past months there have been a number of clashes along ethnic and religious lines in the Russian army, most recently at the Sokol Air Base near Perm where soldiers from the North Caucasus refused to obey orders and the commander turned to the local mufti for assistance.
According to Colonel Vladimir Popov, a historian and specialist on the Caucasus, the reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg, and the extent of this problem is far greater than many assume. He noted that in the formation of units in Chechnya, the General Staff had even established a special rule on the balance of Caucasians and Russians.
If there are too many soldiers from the Caucasus relative to the number of Russian commanders, the former often refuse to obey the latter. And that problem is now spreading, he said. “With the deteriorating demographic situation and the higher birthrate in the North Caucasus, Muslim draftees from there will soon form more than half of the entire contingent of the Russian Army.”
“On the one hand,” he said, “it would be better if they all served in one unit and were commanded by officers from their own region” But such an approach carries with it problems of its own: What happens if at some point “entire battalions” formed in this way “refuse to subordinate themselves to the Ministry of Defense as happened in June 1941.”
Retired Major General Vladimir Bogatyrev, a member of the Association of Units of Reserve Officers, is even more worried about the consequences of forming mono-ethnic or mono-religious units. Doing so, he said, “will not save [the army] from the problems” of insubordination and violence.
Those can be overcome only if officers learn how to better work with soldiers as educators as well as commanders, something he suggested the current leadership of the defense ministry does not appear to understand. And he said that restoring “the Savage Divisions” would be a mistake: A century ago, many of the peoples of the empire “did not know Russian.”
But today, he continued, “the situation is different. Russia is trying to build a democratic society. And corresponding to that, its army must be both democratic and international.” If it isn’t, he clearly implied, then the Russian Federation faces an increasingly problematic future, one that might involve either collapse or even greater authoritarianism.
The “Nezavisimaya” article did not discuss in any detail the history of the Savage Division of the last years of the Russian Empire, but there is one aspect of their history that may also be playing a certain role in the thinking of those at the top of the Russian military and political system now.
The units that made up the Savage Division were among the most disciplined and combat ready in the Russian Imperial Army, and perhaps most relevant now, they were the last to be infected by the revolutionary spirit that ultimately destroyed not only the Russian Imperial Army but the Russian Empire itself.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russian Census Takers Refusing to Enter ‘Siberian’ as a Nationality
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 17 – Russian census workers in many cases are refusing to record as “Siberians” those who declare that as their identity, even though “Siberian” is listed as one of the possible identities in the official protocols and even though Rosstat head Aleksandr Surinov had promised there would be no problems in that regard.
But now, only three days into the 2010 census, violations of the rights of residents of Siberia to make that declaration have been so frequent and their complaints so vocal that Surinov has been forced to promise that he will look into the matter and ensure that the identities people declare are properly recorded.
Unfortunately, many of those affected are unlikely to be convinced that either he or anyone else in the Russian Federation statistical administration is really interested in ensuring accuracy on this point and thus are certain to believe that the census results Moscow will publish will be unreliable, especially regarding national identities.
During the first two days of the census operation, Globalsib.com reported yesterday, dozens of residents of the Russian Federation east of the Urals reported that census takers were violating the law and filling in blanks without asking or ignoring the declarations of citizens, particularly on questions of nationality (globalsib.com/8552/).
One Irkutsk resident said in his blog that when he called himself a Siberian, “the census taker responded that ‘there is no such nationality’ and wrote down Russian. I forced her to write ‘Siberian,’” he continued, but she changed it so that the individual involved became “a Russian Siberian” and will undoubtedly be counted as an ethnic Russian
Dmitry Osipov, a Novosibirsk resident, reported something similar. In his case, the census taker did not even ask his nationality but simply wrote down “Russian.” “I forced him to correct that,” but he tried to answer that “there is no such nationality, but without fanaticism and with a smile.”
Residents in Bratsk, Tomsk, Omsk, Kemerovo and other Siberian cities reported similar situations. All of them were forced to include “Russian” in their declaration of nationality, although one Tomsk blogger said that while he “of course is a Russian,” he wanted to call himself a Siberian, not a “Russian” Siberian. If blocked, he said, he would be “a Martian.”
This pattern has been so widespread, Globalsib.com continued, that it suggests census officials had told their workers how to act. One census taker admitted as much. He told a resident of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka that his bosses had told him that anyone who is a Russian citizen is thus a Russian by nationality.
Mikhail Maglov, an Omsk blogger who has been involved in the campaign to promote Siberian identity, assembled these and other cases and sent an email to Rosstat head Surinov demanding that he take action so that the census results with regard to national identity would be accurate (globalsib.com/8555/).
In his message, Maglov suggested that failure to allow people to declare their nationality represented a form of ethnic discrimination and thus could be punished under the terms of Article 136 of the criminal code by massive fines and imprisonment of up to two years, something the blogger suggested Rosstat should keep in mind.
According to Globalsib.ru, Surinov responded immediately, thanked him “for the signal” and “promised that ‘we will get to the bottom of all cases.’” The Rosstat head asked that those who felt their declarations were not being handled correctly should turn directly to him and he and his staff would take action.
Staunton, October 17 – Russian census workers in many cases are refusing to record as “Siberians” those who declare that as their identity, even though “Siberian” is listed as one of the possible identities in the official protocols and even though Rosstat head Aleksandr Surinov had promised there would be no problems in that regard.
But now, only three days into the 2010 census, violations of the rights of residents of Siberia to make that declaration have been so frequent and their complaints so vocal that Surinov has been forced to promise that he will look into the matter and ensure that the identities people declare are properly recorded.
Unfortunately, many of those affected are unlikely to be convinced that either he or anyone else in the Russian Federation statistical administration is really interested in ensuring accuracy on this point and thus are certain to believe that the census results Moscow will publish will be unreliable, especially regarding national identities.
During the first two days of the census operation, Globalsib.com reported yesterday, dozens of residents of the Russian Federation east of the Urals reported that census takers were violating the law and filling in blanks without asking or ignoring the declarations of citizens, particularly on questions of nationality (globalsib.com/8552/).
One Irkutsk resident said in his blog that when he called himself a Siberian, “the census taker responded that ‘there is no such nationality’ and wrote down Russian. I forced her to write ‘Siberian,’” he continued, but she changed it so that the individual involved became “a Russian Siberian” and will undoubtedly be counted as an ethnic Russian
Dmitry Osipov, a Novosibirsk resident, reported something similar. In his case, the census taker did not even ask his nationality but simply wrote down “Russian.” “I forced him to correct that,” but he tried to answer that “there is no such nationality, but without fanaticism and with a smile.”
Residents in Bratsk, Tomsk, Omsk, Kemerovo and other Siberian cities reported similar situations. All of them were forced to include “Russian” in their declaration of nationality, although one Tomsk blogger said that while he “of course is a Russian,” he wanted to call himself a Siberian, not a “Russian” Siberian. If blocked, he said, he would be “a Martian.”
This pattern has been so widespread, Globalsib.com continued, that it suggests census officials had told their workers how to act. One census taker admitted as much. He told a resident of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka that his bosses had told him that anyone who is a Russian citizen is thus a Russian by nationality.
Mikhail Maglov, an Omsk blogger who has been involved in the campaign to promote Siberian identity, assembled these and other cases and sent an email to Rosstat head Surinov demanding that he take action so that the census results with regard to national identity would be accurate (globalsib.com/8555/).
In his message, Maglov suggested that failure to allow people to declare their nationality represented a form of ethnic discrimination and thus could be punished under the terms of Article 136 of the criminal code by massive fines and imprisonment of up to two years, something the blogger suggested Rosstat should keep in mind.
According to Globalsib.ru, Surinov responded immediately, thanked him “for the signal” and “promised that ‘we will get to the bottom of all cases.’” The Rosstat head asked that those who felt their declarations were not being handled correctly should turn directly to him and he and his staff would take action.
Window on Eurasia: Georgia’s Visa Free Program for North Caucasians Winning Some Hearts and Minds
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 17 – Despite Moscow’s anger and criticism in Georgia itself, many people in Russia’s North Caucasus republics are delighted with Tbilisi’s decision to allow them visa-free travel to Georgia, although some say this opportunity should be open to all Russian citizens and others worry Moscow may block them from taking advantage of this opportunity.
The Kavkaz-uzel.ru news agency, one of the most objective journalist operations in the North Caucasus, interviewed people in Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175633/) and in Adygeya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175609/) on their reactions to the Georgian visa free program for North Caucasians.
While the news agency makes no claim that the people it interviewed are representative of the population as a whole – many spoke only on condition of anonymity, and Kavkaz-uzel.ru journalists did not have access to all groups – the comments that the agency provides suggest that the visa-free program is winning “the hearts and minds” of the North Caucasians.
(For a detailed discussion of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s plans in this regard, see Tbilisi historian and journalist Georgy Zedgenidze’s article “Georgia is Conducting a Struggle for the Minds and Hearts of Russian Mountaineers,” which is available in Russian at slon.ru/blogs/gzegenidze/post/479724/.)
Residents of Chechnya, Kavkaz-uzel.ru reports, “note that the elimination of Georgian of the visa regime for residents of the North Caucasus republics eliminates many problems arising in the cross of the border with this country” but add that they are fearful that “the Russian powers that be will tighten the rules for their own citizens of crossing state borders.”
“I cannot understand why the powers that be of Russia have reacted so negatively to this decision of Georgia. I would think that any government ought to express approval to the fact that its citizens do not have to experience additional problems in travelling to neighboring countries.” But Moscow instead chose to make “loud propaganda” against it.
“It turns out,” he continued, “that the leadership of Georgia is so bad that it decided to easy the life of part of the citizens of Russia living in the North Caucasus. Apparently, the Kremlin isn’t pleased that now residents of our region will not travel to Moscow for visas” from which officials there can make money.
Another Chechen, Ramzan M., said he welcomed the change because his wife has relatives in the Pankisi Gorge and now it will be much easier to visit them. “Of course,” he continued, “we can only greet this decision of the Georgian authorities. They think in the first instance about the interests of simple citizens and not about politics or something else.”
Abubakar, a resident of Grozny, added that he had been in Georgia during Soviet times and retains many friends there. “More than once they have invited me to come for a visit,” but getting a visa which required a trip to Moscow prevented him from doing so. “I hope that now I will be able to visit my friends,” who have already telephoned to ask him to come.
But he said that he is concerned that the Russian authorities, because of their anger at Georgia, will “toughen the rules” for border crossing into Georgia in order to prevent more people from visiting that country. Russian citizens have had to pay bribes to border guards in the past, “now [this requirement] may become still worse.”
Kavkaz-uzel.ru journalists also spoke with residents of the Republic of Adygeya. Most of those with whom they spoke said that “the opening of visa free entrance into Georgia was an incomplete step,” one that should be extended to all citizens of the Russian Federation rather than to only one part.
Timur Khuranov, a resident of Adygeysk, said that he had long wanted to visit Georgia but had been put off by the requirement that he travel to Moscow to get a visa. Now, he had he was “happy that the opportunity to realize his longtime dream had appeared.” Now all he has to do, he said, is “sit in his car and drive.”
Valentina Filatova, a Maikop resident, said that “of course, the removal of excessive limits for entrance into Georgia only brings our countries closer together and makes their residents closer to one another” – especially for those like herself who have “distant relatives” there and now have “a real chance” to visit them.
But others with whom Kavkaz-uzel.ru journalists spoke were more skeptical. “If we can travel to Georgia,” Aydamir Tleuzh, a resident of the Takhtamukaysk district of Adygeya, asked, “then why can’t the residents of Krasnodar who live only 10 kilometers from our village?”
And Alina Kononenko, a resident of Adygeya’s Krasnogvardeysk district, agreed. “I am sure,” she said, “that equal opportunities must be created for everyone. I have acquaintances who have close relatives in Georgia and who live in Kazan. How are things supposed to work for them? Are they worse than we?”
Consequently, Kononenko said, she had to conclude that “this step of the Georgian leadership is an instrument with which [Tbilisi] can ‘split’ Russians into various parts,” an outcome that she implied was totally unacceptable for her and should be for everyone in the region as well.
Staunton, October 17 – Despite Moscow’s anger and criticism in Georgia itself, many people in Russia’s North Caucasus republics are delighted with Tbilisi’s decision to allow them visa-free travel to Georgia, although some say this opportunity should be open to all Russian citizens and others worry Moscow may block them from taking advantage of this opportunity.
The Kavkaz-uzel.ru news agency, one of the most objective journalist operations in the North Caucasus, interviewed people in Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175633/) and in Adygeya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175609/) on their reactions to the Georgian visa free program for North Caucasians.
While the news agency makes no claim that the people it interviewed are representative of the population as a whole – many spoke only on condition of anonymity, and Kavkaz-uzel.ru journalists did not have access to all groups – the comments that the agency provides suggest that the visa-free program is winning “the hearts and minds” of the North Caucasians.
(For a detailed discussion of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s plans in this regard, see Tbilisi historian and journalist Georgy Zedgenidze’s article “Georgia is Conducting a Struggle for the Minds and Hearts of Russian Mountaineers,” which is available in Russian at slon.ru/blogs/gzegenidze/post/479724/.)
Residents of Chechnya, Kavkaz-uzel.ru reports, “note that the elimination of Georgian of the visa regime for residents of the North Caucasus republics eliminates many problems arising in the cross of the border with this country” but add that they are fearful that “the Russian powers that be will tighten the rules for their own citizens of crossing state borders.”
“I cannot understand why the powers that be of Russia have reacted so negatively to this decision of Georgia. I would think that any government ought to express approval to the fact that its citizens do not have to experience additional problems in travelling to neighboring countries.” But Moscow instead chose to make “loud propaganda” against it.
“It turns out,” he continued, “that the leadership of Georgia is so bad that it decided to easy the life of part of the citizens of Russia living in the North Caucasus. Apparently, the Kremlin isn’t pleased that now residents of our region will not travel to Moscow for visas” from which officials there can make money.
Another Chechen, Ramzan M., said he welcomed the change because his wife has relatives in the Pankisi Gorge and now it will be much easier to visit them. “Of course,” he continued, “we can only greet this decision of the Georgian authorities. They think in the first instance about the interests of simple citizens and not about politics or something else.”
Abubakar, a resident of Grozny, added that he had been in Georgia during Soviet times and retains many friends there. “More than once they have invited me to come for a visit,” but getting a visa which required a trip to Moscow prevented him from doing so. “I hope that now I will be able to visit my friends,” who have already telephoned to ask him to come.
But he said that he is concerned that the Russian authorities, because of their anger at Georgia, will “toughen the rules” for border crossing into Georgia in order to prevent more people from visiting that country. Russian citizens have had to pay bribes to border guards in the past, “now [this requirement] may become still worse.”
Kavkaz-uzel.ru journalists also spoke with residents of the Republic of Adygeya. Most of those with whom they spoke said that “the opening of visa free entrance into Georgia was an incomplete step,” one that should be extended to all citizens of the Russian Federation rather than to only one part.
Timur Khuranov, a resident of Adygeysk, said that he had long wanted to visit Georgia but had been put off by the requirement that he travel to Moscow to get a visa. Now, he had he was “happy that the opportunity to realize his longtime dream had appeared.” Now all he has to do, he said, is “sit in his car and drive.”
Valentina Filatova, a Maikop resident, said that “of course, the removal of excessive limits for entrance into Georgia only brings our countries closer together and makes their residents closer to one another” – especially for those like herself who have “distant relatives” there and now have “a real chance” to visit them.
But others with whom Kavkaz-uzel.ru journalists spoke were more skeptical. “If we can travel to Georgia,” Aydamir Tleuzh, a resident of the Takhtamukaysk district of Adygeya, asked, “then why can’t the residents of Krasnodar who live only 10 kilometers from our village?”
And Alina Kononenko, a resident of Adygeya’s Krasnogvardeysk district, agreed. “I am sure,” she said, “that equal opportunities must be created for everyone. I have acquaintances who have close relatives in Georgia and who live in Kazan. How are things supposed to work for them? Are they worse than we?”
Consequently, Kononenko said, she had to conclude that “this step of the Georgian leadership is an instrument with which [Tbilisi] can ‘split’ Russians into various parts,” an outcome that she implied was totally unacceptable for her and should be for everyone in the region as well.
Window on Eurasia: Russian Olympic Committee Makes a Concession to the Circassians
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 17 – The Russian Olympic Committee supports the inclusion of Circassian themes in the cultural programs at the Sochi Olympics in 2014, a concession to those Circassians who felt Moscow had been planning to ignore them and a transparent effort by Russian officials to derail the efforts of other Circassians who hope to block the Sochi games.
Many Circassians, both the 600,000 in the Russian Federation and the five million living abroad, have been outraged by Moscow’s plans to stage an Olympic games on the site of where their ancestors in 1864 were expelled from the North Caucasus, an action that led to the deaths of several hundred thousand Circassians and that many feel was an act of genocide.
Ever since the International Olympic Committee awarded Moscow the right to hold the Olympics in Sochi, Circassians have been working against that idea, with some demanding that the games be moved from the site of a genocide or cancelled altogether and others insisting only that Moscow acknowledge in some public way the Circassian tragedy.
In March 2010, the State Council of the Adygey Republic adopted an appeal to the Russian Olympic Committee and the president of the Sochi 2014 committee expressing concern about “the possible ignoring in the information and cultural program of the Olympiad of the history and culture of the Circassian people” (www.regnum.ru/news/1336449.html).
The appeal noted that organizers of the Olympics in Sidney in 2000, in Salt Lake City in 2002 and in Vancouver in 2010 had gone out of their way not only to include references to the role of indigenous peoples in the area where the games took place but also to involve representatives of those indigenous populations in Olympic ceremonials.
Yesterday, the press service of the State Council of the Adygey Republic announced that it had received word from the Russian Olympic Committee saying that the ROC “supports the initiative of reflecting the cultural and historical heritage of the Circassians in the context of supporting the cultural program of the XXII Winter Games and the XI Para-Olympiad.”
Moreover, the press service reported, the ROC has sent a telegram to the speaker of the Adygey Parliament “expressing confidence that the leadership of the organizing committee of Sochi 2014 will devote the necessary attention to this subject.” And the press service quoted from a letter to the republic signed by Dmitry Chernyshenko, the president of that committee.
Chernyshenko was quoted as saying that “in the framework of the Cultural Olympiad … a special place will be occupied by the Caucasus Games, a festival of national forms of sport and popular creativity, the goal of which is the strengthening of the inter-cultural and inter-ethnic ties among representatives of the regions of Russia and the states of the Black Sea region.”
Unlike the organizers of the games in Australia, the United States, and Canada, the ROC has not up to now shown much willingness to involve the indigenous population in any way or acknowledge its presence, a sharp contrast to the case of Vancouver where organizers included references to the indigenous peoples in the symbols of the games themselves.
This latest action by the ROC suggests that Moscow is increasingly concerned about the ongoing Circassian campaign against Sochi, especially because that effort is gaining support not only among Circassian communities in Turkey, Jordan, Europe and the United States but also because it is attracting the attention of European politicians and environmental activists.
And Moscow may hope that this concession to the Circassians, one that Russian officials undoubtedly view as a major one, will cause some Circassians and their allies to reconsider their opposition to the Sochi Games, an event that Vladimir Putin has indicated is something he wants to be remembered for.
It is likely that some Circassians will indeed decide to back away from the efforts of others to block the games, but it is also likely that others will conclude that if Moscow is prepared to make this concession on the basis of what they have done so far, the Russian powers that be might make even more if the Circassians push even harder in the coming months.
Staunton, October 17 – The Russian Olympic Committee supports the inclusion of Circassian themes in the cultural programs at the Sochi Olympics in 2014, a concession to those Circassians who felt Moscow had been planning to ignore them and a transparent effort by Russian officials to derail the efforts of other Circassians who hope to block the Sochi games.
Many Circassians, both the 600,000 in the Russian Federation and the five million living abroad, have been outraged by Moscow’s plans to stage an Olympic games on the site of where their ancestors in 1864 were expelled from the North Caucasus, an action that led to the deaths of several hundred thousand Circassians and that many feel was an act of genocide.
Ever since the International Olympic Committee awarded Moscow the right to hold the Olympics in Sochi, Circassians have been working against that idea, with some demanding that the games be moved from the site of a genocide or cancelled altogether and others insisting only that Moscow acknowledge in some public way the Circassian tragedy.
In March 2010, the State Council of the Adygey Republic adopted an appeal to the Russian Olympic Committee and the president of the Sochi 2014 committee expressing concern about “the possible ignoring in the information and cultural program of the Olympiad of the history and culture of the Circassian people” (www.regnum.ru/news/1336449.html).
The appeal noted that organizers of the Olympics in Sidney in 2000, in Salt Lake City in 2002 and in Vancouver in 2010 had gone out of their way not only to include references to the role of indigenous peoples in the area where the games took place but also to involve representatives of those indigenous populations in Olympic ceremonials.
Yesterday, the press service of the State Council of the Adygey Republic announced that it had received word from the Russian Olympic Committee saying that the ROC “supports the initiative of reflecting the cultural and historical heritage of the Circassians in the context of supporting the cultural program of the XXII Winter Games and the XI Para-Olympiad.”
Moreover, the press service reported, the ROC has sent a telegram to the speaker of the Adygey Parliament “expressing confidence that the leadership of the organizing committee of Sochi 2014 will devote the necessary attention to this subject.” And the press service quoted from a letter to the republic signed by Dmitry Chernyshenko, the president of that committee.
Chernyshenko was quoted as saying that “in the framework of the Cultural Olympiad … a special place will be occupied by the Caucasus Games, a festival of national forms of sport and popular creativity, the goal of which is the strengthening of the inter-cultural and inter-ethnic ties among representatives of the regions of Russia and the states of the Black Sea region.”
Unlike the organizers of the games in Australia, the United States, and Canada, the ROC has not up to now shown much willingness to involve the indigenous population in any way or acknowledge its presence, a sharp contrast to the case of Vancouver where organizers included references to the indigenous peoples in the symbols of the games themselves.
This latest action by the ROC suggests that Moscow is increasingly concerned about the ongoing Circassian campaign against Sochi, especially because that effort is gaining support not only among Circassian communities in Turkey, Jordan, Europe and the United States but also because it is attracting the attention of European politicians and environmental activists.
And Moscow may hope that this concession to the Circassians, one that Russian officials undoubtedly view as a major one, will cause some Circassians and their allies to reconsider their opposition to the Sochi Games, an event that Vladimir Putin has indicated is something he wants to be remembered for.
It is likely that some Circassians will indeed decide to back away from the efforts of others to block the games, but it is also likely that others will conclude that if Moscow is prepared to make this concession on the basis of what they have done so far, the Russian powers that be might make even more if the Circassians push even harder in the coming months.
Friday, October 15, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Could ODKB Forces Eventually Be Used Against Russian Protesters?
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – The way in which Moscow is arming and training units assigned to the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty suggests that these forces will be used against domestic opposition groups in the member states – not excluding the Russian Federation, according to some analysts -- rather than exclusively against foreign aggressors.
Col.Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the unified staff of the ODKB (its Russian acronym), said this week that “the international forces subordinate to him soon will begin to receive as armaments water cannon, traumatic pistols, tear gas and noise grenades – all “so-called non-lethal” weapons (svpressa.ru/society/article/32035/).
Up until now, such weapons have generally been used by the police or special services rather than by national armies or international alliances. Obviously, “tank columns are not dispersed by water cannon.” Indeed, most of the units in the ODKB are “motorized rifle battalions, the chief task of which is repulsing a foreign threat.”
The ODKB was set up in 2002 as “a military-political bloc,” and its member states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, agreed last year to form a rapid reaction force, a large segment of which consists of Russian units drawn from the Volga-Urals Military District.
Many both in these countries and internationally viewed the ODKB as an effort by Moscow to create “almost a counterweight to the forces of NATO.” But because the organization did not involve large forces and even more because the ODKB increasingly focused not to the West but to Central Asia, ever fewer people share that view.
But on one aspect of the ODKB, most continued to agree: Its primary focus was about repulsing potential foreign aggressors rather than dealing with internal threats. But now, as a result of events in Kyrgyzstan and the declaration of Nogovitsyn, at least some analysts are shifting their view in that regard.
And that is the case even though Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly said that “the application of ODKB forces is possible only if there is an attack from the outside against one of the states which is a member” of the group. The ODKB agreement, the Russian leader insists, do not allow for anything else.
The events in Kyrgyzstan, however, led many to discuss whether ODKB forces might be used against what were after all domestic opponents of one of the signatory regimes, and “the logic” of the armaments Nogovitsyn says some of the ODKB forces will have suggests that some leaders of the ODKB consider such actions “extremely probable.”
Such views are likely to identify later this month, “Svobodnaya pressa” continues, when ODKB forces are scheduled to conduct a joint exercise using non-lethal force near Chebarkul, a step the organization would not be taking if it did not believe that it needed to develop a capacity to cope with domestic violence in its member states.
Leonid Ivashov, a retired colonel general who heads the Moscow Academy of Geopolitical Problems and a frequent critic of the incumbent Russian government, said that the trend in the ODKB forces was clear: the member states want an international capacity to intervene in the case of domestic violence in any of them.
As a result, he continued, “the appearance of [non-lethal weaponry] in the units of the ODKB, the main part of which consists of [Russian] soldiers and officers] will mean that there has begun a reorientation of army structures toward the struggle with the recent growth in protest attitudes across the post-Soviet space.”
And such attitudes are to be found not only in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, Ivashov noted. “Not everything is peaceful in Russia itself.” There are problems in the Far East and in the North Caucasus, and consequently, this new direction in the weaponry of the ODKB could mean that its forces might someday be deployed in the Russian Federation.
Staunton, October 15 – The way in which Moscow is arming and training units assigned to the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty suggests that these forces will be used against domestic opposition groups in the member states – not excluding the Russian Federation, according to some analysts -- rather than exclusively against foreign aggressors.
Col.Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the unified staff of the ODKB (its Russian acronym), said this week that “the international forces subordinate to him soon will begin to receive as armaments water cannon, traumatic pistols, tear gas and noise grenades – all “so-called non-lethal” weapons (svpressa.ru/society/article/32035/).
Up until now, such weapons have generally been used by the police or special services rather than by national armies or international alliances. Obviously, “tank columns are not dispersed by water cannon.” Indeed, most of the units in the ODKB are “motorized rifle battalions, the chief task of which is repulsing a foreign threat.”
The ODKB was set up in 2002 as “a military-political bloc,” and its member states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, agreed last year to form a rapid reaction force, a large segment of which consists of Russian units drawn from the Volga-Urals Military District.
Many both in these countries and internationally viewed the ODKB as an effort by Moscow to create “almost a counterweight to the forces of NATO.” But because the organization did not involve large forces and even more because the ODKB increasingly focused not to the West but to Central Asia, ever fewer people share that view.
But on one aspect of the ODKB, most continued to agree: Its primary focus was about repulsing potential foreign aggressors rather than dealing with internal threats. But now, as a result of events in Kyrgyzstan and the declaration of Nogovitsyn, at least some analysts are shifting their view in that regard.
And that is the case even though Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly said that “the application of ODKB forces is possible only if there is an attack from the outside against one of the states which is a member” of the group. The ODKB agreement, the Russian leader insists, do not allow for anything else.
The events in Kyrgyzstan, however, led many to discuss whether ODKB forces might be used against what were after all domestic opponents of one of the signatory regimes, and “the logic” of the armaments Nogovitsyn says some of the ODKB forces will have suggests that some leaders of the ODKB consider such actions “extremely probable.”
Such views are likely to identify later this month, “Svobodnaya pressa” continues, when ODKB forces are scheduled to conduct a joint exercise using non-lethal force near Chebarkul, a step the organization would not be taking if it did not believe that it needed to develop a capacity to cope with domestic violence in its member states.
Leonid Ivashov, a retired colonel general who heads the Moscow Academy of Geopolitical Problems and a frequent critic of the incumbent Russian government, said that the trend in the ODKB forces was clear: the member states want an international capacity to intervene in the case of domestic violence in any of them.
As a result, he continued, “the appearance of [non-lethal weaponry] in the units of the ODKB, the main part of which consists of [Russian] soldiers and officers] will mean that there has begun a reorientation of army structures toward the struggle with the recent growth in protest attitudes across the post-Soviet space.”
And such attitudes are to be found not only in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, Ivashov noted. “Not everything is peaceful in Russia itself.” There are problems in the Far East and in the North Caucasus, and consequently, this new direction in the weaponry of the ODKB could mean that its forces might someday be deployed in the Russian Federation.
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