Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – The way in which Moscow is arming and training units assigned to the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty suggests that these forces will be used against domestic opposition groups in the member states – not excluding the Russian Federation, according to some analysts -- rather than exclusively against foreign aggressors.
Col.Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the unified staff of the ODKB (its Russian acronym), said this week that “the international forces subordinate to him soon will begin to receive as armaments water cannon, traumatic pistols, tear gas and noise grenades – all “so-called non-lethal” weapons (svpressa.ru/society/article/32035/).
Up until now, such weapons have generally been used by the police or special services rather than by national armies or international alliances. Obviously, “tank columns are not dispersed by water cannon.” Indeed, most of the units in the ODKB are “motorized rifle battalions, the chief task of which is repulsing a foreign threat.”
The ODKB was set up in 2002 as “a military-political bloc,” and its member states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, agreed last year to form a rapid reaction force, a large segment of which consists of Russian units drawn from the Volga-Urals Military District.
Many both in these countries and internationally viewed the ODKB as an effort by Moscow to create “almost a counterweight to the forces of NATO.” But because the organization did not involve large forces and even more because the ODKB increasingly focused not to the West but to Central Asia, ever fewer people share that view.
But on one aspect of the ODKB, most continued to agree: Its primary focus was about repulsing potential foreign aggressors rather than dealing with internal threats. But now, as a result of events in Kyrgyzstan and the declaration of Nogovitsyn, at least some analysts are shifting their view in that regard.
And that is the case even though Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly said that “the application of ODKB forces is possible only if there is an attack from the outside against one of the states which is a member” of the group. The ODKB agreement, the Russian leader insists, do not allow for anything else.
The events in Kyrgyzstan, however, led many to discuss whether ODKB forces might be used against what were after all domestic opponents of one of the signatory regimes, and “the logic” of the armaments Nogovitsyn says some of the ODKB forces will have suggests that some leaders of the ODKB consider such actions “extremely probable.”
Such views are likely to identify later this month, “Svobodnaya pressa” continues, when ODKB forces are scheduled to conduct a joint exercise using non-lethal force near Chebarkul, a step the organization would not be taking if it did not believe that it needed to develop a capacity to cope with domestic violence in its member states.
Leonid Ivashov, a retired colonel general who heads the Moscow Academy of Geopolitical Problems and a frequent critic of the incumbent Russian government, said that the trend in the ODKB forces was clear: the member states want an international capacity to intervene in the case of domestic violence in any of them.
As a result, he continued, “the appearance of [non-lethal weaponry] in the units of the ODKB, the main part of which consists of [Russian] soldiers and officers] will mean that there has begun a reorientation of army structures toward the struggle with the recent growth in protest attitudes across the post-Soviet space.”
And such attitudes are to be found not only in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, Ivashov noted. “Not everything is peaceful in Russia itself.” There are problems in the Far East and in the North Caucasus, and consequently, this new direction in the weaponry of the ODKB could mean that its forces might someday be deployed in the Russian Federation.
Friday, October 15, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Ashgabat Reaches Out to Turkmens of Iran
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – For the first time since Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, Ashgabat has helped to organize a cultural event for the estimated 1.3 million ethnic Turkmen living across its southern border in Iran, an action that by its very nature represents a challenge to Tehran’s control of the region.
Between September 29 and October 2, Ashgabat helped organize the Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran’s Golestan region. Turkmenistan had wanted to hold this event in Gonbad-e Kavoos, a center of Turkmen culture in Iran, but Tehran insisted that it take place far from that location (en.baybak.com/a-hopeful-step-for-the-turkmensahra-people.azr).
According to the Baybak.com portal, a southern Azerbaijani source, “officials of the Islamic Republic accepted Turkmenistan’s proposal reluctantly,” doing so Baybak.com said, only because of “the political conditions generated by the economic sanctions” and Tehran’s desires not to alienate its neighbors.
Ashgabat took advantage of this situation, Baybak.com continued, to reach out “for the first time since independence” to the more than one million Turkmensahra Turkmens of Iran, a community that has been under intense “political and cultural pressures” from Iranian officials to assimilate.
An indication of Iranian fears about the implications of even this relatively limited event, Baybak.com said, was provided by Tehran’s efforts to limit the impact of the Culture Week. Not only did Tehran insist that the week take place in a location where Persians were a majority, but it packed the sessions with Persians so that Turkmens could not take part.
Moreover, the Iranian side worked hard to block any publicity about this event in order to prevent Turkmensahra Turkmens from knowing about it. That effort was undercut, the Southern Azerbaijani site continues, by reports in the media of Turkmenistan itself and by Internet coverage of the Culture Week itself
In reporting this development, Baybak.com said that it “considers the Turkmenistani President’s attempt to organize a Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran a positive step,” one that “shows that Turkmenistan is ambitious about developing the Turkmen culture. And the Southern Azerbaijani site expressed the hope that Ashgabat will take “bigger steps in the future.”
“We again hope that the Turkmenistani officials would also be sensitive about not only the Turkmens’ right to receive education” in their own language and right to the restoration of lands taken from them but also about “the discriminatory policies” that the Iranian authorities apply against them.
“While the Islamic Republic can easily open publishing houses in Iran and carry out cultural activities,” the Southern Azerbaijani portal said, Turkmenistan needs to recognize that Iranian efforts in this regard will be directed against the ethnic Turkmens and consequently take steps to support that community.
Most of the Turkmens of Iran live along the northern border. Like their co-ethnics to the north, they are Sunni Muslims rather than Shiites like most Persians. In the 20th century, some of them fled north to avoid Iranian pressure and others revolved against the Soviet occupation in 1945 and against the Iranians immediately after that.
Following the Iranian revolution of1979, the Turkmens staged a revolt against Khomeini, a rising that Tehran crushed with extreme violence. As a result, some of Iran’s Turkmens have fled abroad, mostly but not exclusively to Turkey, with a small number even moving into the then-Turkmen SSR.
Over the last 20 years, the Turkmens of Iran have cooperated with ethnic Azerbaijanis in that country, protesting against Iranian policies and suffering from similar repressions of various kinds (en.baybak.com/the-regime-of-the-islamic-republic-has-commenced-to-hand-books-in-order-to-destroy-the-turkmen-culture-in-turkmensahra.azr).
Staunton, October 15 – For the first time since Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, Ashgabat has helped to organize a cultural event for the estimated 1.3 million ethnic Turkmen living across its southern border in Iran, an action that by its very nature represents a challenge to Tehran’s control of the region.
Between September 29 and October 2, Ashgabat helped organize the Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran’s Golestan region. Turkmenistan had wanted to hold this event in Gonbad-e Kavoos, a center of Turkmen culture in Iran, but Tehran insisted that it take place far from that location (en.baybak.com/a-hopeful-step-for-the-turkmensahra-people.azr).
According to the Baybak.com portal, a southern Azerbaijani source, “officials of the Islamic Republic accepted Turkmenistan’s proposal reluctantly,” doing so Baybak.com said, only because of “the political conditions generated by the economic sanctions” and Tehran’s desires not to alienate its neighbors.
Ashgabat took advantage of this situation, Baybak.com continued, to reach out “for the first time since independence” to the more than one million Turkmensahra Turkmens of Iran, a community that has been under intense “political and cultural pressures” from Iranian officials to assimilate.
An indication of Iranian fears about the implications of even this relatively limited event, Baybak.com said, was provided by Tehran’s efforts to limit the impact of the Culture Week. Not only did Tehran insist that the week take place in a location where Persians were a majority, but it packed the sessions with Persians so that Turkmens could not take part.
Moreover, the Iranian side worked hard to block any publicity about this event in order to prevent Turkmensahra Turkmens from knowing about it. That effort was undercut, the Southern Azerbaijani site continues, by reports in the media of Turkmenistan itself and by Internet coverage of the Culture Week itself
In reporting this development, Baybak.com said that it “considers the Turkmenistani President’s attempt to organize a Turkmenistan Culture Week in Iran a positive step,” one that “shows that Turkmenistan is ambitious about developing the Turkmen culture. And the Southern Azerbaijani site expressed the hope that Ashgabat will take “bigger steps in the future.”
“We again hope that the Turkmenistani officials would also be sensitive about not only the Turkmens’ right to receive education” in their own language and right to the restoration of lands taken from them but also about “the discriminatory policies” that the Iranian authorities apply against them.
“While the Islamic Republic can easily open publishing houses in Iran and carry out cultural activities,” the Southern Azerbaijani portal said, Turkmenistan needs to recognize that Iranian efforts in this regard will be directed against the ethnic Turkmens and consequently take steps to support that community.
Most of the Turkmens of Iran live along the northern border. Like their co-ethnics to the north, they are Sunni Muslims rather than Shiites like most Persians. In the 20th century, some of them fled north to avoid Iranian pressure and others revolved against the Soviet occupation in 1945 and against the Iranians immediately after that.
Following the Iranian revolution of1979, the Turkmens staged a revolt against Khomeini, a rising that Tehran crushed with extreme violence. As a result, some of Iran’s Turkmens have fled abroad, mostly but not exclusively to Turkey, with a small number even moving into the then-Turkmen SSR.
Over the last 20 years, the Turkmens of Iran have cooperated with ethnic Azerbaijanis in that country, protesting against Iranian policies and suffering from similar repressions of various kinds (en.baybak.com/the-regime-of-the-islamic-republic-has-commenced-to-hand-books-in-order-to-destroy-the-turkmen-culture-in-turkmensahra.azr).
Window on Eurasia: Russian Commander Appeals to Mufti to Help Restore Order in His Unit
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 15 – A Russian military commander at a base near Perm whose officers have lost control over his troops, in part at least because a quarter of them are Muslims from the North Caucasus who are insubordinate or clash with ethnic Russians, has appealed to a local mufti for assistance in restoring order.
But while some outlets, such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, have played this event up as some kind of “a Muslim revolt” (dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/17623/), the situation in Perm was more complicated and is likely to be more widespread given the increasing share of draftees made up by men from historically Muslim nationalities.
The two reports about what has occurred that provide the most nuanced coverage are an article by Sergey Ishchenko in “Svobodnaya pressa” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32098/) which is based on interviews with the principals involved and a report on a military affairs site (topwar.ru/1789-na-voennoj-baze-razgorelsya-islamskij-bunt.html) drawing on Perm media.
According to Ishchenko, Colonel Dmitry Kuznetsov “was forced to turn to the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Kama Region with a request to help call the faithful to order” after the soldiers from the North Caucasus refused to obey orders to perform certain tasks and formed “micro-collectives” which attacked soldiers of other nationalities.
Kuznetsov told a meeting of the inter-religious council in Perm on Monday that he “would not deny that conflicts are taking place” and that “they arise both on a religious and on a specifically ethno-national basis.” At the same time, he said, “we have done everything that we could do within the limits of the law.”
Prosecutors are currently “working in the unit,” the colonel continued, and “they are investigating the criminal cases. They will punish the guilty but unfortunately, that alone will not resolve the problem completely.” Consequently, he said he was seeking help from the religious authorities generally and Muslim ones in particular.
Khalim Sharafeyev, an advisor to the Perm muftiate for social and economic policy, said that the problems the colonel was describing reflected the fact that the young people “had managed to evade the control of commanders,” do not “recognize any power over themselves,” and permit themselves to violate the rules and sometimes to attack other soldiers.
When challenged about their refusal to carry out some task, he said, the Muslim soldiers sometimes invoke Islamic prohibitions against this or that kind of activity. Commanders often don’t know what Islam requires, and non-Muslims are infuriated by such claims, something that he said that has the result of sparking anti-Islamic attitudes.
Sharafeyev said that the first thing that needed to be done was to study the culture of the young people involved and make sure that officers know what the Koran prohibits and what it does not. Then, “jointly with the command, it is necessary to ‘neutralize the leaders’” and thus direct the energy of the soldiers in a useful way.
And finally, the MSD representative said, “there needs to be mediation, that is, the peaceful resolution of personal conflicts” among soldiers and officers. That too will require joint work by Muslim leaders and Russian officers, and Sharafeyev promised that “we will work on that.”
Military prosecutors, however, suggested that “the situation is not as simple as it may look from the side.” That is because, they say, “at a minimum, “half of the criminal cases” involve “soldiers of Slavic nationality” for a variety of violations of the law including “exceeding the authority of their office.” That reality must be addressed as well.
Yet another perspective was offered by Aleksandra Vlakina, head of the Council of Relatives of Military Personnel in Perm. She suggested that what had taken place was less “a revolt” of Muslim troops than a willingness of Col. Kuznetsov to involve the legal authorities in cases of violence among soldiers rather than seeking to cover them up as many officers do.
She also suggested that many of the problems arose from the way in which commanders treat all soldiers and in the Perm unit from overcrowding in the aging barracks. Blaming nationality or religion may get more attention, she pointed out, but these factors may be less significant than more mundane ones.
However that may be, there have been increasing incidents of clashes between soldiers of traditionally Muslim nationalities and ethnic Russians, and appended to Ishchenko’s article is a list of five major conflicts of that type in the Russian military from December 2006 to August 2010.
Staunton, October 15 – A Russian military commander at a base near Perm whose officers have lost control over his troops, in part at least because a quarter of them are Muslims from the North Caucasus who are insubordinate or clash with ethnic Russians, has appealed to a local mufti for assistance in restoring order.
But while some outlets, such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, have played this event up as some kind of “a Muslim revolt” (dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/17623/), the situation in Perm was more complicated and is likely to be more widespread given the increasing share of draftees made up by men from historically Muslim nationalities.
The two reports about what has occurred that provide the most nuanced coverage are an article by Sergey Ishchenko in “Svobodnaya pressa” (svpressa.ru/society/article/32098/) which is based on interviews with the principals involved and a report on a military affairs site (topwar.ru/1789-na-voennoj-baze-razgorelsya-islamskij-bunt.html) drawing on Perm media.
According to Ishchenko, Colonel Dmitry Kuznetsov “was forced to turn to the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Kama Region with a request to help call the faithful to order” after the soldiers from the North Caucasus refused to obey orders to perform certain tasks and formed “micro-collectives” which attacked soldiers of other nationalities.
Kuznetsov told a meeting of the inter-religious council in Perm on Monday that he “would not deny that conflicts are taking place” and that “they arise both on a religious and on a specifically ethno-national basis.” At the same time, he said, “we have done everything that we could do within the limits of the law.”
Prosecutors are currently “working in the unit,” the colonel continued, and “they are investigating the criminal cases. They will punish the guilty but unfortunately, that alone will not resolve the problem completely.” Consequently, he said he was seeking help from the religious authorities generally and Muslim ones in particular.
Khalim Sharafeyev, an advisor to the Perm muftiate for social and economic policy, said that the problems the colonel was describing reflected the fact that the young people “had managed to evade the control of commanders,” do not “recognize any power over themselves,” and permit themselves to violate the rules and sometimes to attack other soldiers.
When challenged about their refusal to carry out some task, he said, the Muslim soldiers sometimes invoke Islamic prohibitions against this or that kind of activity. Commanders often don’t know what Islam requires, and non-Muslims are infuriated by such claims, something that he said that has the result of sparking anti-Islamic attitudes.
Sharafeyev said that the first thing that needed to be done was to study the culture of the young people involved and make sure that officers know what the Koran prohibits and what it does not. Then, “jointly with the command, it is necessary to ‘neutralize the leaders’” and thus direct the energy of the soldiers in a useful way.
And finally, the MSD representative said, “there needs to be mediation, that is, the peaceful resolution of personal conflicts” among soldiers and officers. That too will require joint work by Muslim leaders and Russian officers, and Sharafeyev promised that “we will work on that.”
Military prosecutors, however, suggested that “the situation is not as simple as it may look from the side.” That is because, they say, “at a minimum, “half of the criminal cases” involve “soldiers of Slavic nationality” for a variety of violations of the law including “exceeding the authority of their office.” That reality must be addressed as well.
Yet another perspective was offered by Aleksandra Vlakina, head of the Council of Relatives of Military Personnel in Perm. She suggested that what had taken place was less “a revolt” of Muslim troops than a willingness of Col. Kuznetsov to involve the legal authorities in cases of violence among soldiers rather than seeking to cover them up as many officers do.
She also suggested that many of the problems arose from the way in which commanders treat all soldiers and in the Perm unit from overcrowding in the aging barracks. Blaming nationality or religion may get more attention, she pointed out, but these factors may be less significant than more mundane ones.
However that may be, there have been increasing incidents of clashes between soldiers of traditionally Muslim nationalities and ethnic Russians, and appended to Ishchenko’s article is a list of five major conflicts of that type in the Russian military from December 2006 to August 2010.
Thursday, October 14, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Stavropol’s Russians Want Their Region Removed from North Caucasus Federal District
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 14 – Russians living in Stavropol kray were not happy when their region was included in the North Caucasus Federal District when that administrative unit was reformed earlier this year, and this week, they have launched an online petition campaign in order to pressure Moscow to shift their land to the Southern Federal District.
Since being posted on the web four days ago, the 220-word appeal has attracted more than 6700 signatures, although a significant fraction of them are not of Stavropol residents but rather Muscovites or at least ethnic Russians from other parts of the Russian Federation (www.rus-obr.ru/days/8164).
According to the appeal, Stavropol residents have suffered in a variety of ways since their predominantly ethnic Russian region was combined with the North Caucasus in this way. The number of non-Russian migrants has increased as have violence – including three terrorist attacks – and crime in general (www.sborgolosov.ru/voiteview.php?voite=147).
In recent months, the appeal begins, “the worst fears of the residents of the kray” concerning the inclusion of Stavropol within the North Caucasus Federal District “have been confirmed.” And as a result, “many people [there now] view [Moscow’s decision to do so] as a territorial division” of Russian territory.
Because of the crime and terrorism that have occurred, the appeal says, Stavropol residents now have “a feeling of fear for their own lives and for the lives of their near ones.” Some who can have voted with their feet, leading to “a still greater outmigration of the ethnic Russian and Christian population from Stavropol kray.”
If that trend continues, the appeal goes on to say, it will “negatively affect the chances of our region to fulfill its main mission over the course of the last centuries to be an advanced post of Russia in the North Caucasus.” Consequently, they say, not only Stavropol residents but all ethnic Russians should sign the appeal and support this drive.
There are two major reasons why Moscow is unlikely to agree. On the one hand, the center included Stavropol kray inside the North Caucasus Federal District precisely in order to reduce the non-Russian share of that district’s population and to ensure the continuing presence of an ethnic Russian anchor population there.
Indeed, many expressed concerns at the time of the reformation of the North Caucasus district (it was part of the original map of federal districts but not set up until much later) that having only non-Russian units in the federal district would both make them more obstreperous and create larger administrative headaches for Moscow.
And on the other, if Moscow changed the borders of the North Caucasus Federal District in response to such an appeal, the center would face demands for changes elsewhere, not only in the existing borders of the eight federal districts but also and more explosively in the existing borders of many of the non-Russian republics across the country.
That would create administrative and political problems the center simply does not want to have or see any way to moderate should they begin. Consequently, and with the hope that the North Caucasus Federal District will allow the Sochi Olympics to take place where and when they are scheduled, Moscow almost certainly will reject this appeal.
But it is significant because now the challenge to Moscow’s arrangements is coming from the ethnic Russians on whom the center has always assumed it can rely rather than just from non-Russians the center has never fully trusted. And that makes this development explosive, just as a parallel one in the RSFSR 20 years ago did for the Soviet Union.
Staunton, October 14 – Russians living in Stavropol kray were not happy when their region was included in the North Caucasus Federal District when that administrative unit was reformed earlier this year, and this week, they have launched an online petition campaign in order to pressure Moscow to shift their land to the Southern Federal District.
Since being posted on the web four days ago, the 220-word appeal has attracted more than 6700 signatures, although a significant fraction of them are not of Stavropol residents but rather Muscovites or at least ethnic Russians from other parts of the Russian Federation (www.rus-obr.ru/days/8164).
According to the appeal, Stavropol residents have suffered in a variety of ways since their predominantly ethnic Russian region was combined with the North Caucasus in this way. The number of non-Russian migrants has increased as have violence – including three terrorist attacks – and crime in general (www.sborgolosov.ru/voiteview.php?voite=147).
In recent months, the appeal begins, “the worst fears of the residents of the kray” concerning the inclusion of Stavropol within the North Caucasus Federal District “have been confirmed.” And as a result, “many people [there now] view [Moscow’s decision to do so] as a territorial division” of Russian territory.
Because of the crime and terrorism that have occurred, the appeal says, Stavropol residents now have “a feeling of fear for their own lives and for the lives of their near ones.” Some who can have voted with their feet, leading to “a still greater outmigration of the ethnic Russian and Christian population from Stavropol kray.”
If that trend continues, the appeal goes on to say, it will “negatively affect the chances of our region to fulfill its main mission over the course of the last centuries to be an advanced post of Russia in the North Caucasus.” Consequently, they say, not only Stavropol residents but all ethnic Russians should sign the appeal and support this drive.
There are two major reasons why Moscow is unlikely to agree. On the one hand, the center included Stavropol kray inside the North Caucasus Federal District precisely in order to reduce the non-Russian share of that district’s population and to ensure the continuing presence of an ethnic Russian anchor population there.
Indeed, many expressed concerns at the time of the reformation of the North Caucasus district (it was part of the original map of federal districts but not set up until much later) that having only non-Russian units in the federal district would both make them more obstreperous and create larger administrative headaches for Moscow.
And on the other, if Moscow changed the borders of the North Caucasus Federal District in response to such an appeal, the center would face demands for changes elsewhere, not only in the existing borders of the eight federal districts but also and more explosively in the existing borders of many of the non-Russian republics across the country.
That would create administrative and political problems the center simply does not want to have or see any way to moderate should they begin. Consequently, and with the hope that the North Caucasus Federal District will allow the Sochi Olympics to take place where and when they are scheduled, Moscow almost certainly will reject this appeal.
But it is significant because now the challenge to Moscow’s arrangements is coming from the ethnic Russians on whom the center has always assumed it can rely rather than just from non-Russians the center has never fully trusted. And that makes this development explosive, just as a parallel one in the RSFSR 20 years ago did for the Soviet Union.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Should Exploit, Not Just Denounce, Tbilisi’s Visa-Free Plan, IMEMO Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 14 – There can be no doubt, a leading Russian specialist on international security says, that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s decision to unilaterally allow visa-free travel to Georgia by residents of the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus represents the latest “provocation” by Tbilisi against the Russian Federation.
But at the same time, Stanislav Ivanov, a senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), argues, this Georgian action will have positive consequences for some Russian Federation citizens and should be used rather than simply denounced to help restore bilateral relations (journal-neo.com/?q=ru/node/2272).
In an article posted online today, Ivanov, who specializes on international security questions, explicitly asked whether the elimination of entry visas to Georgia for residents of the North Caucasus was “a benefit for Russians or the latest provocation of the Georgian authorities,” thus opening the door to a very different discussion of the situation.
Ivanov notes that as of yesterday, the Georgian action means that “citizens of the Russian Federation who are residents of the North Osetia-Alania Republic, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygeya” will be able to enter Georgia for up to 90 days without having first secured a visa.
On the one hand, Georgia’s action was not unprecedented: Special visa regulations for people living in border areas have become the norm in many parts of the world. Such arrangements allow people in these areas to travel across international boundaries without having to go to often distant capitals
But on the one hand, because Tbilisi and Moscow have not had diplomatic relations since the August 2008 war, because Tbilisi introduced this arrangement unilaterally and without consultations, and because the Georgians directed it only at residents of the non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus, Moscow reacted with anger.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Moscow scholar noted, “called this decision of the Georgian authorities ‘the latest propaganda act,’ and the deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District Arkady Yedelyev suggested that what Georgia had done “could be considered not otherwise than as a provocation”
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Aleksandr Torshin, the first vice speaker of the Federation Council, went even further. He told the media that Georgia was seeking to make “simpler contacts of band formations in the North Caucasus with Georgian underground bands and Georgian official policy.”
“Unfortunately,” the IMEMO scholar notes, there have been few reports about how “the residents of the North Caucasus or independent experts” view what Tbilisi has offered. An exception to that, he says, is the deputy editor of “Vremya Novostey,” who was sharply critical of Moscow’s response.
Semyon Novoprudsky pointed out that “unfortunately, in Russia there is always a very poor attitude toward any constructive and reasonable initiatives of those countries which from the point of view of the Russian powers that be are hostile.” Moscow simply never “considers the interests of its own citizens,” and thus it fails to see how they could benefit.
“If one throws off all the rhetoric of officials and tries to analyze in an open fashion the last step of the Georgian authorities,” Ivanov suggests, “then it is possible to make the following, most preliminary assessments and conclusions.”
It is impossible not to agree with the foreign ministry’s assessment that Saakashvili’s action bears “a propagandistic character and is a provocation,” one that by itself will do little to improve bilateral relations especially since it appears to represent a “discriminatory” approach to different categories of Russian citizens
But at the same time, Ivanov continues, statements like those of Torshin “look more emotional than convincing and based in reality.” Whatever the Georgian authorities do, he points out, Russian border guards will be in a position to block the introduction into Russia of illegal bands and weapons.
Moreover, the IMEMO expert continues, “one must recognize that the realization of Saakashvili’s order will be extremely difficult in practice above all from the point of view of documentation.” That is because the residence of any citizen of the Russian Federation is shown only on his or her internal passport and not on the foreign one.
Consequently, someone from one of a North Caucasus republic will have to show not one passport but two, Ivanov says. Nor, he adds, is it clear that anyone will react in any but the most negative way to Georgia’s unilateral proposal for simplified border crossing procedures between South Ossetia and Georgia.
“If, however, the reaction of Moscow to the unilateral action of Tbilisi would be more flexible,” Ivanov says, “and if Russia were to take some kind of steps in response … then everyone would win: the powers that be and the residents of both countries.” Neither capital should forget “about the simple people who live on both sides of the border.”
Despite the obvious “subjective and objective difficulties” in relations between the two countries since the August 2008 war, he continues, “today as never before, it is extremely important to preserve the traditionally friendly relations build up over the centuries between the peoples of Russia and Georgia.”
Moreover, Ivanov says, Moscow doesn’t gain from “passively awaiting” regime change in Georgia. It needs to take the initiative And as a first step, the Russian authorities could at least “respond” with understanding to the possibilities of “trans-border cooperation and questions of humanitarian nature” that the visa-free arrangements could allow.
“Even the most insignificant normalization of Russian-Georgian relations could in the most favorable pay have an impact on the improvement of the general situation in the region and serve as a stimulus to the development of trade and economic relations, to raising the level of national and international security … and to lower terrorist activity in the North Caucasus.”
Staunton, October 14 – There can be no doubt, a leading Russian specialist on international security says, that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s decision to unilaterally allow visa-free travel to Georgia by residents of the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus represents the latest “provocation” by Tbilisi against the Russian Federation.
But at the same time, Stanislav Ivanov, a senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), argues, this Georgian action will have positive consequences for some Russian Federation citizens and should be used rather than simply denounced to help restore bilateral relations (journal-neo.com/?q=ru/node/2272).
In an article posted online today, Ivanov, who specializes on international security questions, explicitly asked whether the elimination of entry visas to Georgia for residents of the North Caucasus was “a benefit for Russians or the latest provocation of the Georgian authorities,” thus opening the door to a very different discussion of the situation.
Ivanov notes that as of yesterday, the Georgian action means that “citizens of the Russian Federation who are residents of the North Osetia-Alania Republic, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygeya” will be able to enter Georgia for up to 90 days without having first secured a visa.
On the one hand, Georgia’s action was not unprecedented: Special visa regulations for people living in border areas have become the norm in many parts of the world. Such arrangements allow people in these areas to travel across international boundaries without having to go to often distant capitals
But on the one hand, because Tbilisi and Moscow have not had diplomatic relations since the August 2008 war, because Tbilisi introduced this arrangement unilaterally and without consultations, and because the Georgians directed it only at residents of the non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus, Moscow reacted with anger.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Moscow scholar noted, “called this decision of the Georgian authorities ‘the latest propaganda act,’ and the deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District Arkady Yedelyev suggested that what Georgia had done “could be considered not otherwise than as a provocation”
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Aleksandr Torshin, the first vice speaker of the Federation Council, went even further. He told the media that Georgia was seeking to make “simpler contacts of band formations in the North Caucasus with Georgian underground bands and Georgian official policy.”
“Unfortunately,” the IMEMO scholar notes, there have been few reports about how “the residents of the North Caucasus or independent experts” view what Tbilisi has offered. An exception to that, he says, is the deputy editor of “Vremya Novostey,” who was sharply critical of Moscow’s response.
Semyon Novoprudsky pointed out that “unfortunately, in Russia there is always a very poor attitude toward any constructive and reasonable initiatives of those countries which from the point of view of the Russian powers that be are hostile.” Moscow simply never “considers the interests of its own citizens,” and thus it fails to see how they could benefit.
“If one throws off all the rhetoric of officials and tries to analyze in an open fashion the last step of the Georgian authorities,” Ivanov suggests, “then it is possible to make the following, most preliminary assessments and conclusions.”
It is impossible not to agree with the foreign ministry’s assessment that Saakashvili’s action bears “a propagandistic character and is a provocation,” one that by itself will do little to improve bilateral relations especially since it appears to represent a “discriminatory” approach to different categories of Russian citizens
But at the same time, Ivanov continues, statements like those of Torshin “look more emotional than convincing and based in reality.” Whatever the Georgian authorities do, he points out, Russian border guards will be in a position to block the introduction into Russia of illegal bands and weapons.
Moreover, the IMEMO expert continues, “one must recognize that the realization of Saakashvili’s order will be extremely difficult in practice above all from the point of view of documentation.” That is because the residence of any citizen of the Russian Federation is shown only on his or her internal passport and not on the foreign one.
Consequently, someone from one of a North Caucasus republic will have to show not one passport but two, Ivanov says. Nor, he adds, is it clear that anyone will react in any but the most negative way to Georgia’s unilateral proposal for simplified border crossing procedures between South Ossetia and Georgia.
“If, however, the reaction of Moscow to the unilateral action of Tbilisi would be more flexible,” Ivanov says, “and if Russia were to take some kind of steps in response … then everyone would win: the powers that be and the residents of both countries.” Neither capital should forget “about the simple people who live on both sides of the border.”
Despite the obvious “subjective and objective difficulties” in relations between the two countries since the August 2008 war, he continues, “today as never before, it is extremely important to preserve the traditionally friendly relations build up over the centuries between the peoples of Russia and Georgia.”
Moreover, Ivanov says, Moscow doesn’t gain from “passively awaiting” regime change in Georgia. It needs to take the initiative And as a first step, the Russian authorities could at least “respond” with understanding to the possibilities of “trans-border cooperation and questions of humanitarian nature” that the visa-free arrangements could allow.
“Even the most insignificant normalization of Russian-Georgian relations could in the most favorable pay have an impact on the improvement of the general situation in the region and serve as a stimulus to the development of trade and economic relations, to raising the level of national and international security … and to lower terrorist activity in the North Caucasus.”
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Tehran May Now Send More Mujahidin to North Caucasus to Support Emirate, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 13 – As Russian-Iranian relations deteriorate and the divisions between jihadists and ethno-nationalists in the North Caucasus resistance deepen, Tehran may provide “massive reinforcements to the detachments of [Caucasus Emir] Doku Umarov, something that could lead to more terrorist violence in the region and across Russia.
In an essay on the “Chastny korrespondent” portal, Denis Kolchin argues that if the Iranian leadership decides to send more “Muslim volunteers” to Russia’s North Caucasus, it will only be continuing a program that it and other jihadist groups abroad have been pursuing for more than a decade (www.chaskor.ru/article/modzhahedy_v_rossii_20436).
Even though Russian forces have managed to kill some of them, Kolchin notes, “foreign Muslim volunteers continue to arrive in the North Caucasus.” And given the deterioration of relations between Russia and Iran, there is a very real threat that “Tehran can provide massive reinforcements of Persian mujahidin Doku Umarov’s detachments.”
Over the last 15 years, he continues, such Muslim fighters have arrived in the North Caucasus from “the Islamic countries of Africa, from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Albania, from the Crimea (Crimean Tatars)” and even from Indian Kashmir, Chinese Uyghuristan and Malaysia.
The most numerous and high profile arrivals came at the time of “the active phases of military operations: in 1995-96 and in 1999-2000,” when many of the arrivals were well-trained military operatives from Jordan and Saudi Arabia and when these mujahidin assumed command positions in the North Caucasus resistance.
As Kolchin points out, “the phenomenon of mujahidism [in its modern form] was born during the period of the Afghan war (1979-1989). At that time, against Soviet forces fought not only representatives of the Afghan peoples but also volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and the Philippines.”
In the early 1980s, there were some 3500 Arab fighters in Afghanistan, and by the middle of that decade there were 18,000 of them in the units subordinate to Gulbeddin Hekmatiar, an indication of just how many people in the Muslim world are interested in such activities and how quickly they can be dispatched to places of conflict.
When Doku Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in 2007, he spoke the language of these mujahidin. “The Caucasus is occupied by the unbelievers and those who have betrayed the faith and is thus part of the Dar ul-Harb or Abode of War, and our immediate task consists in making the Caucasus part of the Dar ul-Islam or Abode of Peace.”
That can be done, Umarov continued, by “establishing shariat on this land and driving out the unbelievers.” After that is achieved, he continued, “we must return to ourselves all the historical lands of the Muslims, and these borders are situated beyond the borders of the Caucasus” – “the program maximum” of his movement, Kolchin says.
That agenda, religious not national, is especially attractive to potential mujahidin from abroad, and they will be dissuaded if and only if Russian forces inflict a decisive defeat of the militants, but the current situation in that region is “very, very far from that.” Consequently, the foreign mujahidin will continue to arrive.
Kolchin devotes most of his article to the origins and careers of four notable foreign mujahidin in the North Caucasus: Amir ibn al-Hattab, Abu al-Walid al-Gamidi, Abu Haf al-Urdani and Haled Yusuf Mohammad al-Elitat. While the first have been eliminated, the last remains active and was reportedly behind the split in the Emirate leadership this past summer.
All these people came from the Arab world, but for the Russian Federation, Kolchin argues, “the experience of Bosnia is more valuable” because “one of the organizers and sponsors of Muslim resistance there, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, was Iran,” whose “Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution” helped train and lead Muslim units there.
“Today,” Kolchin concludes, “there is a definite risk that Russia may partially fall into a situation like Yugoslavia.” Relations with Iran have deteriorated, and Tehran is likely to response by dispatching “unofficial representatives” of the Corps of Guardians to the North Caucasus to strengthen the Islamist resistance.
Iran can do that through the already “tested” corridor through Azerbaijan. Baku has killed some of the people passing through that corridor, Kolchin says, but the widely reported “death of these persons in no way means that the project of transit through Azerbaijan has been closed.” Consequently, for Russia, “the jihad is continuing.”
Staunton, October 13 – As Russian-Iranian relations deteriorate and the divisions between jihadists and ethno-nationalists in the North Caucasus resistance deepen, Tehran may provide “massive reinforcements to the detachments of [Caucasus Emir] Doku Umarov, something that could lead to more terrorist violence in the region and across Russia.
In an essay on the “Chastny korrespondent” portal, Denis Kolchin argues that if the Iranian leadership decides to send more “Muslim volunteers” to Russia’s North Caucasus, it will only be continuing a program that it and other jihadist groups abroad have been pursuing for more than a decade (www.chaskor.ru/article/modzhahedy_v_rossii_20436).
Even though Russian forces have managed to kill some of them, Kolchin notes, “foreign Muslim volunteers continue to arrive in the North Caucasus.” And given the deterioration of relations between Russia and Iran, there is a very real threat that “Tehran can provide massive reinforcements of Persian mujahidin Doku Umarov’s detachments.”
Over the last 15 years, he continues, such Muslim fighters have arrived in the North Caucasus from “the Islamic countries of Africa, from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Albania, from the Crimea (Crimean Tatars)” and even from Indian Kashmir, Chinese Uyghuristan and Malaysia.
The most numerous and high profile arrivals came at the time of “the active phases of military operations: in 1995-96 and in 1999-2000,” when many of the arrivals were well-trained military operatives from Jordan and Saudi Arabia and when these mujahidin assumed command positions in the North Caucasus resistance.
As Kolchin points out, “the phenomenon of mujahidism [in its modern form] was born during the period of the Afghan war (1979-1989). At that time, against Soviet forces fought not only representatives of the Afghan peoples but also volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and the Philippines.”
In the early 1980s, there were some 3500 Arab fighters in Afghanistan, and by the middle of that decade there were 18,000 of them in the units subordinate to Gulbeddin Hekmatiar, an indication of just how many people in the Muslim world are interested in such activities and how quickly they can be dispatched to places of conflict.
When Doku Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in 2007, he spoke the language of these mujahidin. “The Caucasus is occupied by the unbelievers and those who have betrayed the faith and is thus part of the Dar ul-Harb or Abode of War, and our immediate task consists in making the Caucasus part of the Dar ul-Islam or Abode of Peace.”
That can be done, Umarov continued, by “establishing shariat on this land and driving out the unbelievers.” After that is achieved, he continued, “we must return to ourselves all the historical lands of the Muslims, and these borders are situated beyond the borders of the Caucasus” – “the program maximum” of his movement, Kolchin says.
That agenda, religious not national, is especially attractive to potential mujahidin from abroad, and they will be dissuaded if and only if Russian forces inflict a decisive defeat of the militants, but the current situation in that region is “very, very far from that.” Consequently, the foreign mujahidin will continue to arrive.
Kolchin devotes most of his article to the origins and careers of four notable foreign mujahidin in the North Caucasus: Amir ibn al-Hattab, Abu al-Walid al-Gamidi, Abu Haf al-Urdani and Haled Yusuf Mohammad al-Elitat. While the first have been eliminated, the last remains active and was reportedly behind the split in the Emirate leadership this past summer.
All these people came from the Arab world, but for the Russian Federation, Kolchin argues, “the experience of Bosnia is more valuable” because “one of the organizers and sponsors of Muslim resistance there, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, was Iran,” whose “Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution” helped train and lead Muslim units there.
“Today,” Kolchin concludes, “there is a definite risk that Russia may partially fall into a situation like Yugoslavia.” Relations with Iran have deteriorated, and Tehran is likely to response by dispatching “unofficial representatives” of the Corps of Guardians to the North Caucasus to strengthen the Islamist resistance.
Iran can do that through the already “tested” corridor through Azerbaijan. Baku has killed some of the people passing through that corridor, Kolchin says, but the widely reported “death of these persons in no way means that the project of transit through Azerbaijan has been closed.” Consequently, for Russia, “the jihad is continuing.”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow City Will Remain a Foreign Policy Player, Russian Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 13 – Even though President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin want a manager rather than a politician as mayor of the Russian capital, the incoming Moscow chief will continue to play a major foreign policy role, albeit one not as “extravagant” as that of former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, according to a Russian analyst.
Luzhkov was by turn famous and infamous, Moscow State University expert Aleksandr Karavayev says, for his foreign policy pronouncements, including his calls for Siberian river diversion to Central Asia and the restoration of Russian control of the Crimea. And the current tandem does not want to see his replacement making such declarations.
But Karavayev, a specialist on the former Soviet space, points out, Moscow’s new mayor by virtue of the importance of the Russian capital not only for the Russian Federation but for all the post-Soviet states as well as for many foreign investors will continue to have a major foreign policy role to play (www.politcom.ru/10870.html).
Given the requirement that the new mayor conform to current political realities and adopt “a Medvedev-style” approach, few have focused on this aspect of the work of the future mayor, Karavayev notes, but Moscow centrality, its role as “not simply the capital” but “the first and main display case” of Russia, means that this aspect of the new incumbent will be important.
Moreover, the Moscow State specialist continues, there is every reason to think that the importance of the capital is only going to increase, something that means the new mayor will need to be able to carry out this foreign policy task efficiently and effectively and in this way be the implementer of the city’s own distinctive foreign policy.
The new mayor will not be able to make the kind of “extravagant” foreign policy statements that characterized the Luzhkov period, although it should be remembered, Karavayev notes, that Luzhkov’s remarks were “not only” a reflection of his views but “an essential addition to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.”
Consequently, the new mayor may very well fulfill a similar niche in Moscow’s approach, but “under the present conditions of the high capitalization of the Moscow economy,” Karavayev argues, “there are other foreign policy tasks [that need to be performed] in any case, stylistically.”
“The exotic views of the charismatic mayor will now recede, but the very theme of the support [“sheftstvo”] of Moscow over a number of regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States apparently will remain.” Moreover, the new mayor will play a major role in attracting and distributing foreign investments by virtue of its relative size and international importance.
Moreover, Karavayev continues, “the CIS capitals will follow carefully how Moscow reso0lves its transportation and social-economic problems and how its organizers its city economy,” and they will especially track how Moscow deals with “legal illegal migration,” given that Moscow is “the capital” of both in the CIS.
And at the same time, “in Moscow are concentrated all Russian problems of inter-ethnic relations” and it is in the Russian capital that “the ability to resolve in an adequate fashion the problem of communications between those coming from the depressed regions of the Russian Caucasus and indigenous Muscovites” is being tested.
As a result, what the new Moscow mayor says and does on all these issues will have foreign policy consequences, Karavayev says. And that will be true even if – and perhaps especially if – the central powers that be deny to themselves that the incoming head of this special federal subject will play that role.
Staunton, October 13 – Even though President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin want a manager rather than a politician as mayor of the Russian capital, the incoming Moscow chief will continue to play a major foreign policy role, albeit one not as “extravagant” as that of former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, according to a Russian analyst.
Luzhkov was by turn famous and infamous, Moscow State University expert Aleksandr Karavayev says, for his foreign policy pronouncements, including his calls for Siberian river diversion to Central Asia and the restoration of Russian control of the Crimea. And the current tandem does not want to see his replacement making such declarations.
But Karavayev, a specialist on the former Soviet space, points out, Moscow’s new mayor by virtue of the importance of the Russian capital not only for the Russian Federation but for all the post-Soviet states as well as for many foreign investors will continue to have a major foreign policy role to play (www.politcom.ru/10870.html).
Given the requirement that the new mayor conform to current political realities and adopt “a Medvedev-style” approach, few have focused on this aspect of the work of the future mayor, Karavayev notes, but Moscow centrality, its role as “not simply the capital” but “the first and main display case” of Russia, means that this aspect of the new incumbent will be important.
Moreover, the Moscow State specialist continues, there is every reason to think that the importance of the capital is only going to increase, something that means the new mayor will need to be able to carry out this foreign policy task efficiently and effectively and in this way be the implementer of the city’s own distinctive foreign policy.
The new mayor will not be able to make the kind of “extravagant” foreign policy statements that characterized the Luzhkov period, although it should be remembered, Karavayev notes, that Luzhkov’s remarks were “not only” a reflection of his views but “an essential addition to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.”
Consequently, the new mayor may very well fulfill a similar niche in Moscow’s approach, but “under the present conditions of the high capitalization of the Moscow economy,” Karavayev argues, “there are other foreign policy tasks [that need to be performed] in any case, stylistically.”
“The exotic views of the charismatic mayor will now recede, but the very theme of the support [“sheftstvo”] of Moscow over a number of regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States apparently will remain.” Moreover, the new mayor will play a major role in attracting and distributing foreign investments by virtue of its relative size and international importance.
Moreover, Karavayev continues, “the CIS capitals will follow carefully how Moscow reso0lves its transportation and social-economic problems and how its organizers its city economy,” and they will especially track how Moscow deals with “legal illegal migration,” given that Moscow is “the capital” of both in the CIS.
And at the same time, “in Moscow are concentrated all Russian problems of inter-ethnic relations” and it is in the Russian capital that “the ability to resolve in an adequate fashion the problem of communications between those coming from the depressed regions of the Russian Caucasus and indigenous Muscovites” is being tested.
As a result, what the new Moscow mayor says and does on all these issues will have foreign policy consequences, Karavayev says. And that will be true even if – and perhaps especially if – the central powers that be deny to themselves that the incoming head of this special federal subject will play that role.
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