Paul Goble
Staunton, October 14 – Russians living in Stavropol kray were not happy when their region was included in the North Caucasus Federal District when that administrative unit was reformed earlier this year, and this week, they have launched an online petition campaign in order to pressure Moscow to shift their land to the Southern Federal District.
Since being posted on the web four days ago, the 220-word appeal has attracted more than 6700 signatures, although a significant fraction of them are not of Stavropol residents but rather Muscovites or at least ethnic Russians from other parts of the Russian Federation (www.rus-obr.ru/days/8164).
According to the appeal, Stavropol residents have suffered in a variety of ways since their predominantly ethnic Russian region was combined with the North Caucasus in this way. The number of non-Russian migrants has increased as have violence – including three terrorist attacks – and crime in general (www.sborgolosov.ru/voiteview.php?voite=147).
In recent months, the appeal begins, “the worst fears of the residents of the kray” concerning the inclusion of Stavropol within the North Caucasus Federal District “have been confirmed.” And as a result, “many people [there now] view [Moscow’s decision to do so] as a territorial division” of Russian territory.
Because of the crime and terrorism that have occurred, the appeal says, Stavropol residents now have “a feeling of fear for their own lives and for the lives of their near ones.” Some who can have voted with their feet, leading to “a still greater outmigration of the ethnic Russian and Christian population from Stavropol kray.”
If that trend continues, the appeal goes on to say, it will “negatively affect the chances of our region to fulfill its main mission over the course of the last centuries to be an advanced post of Russia in the North Caucasus.” Consequently, they say, not only Stavropol residents but all ethnic Russians should sign the appeal and support this drive.
There are two major reasons why Moscow is unlikely to agree. On the one hand, the center included Stavropol kray inside the North Caucasus Federal District precisely in order to reduce the non-Russian share of that district’s population and to ensure the continuing presence of an ethnic Russian anchor population there.
Indeed, many expressed concerns at the time of the reformation of the North Caucasus district (it was part of the original map of federal districts but not set up until much later) that having only non-Russian units in the federal district would both make them more obstreperous and create larger administrative headaches for Moscow.
And on the other, if Moscow changed the borders of the North Caucasus Federal District in response to such an appeal, the center would face demands for changes elsewhere, not only in the existing borders of the eight federal districts but also and more explosively in the existing borders of many of the non-Russian republics across the country.
That would create administrative and political problems the center simply does not want to have or see any way to moderate should they begin. Consequently, and with the hope that the North Caucasus Federal District will allow the Sochi Olympics to take place where and when they are scheduled, Moscow almost certainly will reject this appeal.
But it is significant because now the challenge to Moscow’s arrangements is coming from the ethnic Russians on whom the center has always assumed it can rely rather than just from non-Russians the center has never fully trusted. And that makes this development explosive, just as a parallel one in the RSFSR 20 years ago did for the Soviet Union.
Thursday, October 14, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Should Exploit, Not Just Denounce, Tbilisi’s Visa-Free Plan, IMEMO Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 14 – There can be no doubt, a leading Russian specialist on international security says, that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s decision to unilaterally allow visa-free travel to Georgia by residents of the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus represents the latest “provocation” by Tbilisi against the Russian Federation.
But at the same time, Stanislav Ivanov, a senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), argues, this Georgian action will have positive consequences for some Russian Federation citizens and should be used rather than simply denounced to help restore bilateral relations (journal-neo.com/?q=ru/node/2272).
In an article posted online today, Ivanov, who specializes on international security questions, explicitly asked whether the elimination of entry visas to Georgia for residents of the North Caucasus was “a benefit for Russians or the latest provocation of the Georgian authorities,” thus opening the door to a very different discussion of the situation.
Ivanov notes that as of yesterday, the Georgian action means that “citizens of the Russian Federation who are residents of the North Osetia-Alania Republic, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygeya” will be able to enter Georgia for up to 90 days without having first secured a visa.
On the one hand, Georgia’s action was not unprecedented: Special visa regulations for people living in border areas have become the norm in many parts of the world. Such arrangements allow people in these areas to travel across international boundaries without having to go to often distant capitals
But on the one hand, because Tbilisi and Moscow have not had diplomatic relations since the August 2008 war, because Tbilisi introduced this arrangement unilaterally and without consultations, and because the Georgians directed it only at residents of the non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus, Moscow reacted with anger.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Moscow scholar noted, “called this decision of the Georgian authorities ‘the latest propaganda act,’ and the deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District Arkady Yedelyev suggested that what Georgia had done “could be considered not otherwise than as a provocation”
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Aleksandr Torshin, the first vice speaker of the Federation Council, went even further. He told the media that Georgia was seeking to make “simpler contacts of band formations in the North Caucasus with Georgian underground bands and Georgian official policy.”
“Unfortunately,” the IMEMO scholar notes, there have been few reports about how “the residents of the North Caucasus or independent experts” view what Tbilisi has offered. An exception to that, he says, is the deputy editor of “Vremya Novostey,” who was sharply critical of Moscow’s response.
Semyon Novoprudsky pointed out that “unfortunately, in Russia there is always a very poor attitude toward any constructive and reasonable initiatives of those countries which from the point of view of the Russian powers that be are hostile.” Moscow simply never “considers the interests of its own citizens,” and thus it fails to see how they could benefit.
“If one throws off all the rhetoric of officials and tries to analyze in an open fashion the last step of the Georgian authorities,” Ivanov suggests, “then it is possible to make the following, most preliminary assessments and conclusions.”
It is impossible not to agree with the foreign ministry’s assessment that Saakashvili’s action bears “a propagandistic character and is a provocation,” one that by itself will do little to improve bilateral relations especially since it appears to represent a “discriminatory” approach to different categories of Russian citizens
But at the same time, Ivanov continues, statements like those of Torshin “look more emotional than convincing and based in reality.” Whatever the Georgian authorities do, he points out, Russian border guards will be in a position to block the introduction into Russia of illegal bands and weapons.
Moreover, the IMEMO expert continues, “one must recognize that the realization of Saakashvili’s order will be extremely difficult in practice above all from the point of view of documentation.” That is because the residence of any citizen of the Russian Federation is shown only on his or her internal passport and not on the foreign one.
Consequently, someone from one of a North Caucasus republic will have to show not one passport but two, Ivanov says. Nor, he adds, is it clear that anyone will react in any but the most negative way to Georgia’s unilateral proposal for simplified border crossing procedures between South Ossetia and Georgia.
“If, however, the reaction of Moscow to the unilateral action of Tbilisi would be more flexible,” Ivanov says, “and if Russia were to take some kind of steps in response … then everyone would win: the powers that be and the residents of both countries.” Neither capital should forget “about the simple people who live on both sides of the border.”
Despite the obvious “subjective and objective difficulties” in relations between the two countries since the August 2008 war, he continues, “today as never before, it is extremely important to preserve the traditionally friendly relations build up over the centuries between the peoples of Russia and Georgia.”
Moreover, Ivanov says, Moscow doesn’t gain from “passively awaiting” regime change in Georgia. It needs to take the initiative And as a first step, the Russian authorities could at least “respond” with understanding to the possibilities of “trans-border cooperation and questions of humanitarian nature” that the visa-free arrangements could allow.
“Even the most insignificant normalization of Russian-Georgian relations could in the most favorable pay have an impact on the improvement of the general situation in the region and serve as a stimulus to the development of trade and economic relations, to raising the level of national and international security … and to lower terrorist activity in the North Caucasus.”
Staunton, October 14 – There can be no doubt, a leading Russian specialist on international security says, that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s decision to unilaterally allow visa-free travel to Georgia by residents of the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus represents the latest “provocation” by Tbilisi against the Russian Federation.
But at the same time, Stanislav Ivanov, a senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), argues, this Georgian action will have positive consequences for some Russian Federation citizens and should be used rather than simply denounced to help restore bilateral relations (journal-neo.com/?q=ru/node/2272).
In an article posted online today, Ivanov, who specializes on international security questions, explicitly asked whether the elimination of entry visas to Georgia for residents of the North Caucasus was “a benefit for Russians or the latest provocation of the Georgian authorities,” thus opening the door to a very different discussion of the situation.
Ivanov notes that as of yesterday, the Georgian action means that “citizens of the Russian Federation who are residents of the North Osetia-Alania Republic, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygeya” will be able to enter Georgia for up to 90 days without having first secured a visa.
On the one hand, Georgia’s action was not unprecedented: Special visa regulations for people living in border areas have become the norm in many parts of the world. Such arrangements allow people in these areas to travel across international boundaries without having to go to often distant capitals
But on the one hand, because Tbilisi and Moscow have not had diplomatic relations since the August 2008 war, because Tbilisi introduced this arrangement unilaterally and without consultations, and because the Georgians directed it only at residents of the non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus, Moscow reacted with anger.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Moscow scholar noted, “called this decision of the Georgian authorities ‘the latest propaganda act,’ and the deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District Arkady Yedelyev suggested that what Georgia had done “could be considered not otherwise than as a provocation”
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Aleksandr Torshin, the first vice speaker of the Federation Council, went even further. He told the media that Georgia was seeking to make “simpler contacts of band formations in the North Caucasus with Georgian underground bands and Georgian official policy.”
“Unfortunately,” the IMEMO scholar notes, there have been few reports about how “the residents of the North Caucasus or independent experts” view what Tbilisi has offered. An exception to that, he says, is the deputy editor of “Vremya Novostey,” who was sharply critical of Moscow’s response.
Semyon Novoprudsky pointed out that “unfortunately, in Russia there is always a very poor attitude toward any constructive and reasonable initiatives of those countries which from the point of view of the Russian powers that be are hostile.” Moscow simply never “considers the interests of its own citizens,” and thus it fails to see how they could benefit.
“If one throws off all the rhetoric of officials and tries to analyze in an open fashion the last step of the Georgian authorities,” Ivanov suggests, “then it is possible to make the following, most preliminary assessments and conclusions.”
It is impossible not to agree with the foreign ministry’s assessment that Saakashvili’s action bears “a propagandistic character and is a provocation,” one that by itself will do little to improve bilateral relations especially since it appears to represent a “discriminatory” approach to different categories of Russian citizens
But at the same time, Ivanov continues, statements like those of Torshin “look more emotional than convincing and based in reality.” Whatever the Georgian authorities do, he points out, Russian border guards will be in a position to block the introduction into Russia of illegal bands and weapons.
Moreover, the IMEMO expert continues, “one must recognize that the realization of Saakashvili’s order will be extremely difficult in practice above all from the point of view of documentation.” That is because the residence of any citizen of the Russian Federation is shown only on his or her internal passport and not on the foreign one.
Consequently, someone from one of a North Caucasus republic will have to show not one passport but two, Ivanov says. Nor, he adds, is it clear that anyone will react in any but the most negative way to Georgia’s unilateral proposal for simplified border crossing procedures between South Ossetia and Georgia.
“If, however, the reaction of Moscow to the unilateral action of Tbilisi would be more flexible,” Ivanov says, “and if Russia were to take some kind of steps in response … then everyone would win: the powers that be and the residents of both countries.” Neither capital should forget “about the simple people who live on both sides of the border.”
Despite the obvious “subjective and objective difficulties” in relations between the two countries since the August 2008 war, he continues, “today as never before, it is extremely important to preserve the traditionally friendly relations build up over the centuries between the peoples of Russia and Georgia.”
Moreover, Ivanov says, Moscow doesn’t gain from “passively awaiting” regime change in Georgia. It needs to take the initiative And as a first step, the Russian authorities could at least “respond” with understanding to the possibilities of “trans-border cooperation and questions of humanitarian nature” that the visa-free arrangements could allow.
“Even the most insignificant normalization of Russian-Georgian relations could in the most favorable pay have an impact on the improvement of the general situation in the region and serve as a stimulus to the development of trade and economic relations, to raising the level of national and international security … and to lower terrorist activity in the North Caucasus.”
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Tehran May Now Send More Mujahidin to North Caucasus to Support Emirate, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 13 – As Russian-Iranian relations deteriorate and the divisions between jihadists and ethno-nationalists in the North Caucasus resistance deepen, Tehran may provide “massive reinforcements to the detachments of [Caucasus Emir] Doku Umarov, something that could lead to more terrorist violence in the region and across Russia.
In an essay on the “Chastny korrespondent” portal, Denis Kolchin argues that if the Iranian leadership decides to send more “Muslim volunteers” to Russia’s North Caucasus, it will only be continuing a program that it and other jihadist groups abroad have been pursuing for more than a decade (www.chaskor.ru/article/modzhahedy_v_rossii_20436).
Even though Russian forces have managed to kill some of them, Kolchin notes, “foreign Muslim volunteers continue to arrive in the North Caucasus.” And given the deterioration of relations between Russia and Iran, there is a very real threat that “Tehran can provide massive reinforcements of Persian mujahidin Doku Umarov’s detachments.”
Over the last 15 years, he continues, such Muslim fighters have arrived in the North Caucasus from “the Islamic countries of Africa, from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Albania, from the Crimea (Crimean Tatars)” and even from Indian Kashmir, Chinese Uyghuristan and Malaysia.
The most numerous and high profile arrivals came at the time of “the active phases of military operations: in 1995-96 and in 1999-2000,” when many of the arrivals were well-trained military operatives from Jordan and Saudi Arabia and when these mujahidin assumed command positions in the North Caucasus resistance.
As Kolchin points out, “the phenomenon of mujahidism [in its modern form] was born during the period of the Afghan war (1979-1989). At that time, against Soviet forces fought not only representatives of the Afghan peoples but also volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and the Philippines.”
In the early 1980s, there were some 3500 Arab fighters in Afghanistan, and by the middle of that decade there were 18,000 of them in the units subordinate to Gulbeddin Hekmatiar, an indication of just how many people in the Muslim world are interested in such activities and how quickly they can be dispatched to places of conflict.
When Doku Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in 2007, he spoke the language of these mujahidin. “The Caucasus is occupied by the unbelievers and those who have betrayed the faith and is thus part of the Dar ul-Harb or Abode of War, and our immediate task consists in making the Caucasus part of the Dar ul-Islam or Abode of Peace.”
That can be done, Umarov continued, by “establishing shariat on this land and driving out the unbelievers.” After that is achieved, he continued, “we must return to ourselves all the historical lands of the Muslims, and these borders are situated beyond the borders of the Caucasus” – “the program maximum” of his movement, Kolchin says.
That agenda, religious not national, is especially attractive to potential mujahidin from abroad, and they will be dissuaded if and only if Russian forces inflict a decisive defeat of the militants, but the current situation in that region is “very, very far from that.” Consequently, the foreign mujahidin will continue to arrive.
Kolchin devotes most of his article to the origins and careers of four notable foreign mujahidin in the North Caucasus: Amir ibn al-Hattab, Abu al-Walid al-Gamidi, Abu Haf al-Urdani and Haled Yusuf Mohammad al-Elitat. While the first have been eliminated, the last remains active and was reportedly behind the split in the Emirate leadership this past summer.
All these people came from the Arab world, but for the Russian Federation, Kolchin argues, “the experience of Bosnia is more valuable” because “one of the organizers and sponsors of Muslim resistance there, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, was Iran,” whose “Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution” helped train and lead Muslim units there.
“Today,” Kolchin concludes, “there is a definite risk that Russia may partially fall into a situation like Yugoslavia.” Relations with Iran have deteriorated, and Tehran is likely to response by dispatching “unofficial representatives” of the Corps of Guardians to the North Caucasus to strengthen the Islamist resistance.
Iran can do that through the already “tested” corridor through Azerbaijan. Baku has killed some of the people passing through that corridor, Kolchin says, but the widely reported “death of these persons in no way means that the project of transit through Azerbaijan has been closed.” Consequently, for Russia, “the jihad is continuing.”
Staunton, October 13 – As Russian-Iranian relations deteriorate and the divisions between jihadists and ethno-nationalists in the North Caucasus resistance deepen, Tehran may provide “massive reinforcements to the detachments of [Caucasus Emir] Doku Umarov, something that could lead to more terrorist violence in the region and across Russia.
In an essay on the “Chastny korrespondent” portal, Denis Kolchin argues that if the Iranian leadership decides to send more “Muslim volunteers” to Russia’s North Caucasus, it will only be continuing a program that it and other jihadist groups abroad have been pursuing for more than a decade (www.chaskor.ru/article/modzhahedy_v_rossii_20436).
Even though Russian forces have managed to kill some of them, Kolchin notes, “foreign Muslim volunteers continue to arrive in the North Caucasus.” And given the deterioration of relations between Russia and Iran, there is a very real threat that “Tehran can provide massive reinforcements of Persian mujahidin Doku Umarov’s detachments.”
Over the last 15 years, he continues, such Muslim fighters have arrived in the North Caucasus from “the Islamic countries of Africa, from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Albania, from the Crimea (Crimean Tatars)” and even from Indian Kashmir, Chinese Uyghuristan and Malaysia.
The most numerous and high profile arrivals came at the time of “the active phases of military operations: in 1995-96 and in 1999-2000,” when many of the arrivals were well-trained military operatives from Jordan and Saudi Arabia and when these mujahidin assumed command positions in the North Caucasus resistance.
As Kolchin points out, “the phenomenon of mujahidism [in its modern form] was born during the period of the Afghan war (1979-1989). At that time, against Soviet forces fought not only representatives of the Afghan peoples but also volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and the Philippines.”
In the early 1980s, there were some 3500 Arab fighters in Afghanistan, and by the middle of that decade there were 18,000 of them in the units subordinate to Gulbeddin Hekmatiar, an indication of just how many people in the Muslim world are interested in such activities and how quickly they can be dispatched to places of conflict.
When Doku Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in 2007, he spoke the language of these mujahidin. “The Caucasus is occupied by the unbelievers and those who have betrayed the faith and is thus part of the Dar ul-Harb or Abode of War, and our immediate task consists in making the Caucasus part of the Dar ul-Islam or Abode of Peace.”
That can be done, Umarov continued, by “establishing shariat on this land and driving out the unbelievers.” After that is achieved, he continued, “we must return to ourselves all the historical lands of the Muslims, and these borders are situated beyond the borders of the Caucasus” – “the program maximum” of his movement, Kolchin says.
That agenda, religious not national, is especially attractive to potential mujahidin from abroad, and they will be dissuaded if and only if Russian forces inflict a decisive defeat of the militants, but the current situation in that region is “very, very far from that.” Consequently, the foreign mujahidin will continue to arrive.
Kolchin devotes most of his article to the origins and careers of four notable foreign mujahidin in the North Caucasus: Amir ibn al-Hattab, Abu al-Walid al-Gamidi, Abu Haf al-Urdani and Haled Yusuf Mohammad al-Elitat. While the first have been eliminated, the last remains active and was reportedly behind the split in the Emirate leadership this past summer.
All these people came from the Arab world, but for the Russian Federation, Kolchin argues, “the experience of Bosnia is more valuable” because “one of the organizers and sponsors of Muslim resistance there, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, was Iran,” whose “Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution” helped train and lead Muslim units there.
“Today,” Kolchin concludes, “there is a definite risk that Russia may partially fall into a situation like Yugoslavia.” Relations with Iran have deteriorated, and Tehran is likely to response by dispatching “unofficial representatives” of the Corps of Guardians to the North Caucasus to strengthen the Islamist resistance.
Iran can do that through the already “tested” corridor through Azerbaijan. Baku has killed some of the people passing through that corridor, Kolchin says, but the widely reported “death of these persons in no way means that the project of transit through Azerbaijan has been closed.” Consequently, for Russia, “the jihad is continuing.”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow City Will Remain a Foreign Policy Player, Russian Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 13 – Even though President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin want a manager rather than a politician as mayor of the Russian capital, the incoming Moscow chief will continue to play a major foreign policy role, albeit one not as “extravagant” as that of former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, according to a Russian analyst.
Luzhkov was by turn famous and infamous, Moscow State University expert Aleksandr Karavayev says, for his foreign policy pronouncements, including his calls for Siberian river diversion to Central Asia and the restoration of Russian control of the Crimea. And the current tandem does not want to see his replacement making such declarations.
But Karavayev, a specialist on the former Soviet space, points out, Moscow’s new mayor by virtue of the importance of the Russian capital not only for the Russian Federation but for all the post-Soviet states as well as for many foreign investors will continue to have a major foreign policy role to play (www.politcom.ru/10870.html).
Given the requirement that the new mayor conform to current political realities and adopt “a Medvedev-style” approach, few have focused on this aspect of the work of the future mayor, Karavayev notes, but Moscow centrality, its role as “not simply the capital” but “the first and main display case” of Russia, means that this aspect of the new incumbent will be important.
Moreover, the Moscow State specialist continues, there is every reason to think that the importance of the capital is only going to increase, something that means the new mayor will need to be able to carry out this foreign policy task efficiently and effectively and in this way be the implementer of the city’s own distinctive foreign policy.
The new mayor will not be able to make the kind of “extravagant” foreign policy statements that characterized the Luzhkov period, although it should be remembered, Karavayev notes, that Luzhkov’s remarks were “not only” a reflection of his views but “an essential addition to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.”
Consequently, the new mayor may very well fulfill a similar niche in Moscow’s approach, but “under the present conditions of the high capitalization of the Moscow economy,” Karavayev argues, “there are other foreign policy tasks [that need to be performed] in any case, stylistically.”
“The exotic views of the charismatic mayor will now recede, but the very theme of the support [“sheftstvo”] of Moscow over a number of regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States apparently will remain.” Moreover, the new mayor will play a major role in attracting and distributing foreign investments by virtue of its relative size and international importance.
Moreover, Karavayev continues, “the CIS capitals will follow carefully how Moscow reso0lves its transportation and social-economic problems and how its organizers its city economy,” and they will especially track how Moscow deals with “legal illegal migration,” given that Moscow is “the capital” of both in the CIS.
And at the same time, “in Moscow are concentrated all Russian problems of inter-ethnic relations” and it is in the Russian capital that “the ability to resolve in an adequate fashion the problem of communications between those coming from the depressed regions of the Russian Caucasus and indigenous Muscovites” is being tested.
As a result, what the new Moscow mayor says and does on all these issues will have foreign policy consequences, Karavayev says. And that will be true even if – and perhaps especially if – the central powers that be deny to themselves that the incoming head of this special federal subject will play that role.
Staunton, October 13 – Even though President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin want a manager rather than a politician as mayor of the Russian capital, the incoming Moscow chief will continue to play a major foreign policy role, albeit one not as “extravagant” as that of former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, according to a Russian analyst.
Luzhkov was by turn famous and infamous, Moscow State University expert Aleksandr Karavayev says, for his foreign policy pronouncements, including his calls for Siberian river diversion to Central Asia and the restoration of Russian control of the Crimea. And the current tandem does not want to see his replacement making such declarations.
But Karavayev, a specialist on the former Soviet space, points out, Moscow’s new mayor by virtue of the importance of the Russian capital not only for the Russian Federation but for all the post-Soviet states as well as for many foreign investors will continue to have a major foreign policy role to play (www.politcom.ru/10870.html).
Given the requirement that the new mayor conform to current political realities and adopt “a Medvedev-style” approach, few have focused on this aspect of the work of the future mayor, Karavayev notes, but Moscow centrality, its role as “not simply the capital” but “the first and main display case” of Russia, means that this aspect of the new incumbent will be important.
Moreover, the Moscow State specialist continues, there is every reason to think that the importance of the capital is only going to increase, something that means the new mayor will need to be able to carry out this foreign policy task efficiently and effectively and in this way be the implementer of the city’s own distinctive foreign policy.
The new mayor will not be able to make the kind of “extravagant” foreign policy statements that characterized the Luzhkov period, although it should be remembered, Karavayev notes, that Luzhkov’s remarks were “not only” a reflection of his views but “an essential addition to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.”
Consequently, the new mayor may very well fulfill a similar niche in Moscow’s approach, but “under the present conditions of the high capitalization of the Moscow economy,” Karavayev argues, “there are other foreign policy tasks [that need to be performed] in any case, stylistically.”
“The exotic views of the charismatic mayor will now recede, but the very theme of the support [“sheftstvo”] of Moscow over a number of regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States apparently will remain.” Moreover, the new mayor will play a major role in attracting and distributing foreign investments by virtue of its relative size and international importance.
Moreover, Karavayev continues, “the CIS capitals will follow carefully how Moscow reso0lves its transportation and social-economic problems and how its organizers its city economy,” and they will especially track how Moscow deals with “legal illegal migration,” given that Moscow is “the capital” of both in the CIS.
And at the same time, “in Moscow are concentrated all Russian problems of inter-ethnic relations” and it is in the Russian capital that “the ability to resolve in an adequate fashion the problem of communications between those coming from the depressed regions of the Russian Caucasus and indigenous Muscovites” is being tested.
As a result, what the new Moscow mayor says and does on all these issues will have foreign policy consequences, Karavayev says. And that will be true even if – and perhaps especially if – the central powers that be deny to themselves that the incoming head of this special federal subject will play that role.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Soviet-Era ‘Underground’ Medrassah Helped Prepare Russia’s Current Muslim Leadership
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 12 – Today marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Gabdulkhak Samatov, a self-educated Muslim who prior to his death in 2009 laid the foundations for Muslim educational institutions in the Russia Federation, first by organizing an underground medrassah in Kazan in the 1960s and 1970s and then by overseeing the growth of that system after 1991.
To mark that event, Muslim leaders from around the Russian Federation have assembled in Kazan to recall the career of that man who many of Russia’s Muslims call “one of the founding fathers of the contemporary system of Muslim religious education in Russia” (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/anons/?ID=2392).
In advance of that session, several websites posted biographies of Samatov, an individual who not only helped keep Islam alive in the late Soviet period but helped bridge the divide between the permitted and often desiccated forms of “official” Islam and the more active and radical “unofficial” one (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/public/?ID=2380).
But what is perhaps most striking is that Samatov, in organizing an “underground” Muslim religious institution in Kazan, succeeded in attracting to that then-illegal institution many of the individuals such as Talgat Tajuddin, Ravil Gainutdin, Gusman Iskhakov, and other leaders of Islam in Russia now.
Born in a village in the Aksubayev district of Tatarstan, Samatov grew up in a deeply religious family where he received his first lessons in Islam. When his father and elder brothers fought in World War II, he served as head of the family but decided at that time that he would continue to study Muslim theology independently.
After service in the Soviet Army, he became a driven but in the 1950s, during his free time, he studied with Gadulkhak Sadyykov and received “a jadidist education in the Muhammadiya mosque.” Later, he worked as a mechanic at the Marjani Mosque, the only Muslim religious center open in Kazan at that time.
He took that job, his biographers say, with “a double purpose.” On the one hand, he needed to have a job to avoid falling afoul of the Soviet authorities. But on the other, he wanted to work with the imams to provide “unofficial lessons on the foundations of Islam” to all who were interested.
“In the 1960s, 1970s and even later, this ‘underground’ medressah was visited by such well-known Russian religious leaders as Talgat Tajuddin [who now heads the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa] and Ravil Gainudtin [the leader of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR)],” not to mention many other current Muslim leaders in the Middle Volga.
In the mid-1960s, the authorities dispatched Samatov and Tajuddin to the Mir Arab medrassah in Bukhara,” but Samatov remained there only two years. On the one hand, he already knew most of what the instructors there had to teach. And on the other, the head of the Central Asian MSD didn’t like having two Middle Volga Muslims there at any one time.
By the 1970s, Samatov had become a member of the Marjani Mosque administration and helped restore the call of the azans and rebuild the infrastructure of the mosque, including recovering its library which the Soviet authorities had confiscated. Then in 1980, when Tajuddin assumed the post he now holds, Samatov began his service as an imam.
From 1981 to 1986, he worked as a mullah in Almetyevsk, then from 1988 to 1991 in Orenburg, and then in Chistopol. And throughout this period, he continued to push for Muslim education thus winning for himself recognition as “one of the founding fathers” of the current extensive system of Islamic training in the Middle Volga.
Among his students in the 1990s – Samatov continued to teach until 2003 – were the future mufti of Chuvashia, the imam-khatyb of the Kul Sharif mosque in Kazan, the rector of the Muhammadiya medrassah, and many others. In 1998, he was elected the chief kazi of Tatarstan, a post he occupied until 2006 when he was replaced by one of his students.
Samatov died on March 9, 2009. Today, he is being recalled as an intellectual and teacher, a continuer of the jadid and Naqshbandia Sufi traditions, and as the founder of a dynasty of imams – both his sons are serving in that capacity. But what may be most important about this anniversary is what it says about the relationship of official and unofficial Islam.
Many commentaries on Islam in Soviet times stress how distant and hostile these two trends were, with the former supported and controlled by the Soviet state and the latter reflecting the popular and far more vibrant tradition of Islam But Samatov in his career demonstrated that the two were closely connected, a reality that lives on in the leadership of Russia’s Muslims.
And that in turn means that the leaders of the officially recognized MSDs, like Tajuddin and Gainutdin, almost certainly have a different attitude toward those parts of Islamic life that are not included within their “official” purview, an attitude that they may use to defend themselves against Moscow’s demands and to push their own Islamic values.
Staunton, October 12 – Today marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Gabdulkhak Samatov, a self-educated Muslim who prior to his death in 2009 laid the foundations for Muslim educational institutions in the Russia Federation, first by organizing an underground medrassah in Kazan in the 1960s and 1970s and then by overseeing the growth of that system after 1991.
To mark that event, Muslim leaders from around the Russian Federation have assembled in Kazan to recall the career of that man who many of Russia’s Muslims call “one of the founding fathers of the contemporary system of Muslim religious education in Russia” (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/anons/?ID=2392).
In advance of that session, several websites posted biographies of Samatov, an individual who not only helped keep Islam alive in the late Soviet period but helped bridge the divide between the permitted and often desiccated forms of “official” Islam and the more active and radical “unofficial” one (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/public/?ID=2380).
But what is perhaps most striking is that Samatov, in organizing an “underground” Muslim religious institution in Kazan, succeeded in attracting to that then-illegal institution many of the individuals such as Talgat Tajuddin, Ravil Gainutdin, Gusman Iskhakov, and other leaders of Islam in Russia now.
Born in a village in the Aksubayev district of Tatarstan, Samatov grew up in a deeply religious family where he received his first lessons in Islam. When his father and elder brothers fought in World War II, he served as head of the family but decided at that time that he would continue to study Muslim theology independently.
After service in the Soviet Army, he became a driven but in the 1950s, during his free time, he studied with Gadulkhak Sadyykov and received “a jadidist education in the Muhammadiya mosque.” Later, he worked as a mechanic at the Marjani Mosque, the only Muslim religious center open in Kazan at that time.
He took that job, his biographers say, with “a double purpose.” On the one hand, he needed to have a job to avoid falling afoul of the Soviet authorities. But on the other, he wanted to work with the imams to provide “unofficial lessons on the foundations of Islam” to all who were interested.
“In the 1960s, 1970s and even later, this ‘underground’ medressah was visited by such well-known Russian religious leaders as Talgat Tajuddin [who now heads the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa] and Ravil Gainudtin [the leader of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR)],” not to mention many other current Muslim leaders in the Middle Volga.
In the mid-1960s, the authorities dispatched Samatov and Tajuddin to the Mir Arab medrassah in Bukhara,” but Samatov remained there only two years. On the one hand, he already knew most of what the instructors there had to teach. And on the other, the head of the Central Asian MSD didn’t like having two Middle Volga Muslims there at any one time.
By the 1970s, Samatov had become a member of the Marjani Mosque administration and helped restore the call of the azans and rebuild the infrastructure of the mosque, including recovering its library which the Soviet authorities had confiscated. Then in 1980, when Tajuddin assumed the post he now holds, Samatov began his service as an imam.
From 1981 to 1986, he worked as a mullah in Almetyevsk, then from 1988 to 1991 in Orenburg, and then in Chistopol. And throughout this period, he continued to push for Muslim education thus winning for himself recognition as “one of the founding fathers” of the current extensive system of Islamic training in the Middle Volga.
Among his students in the 1990s – Samatov continued to teach until 2003 – were the future mufti of Chuvashia, the imam-khatyb of the Kul Sharif mosque in Kazan, the rector of the Muhammadiya medrassah, and many others. In 1998, he was elected the chief kazi of Tatarstan, a post he occupied until 2006 when he was replaced by one of his students.
Samatov died on March 9, 2009. Today, he is being recalled as an intellectual and teacher, a continuer of the jadid and Naqshbandia Sufi traditions, and as the founder of a dynasty of imams – both his sons are serving in that capacity. But what may be most important about this anniversary is what it says about the relationship of official and unofficial Islam.
Many commentaries on Islam in Soviet times stress how distant and hostile these two trends were, with the former supported and controlled by the Soviet state and the latter reflecting the popular and far more vibrant tradition of Islam But Samatov in his career demonstrated that the two were closely connected, a reality that lives on in the leadership of Russia’s Muslims.
And that in turn means that the leaders of the officially recognized MSDs, like Tajuddin and Gainutdin, almost certainly have a different attitude toward those parts of Islamic life that are not included within their “official” purview, an attitude that they may use to defend themselves against Moscow’s demands and to push their own Islamic values.
Window on Eurasia: Two New Moves on the Chechen Chess Board
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 12 – Two moves on the Chechen political scene this week – Akhmed Zakayev’s decision to defer to the Chechen militants at home and Ramzan Kadyrov’s effort to reach out to Chechens living outside the republic – could re-order the political situation not only in Chechnya but elsewhere as well.
On the one hand, the decision of Zakayaev, who has led the Chechen Republic Ichkeria in emigration, to recognize the supremacy of those fighting for Chechen independence inside the republic will help unite the militants around a nationalist agenda and undermine the arguments of those who insist that Islamic radicalism has displaced ethno-nationalism among Chechens.
And on the other, Kadyrov’s convention of a World Congress of Chechens in Grozny reinforces his authority among Chechens at home but also and perhaps more importantly gives him an independent power base and thus reduces Moscow’s ability either to rein him in as many in the Russian capital have urged or to dismiss him as at least some political figures want.
Zakayev announced that he was disbanding the émigré government he has headed and subordinating himself and it to the State Committee of Defense, the Shura Mejlis, “for the period of war, thus effectively making Khuseyn Gakayev, the militant leader who broke with Doku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175413/).
In comments to “Kommersant,” Zakayev said he and his colleagues had taken this step because “we consider that the Chechen militants have distanced themselves from this mythical formation with the name ‘emirate’ and intend to return to the legal field of Ichkeria,” a secular project rather than a religious one (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1520658).
Zakayev’s decision ends the split between the émigré leadership and the Chechen militants, a split that had its origins in the 2007 decision of Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in place of the Chechen republic and to promote Islamic goals rather than strictly national ones.
Gakayev recently explained his break with Umarov, the Moscow paper points out, by saying that “the problems of Chechens don’t interest Umarov” and that “other people direct his actions.” Thus, it turns out, “Kommersant” concludes, that “the conflict of Mssrs. Zakayev and Umarov has ended with the defeat of the latter.”
Zakayev has no plans to leave the political field, however. He said that he or his emissaries would meet with Gakayev’s militants “with the intention of forming new structures of power” and that “until that time, “he and the members of his government will continue to fulfill their responsibilities.”
But at the same time, Zakayev made clear that he expects that new government to consist primarily of those who are in Chechnya, although he said that he did not “exclude” the possibility that someone “from outside the borders of the republic might serve as prime minster,” a position he may hope to fill.
Meanwhile, today, Kadyrov opened a two-day World Congress of the Chechen People that his government said was attended by more than a thousand Chechens from outside the republic, including various parts of the Russian Federation, European countries and North America (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175436/).
While many observers suggested that this was simply Kadyrov’s response to the September 16th meeting Zakayev organized in Poland, others noted that this session was originally discussed as a possible venue for the return of Zakayev to Grozny, something that clearly is not going to happen.
In an opening address to the meeting, Kadyrov set the tone, saying that he wanted those attending to be sincere and open in their remarks and not to distort the meaning of what is said in the hall.” But he made it very clear that he has carefully thought through what he wants this meeting to achieve (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/Chechnya/27020.html).
Specifically, he said he wanted the meeting to adopt a resolution calling on Chechens regardless of where they live to preserve “their language, customs and culture, to always remain real Muslims and not forget that they are Chechens,” thus pointing to a different balance between Islam and nationalism than Akayev offers.
“Today, we are masters in our own republic,” Kadyrov continued. “We have full freedom and all opportunities for observing the canons of Islam. We can freely shout to the entire world that we are Muslims and Chechens. What more do we want? We need first of all that the world understands that the Chechen people are not guilty of the tragedies” it has suffered.
And “we need to become on fraternal family and protect that which we have now.” All Chechens of good will, Kadyrov continued, need to cooperate, except for those which he said he considers “enemies of the people.” And to that end, he called for forming a general council of the Chechens of the world and the launch of a new journal, “Chechens in the 21st Century.”
What is most immediately striking is the difference between Akayev and Kadyrov concerning Chechen national identity and Islam. Akayev, who, Moscow views as an enemy, took the step he did because the militants have broken with the jihadist groups in Islam, while Kadyrov, who enjoys Moscow’s support, celebrated Islam over Chechen identity.
Vienna, October 12 – Two moves on the Chechen political scene this week – Akhmed Zakayev’s decision to defer to the Chechen militants at home and Ramzan Kadyrov’s effort to reach out to Chechens living outside the republic – could re-order the political situation not only in Chechnya but elsewhere as well.
On the one hand, the decision of Zakayaev, who has led the Chechen Republic Ichkeria in emigration, to recognize the supremacy of those fighting for Chechen independence inside the republic will help unite the militants around a nationalist agenda and undermine the arguments of those who insist that Islamic radicalism has displaced ethno-nationalism among Chechens.
And on the other, Kadyrov’s convention of a World Congress of Chechens in Grozny reinforces his authority among Chechens at home but also and perhaps more importantly gives him an independent power base and thus reduces Moscow’s ability either to rein him in as many in the Russian capital have urged or to dismiss him as at least some political figures want.
Zakayev announced that he was disbanding the émigré government he has headed and subordinating himself and it to the State Committee of Defense, the Shura Mejlis, “for the period of war, thus effectively making Khuseyn Gakayev, the militant leader who broke with Doku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175413/).
In comments to “Kommersant,” Zakayev said he and his colleagues had taken this step because “we consider that the Chechen militants have distanced themselves from this mythical formation with the name ‘emirate’ and intend to return to the legal field of Ichkeria,” a secular project rather than a religious one (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1520658).
Zakayev’s decision ends the split between the émigré leadership and the Chechen militants, a split that had its origins in the 2007 decision of Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in place of the Chechen republic and to promote Islamic goals rather than strictly national ones.
Gakayev recently explained his break with Umarov, the Moscow paper points out, by saying that “the problems of Chechens don’t interest Umarov” and that “other people direct his actions.” Thus, it turns out, “Kommersant” concludes, that “the conflict of Mssrs. Zakayev and Umarov has ended with the defeat of the latter.”
Zakayev has no plans to leave the political field, however. He said that he or his emissaries would meet with Gakayev’s militants “with the intention of forming new structures of power” and that “until that time, “he and the members of his government will continue to fulfill their responsibilities.”
But at the same time, Zakayev made clear that he expects that new government to consist primarily of those who are in Chechnya, although he said that he did not “exclude” the possibility that someone “from outside the borders of the republic might serve as prime minster,” a position he may hope to fill.
Meanwhile, today, Kadyrov opened a two-day World Congress of the Chechen People that his government said was attended by more than a thousand Chechens from outside the republic, including various parts of the Russian Federation, European countries and North America (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175436/).
While many observers suggested that this was simply Kadyrov’s response to the September 16th meeting Zakayev organized in Poland, others noted that this session was originally discussed as a possible venue for the return of Zakayev to Grozny, something that clearly is not going to happen.
In an opening address to the meeting, Kadyrov set the tone, saying that he wanted those attending to be sincere and open in their remarks and not to distort the meaning of what is said in the hall.” But he made it very clear that he has carefully thought through what he wants this meeting to achieve (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/Chechnya/27020.html).
Specifically, he said he wanted the meeting to adopt a resolution calling on Chechens regardless of where they live to preserve “their language, customs and culture, to always remain real Muslims and not forget that they are Chechens,” thus pointing to a different balance between Islam and nationalism than Akayev offers.
“Today, we are masters in our own republic,” Kadyrov continued. “We have full freedom and all opportunities for observing the canons of Islam. We can freely shout to the entire world that we are Muslims and Chechens. What more do we want? We need first of all that the world understands that the Chechen people are not guilty of the tragedies” it has suffered.
And “we need to become on fraternal family and protect that which we have now.” All Chechens of good will, Kadyrov continued, need to cooperate, except for those which he said he considers “enemies of the people.” And to that end, he called for forming a general council of the Chechens of the world and the launch of a new journal, “Chechens in the 21st Century.”
What is most immediately striking is the difference between Akayev and Kadyrov concerning Chechen national identity and Islam. Akayev, who, Moscow views as an enemy, took the step he did because the militants have broken with the jihadist groups in Islam, while Kadyrov, who enjoys Moscow’s support, celebrated Islam over Chechen identity.
Window on Eurasia: Siberian Nationalists Issue Appeal to the World
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 12 – Siberian nationalists, encouraged by the response to their call for residents of that enormous region to declare themselves Siberian by nationality in the upcoming Russian Federation census, have now issued an appeal to the broader international community about what they see as the coming of age of the Siberian nation.
The 400-word appeal, which was posted online yesterday in both Siberian/Russian and English, argues that the willingness of people there to declare their nationality as Siberian marks “the end of the ripening and forming of Siberian identity” and thus the coming into existence of a Siberian nation (www.verkhoturov.info/content/view/1010/1/).
“We have been able to overcome the forcible imposition of an alien identity, the destruction of our culture, and the suppression of free speech which had blocked our development and self-determination,” the appeal says And it continues that “while there are difficult problems ahead,” the Siberian nationalists say they see the way clear to do so.
Among the most serious problems the nationalists say they and others in the region face are “the rehabilitation of natural resources that have been harmed by severe industrial pollution,” something that they suggest can be achieved only if Siberians “consolidate our rights to be free on our own land.”
(Indeed, although the appeal does not go into details, it is the coming together of ecological and economic concerns that is driving this movement, in particular, Moscow’s willingness to exploit Siberia even if that involves destroying it and involving Chinese investors. On this, see www.plotina.net/eurosibenergo-china-yangtze/#more-2390.)
The appeal then specifies the attitude of Siberians toward “other nations of the world.” First of all, it says, “Siberians wholly respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the [Helsinki] Final Act, “ideas which changed humanity for the better and have become the foundation of all international relations.”
Siberians, the appeal says, “will follow these principles regardless of the form that our political self-determination takes.”
Second, the appeal asserts, “Siberians do not threaten any nation which lives in peace, have no plans to attack anyone, condemn war and violence and reject double standards.” Third, Siberians support “the development and progress of all nations” and support all efforts to promote scientific and technical development.
“We see ourselves as part of humanity,” the Siberian appeal whose authors include Dmitry Verkhoturov, Yaroslav Zolotarev and Anton Patrushev ends, “and intend to devote all our efforts to promote progressive development” and “offer peace, friendship and equal cooperation” to all others.
This declaration is important even though it is clear that not all residents of Siberia share its implicit interest in the pursuit of independence. On the one hand, it is likely to be used by Moscow and Russian nationalists as evidence that the Siberian movement is “secessionist” as Russian commentators have said.
But on the other hand, the appearance of this declaration is an indication that Siberian regionalism is own rapidly evolving in a more explicitly nationalist direction, the result of policies that in and of themselves are contributing to a growing sense of victimhood among Siberians.
In this sense and more clearly than in any other predominantly ethnic Russian region in the Russian Federation, Siberia provides a clear indication of the direction other “Russian” regions are likely to follow if the powers that be continue to destroy the last remnants of federalism, something that they seem bent on doing.
Vienna, October 12 – Siberian nationalists, encouraged by the response to their call for residents of that enormous region to declare themselves Siberian by nationality in the upcoming Russian Federation census, have now issued an appeal to the broader international community about what they see as the coming of age of the Siberian nation.
The 400-word appeal, which was posted online yesterday in both Siberian/Russian and English, argues that the willingness of people there to declare their nationality as Siberian marks “the end of the ripening and forming of Siberian identity” and thus the coming into existence of a Siberian nation (www.verkhoturov.info/content/view/1010/1/).
“We have been able to overcome the forcible imposition of an alien identity, the destruction of our culture, and the suppression of free speech which had blocked our development and self-determination,” the appeal says And it continues that “while there are difficult problems ahead,” the Siberian nationalists say they see the way clear to do so.
Among the most serious problems the nationalists say they and others in the region face are “the rehabilitation of natural resources that have been harmed by severe industrial pollution,” something that they suggest can be achieved only if Siberians “consolidate our rights to be free on our own land.”
(Indeed, although the appeal does not go into details, it is the coming together of ecological and economic concerns that is driving this movement, in particular, Moscow’s willingness to exploit Siberia even if that involves destroying it and involving Chinese investors. On this, see www.plotina.net/eurosibenergo-china-yangtze/#more-2390.)
The appeal then specifies the attitude of Siberians toward “other nations of the world.” First of all, it says, “Siberians wholly respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the [Helsinki] Final Act, “ideas which changed humanity for the better and have become the foundation of all international relations.”
Siberians, the appeal says, “will follow these principles regardless of the form that our political self-determination takes.”
Second, the appeal asserts, “Siberians do not threaten any nation which lives in peace, have no plans to attack anyone, condemn war and violence and reject double standards.” Third, Siberians support “the development and progress of all nations” and support all efforts to promote scientific and technical development.
“We see ourselves as part of humanity,” the Siberian appeal whose authors include Dmitry Verkhoturov, Yaroslav Zolotarev and Anton Patrushev ends, “and intend to devote all our efforts to promote progressive development” and “offer peace, friendship and equal cooperation” to all others.
This declaration is important even though it is clear that not all residents of Siberia share its implicit interest in the pursuit of independence. On the one hand, it is likely to be used by Moscow and Russian nationalists as evidence that the Siberian movement is “secessionist” as Russian commentators have said.
But on the other hand, the appearance of this declaration is an indication that Siberian regionalism is own rapidly evolving in a more explicitly nationalist direction, the result of policies that in and of themselves are contributing to a growing sense of victimhood among Siberians.
In this sense and more clearly than in any other predominantly ethnic Russian region in the Russian Federation, Siberia provides a clear indication of the direction other “Russian” regions are likely to follow if the powers that be continue to destroy the last remnants of federalism, something that they seem bent on doing.
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