Paul Goble
Staunton, October 13 – Even though President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin want a manager rather than a politician as mayor of the Russian capital, the incoming Moscow chief will continue to play a major foreign policy role, albeit one not as “extravagant” as that of former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, according to a Russian analyst.
Luzhkov was by turn famous and infamous, Moscow State University expert Aleksandr Karavayev says, for his foreign policy pronouncements, including his calls for Siberian river diversion to Central Asia and the restoration of Russian control of the Crimea. And the current tandem does not want to see his replacement making such declarations.
But Karavayev, a specialist on the former Soviet space, points out, Moscow’s new mayor by virtue of the importance of the Russian capital not only for the Russian Federation but for all the post-Soviet states as well as for many foreign investors will continue to have a major foreign policy role to play (www.politcom.ru/10870.html).
Given the requirement that the new mayor conform to current political realities and adopt “a Medvedev-style” approach, few have focused on this aspect of the work of the future mayor, Karavayev notes, but Moscow centrality, its role as “not simply the capital” but “the first and main display case” of Russia, means that this aspect of the new incumbent will be important.
Moreover, the Moscow State specialist continues, there is every reason to think that the importance of the capital is only going to increase, something that means the new mayor will need to be able to carry out this foreign policy task efficiently and effectively and in this way be the implementer of the city’s own distinctive foreign policy.
The new mayor will not be able to make the kind of “extravagant” foreign policy statements that characterized the Luzhkov period, although it should be remembered, Karavayev notes, that Luzhkov’s remarks were “not only” a reflection of his views but “an essential addition to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.”
Consequently, the new mayor may very well fulfill a similar niche in Moscow’s approach, but “under the present conditions of the high capitalization of the Moscow economy,” Karavayev argues, “there are other foreign policy tasks [that need to be performed] in any case, stylistically.”
“The exotic views of the charismatic mayor will now recede, but the very theme of the support [“sheftstvo”] of Moscow over a number of regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States apparently will remain.” Moreover, the new mayor will play a major role in attracting and distributing foreign investments by virtue of its relative size and international importance.
Moreover, Karavayev continues, “the CIS capitals will follow carefully how Moscow reso0lves its transportation and social-economic problems and how its organizers its city economy,” and they will especially track how Moscow deals with “legal illegal migration,” given that Moscow is “the capital” of both in the CIS.
And at the same time, “in Moscow are concentrated all Russian problems of inter-ethnic relations” and it is in the Russian capital that “the ability to resolve in an adequate fashion the problem of communications between those coming from the depressed regions of the Russian Caucasus and indigenous Muscovites” is being tested.
As a result, what the new Moscow mayor says and does on all these issues will have foreign policy consequences, Karavayev says. And that will be true even if – and perhaps especially if – the central powers that be deny to themselves that the incoming head of this special federal subject will play that role.
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Soviet-Era ‘Underground’ Medrassah Helped Prepare Russia’s Current Muslim Leadership
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 12 – Today marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Gabdulkhak Samatov, a self-educated Muslim who prior to his death in 2009 laid the foundations for Muslim educational institutions in the Russia Federation, first by organizing an underground medrassah in Kazan in the 1960s and 1970s and then by overseeing the growth of that system after 1991.
To mark that event, Muslim leaders from around the Russian Federation have assembled in Kazan to recall the career of that man who many of Russia’s Muslims call “one of the founding fathers of the contemporary system of Muslim religious education in Russia” (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/anons/?ID=2392).
In advance of that session, several websites posted biographies of Samatov, an individual who not only helped keep Islam alive in the late Soviet period but helped bridge the divide between the permitted and often desiccated forms of “official” Islam and the more active and radical “unofficial” one (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/public/?ID=2380).
But what is perhaps most striking is that Samatov, in organizing an “underground” Muslim religious institution in Kazan, succeeded in attracting to that then-illegal institution many of the individuals such as Talgat Tajuddin, Ravil Gainutdin, Gusman Iskhakov, and other leaders of Islam in Russia now.
Born in a village in the Aksubayev district of Tatarstan, Samatov grew up in a deeply religious family where he received his first lessons in Islam. When his father and elder brothers fought in World War II, he served as head of the family but decided at that time that he would continue to study Muslim theology independently.
After service in the Soviet Army, he became a driven but in the 1950s, during his free time, he studied with Gadulkhak Sadyykov and received “a jadidist education in the Muhammadiya mosque.” Later, he worked as a mechanic at the Marjani Mosque, the only Muslim religious center open in Kazan at that time.
He took that job, his biographers say, with “a double purpose.” On the one hand, he needed to have a job to avoid falling afoul of the Soviet authorities. But on the other, he wanted to work with the imams to provide “unofficial lessons on the foundations of Islam” to all who were interested.
“In the 1960s, 1970s and even later, this ‘underground’ medressah was visited by such well-known Russian religious leaders as Talgat Tajuddin [who now heads the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa] and Ravil Gainudtin [the leader of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR)],” not to mention many other current Muslim leaders in the Middle Volga.
In the mid-1960s, the authorities dispatched Samatov and Tajuddin to the Mir Arab medrassah in Bukhara,” but Samatov remained there only two years. On the one hand, he already knew most of what the instructors there had to teach. And on the other, the head of the Central Asian MSD didn’t like having two Middle Volga Muslims there at any one time.
By the 1970s, Samatov had become a member of the Marjani Mosque administration and helped restore the call of the azans and rebuild the infrastructure of the mosque, including recovering its library which the Soviet authorities had confiscated. Then in 1980, when Tajuddin assumed the post he now holds, Samatov began his service as an imam.
From 1981 to 1986, he worked as a mullah in Almetyevsk, then from 1988 to 1991 in Orenburg, and then in Chistopol. And throughout this period, he continued to push for Muslim education thus winning for himself recognition as “one of the founding fathers” of the current extensive system of Islamic training in the Middle Volga.
Among his students in the 1990s – Samatov continued to teach until 2003 – were the future mufti of Chuvashia, the imam-khatyb of the Kul Sharif mosque in Kazan, the rector of the Muhammadiya medrassah, and many others. In 1998, he was elected the chief kazi of Tatarstan, a post he occupied until 2006 when he was replaced by one of his students.
Samatov died on March 9, 2009. Today, he is being recalled as an intellectual and teacher, a continuer of the jadid and Naqshbandia Sufi traditions, and as the founder of a dynasty of imams – both his sons are serving in that capacity. But what may be most important about this anniversary is what it says about the relationship of official and unofficial Islam.
Many commentaries on Islam in Soviet times stress how distant and hostile these two trends were, with the former supported and controlled by the Soviet state and the latter reflecting the popular and far more vibrant tradition of Islam But Samatov in his career demonstrated that the two were closely connected, a reality that lives on in the leadership of Russia’s Muslims.
And that in turn means that the leaders of the officially recognized MSDs, like Tajuddin and Gainutdin, almost certainly have a different attitude toward those parts of Islamic life that are not included within their “official” purview, an attitude that they may use to defend themselves against Moscow’s demands and to push their own Islamic values.
Staunton, October 12 – Today marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Gabdulkhak Samatov, a self-educated Muslim who prior to his death in 2009 laid the foundations for Muslim educational institutions in the Russia Federation, first by organizing an underground medrassah in Kazan in the 1960s and 1970s and then by overseeing the growth of that system after 1991.
To mark that event, Muslim leaders from around the Russian Federation have assembled in Kazan to recall the career of that man who many of Russia’s Muslims call “one of the founding fathers of the contemporary system of Muslim religious education in Russia” (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/anons/?ID=2392).
In advance of that session, several websites posted biographies of Samatov, an individual who not only helped keep Islam alive in the late Soviet period but helped bridge the divide between the permitted and often desiccated forms of “official” Islam and the more active and radical “unofficial” one (www.e-islam.ru/newsall/public/?ID=2380).
But what is perhaps most striking is that Samatov, in organizing an “underground” Muslim religious institution in Kazan, succeeded in attracting to that then-illegal institution many of the individuals such as Talgat Tajuddin, Ravil Gainutdin, Gusman Iskhakov, and other leaders of Islam in Russia now.
Born in a village in the Aksubayev district of Tatarstan, Samatov grew up in a deeply religious family where he received his first lessons in Islam. When his father and elder brothers fought in World War II, he served as head of the family but decided at that time that he would continue to study Muslim theology independently.
After service in the Soviet Army, he became a driven but in the 1950s, during his free time, he studied with Gadulkhak Sadyykov and received “a jadidist education in the Muhammadiya mosque.” Later, he worked as a mechanic at the Marjani Mosque, the only Muslim religious center open in Kazan at that time.
He took that job, his biographers say, with “a double purpose.” On the one hand, he needed to have a job to avoid falling afoul of the Soviet authorities. But on the other, he wanted to work with the imams to provide “unofficial lessons on the foundations of Islam” to all who were interested.
“In the 1960s, 1970s and even later, this ‘underground’ medressah was visited by such well-known Russian religious leaders as Talgat Tajuddin [who now heads the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa] and Ravil Gainudtin [the leader of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR)],” not to mention many other current Muslim leaders in the Middle Volga.
In the mid-1960s, the authorities dispatched Samatov and Tajuddin to the Mir Arab medrassah in Bukhara,” but Samatov remained there only two years. On the one hand, he already knew most of what the instructors there had to teach. And on the other, the head of the Central Asian MSD didn’t like having two Middle Volga Muslims there at any one time.
By the 1970s, Samatov had become a member of the Marjani Mosque administration and helped restore the call of the azans and rebuild the infrastructure of the mosque, including recovering its library which the Soviet authorities had confiscated. Then in 1980, when Tajuddin assumed the post he now holds, Samatov began his service as an imam.
From 1981 to 1986, he worked as a mullah in Almetyevsk, then from 1988 to 1991 in Orenburg, and then in Chistopol. And throughout this period, he continued to push for Muslim education thus winning for himself recognition as “one of the founding fathers” of the current extensive system of Islamic training in the Middle Volga.
Among his students in the 1990s – Samatov continued to teach until 2003 – were the future mufti of Chuvashia, the imam-khatyb of the Kul Sharif mosque in Kazan, the rector of the Muhammadiya medrassah, and many others. In 1998, he was elected the chief kazi of Tatarstan, a post he occupied until 2006 when he was replaced by one of his students.
Samatov died on March 9, 2009. Today, he is being recalled as an intellectual and teacher, a continuer of the jadid and Naqshbandia Sufi traditions, and as the founder of a dynasty of imams – both his sons are serving in that capacity. But what may be most important about this anniversary is what it says about the relationship of official and unofficial Islam.
Many commentaries on Islam in Soviet times stress how distant and hostile these two trends were, with the former supported and controlled by the Soviet state and the latter reflecting the popular and far more vibrant tradition of Islam But Samatov in his career demonstrated that the two were closely connected, a reality that lives on in the leadership of Russia’s Muslims.
And that in turn means that the leaders of the officially recognized MSDs, like Tajuddin and Gainutdin, almost certainly have a different attitude toward those parts of Islamic life that are not included within their “official” purview, an attitude that they may use to defend themselves against Moscow’s demands and to push their own Islamic values.
Window on Eurasia: Two New Moves on the Chechen Chess Board
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 12 – Two moves on the Chechen political scene this week – Akhmed Zakayev’s decision to defer to the Chechen militants at home and Ramzan Kadyrov’s effort to reach out to Chechens living outside the republic – could re-order the political situation not only in Chechnya but elsewhere as well.
On the one hand, the decision of Zakayaev, who has led the Chechen Republic Ichkeria in emigration, to recognize the supremacy of those fighting for Chechen independence inside the republic will help unite the militants around a nationalist agenda and undermine the arguments of those who insist that Islamic radicalism has displaced ethno-nationalism among Chechens.
And on the other, Kadyrov’s convention of a World Congress of Chechens in Grozny reinforces his authority among Chechens at home but also and perhaps more importantly gives him an independent power base and thus reduces Moscow’s ability either to rein him in as many in the Russian capital have urged or to dismiss him as at least some political figures want.
Zakayev announced that he was disbanding the émigré government he has headed and subordinating himself and it to the State Committee of Defense, the Shura Mejlis, “for the period of war, thus effectively making Khuseyn Gakayev, the militant leader who broke with Doku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175413/).
In comments to “Kommersant,” Zakayev said he and his colleagues had taken this step because “we consider that the Chechen militants have distanced themselves from this mythical formation with the name ‘emirate’ and intend to return to the legal field of Ichkeria,” a secular project rather than a religious one (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1520658).
Zakayev’s decision ends the split between the émigré leadership and the Chechen militants, a split that had its origins in the 2007 decision of Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in place of the Chechen republic and to promote Islamic goals rather than strictly national ones.
Gakayev recently explained his break with Umarov, the Moscow paper points out, by saying that “the problems of Chechens don’t interest Umarov” and that “other people direct his actions.” Thus, it turns out, “Kommersant” concludes, that “the conflict of Mssrs. Zakayev and Umarov has ended with the defeat of the latter.”
Zakayev has no plans to leave the political field, however. He said that he or his emissaries would meet with Gakayev’s militants “with the intention of forming new structures of power” and that “until that time, “he and the members of his government will continue to fulfill their responsibilities.”
But at the same time, Zakayev made clear that he expects that new government to consist primarily of those who are in Chechnya, although he said that he did not “exclude” the possibility that someone “from outside the borders of the republic might serve as prime minster,” a position he may hope to fill.
Meanwhile, today, Kadyrov opened a two-day World Congress of the Chechen People that his government said was attended by more than a thousand Chechens from outside the republic, including various parts of the Russian Federation, European countries and North America (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175436/).
While many observers suggested that this was simply Kadyrov’s response to the September 16th meeting Zakayev organized in Poland, others noted that this session was originally discussed as a possible venue for the return of Zakayev to Grozny, something that clearly is not going to happen.
In an opening address to the meeting, Kadyrov set the tone, saying that he wanted those attending to be sincere and open in their remarks and not to distort the meaning of what is said in the hall.” But he made it very clear that he has carefully thought through what he wants this meeting to achieve (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/Chechnya/27020.html).
Specifically, he said he wanted the meeting to adopt a resolution calling on Chechens regardless of where they live to preserve “their language, customs and culture, to always remain real Muslims and not forget that they are Chechens,” thus pointing to a different balance between Islam and nationalism than Akayev offers.
“Today, we are masters in our own republic,” Kadyrov continued. “We have full freedom and all opportunities for observing the canons of Islam. We can freely shout to the entire world that we are Muslims and Chechens. What more do we want? We need first of all that the world understands that the Chechen people are not guilty of the tragedies” it has suffered.
And “we need to become on fraternal family and protect that which we have now.” All Chechens of good will, Kadyrov continued, need to cooperate, except for those which he said he considers “enemies of the people.” And to that end, he called for forming a general council of the Chechens of the world and the launch of a new journal, “Chechens in the 21st Century.”
What is most immediately striking is the difference between Akayev and Kadyrov concerning Chechen national identity and Islam. Akayev, who, Moscow views as an enemy, took the step he did because the militants have broken with the jihadist groups in Islam, while Kadyrov, who enjoys Moscow’s support, celebrated Islam over Chechen identity.
Vienna, October 12 – Two moves on the Chechen political scene this week – Akhmed Zakayev’s decision to defer to the Chechen militants at home and Ramzan Kadyrov’s effort to reach out to Chechens living outside the republic – could re-order the political situation not only in Chechnya but elsewhere as well.
On the one hand, the decision of Zakayaev, who has led the Chechen Republic Ichkeria in emigration, to recognize the supremacy of those fighting for Chechen independence inside the republic will help unite the militants around a nationalist agenda and undermine the arguments of those who insist that Islamic radicalism has displaced ethno-nationalism among Chechens.
And on the other, Kadyrov’s convention of a World Congress of Chechens in Grozny reinforces his authority among Chechens at home but also and perhaps more importantly gives him an independent power base and thus reduces Moscow’s ability either to rein him in as many in the Russian capital have urged or to dismiss him as at least some political figures want.
Zakayev announced that he was disbanding the émigré government he has headed and subordinating himself and it to the State Committee of Defense, the Shura Mejlis, “for the period of war, thus effectively making Khuseyn Gakayev, the militant leader who broke with Doku Umarov, the new leader of the Chechen militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175413/).
In comments to “Kommersant,” Zakayev said he and his colleagues had taken this step because “we consider that the Chechen militants have distanced themselves from this mythical formation with the name ‘emirate’ and intend to return to the legal field of Ichkeria,” a secular project rather than a religious one (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1520658).
Zakayev’s decision ends the split between the émigré leadership and the Chechen militants, a split that had its origins in the 2007 decision of Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in place of the Chechen republic and to promote Islamic goals rather than strictly national ones.
Gakayev recently explained his break with Umarov, the Moscow paper points out, by saying that “the problems of Chechens don’t interest Umarov” and that “other people direct his actions.” Thus, it turns out, “Kommersant” concludes, that “the conflict of Mssrs. Zakayev and Umarov has ended with the defeat of the latter.”
Zakayev has no plans to leave the political field, however. He said that he or his emissaries would meet with Gakayev’s militants “with the intention of forming new structures of power” and that “until that time, “he and the members of his government will continue to fulfill their responsibilities.”
But at the same time, Zakayev made clear that he expects that new government to consist primarily of those who are in Chechnya, although he said that he did not “exclude” the possibility that someone “from outside the borders of the republic might serve as prime minster,” a position he may hope to fill.
Meanwhile, today, Kadyrov opened a two-day World Congress of the Chechen People that his government said was attended by more than a thousand Chechens from outside the republic, including various parts of the Russian Federation, European countries and North America (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175436/).
While many observers suggested that this was simply Kadyrov’s response to the September 16th meeting Zakayev organized in Poland, others noted that this session was originally discussed as a possible venue for the return of Zakayev to Grozny, something that clearly is not going to happen.
In an opening address to the meeting, Kadyrov set the tone, saying that he wanted those attending to be sincere and open in their remarks and not to distort the meaning of what is said in the hall.” But he made it very clear that he has carefully thought through what he wants this meeting to achieve (www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/Chechnya/27020.html).
Specifically, he said he wanted the meeting to adopt a resolution calling on Chechens regardless of where they live to preserve “their language, customs and culture, to always remain real Muslims and not forget that they are Chechens,” thus pointing to a different balance between Islam and nationalism than Akayev offers.
“Today, we are masters in our own republic,” Kadyrov continued. “We have full freedom and all opportunities for observing the canons of Islam. We can freely shout to the entire world that we are Muslims and Chechens. What more do we want? We need first of all that the world understands that the Chechen people are not guilty of the tragedies” it has suffered.
And “we need to become on fraternal family and protect that which we have now.” All Chechens of good will, Kadyrov continued, need to cooperate, except for those which he said he considers “enemies of the people.” And to that end, he called for forming a general council of the Chechens of the world and the launch of a new journal, “Chechens in the 21st Century.”
What is most immediately striking is the difference between Akayev and Kadyrov concerning Chechen national identity and Islam. Akayev, who, Moscow views as an enemy, took the step he did because the militants have broken with the jihadist groups in Islam, while Kadyrov, who enjoys Moscow’s support, celebrated Islam over Chechen identity.
Window on Eurasia: Siberian Nationalists Issue Appeal to the World
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 12 – Siberian nationalists, encouraged by the response to their call for residents of that enormous region to declare themselves Siberian by nationality in the upcoming Russian Federation census, have now issued an appeal to the broader international community about what they see as the coming of age of the Siberian nation.
The 400-word appeal, which was posted online yesterday in both Siberian/Russian and English, argues that the willingness of people there to declare their nationality as Siberian marks “the end of the ripening and forming of Siberian identity” and thus the coming into existence of a Siberian nation (www.verkhoturov.info/content/view/1010/1/).
“We have been able to overcome the forcible imposition of an alien identity, the destruction of our culture, and the suppression of free speech which had blocked our development and self-determination,” the appeal says And it continues that “while there are difficult problems ahead,” the Siberian nationalists say they see the way clear to do so.
Among the most serious problems the nationalists say they and others in the region face are “the rehabilitation of natural resources that have been harmed by severe industrial pollution,” something that they suggest can be achieved only if Siberians “consolidate our rights to be free on our own land.”
(Indeed, although the appeal does not go into details, it is the coming together of ecological and economic concerns that is driving this movement, in particular, Moscow’s willingness to exploit Siberia even if that involves destroying it and involving Chinese investors. On this, see www.plotina.net/eurosibenergo-china-yangtze/#more-2390.)
The appeal then specifies the attitude of Siberians toward “other nations of the world.” First of all, it says, “Siberians wholly respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the [Helsinki] Final Act, “ideas which changed humanity for the better and have become the foundation of all international relations.”
Siberians, the appeal says, “will follow these principles regardless of the form that our political self-determination takes.”
Second, the appeal asserts, “Siberians do not threaten any nation which lives in peace, have no plans to attack anyone, condemn war and violence and reject double standards.” Third, Siberians support “the development and progress of all nations” and support all efforts to promote scientific and technical development.
“We see ourselves as part of humanity,” the Siberian appeal whose authors include Dmitry Verkhoturov, Yaroslav Zolotarev and Anton Patrushev ends, “and intend to devote all our efforts to promote progressive development” and “offer peace, friendship and equal cooperation” to all others.
This declaration is important even though it is clear that not all residents of Siberia share its implicit interest in the pursuit of independence. On the one hand, it is likely to be used by Moscow and Russian nationalists as evidence that the Siberian movement is “secessionist” as Russian commentators have said.
But on the other hand, the appearance of this declaration is an indication that Siberian regionalism is own rapidly evolving in a more explicitly nationalist direction, the result of policies that in and of themselves are contributing to a growing sense of victimhood among Siberians.
In this sense and more clearly than in any other predominantly ethnic Russian region in the Russian Federation, Siberia provides a clear indication of the direction other “Russian” regions are likely to follow if the powers that be continue to destroy the last remnants of federalism, something that they seem bent on doing.
Vienna, October 12 – Siberian nationalists, encouraged by the response to their call for residents of that enormous region to declare themselves Siberian by nationality in the upcoming Russian Federation census, have now issued an appeal to the broader international community about what they see as the coming of age of the Siberian nation.
The 400-word appeal, which was posted online yesterday in both Siberian/Russian and English, argues that the willingness of people there to declare their nationality as Siberian marks “the end of the ripening and forming of Siberian identity” and thus the coming into existence of a Siberian nation (www.verkhoturov.info/content/view/1010/1/).
“We have been able to overcome the forcible imposition of an alien identity, the destruction of our culture, and the suppression of free speech which had blocked our development and self-determination,” the appeal says And it continues that “while there are difficult problems ahead,” the Siberian nationalists say they see the way clear to do so.
Among the most serious problems the nationalists say they and others in the region face are “the rehabilitation of natural resources that have been harmed by severe industrial pollution,” something that they suggest can be achieved only if Siberians “consolidate our rights to be free on our own land.”
(Indeed, although the appeal does not go into details, it is the coming together of ecological and economic concerns that is driving this movement, in particular, Moscow’s willingness to exploit Siberia even if that involves destroying it and involving Chinese investors. On this, see www.plotina.net/eurosibenergo-china-yangtze/#more-2390.)
The appeal then specifies the attitude of Siberians toward “other nations of the world.” First of all, it says, “Siberians wholly respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the [Helsinki] Final Act, “ideas which changed humanity for the better and have become the foundation of all international relations.”
Siberians, the appeal says, “will follow these principles regardless of the form that our political self-determination takes.”
Second, the appeal asserts, “Siberians do not threaten any nation which lives in peace, have no plans to attack anyone, condemn war and violence and reject double standards.” Third, Siberians support “the development and progress of all nations” and support all efforts to promote scientific and technical development.
“We see ourselves as part of humanity,” the Siberian appeal whose authors include Dmitry Verkhoturov, Yaroslav Zolotarev and Anton Patrushev ends, “and intend to devote all our efforts to promote progressive development” and “offer peace, friendship and equal cooperation” to all others.
This declaration is important even though it is clear that not all residents of Siberia share its implicit interest in the pursuit of independence. On the one hand, it is likely to be used by Moscow and Russian nationalists as evidence that the Siberian movement is “secessionist” as Russian commentators have said.
But on the other hand, the appearance of this declaration is an indication that Siberian regionalism is own rapidly evolving in a more explicitly nationalist direction, the result of policies that in and of themselves are contributing to a growing sense of victimhood among Siberians.
In this sense and more clearly than in any other predominantly ethnic Russian region in the Russian Federation, Siberia provides a clear indication of the direction other “Russian” regions are likely to follow if the powers that be continue to destroy the last remnants of federalism, something that they seem bent on doing.
Monday, October 11, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russian Officials Preparing for More and Larger Street Clashes Ahead
Paul Goble
Vienna, October 11 – Until recently, Russian officials and most systemic politicians have played down the risk of massive street clashes and the need to prepare for them, but in the course of the last week, a “Novaya Versiya” commentator notes, members of both groups have expressed concern about this possibility and outlined steps to counter it.
In recent months, Mikhail Sukhodolsky, the first deputy minister of internal affairs, said last week, the number of crimes connected with popular clashes and disorders “has markedly increased, and for objective reasons, [such crimes and the milieu from which they spring] are generating a serious social response (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/11/massovie_besporyadki)
In the past, “Novaya Versiya” analyst Ruslan Gorevoy says, officials had been restrained in making any such assessment, but “now they are speaking about [this problem] openly,” apparently because “it is becoming ever more complicated to rein in protest attitudes by bloodless means” and law enforcement bodies want to justify in advance the use of force
The powers that be, Gorevoy says, have been preparing for just such a possibility. On the one hand, both the central and regional offices of the MVD have set up special “rapid reaction” forces to disperse street demonstrations, and perhaps more important, the Duma has passed a law denying those charged in such cases of the right to a jury trial
Moreover, he continues, the belief that “in the near future mass disorders are inevitable” appears to be shared “not only by representatives of ‘the extra systemic opposition [who may have a vested interest in making such predictions] … but also by those whose responsibilities include not allowing such excesses to occur and in the worst case to suppress them.”
“Militia officers, court officials, and legislators as one firmly declare about the inevitability of force actions,” Gorevoy notes, although their explanations for this possibility vary. Militia officers blame the failure of the courts to punish those who have taken part, judges blame shortcomings in legislation and politicians blame “irresponsible opposition figures.”
For example, Sergey Markov, a political scientist and Duma member, says that “disorders like those which we observed not long ago in Riga and Sofia today can occur in all countries of the world except those where there is a socially oriented economy. They can even break out in Russia.”
Indeed, Markov said, “there are already elements of a pre-revolutionary situation in Russia” but “there are only elements” and they are more social-economic than political because of the resources of the existing regime and the absence of credible alternative political leaders who could exploit such “elements.”
One measure of the spread of such concerns is the increasing popularity of insurance policies against the consequences of mass violence, Gorevoy says. When such policies were offered two years ago, only five firms bought them. Now, they are far more popular, with one in every four firms insuring itself against such problems
More significant, however, the “Novaya versiya” analyst continues, is that the formation of the MVD special units was completed in August, a development that prompted the deputy minister of internal affairs to talk about the ability of his institution to cope with anything that might happen.
Sukhodolsky said that “the crime-generating situation can deepen with the growth of protest attitudes called forth by dissatisfaction of the labor capable population of the country as a result of the non-payment of wages, threats of firings, and also unpopular measures taken in the framework of the anti-crisis program.”
Because of that risk, he continued, MVD units must give “heightened attention” to the risks of street violence and be ready to counter it before it spreads.
More junior MVD officials speaking on condition of anonymity told Gorevoy that the organs knew how to disperse street actions even in Soviet times, “and after the Moscow events of 2002 … our people developed detailed instructions literally minute by minute on how to effectively and quickly disperse any group, even one numbering in the thousands.”
Not long ago, these officials said, they had received from MVD officers in Moscow and Moscow oblast a special “circular” in which “were enumerated ‘the structures destabilizing the social structure’ which could be involved in the initiation of massive street clashes” – including nationalists and extreme right groups especially in certain regions.
That document and other officials and analysts stressed that all these clashes are local and have not yet come together in any country-wide fashion. Consequently, they believe, Gorevoy continues, that there is no basis for particular concern. But he asks rhetorically, is that in fact the case?
If it is, then why did Sukhodolsky feel compelled to talk about “the heightened aggression of certain citizens of Russia toward the militia” and take note of “the growing aggression and wildness in behavior of certain groups of citizens”? Perhaps he wants a change in the rules of engagement or to prepare the leadership for harsher actions.
But if that is the case, then the increasing frequency and size of such clashes does represent a real threat, perhaps not of a revolution but certainly of a problem that the powers that be are now far more worried about than they were only a few months ago and are thus getting ready to defend themselves.
Vienna, October 11 – Until recently, Russian officials and most systemic politicians have played down the risk of massive street clashes and the need to prepare for them, but in the course of the last week, a “Novaya Versiya” commentator notes, members of both groups have expressed concern about this possibility and outlined steps to counter it.
In recent months, Mikhail Sukhodolsky, the first deputy minister of internal affairs, said last week, the number of crimes connected with popular clashes and disorders “has markedly increased, and for objective reasons, [such crimes and the milieu from which they spring] are generating a serious social response (versia.ru/articles/2010/oct/11/massovie_besporyadki)
In the past, “Novaya Versiya” analyst Ruslan Gorevoy says, officials had been restrained in making any such assessment, but “now they are speaking about [this problem] openly,” apparently because “it is becoming ever more complicated to rein in protest attitudes by bloodless means” and law enforcement bodies want to justify in advance the use of force
The powers that be, Gorevoy says, have been preparing for just such a possibility. On the one hand, both the central and regional offices of the MVD have set up special “rapid reaction” forces to disperse street demonstrations, and perhaps more important, the Duma has passed a law denying those charged in such cases of the right to a jury trial
Moreover, he continues, the belief that “in the near future mass disorders are inevitable” appears to be shared “not only by representatives of ‘the extra systemic opposition [who may have a vested interest in making such predictions] … but also by those whose responsibilities include not allowing such excesses to occur and in the worst case to suppress them.”
“Militia officers, court officials, and legislators as one firmly declare about the inevitability of force actions,” Gorevoy notes, although their explanations for this possibility vary. Militia officers blame the failure of the courts to punish those who have taken part, judges blame shortcomings in legislation and politicians blame “irresponsible opposition figures.”
For example, Sergey Markov, a political scientist and Duma member, says that “disorders like those which we observed not long ago in Riga and Sofia today can occur in all countries of the world except those where there is a socially oriented economy. They can even break out in Russia.”
Indeed, Markov said, “there are already elements of a pre-revolutionary situation in Russia” but “there are only elements” and they are more social-economic than political because of the resources of the existing regime and the absence of credible alternative political leaders who could exploit such “elements.”
One measure of the spread of such concerns is the increasing popularity of insurance policies against the consequences of mass violence, Gorevoy says. When such policies were offered two years ago, only five firms bought them. Now, they are far more popular, with one in every four firms insuring itself against such problems
More significant, however, the “Novaya versiya” analyst continues, is that the formation of the MVD special units was completed in August, a development that prompted the deputy minister of internal affairs to talk about the ability of his institution to cope with anything that might happen.
Sukhodolsky said that “the crime-generating situation can deepen with the growth of protest attitudes called forth by dissatisfaction of the labor capable population of the country as a result of the non-payment of wages, threats of firings, and also unpopular measures taken in the framework of the anti-crisis program.”
Because of that risk, he continued, MVD units must give “heightened attention” to the risks of street violence and be ready to counter it before it spreads.
More junior MVD officials speaking on condition of anonymity told Gorevoy that the organs knew how to disperse street actions even in Soviet times, “and after the Moscow events of 2002 … our people developed detailed instructions literally minute by minute on how to effectively and quickly disperse any group, even one numbering in the thousands.”
Not long ago, these officials said, they had received from MVD officers in Moscow and Moscow oblast a special “circular” in which “were enumerated ‘the structures destabilizing the social structure’ which could be involved in the initiation of massive street clashes” – including nationalists and extreme right groups especially in certain regions.
That document and other officials and analysts stressed that all these clashes are local and have not yet come together in any country-wide fashion. Consequently, they believe, Gorevoy continues, that there is no basis for particular concern. But he asks rhetorically, is that in fact the case?
If it is, then why did Sukhodolsky feel compelled to talk about “the heightened aggression of certain citizens of Russia toward the militia” and take note of “the growing aggression and wildness in behavior of certain groups of citizens”? Perhaps he wants a change in the rules of engagement or to prepare the leadership for harsher actions.
But if that is the case, then the increasing frequency and size of such clashes does represent a real threat, perhaps not of a revolution but certainly of a problem that the powers that be are now far more worried about than they were only a few months ago and are thus getting ready to defend themselves.
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Window on Eurasia: North Caucasus Militants Every Day Inflict ‘Five to Six’ Casualties among MVD Troops, Bastrykin Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 10 – Aleksandr Bastrykin, the acting head of the newly-independent Russian investigative service, says that militants in the North Caucasus at the present time are inflicting up to “five to six” losses among MVD troops every day, a situation that is “almost a war” and that requires military and ideological responses more than economic ones.
On Ekho Moskvy’s “Dura Lex” program Friday night, Bastrykin said that “the organs of internal affairs in the North Caucasus republics … are daily bearing losses of up to five to six people,” “big losses” which alongside the special operations of other Russian forces merit calling the conflict there “almost a war” (echo.msk.ru/programs/lex/716493-echo/).
He added that in his view, the causes of the conflict remain “the same” as they were; and while he said that Moscow’s new “strategy of social-economic development” is “correct,” Bastrykin said his own experience in the Caucasus and that of his agency “demonstrates” that economic measures are insufficient.
What is critical, he suggested, is that Moscow must “think up a system of ideological (and I am expressing this in a soft way [he added]) influence on this problem,” given that Russian forces are now dealing with people who on the basis of their own beliefs are prepared to sacrifice their lives to kill ordinary people and the forces sent against them.
Some of these young militants, he pointed out, make videos for their relatives and friends and tell them that “’I am going to commit a heroic act in the name of Allah, and I will end in paradise, but my sacrifice is not meaningless, and I will carry off with me dozens of the bodies and souls of my enemies in the name of Allah’ and so on.”
Unfortunately, at the present time, Bastrykin continued, “no one is working on this theme” in order to come up with ways to counter it.
His Ekho Moskvy interviewer recalled that on September 12, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States, he had remarked that “the Third World War had begun” and that it was “an ideological war,” views which Bastrykin’s comments this week suggest he shares.
At the present time, Bastrykin said, his agency is working together with the interior ministry and FSB “in the framework of the joint operational group which was created by the decree of the president of the Russian Federation,” even though this group is not involved in the investigation of crimes but in preventing terrorist acts.
Bastrykin’s comments are important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, his view that Moscow should develop an ideological message to counter the militants rather than relying on economic development represents at least in part a dissent from the position now being pushed by President Dmitry Medvedev and his representative Aleksandr Khloponin.
And on the other, his suggestion that Russian forces are currently losing five or six soldiers a day in this campaign underscores that the conflict – in Bastrykin’s words, “the war” – continues at a higher level of violence than Russian officials and the Moscow media currently tend to acknowledge.
Consequently, while colder weather and the loss of vegetation in the mountains that follows will almost certainly reduce the intensity of the conflicts in that region in the coming weeks, the war in the North Caucasus, even if it is more often labeled “the counter-terrorist struggle,” is likely to remain at the center of Russian concerns for a long time to come.
And that in turn means, as the Russian Federation heads into the parliamentary and presidential elections, ever more Russian politicians and commentators are going to be forced to take a position on it and on the ways Moscow has so far unsuccessfully prosecuted its effort in the North Caucasus.
Staunton, October 10 – Aleksandr Bastrykin, the acting head of the newly-independent Russian investigative service, says that militants in the North Caucasus at the present time are inflicting up to “five to six” losses among MVD troops every day, a situation that is “almost a war” and that requires military and ideological responses more than economic ones.
On Ekho Moskvy’s “Dura Lex” program Friday night, Bastrykin said that “the organs of internal affairs in the North Caucasus republics … are daily bearing losses of up to five to six people,” “big losses” which alongside the special operations of other Russian forces merit calling the conflict there “almost a war” (echo.msk.ru/programs/lex/716493-echo/).
He added that in his view, the causes of the conflict remain “the same” as they were; and while he said that Moscow’s new “strategy of social-economic development” is “correct,” Bastrykin said his own experience in the Caucasus and that of his agency “demonstrates” that economic measures are insufficient.
What is critical, he suggested, is that Moscow must “think up a system of ideological (and I am expressing this in a soft way [he added]) influence on this problem,” given that Russian forces are now dealing with people who on the basis of their own beliefs are prepared to sacrifice their lives to kill ordinary people and the forces sent against them.
Some of these young militants, he pointed out, make videos for their relatives and friends and tell them that “’I am going to commit a heroic act in the name of Allah, and I will end in paradise, but my sacrifice is not meaningless, and I will carry off with me dozens of the bodies and souls of my enemies in the name of Allah’ and so on.”
Unfortunately, at the present time, Bastrykin continued, “no one is working on this theme” in order to come up with ways to counter it.
His Ekho Moskvy interviewer recalled that on September 12, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States, he had remarked that “the Third World War had begun” and that it was “an ideological war,” views which Bastrykin’s comments this week suggest he shares.
At the present time, Bastrykin said, his agency is working together with the interior ministry and FSB “in the framework of the joint operational group which was created by the decree of the president of the Russian Federation,” even though this group is not involved in the investigation of crimes but in preventing terrorist acts.
Bastrykin’s comments are important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, his view that Moscow should develop an ideological message to counter the militants rather than relying on economic development represents at least in part a dissent from the position now being pushed by President Dmitry Medvedev and his representative Aleksandr Khloponin.
And on the other, his suggestion that Russian forces are currently losing five or six soldiers a day in this campaign underscores that the conflict – in Bastrykin’s words, “the war” – continues at a higher level of violence than Russian officials and the Moscow media currently tend to acknowledge.
Consequently, while colder weather and the loss of vegetation in the mountains that follows will almost certainly reduce the intensity of the conflicts in that region in the coming weeks, the war in the North Caucasus, even if it is more often labeled “the counter-terrorist struggle,” is likely to remain at the center of Russian concerns for a long time to come.
And that in turn means, as the Russian Federation heads into the parliamentary and presidential elections, ever more Russian politicians and commentators are going to be forced to take a position on it and on the ways Moscow has so far unsuccessfully prosecuted its effort in the North Caucasus.
Window on Eurasia: Pipelines Not Personalities behind Moscow-Minsk Spat, Russian Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 10 – The clash between the Russian Federation and Belarus has its roots less in the personalities of the presidents of those two countries, however much that may account for the atmospherics, than in pipeline routes and other economic considerations, according to a leading Moscow specialist on Belarusian foreign policy.
Kirill Koktysh, who teaches in the political theory department of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that one must look beyond the charges and countercharges of the two leaders and the suggestion by Dmitry Medvedev that relations with Alyaksandr Lukashenka are now irrevocably destroyed.
If one does that, the MGIMO scholar said on a Finam.FM talk show at the end of last week, one can see that what is happening now is the playing out of Moscow’s decision in 2006 to build pipelines bypassing Belarus, pipelines that will come online over the next two years, and thus depriving Minsk of much-needed income (finam.fm/archive-view/3131/).
Up to now, Koktysh pointed out, Belarus had been able to pay for “up to a third” of its state budget from the transit fees it has been receiving for the 80 percent of Russian oil exports that cross its territory on the way to European markets. (The other 20 percent of Russian oil exports in that direction has been passing through Ukraine.)
But in 2011 and especially in 2012, Russia’s planned bypass pipelines should “begin to work,” Koktysh says, thereby “minimizing” Moscow’s dependence on the willingness of Belarus, Ukraine and other East European countries to serve as transit routes. This may be “good or bad,” he says, but that is what is happening.
The impact of this shift on Belarus will be devastating, and Minsk is worried about it. At present, “up to a third” of its state budget comes from oil transit fees, money that some in Moscow see as a form of assistance but that in fact, given the size of Russia’s earnings from the export of oil via this route, is within the normal range of the cost of doing business.
. Not surprisingly, the MGIMO scholar says, Belarus is not happy with this situation and is trying to find alternative sources of financing. That does not mean that Minsk is about to denounce the union state accord. That has always been more a virtual “PR project” than something real.
Those in Moscow who are now angry at Lukashenka need to remember this and recognize that doing something like not recognizing the results of the upcoming presidential election in Belarus would be to play into the incumbent Belarusian president’s hands because it would allow him to gain support from the West by presenting Russia as a threat.
Moreover, Koktysh continues, those Russian officials who think this way are showing that they do not realize that “the union state was denounced by [Moscow’s] construction of the bypass oil and gas pipelines” and that today the Russian and Belarusian economies are competitors rather than complementary players in the international marketplace.
Still worse, the MGIMO scholar says, it reflects the mistaken view that “Belarusians and Russians are a single people.” That is simply not the case. “They are two different peoples. More than that,” he adds, “attempts to make them one people” will have negative consequences for both, leaving Russians and Belarusians less well off than they are now.
Consequently, while “personal relations” between Medvedev and Lukashenka may have been destroyed as the Russian president and his supporters insist, the underlying geopolitical relationship of the two countries is far different than officials and experts in the Russian capital and elsewhere appear to assume.
Belarus is not going to denounce the “virtual” Union state, nor is it likely to leave the Customs Union or the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, however much Minsk may criticize this or that aspect of these bodies and however much it like other members will constantly redefine what membership means.
A major reason for that conclusion, he continues, is that Lukashenka is not a fool but rather “a competent politician who knows very well what he is doing.” The Belarusian president like “all of Eastern Europe and all of Central Asia” is “a limitrophe state, that is a state located between big neighbors which earns its way” as a transit bridge between them.
Like any such state, Belarus “is interested in supporting a sufficient level of distrust between the major and interacting figures and in cultivating the truth in the extreme case with one of these two figures in order to win the chance to serve” as such a bridge.
Such an approach is both “understandable and simple,” and “in this regard, if Lukashenka started when Russia funded his anti-Western confrontation and pro-Russian orientation, now, he must receive the same sum from the West, a sum which Russia in fact refuses to pay because of the construction of its new pipelines.”
The only change is that now this sum will be sought “for the defense of sovereign Belarus from insolent Russian imperialism which is attempting to russify, divide and swallow it up in its imperial embraces.” And everyone must recognize that “in this case, Belarus was not pro-Russian in the early 1990s just as it is not pro-Western today.”
Instead, the MGIMO scholar insists, “Belarus always has been pro-Belarus.”
Staunton, October 10 – The clash between the Russian Federation and Belarus has its roots less in the personalities of the presidents of those two countries, however much that may account for the atmospherics, than in pipeline routes and other economic considerations, according to a leading Moscow specialist on Belarusian foreign policy.
Kirill Koktysh, who teaches in the political theory department of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that one must look beyond the charges and countercharges of the two leaders and the suggestion by Dmitry Medvedev that relations with Alyaksandr Lukashenka are now irrevocably destroyed.
If one does that, the MGIMO scholar said on a Finam.FM talk show at the end of last week, one can see that what is happening now is the playing out of Moscow’s decision in 2006 to build pipelines bypassing Belarus, pipelines that will come online over the next two years, and thus depriving Minsk of much-needed income (finam.fm/archive-view/3131/).
Up to now, Koktysh pointed out, Belarus had been able to pay for “up to a third” of its state budget from the transit fees it has been receiving for the 80 percent of Russian oil exports that cross its territory on the way to European markets. (The other 20 percent of Russian oil exports in that direction has been passing through Ukraine.)
But in 2011 and especially in 2012, Russia’s planned bypass pipelines should “begin to work,” Koktysh says, thereby “minimizing” Moscow’s dependence on the willingness of Belarus, Ukraine and other East European countries to serve as transit routes. This may be “good or bad,” he says, but that is what is happening.
The impact of this shift on Belarus will be devastating, and Minsk is worried about it. At present, “up to a third” of its state budget comes from oil transit fees, money that some in Moscow see as a form of assistance but that in fact, given the size of Russia’s earnings from the export of oil via this route, is within the normal range of the cost of doing business.
. Not surprisingly, the MGIMO scholar says, Belarus is not happy with this situation and is trying to find alternative sources of financing. That does not mean that Minsk is about to denounce the union state accord. That has always been more a virtual “PR project” than something real.
Those in Moscow who are now angry at Lukashenka need to remember this and recognize that doing something like not recognizing the results of the upcoming presidential election in Belarus would be to play into the incumbent Belarusian president’s hands because it would allow him to gain support from the West by presenting Russia as a threat.
Moreover, Koktysh continues, those Russian officials who think this way are showing that they do not realize that “the union state was denounced by [Moscow’s] construction of the bypass oil and gas pipelines” and that today the Russian and Belarusian economies are competitors rather than complementary players in the international marketplace.
Still worse, the MGIMO scholar says, it reflects the mistaken view that “Belarusians and Russians are a single people.” That is simply not the case. “They are two different peoples. More than that,” he adds, “attempts to make them one people” will have negative consequences for both, leaving Russians and Belarusians less well off than they are now.
Consequently, while “personal relations” between Medvedev and Lukashenka may have been destroyed as the Russian president and his supporters insist, the underlying geopolitical relationship of the two countries is far different than officials and experts in the Russian capital and elsewhere appear to assume.
Belarus is not going to denounce the “virtual” Union state, nor is it likely to leave the Customs Union or the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, however much Minsk may criticize this or that aspect of these bodies and however much it like other members will constantly redefine what membership means.
A major reason for that conclusion, he continues, is that Lukashenka is not a fool but rather “a competent politician who knows very well what he is doing.” The Belarusian president like “all of Eastern Europe and all of Central Asia” is “a limitrophe state, that is a state located between big neighbors which earns its way” as a transit bridge between them.
Like any such state, Belarus “is interested in supporting a sufficient level of distrust between the major and interacting figures and in cultivating the truth in the extreme case with one of these two figures in order to win the chance to serve” as such a bridge.
Such an approach is both “understandable and simple,” and “in this regard, if Lukashenka started when Russia funded his anti-Western confrontation and pro-Russian orientation, now, he must receive the same sum from the West, a sum which Russia in fact refuses to pay because of the construction of its new pipelines.”
The only change is that now this sum will be sought “for the defense of sovereign Belarus from insolent Russian imperialism which is attempting to russify, divide and swallow it up in its imperial embraces.” And everyone must recognize that “in this case, Belarus was not pro-Russian in the early 1990s just as it is not pro-Western today.”
Instead, the MGIMO scholar insists, “Belarus always has been pro-Belarus.”
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